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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the present regulations of corporate insider trading in 
the United States and Saudi Arabia and whether the two laws are doctrinally and practically 
similar or different. It also focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the Saudi Arabian 
corporate insider trading regulations by comparing them with the U.S. regulations. This 
dissertation includes both descriptive and comparative analysis of the two countries’ 
regulations. First, it describes and explains the regulations in the United States and Saudi 
Arabia. This dissertation then compares them focusing on the similarities and differences 
arising from the legal outcome of applying each country’s regulations to a hypothetical 
case. The findings show that both countries’ regulations share relatively similar 
regulations. However, there is some divergence between the two countries’ regulations 
regarding the justification of the law and the reach of the regulations. The findings of this 
dissertation imply that the Saudi Arabian regulations are somewhat uncertain and 
ambiguous compared to the U.S. regulations. Therefore, this dissertation proposes 
recommendations to reform Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations that 
benefit from the U.S. regulations, so they are more certain for all parties.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Little academic attention has been given to the subject of corporate insider trading 
in Saudi Arabia. Thus, I chose to study the regulations that govern this subject through a 
comparative analysis study with U.S. corporate insider trading law. This dissertation is an 
attempt to link corporate insider trading regulations in Saudi Arabia to the U.S. counterpart 
by examining the comprehensive federal securities laws, which have regulated corporate 
insiders trading since the 1930s.1   
The main motivation for this dissertation is that corporate insider trading 
regulations have a direct impact on corporate insiders including their securities ownership 
and trading transactions. Since these regulations have not been analyzed in comprehensive 
studies in Saudi Arabia, there is a need to determine when corporate insiders can legally 
trade and when they cannot. Conducting this analysis increases awareness of corporate 
insider trading regulations among corporate insiders and public investors. In addition, 
studying the Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations in a comparative analysis 
with the U.S. regulations enriches academic and legal studies in the area of securities laws. 
It will also raise awareness for the related public authorities of the differences and the 
similarities between the two countries’ regulations. 
This dissertation is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general 
understanding of corporate insider trading and the regulatory framework in the United 
States and Saudi Arabia. Chapter 2 and 3 discuss the regulations of corporate insider 
trading by examining three main questions: (1) What is the legal status of corporate 
                                               
1 See Thomas C. Newkirk & Melissa A. Robertson, Speech by SEC Staff: Insider Trading - A U.S. 
Perspective, (Sep. 19, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm. 
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insiders? (2) What are the regulations that govern their securities ownership and trading 
activities? and (3) What are the regulations that prohibit corporate insiders from trading on 
inside information? Chapter 4 provides a comparative analysis between the two countries’ 
regulations by applying the regulations to a hypothetical case and assessing the differences 
and similarities between the regulations and a discussion of the resulting comparison. 
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation including a summary of the findings and 
recommendations for reform for the Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations. 
What is Corporate Insider Trading?  
 
This dissertation uses the term “corporate insiders” to refer to corporate directors, 
senior officers, and large shareholders. For the purpose of this dissertation, the term 
“corporate insider trading” means the purchase or sale of a stock of a listed corporation in 
a national exchange by one who has actual or constructive control of the corporation or 
who has legitimate access to inside information. The term “inside information” refers to 
information that is not publicly known and is only available to corporate insiders and others 
who are bound by a confidentiality and where the disclosure of such information would 
materially affect the market price of the traded stock.2 
 Although corporate insider trading is usually associated with the notion that it is 
illegal, it could also be legal. The basic rule is that corporate insiders are legally allowed 
to trade securities of their corporations based on their personal assessment, skill, and 
sophistication.3 In fact, corporate insiders typically own a considerable amount of their 
                                               
2 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATIES ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 3 Law Sec. Reg., 
§12:160, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018); Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential 
Information – A breach in Search of a Duty, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 83, 86 (1998).  
3 See HAZEN, supra note 2.  
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corporation’s stock, and there are thousands of legal corporate insider trading reports every 
day.4 However, although they are allowed to trade, they must comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements and refrain from certain trading activities. Illegal corporate insider 
trading is mostly termed in judicial decisions and legal literature as “insider trading.”5 
Insider trading is defined as: “trading by anyone (inside or outside the issuer) on any type 
of material nonpublic information about the issuer or about the market for the security.”6 
It is also defined as “unlawful trading by persons possessing material nonpublic 
information, whether or not the trader is truly a corporate ‘insider’.”7 The problem with the 
term insider trading is that it is a misnomer that has been more frequently used to cover the 
trading by any person who possesses an informational advantage over public investors 
based on the knowledge of information that has not been disclosed to the public, and its 
disclosure would significantly affect the price of the traded security.8 However, trading 
while in possession of material non-public information can also be legal and lawful in 
several instances.9  This dissertation uses the term “corporate insider trading” to mainly 
examine the rules governing the legal and illegal trading activities of corporate insiders. 
The use of this term is because corporate insiders are subject to additional rules and 
restrictions that go beyond the prohibition of trading on inside information including public 
reporting requirements that corporate outsiders would lack. In addition, corporate insiders 
                                               
4 Richard H. Wagner; Catherine G. Wagner, Recent Developments in Executive, Directors, and Employees 
Stock Compensation Plans: New Concerns for Corporate Directors, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin.5,8 (1997)  
5 See WILLAM K.S. & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING, 1, (3rd ed. 2010). 
6 Id. See also DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 18 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND 
PREVENTION, §1:1, Westlaw (database updated April 2018). 
7 JAMES D. COX ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS, 905 (7th ed. 2013).  
8 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 1, Nt. 5; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6.  
9 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6. (Professor Donald Langevoort states that: “there is a circularity to the 
definition, insofar as the term is generally used to refer only to unlawful trading. There are numerous 
instances where persons who possess material nonpublic information can trade lawfully.”) Id.  
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are the main target of securities regulations regarding trading on material non-public 
information. One of the problems, however, is that the reach of the prohibition of illegal 
corporate insider trading to corporate outsiders can differ between one law and another. 
Thus, the main goal of this dissertation is to examine the U.S. and Saudi Arabian 
regulations to compare when corporate insiders are legally allowed to trade and when their 
trading is illegal. One of the key purposes is to determine how the regulations are similar 
or different.   
What are the Concerns about Corporate Insider Trading? 
 
There are several concerns and reasons for securities regulators to govern and 
regulate corporate insider trading.  
a. Fairness  
The main concern of market securities regulators about corporate insider trading is 
that insiders could have an unerodable informational advantage over public investors 
because of insiders’ privy position inside the listed corporation.10 The concern is that 
corporate insiders are the first ones to know about material non-public information 
regarding the listed corporation or its traded security. The information will subsequently 
be released and disclosed to the public and will significantly affect the current market price 
of the security.11 If corporate insiders are freely allowed to trade before the information is 
publicly disclosed, other investors would find themselves at a disadvantage position against 
corporate insiders that cannot be overcome.12 As a result, public investors would lose 
                                               
10 Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979). 
11 A.C. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, Wis. L. Rev. 720 (1967). 
12 See Kim Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 Law& Contemp. Probs, 
123, 159 (1993).  
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confidence in the integrity of the securities markets and refrain from trading because they 
would believe that “the odds are stacked against them.”13 This notion is based on a concern 
about fairness in that securities markets should be a fair playing field where all investors 
should trade on equal access to information.14 Persons “in the know” or who are well-
connected must be prevented from taking advantage of other people who are outside and 
less-connected.15 Professor Kim Lane Scheppele illustrated this notion of fairness by 
stating that fairness requires that investors should have an approximately calculable chance 
to win and investors should play on a level playing field.16 Professor Scheppele explained 
this notion by finding that each investor typically takes a risk by investing in the market. 
However, when the risk is a deep secret of sort that is unknown or even unsuspected at the 
time of the investment, this type of risk is intolerable. Therefore, investors prefer a full 
disclosure policy to protect themselves from the risk of deep secrets that could not be 
suspected at the time of the trade.17 To sustain a policy of a fair game investment field in 
which investors have a chance to win, they need to have equal access to information.18 This 
means that they should have an equal cost of researching and acquiring information, not 
that they have the same information.19 If corporate insiders can use secret information in 
their trades, the cost to acquire the information will be much lower for insiders than for 
public investors. Therefore, “the disparity in search cost makes the playing field no longer 
level.”20 Professor Sheppele also stated that, “When insiders trade with people who are in 
                                               
13 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 24; Id. at 157; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §1:6.  
14 Hetherington, supra note 11, at 720; COX ET AL, supra note 7.  
15 Id.  
16 Scheppele, supra note 12, at 157.  
17 Id. at 158.  
18 Id. at 160.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 161.  
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no position, or a distinctly disadvantageous position, to acquire the information that the 
insiders now want to use, the insiders should have an obligation to disclose the information 
or refrain from trading with these unequal trading partners.”21 
b. Interruption of the Duty of Issuers’ Public Disclosure  
Securities regulators may be concerned that allowing corporate insider trading 
without restrictions would grant corporate insiders the opportunity to delay public 
disclosure about material information until they trade either to gain profits or avoid loss 
that would have occurred had they disclosed the information before they traded.22 
Therefore, the ban of misusing material non-public information encourages insiders to 
make timely public disclosures.23 Some commentators suggest that there is a connection 
between the duty to make a timely disclosure and illegal corporate insider trading.24 When 
securities regulations do not require timely disclosure of material information at the time 
it occurs, corporate insiders are more likely to use inside information in their trades. 
However, when securities regulations require a duty to make timely disclosure, the 
possibility of illegal corporate insider trading is reduced and decreased.25  
 
 
                                               
21 Id. at 163.  
22 See Barbara J. Watson, Prohibiting Insider Trading: Is it All Worth It, 3 Eur. J. Crime Crim. L. & Crim. 
Just, 122,127 (1995); Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 
38 U. Fla. L. Rev. 35, 54 (1986).  
23 Id; Karmel, supra note 2, at 110-11; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 27; HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL 
& SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW, 3C Sec. & Fed. Corp. Law, §19:1, (2d ed.) 
Westlaw (database updated Dec 2018). James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory 
Disclosure, 2018 Wisconsin Law Review 1133, 104 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3258608.  
24 Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 23, at §19:1. 
25 Id.  
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c.  Harm to Investors  
Securities regulators are concerned about corporate insider trading because of the 
potential harm investors if insiders were allowed to freely trade based on non-public 
information without public disclosure.26 The harm that can occur because of corporate 
insider trading would affect public investors as a group, as well as specific investors.27  If 
corporate insiders are allowed to trade without a prohibition of trading on material non-
public information, it would harm investors’ confidence in the integrity of securities 
transactions.28 As a result of such harm, some investors may decide to leave the market or 
refrain from participation, and other investors may require higher prices for sale 
transactions and lower prices for purchase transactions to offset the risk of being the victim 
of illegal corporate insider trading.29 This result would raise the cost of capital. Professor 
Victor Brudeny stated that:  
If the market is thought to be systematically populated with such transactors some investors 
will refrain from dealing altogether, and others will incur costs to avoid dealing with such 
transactors or corruptly to overcome their unerodable informational advantages. None of 
those responses is socially useful. All raise the cost of capital.30 
 
Professors William Wang and Marc Steinberg claimed that every act of illegal 
corporate insider trading has certain victims.31 These victims are “who would be better off, 
                                               
26 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 24; Id. at 24; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 49; Jie Hu & Thomas 
H. Noe, The Insider Trading Debate, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, 4th Quarter (1997), 
https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/economic-review/1997/vol82no4_hu-
noe.pdf.  
27 Id.  
28 Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 59; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 24.  
29 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 24; George W. Jr. Dent, Why Legalized Insider Trading Would be a 
Disaster, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 247, 260 (2013); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law 
Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 Geo. L. J. 1083, 118 (1986).  
30 Brudney, supra note 10, at 356. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 31.  
31 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 55.  
 
 8 
 
but for the act of insider trading.” However, identifying these victims can be extremely 
difficult or even impossible.32 Professor Wang illustrated that:  
This injury is demonstrated by examining stock holdings at the time of public 
dissemination of the information. With an insider purchase of an existing issue of 
securities, the buyer has more of that issue at dissemination; someone else must have less. 
That ‘trade victim’ is worse off because of the insider trade. With an insider sale of an 
existing issue of securities, the seller has less of that issue at dissemination; someone else 
must have more. That ‘trade victim’ is worse off because of the insider trade.33 
 
d. Market Liquidity 
Securities regulators have an interest in restricting corporate insider trading and 
prohibiting insiders from trading on material non-public information to protect the market 
liquidity.34 Some economic studies have shown that allowing corporate insiders to trade on 
the basis of inside information decreases market liquidity and raises the cost of capital.35 
Professor Franklin Gevurtz notices that: “Governments have come to believe that among 
the regulations necessary…for deep and liquid stock markets is a ban on at least some 
amount of trading on inside information.”36  
When corporate insiders are allowed to trade on inside information before public 
disclosure, market makers, as frequent traders, may increase the bid-ask spreads to avoid 
                                               
32 Id. at 73.  
33 Id. at 55-56.  
34 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 24; Id. at 68. Laura E. Hughes, The Impact of Insider Trading 
Regulations on Stock Market Efficiency: A Critique of the Law and Economics Debate and a Cross-Country 
Comparison, 23 Temp, Int’l & Comp. L.J. 479, 493-94(2009). (The author defines market liquidity as “the 
ratio of the market turnover to market capitalization and is relatively straightforward to measure. Liquidity 
refers to the direct and indirect transaction costs of trading. In a liquid stock market, stocks are bought and 
sold freely and easily, and buyer and seller of a stock are able to immediately find one another.”) Id.  
35 Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical 
Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economic Debate, 32 J. Corp. L. 237, 277 (2007); Dent, supra note 
29, at 259.  
36 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Insider Trading prohibitions, 15 Transnat’I Law. 63, 68 (2002), 
available at: 
https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=facultyarticles.  
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being victims of illegal corporate insider trading.37  The increased of bid-ask spreads may 
harm other frequent traders such as speculators.38 As a result, frequent traders may refrain 
from trading causing the market to be illiquid.39 
Academic Debate on Deregulation of Corporate Insider Trading 
 
Deregulation of corporate insider trading is an unresolved and continuing debate 
among economic and legal scholars of whether corporate insider trading should be 
deregulated.40  The most famous opponent of regulating corporate insider trading was 
Professor Henry Manne, who was the first to raise the argument.41 Commentators 
supporting deregulations assert that the question is whether firms’ owners would allow 
their firms’ agents to trade on inside information. Then, it would be up to the shareholders 
to decide whether such a trade is efficient, and therefore, allow it or not.42 Deregulators 
argued that there is no substantial harm in allowing illegal corporate insider trading. In fact, 
allowing it would benefit the corporation and the market.43 Professor Henry Manne argued 
that public investors are not harmed from illegal corporate insider trading.44 He concluded 
that the only traders who would be harmed from corporate insiders’ trade on inside 
information are speculators who are motivated to trade based on the price movement and 
                                               
37 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 67.  
38 Id. at 68.  
39 Beny, supra note 35, at 250; Hughes, supra note 34, at 495.  
40 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 9; Dent, supra note 29, at 249; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 42; 
Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 375, 382-83 
(1999).  
41 HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). See Richard W. Painter, Insider 
Trading and the Stock Market Thirty Years Later, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 305 (2000). 
42 Bainbridge, supra note 22, 42.  
43 Id; Dent, supra note 29, at 249.  
44 MANNE, supra note 41, at 99,102; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog 
that Did not Bark, Journal of Corporation Law, Vol, 31, N0. 1, 2 (2005), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=679662; Watson, supra note 22, at 124-25.  
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who are looking to gain short-swing profits. However, these speculators are not true 
investors.45 Professor Manne also found that the concern about a substantial effect on 
market makers because of deregulating corporate insider trading “is theoretically feasible,” 
but “it seems to be practically irrelevant in the real world.”46  
Some commentators have also argued that, based on economic efficiency, the 
fairness concern that is based on the need for equal access to information is unrealistic.47 
This is because information is imperfect and informational asymmetry is inevitable in the 
market.48 Professor Donald Langevoort said that: “large numbers of people are actually led 
to trade by the belief (often a false hope, but nonetheless carefully fostered by some 
brokers, investment advisers, and the like) that they themselves have some sort of inside 
advantage.”49 In addition, imposing a rule of equal access to information may discourage 
the research and the production of information that securities professionals provide which 
is an important method to improve the information efficiency of the market.50 Professor 
Frank Easterbrook also argued that corporate insiders’ informational advantage is not 
related to whether outsiders have access to information or not, but rather is about the cost 
of acquiring the information. The disparity of the cost of acquiring information is “simply 
a function of the division of labor…but unless there is something unethical about the 
division of labor, the difference is not unfair.”51  
                                               
45 Manne, supra note 41, at 108; Manne, id. at 3.  
46 Manne, supra note 44, at 1-3.  
47 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW, 631 (2nd ed. 2010).  
48 Strudler & Orts, supra note 40, at 400-01; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 57-58.  
49 Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and practice of insider trading regulation, 
99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319, 1326 (1999). 
50 Strudler & Orts, supra note 40, 400-01.  
51 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of 
Information, The Supreme Court Review, Vol. 1981, 309, 330 (1981) https://www-jstor-
org.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/stable/3109548?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 58-
59. 
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Deregulators have also argued that two main benefits of deregulating corporate 
insider trading. First, allowing insiders to trade on inside information is the best tool for 
compensating them for their entrepreneurship and innovation. Second, it is an efficient 
mechanism to accurately price securities in stock markets.  
a. Efficient Tool to Compensate Corporate Insiders  
Deregulators have argued that allowing corporate insider trading is the best method 
to compensate insiders as entrepreneurs and to encourage innovations.52 Professor Manne 
realized that entrepreneurship is “a functional condition relating to innovational activity.” 
This innovational “activity is not always easy to identify or distinguish in an advance.”53 
Professor Stephen Bainbridge illustrated Manne’s argument by stating that the contribution 
of entrepreneurs to the corporation constitutes the “production of new information that is 
valuable to the firm.” For the purpose of giving entrepreneurs ways to invent new 
information, it is difficult to determine the compensation of such innovation. Therefore, a 
salary is not a suitable means to compensate entrepreneurs.54 Professor Manne concluded 
that corporate insider trading “meets all the conditions for appropriately compensating 
entrepreneurs.”55 Furthermore, Professors Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel have argued 
that corporate managers and shareholders have a divergence of interest.56 They found that 
fixed compensation does not solve the problem of agency-cost and suggested that periodic 
renegotiation of managers’ compensation is an alternative solution to this problem.57 Since 
                                               
52 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 10; Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 46.  
53 Manne, supra note 41, at 116,17.  
54 Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 46.  
55 Manne, supra note 41, at 138. 
56 Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 870 
(1983).  
57 Id; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 46. 
 
 12 
 
contract-based renegotiation is costly because it requires monitoring the performance of 
managers and determining the output of each manager, they suggested that allowing 
corporate managers to trade on inside information could solve the problem of the cost of 
renegotiation.58 
Some deregulators have also argued that allowing corporate insiders to trade on 
inside information has drawbacks but can bring some benefits.59 They have reasoned that 
inside information belongs to the corporation as a property right so it is up to the 
corporation to decide whether to allow corporate insiders to use this information in their 
trades or not.60 Professor Richard Painter stated that the cost and benefit of allowing 
corporate insiders to trade on inside information “are likely to be reflected in an issuer’s 
cost of capital. If so, it is arguably appropriate for the issuer to decide whether restrictions 
on insider trading should apply, and if so, how broad those restrictions should be.”61 
Commentators advocating for regulating corporate insider trading, however, have 
rebutted these arguments by highlighting several flaws with this logic.62 They have 
contended that it is uncertain whether allowing corporate insider trading is a useful 
mechanism to compensate insiders because it is difficult to ascertain who produces the 
information.63 Therefore, lazy managers, who had no part in the production of the 
information, would share the profits from the information.64 In addition, this claim ignores 
that the profit made from trading on inside information is not based on the value of an 
                                               
58 Id. 
59 See Beny, supra note 35, at 246; Painter, supra note 41, at 306.   
60 Id; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 33.  
61 Painter, supra note 41, at 306.   
62 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 10.  
63 Id; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 46; Dent, supra note 29, at 267.  
64 Id.  
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insider’s contribution in the production of the information, but rather is based on the wealth 
of the insider.65 Another rebuttal is that allowing insiders to freely trade on inside 
information is detrimental to the issuer because insiders would be incentivized to enter into 
high-risk projects and make more profits by benefiting from the volatility of the securities 
price.66 
b. Efficient Mechanism to Accurately Price Securities  
Another argument of deregulators is that allowing corporate insiders to freely trade 
on a corporation’s stock would improve the efficiency of the stock market by accurately 
pricing securities, which would, in turn, improve capital allocation and reduce volatility 
and uncertainty.67 “Share price is relatively ‘accurate’ if it is likely to be relatively close, 
whether above or below, to the share's actual value. When a price has a high expected 
accuracy, the deviation of the price from actual value is, on average, relatively small.”68 In 
a securities market where issuers are not required to make full disclosure of new material 
developments or even in securities markets that require a continuous disclosure paradigm, 
in certain circumstances the public disclosure is adverse to the interest of the issuer and its 
shareholders and the issuer may have a legitimate purpose to delay the disclosure.69 
Therefore, allowing corporate insiders to trade on inside information would give the issuer 
another way to communicate with the public to correct the error of the stock price when 
the issuer prefers to delay the disclosure.70 As a result, the issuer would maintain having 
                                               
65 Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 47-84.  
66 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 12.  
67 See Id. at 14; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 42; Beny, supra note 35, at 250 
68 Merritt B. Fox et. al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 331, 345 (2003). See Beny, supra note 35, at 246.  
69 Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 42-43; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 56, at 879; W WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 5, at 20.  
70 Id.  
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the right to delay public disclosure and the mechanism to impute the information into the 
security price through corporate insider trading with the goal of maintaining accurate stock 
prices and enhancing market efficiency.71 These deregulators also rebutted the concern that 
corporate insiders may intentionally delay public disclosure to benefit themselves by 
trading on the subsequently disclosed information.72 Professors Carlton and Fischel have 
found that although this concern is possible, it has little empirical ground.73 In fact, 
allowing corporate insiders to trade on inside information may strongly encourage insiders 
to accelerate public disclosure to gain profits from their trade.74 
However, commentators supporting regulating corporate insider trading rebutted the 
argument of accurately pricing securities by stating that although corporate insider trading 
may improve the accuracy of the price of securities, the effect would be small and 
insignificant.75 Therefore, it is not a useful tool to increase the efficiency of securities 
markets.76 
Conclusion  
 
It can be concluded that both sides have roughly close arguments in the legal and 
economic debate of whether corporate insider trading should be regulated or deregulated.77 
However, as many commentators have criticized both sides, most of the benefits or harms 
that are allegedly associated with the regulation or deregulation of corporate insider trading 
                                               
71 Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 42-43.  
72 See Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 50; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 56, at 879; Watson, supra note 22, at 
127. See also Karmel, supra note 2, at 133.  
73 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 56, at 879. 
74 Id. See Watson, supra note 22, at 127.  
75 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 21; Dent, supra note 29, at 250; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 44-
45.  
76 Id.  
77 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 39; Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 68; LANGEVOORT, supra note 
6, at §1:6; Strudler & Orts, supra note 40, at 382-83. 
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are speculative and theoretical in nature.78 Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the core 
underlying motivation to regulate corporate insider trading is based on the ethical concept 
that it is unfair and immoral to allow corporate insiders to abuse the trust reposed on them 
by the exploitation of inside information for personal gain.79 This suggestion also 
acknowledges that there is an economic basis supporting regulating corporate insider 
trading.80 In particular, for frequent traders, there is potential harm to frequent traders from 
deregulating corporate insider trading, including speculators who may reduce the market 
liquidity.81 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that any economic basis alone without the ethical 
rule would be grounds to regulate or deregulate corporate insider trading.   
Although the prevailing view is that it is necessary to regulate corporate insider 
trading,82 the question is how to translate this ethical notion into legal rules and what is the 
scope of such rules? Should the rules be general or restricted? To answer this question, this 
dissertation examines the U.S. and Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations 
including the similarities and differences between the two countries’ regulations in the 
scope of the regulations and legal justifications.  
 
 
 
                                               
78 Id. See also WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 96.  
79 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §1:6; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 97; Langevoort, supra 
note 49, at 1227-28; Strudler & Orts, supra note 40, at 383.  
80 See Merritt B. Fox et al, Informed Trading and Its Regulation, J. Corp, L. 43, No. 4, 817, 839-40 (2018) 
available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2009/; Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf 
Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of Two Duties, Georgetown University Law Center, 6-7 (2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3091189. 
81 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. See also Beny, supra note 35, at 280-83.  
82 Donald C. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, 19 Dick. J. Int’l L. 161, 166 (2000) available at: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/140/.  
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Background 
 
I. U.S. Regulatory Framework  
 
Corporate insider trading in the United States is regulated by federal securities laws 
and administrative rules issued by the SEC. However, the issue is largely governed by 
federal case-law as discussed later in this dissertation. Before examining the U.S. 
regulation of corporate insider trading, it is helpful to briefly describe the federal regulatory 
framework in relation to corporate insider trading. Below is a description of the federal 
securities laws by which corporate insider trading is regulated, and the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as the regulatory agency that is authorized to issue administrative rules 
governing corporate insider trading.  
a. Federal Securities Laws  
 
Two statutes constitute the fundamental laws that govern federal securities: the 
Securities Act of 193383 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA).84 The Securities 
Act mainly governs the initial public offering of securities in the primary market (IPO) and 
the distribution of securities.85 The SEA governs a broader range than the Securities Act,86 
governing and regulating all aspects of the secondary securities trading markets,87 
including the issuers and their insiders, the exchange, the over-the-counter markets, 
broker/dealers, and purchasers and sellers.88 It is noteworthy that there is no federal 
                                               
83 The Securities Act of 1933, Act of May 27, 1933, c. 38, Title I, §1, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.A. §§77a (2012). 
See HAZEN, supra note 2, at §1:3. 
84 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Act of June 6, 1934, C. 404, Title, I, §1, 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§78a (2012). DONNA M. NAGY ET AL, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT CASES AND MATERIALS, 2 
(3rd ed. 2012). 
85 Id; COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 5; HAZEN, supra note 2, at §1:17.  
86 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §1:18. 
87 Id; COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 8-9.  
88 Id.  
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common law of securities.89 The source of securities laws are the statutes.90 In addition 
federal securities laws can be found under administrative law in the form of administrative 
rules and cases issued or ruled by the SEC.91 However, when a statutory provision is 
ambiguous or highly general, federal courts turn to common law as a “supplemental source 
of law.”92 This supplemental use of common law is clear in the area of corporate insider 
trading under the interpretation of Section 10(b) of the SEA.93  
One of the principal goals that the SEA was enacted to accomplish was “to 
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to 
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”94 The SEA is a 
disclosure-oriented regulation containing several mandatory continuous disclosure 
provisions.95 The philosophy was that securities prices shall not be a reflection of abusive 
conduct including manipulation, but prices should mirror sophistication.96 The SEA 
requires issuers to make mandatory periodic disclosure reports filed with the SEC.97 Issuers 
are required to file annual reports that include financial statements, a description of the 
                                               
89 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §1:3. Common law means: “the body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather 
than from statutes or constitutions.” “where the common law governs, the judges…decided the case in 
accordance with morality and custom and later judges followed his decision. They did not do so by construing 
the words of his judgment. They looked for the reason which had made him decide the case they way he 
did…Tus it was the principle of the case not the words, which went into the common law.” American 
common law is “[t]he body of judge-made law that developed during and after the United States’ colonial 
period, esp. since independence.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
90 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §1:3. 
91 Id. at §1:4.  
92 Id. at §1:3. 
93 15 U.S.C.A. §78j. Id. See also ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5B DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES 
LAWS, § 1:1, Westlaw. (database updated Dec. 2018).  
94 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) Citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). See Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National 
Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1473, 74 (1986). Caveat emptor 
is a “doctrine holding that a purchaser buys at his or her own risk.” Blacks’ Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
95 See COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 9.  
96 Id. at 8.  
97 See Id. at 9; MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW, §5 (7th ed. 2018) (ebook).   
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issuer’s business and performance, and management discussion.98 They are also required 
to provide quarterly reports in the issuer’s fiscal year.99 In addition, issuers are required to 
promptly disclose specific material events and changes when they occur.100   
The SEA also contains a different scheme to ensure protection for investors and 
honesty in securities markets.101 This scheme is reflected by enacting general anti-fraud 
and manipulation provisions.102 Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-5 thereunder are 
the most important antifraud provisions.103 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5- are “catch-all” 
provisions making it unlawful to use any deceptive or manipulative device in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security.104 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are used to prohibit 
misrepresentations, omissions of material facts as well as the prohibition of illegal 
corporate insider trading.105       
b. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
Section 4 of the SEA enacted the SEC as an independent “super agency.”106 The 
SEC has four main powers: rulemaking, adjudication, investigation, and enforcement 
powers.107 Under the rulemaking power, the SEC has issued three types of rules: procedural 
rules, rules issued under statutory provisions that delegated the SEC as the authority to 
regulate, and rules that define statutory terms.108 The SEC is considered as one of the most 
                                               
98 Id.   
99 See COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 10.  
100 Id; STEINBERG, supra note 97, at §11:07.  
101 See HAZEN, supra note 2, at §1:18; STEINBERG, supra note 97, at §8.01; NAGY ET AL, supra note 84, at 6.  
102 Id.  
103 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.  STEINBERG, supra note 97, at §8.01; NAGY ET AL, supra note 81, at 6. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d. (2012). THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION, REVISED, 22 
(4th ed. 2017).  
107 Id.  
108 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §1:4.  
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professional and active federal agencies in the United States.109 Considering their broad 
rulemaking power, the SEC must determine before issuing such rules, “whether an action 
is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, [] [the SEC] shall consider, in addition to 
the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”110 
c. Corporate Law  
 
State law governs the internal affairs of corporations, including the relationship 
between corporate insiders and the corporation or its shareholders.111 Although some 
aspects of corporate legal matters are governed by federal securities laws, such as tender 
offers, proxy solicitations, and corporate insider trading, each U.S. state has its own 
corporate law, and every corporation is generally governed by the state where the 
corporation has been incorporated.112 The United States Supreme Court clearly states that, 
“Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate 
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain 
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal 
affairs of the corporation.”113 Delaware’s corporate law is the most influential corporate 
law in the U.S.114 The superiority of Delaware’s corporate law is demonstrated by the fact 
that more than 60% of the Fortune 500 corporations in the U.S. are incorporated in 
                                               
109 HAZEN, supra note 106, at 22.  
110 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c. (2012). See COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 17.  
111 ROBERT HAMILTON ET AL, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS, 
151 (12th ed.); RONALD J. COLOMBO, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND 
LIABILITIES, §1:4. Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017).   
112 Id.  
113 Santa Fe Industries, Inc. V. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (U.S. 1977) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 
(1975).  
114 HAMILTON ET AL, supra note 111, at 156; COLOMBO, supra note 111, at §1:4. 
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Delaware.115 Commentators suggest that the attractiveness of incorporating in Delaware 
may be due to the judicial expertise in corporate affairs and the widely-recognized 
precedents that have been produced over the years.116 In addition, the Model Business 
Corporate Act (MBCA), which is promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA), 
has considerable influence on other states’ corporate laws.117 As of 2016, 32 states in the 
U.S. in addition to the District of Columbia have adopted the MBCA.118  
d. Regulatory Framework of Corporate Insider Trading Regulations  
 
The sources of U.S. corporate insider trading regulations are statutory provisions, 
case-law, and administrative rules issued by the SEC. Section 16 of the SEA is the 
provision that expressly governs corporate insider trading activities.119 First, Section 16(a) 
obligates corporate directors, officers, and holders of more than 10 percent of a class of an 
equity registered pursuant to Section 12 of the SEA,120 to publicly report their beneficial 
ownership.121 Corporate insiders are required to report once they become insiders and 
disclose a list of all equity securities they own and all transactions in the corporation’s 
security that result in a change in beneficial ownership of the insiders.122  Section 16(b) of 
the SEA prohibits corporate insiders from gaining short-swing profits, in which corporate 
insiders purchase and sell or sell and purchase securities within a period of less than six 
                                               
115 See Delaware Corporate Law Website, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-businesses-choose-delaware/ 
(last visited July. 15, 2018) id.  
116 HAMILTON ET AL, supra note 111, at 156.  
117 RICHARD D. FREER & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 171 (2d ed. 2018).  
118 2016 Revision to Model Business Corporation Act Makes Its Debut, (visted July.18 2018) available at 
American Bar Association.  
119 Section 16 of the SEA, 15 U.S.C.A. §78p. (2012). Michael J. Kaufman, Section 16(b) and its Limitations 
period: The Case for Equitable Tolling, 39 SEC. REG. L. J.I 169 (2011).  
120 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l. (2012).  
121 Section 16(a) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C.A. §78p. (2012).  
122 Id.  
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months and make a profit. If corporate insiders violate this Section, they must disgorge the 
full profit that they have gained from the violated transactions back to the reporting 
company.123 Moreover, Section 16(c) of the SEA prohibits insiders from transacting short 
sales of their corporations’ securities.124 Nevertheless, Section 16(b) of the SEA did not 
prohibit corporate insiders from trading on inside information and insiders were not 
prohibited from trading on inside information.125  
The source of the prohibition against corporate insider trading on inside information 
before public disclosure is a judge-made law that has been developed since 1961, SEC’s 
administrative enforcement action in the Matter of Cady, Roberts,126 based on the 
interpretation of the anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-5 
thereunder, in which such trade was construed to involve fraud and deception prohibited 
under these provisions.127 Section10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange…(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered or 
any securities based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commissions may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.128  
 
Rule 10b-5 states that:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
                                               
123 Section 16(b) of the SEA, id.  
124 Section 16(c) of the SEA. id. 
125 See infra notes 265-82 and accompanying text. 
126 Cady, Roberts & Co., Re, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
127 See infra notes 473-92 and accompanying text. 
128 15 U.S.C.A. §78j. (2012).  
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not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.129 
 
Although the language of Section10(b) and Rule 10b-5 does not precisely state that 
trading without disclosure of material non-public information constitutes a manipulative or 
deceptive device, Section10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provisions were designed to be catch-all 
clauses to deter all fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of 
securities.130 The SEC and federal courts interpreted Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to mean 
that the failure to disclose material non-public information in connection with the purchase 
or sale of securities may operate as a fraud under Section 10(b) disregarding the absence 
of statutory language or legislative history precisely prohibiting the failure to comply with 
the duty to disclose.131  
The scope of persons who are subject to the prohibition of trading on the basis of 
material non-public information goes beyond traditional corporate insiders to include 
certain outsiders. However, the U.S.  Supreme Court narrowed the broad range of persons 
subject to the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading. In three judicial decisions,132 
the Supreme Court restricted the reach of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading 
to persons trading on material non-public information who have a direct or derivative duty 
to disclose such acquired or discovered information that arises from a fiduciary-like 
relationship either to the other party in a security transaction or the source of the 
information.133   
                                               
129 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  
130 See infra notes 423-31 and accompanying text.  
131 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-23 (1980). See id.  
132 Id; Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646 (U.S. 1983); U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (U.S.1997). 
133 For detailed discussion of who is subject to the prohibition, see infra Part 3 of Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
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Congress enacted three laws to amend the SEA regarding corporate insider trading 
mainly to increase the sanctions of violations.134 The first law was the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984.135 The goal of enacting this Act was to assure the public and protect 
the honesty and fairness of the securities markets by increasing the sanctions and providing 
an additional remedy to the SEC to enforce the prohibition.136 This Act allowed the SEC 
to seek a civil penalty up to three times the amount of the profit gained or loses avoided 
from illegal corporate insider trading. This Act also increased criminal financial 
sanctions.137 The second congressional enactment was the Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).138 ITSFEA amended SEA and granted the SEC 
the right to seek civil penalties to be paid by controlling persons, increased criminal 
sanctions, and granted an express private right of action for contemporaneous traders 
against persons violating the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading.139 The last 
statute was the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK).140 This 
Act makes it clear that the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading applies to 
members and employees of Congress, and other federal officials.141 
The SEC has issued four administrative rules and regulations regarding illegal 
corporate insider trading prohibition.  The first rule was Rule 14e-3,142 promulgated under 
                                               
134 See infra notes 1109-32. See also LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:13.  
135 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), Pub. L. No 98–376, 98 Stat. 1264, (1984).  
136 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:13. 
137 See infra notes 1111-13. 
138 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub, L. 100-704, 100 Stat. 4677 
(1988).  
139 See infra notes 1114-20 and accompanying text. 
140 Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK), Pub. L. No 112–105, 126 Stat. 291 
(2012).  
141 Id. §3, 4, and 9. See Michael V. Seitzinger, Federal Securities Law: Insider Trading, Congressional 
Research Services, 7-5700, RS21127, (2016) available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21127.pdf.  
142 Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e–3.  
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Section 14(e) of the SEA,143 which prohibits trading while in possession of material non-
public information related to a tender offer.144 In 2000, the SEA issued three additional 
rules and regulations: Rule 10b5-1 defines when trading on the basis of material non-public 
information occurs and provides an affirmative defenses that insiders can use to shield 
themselves from liability even if the trade was made while in possession of material non-
public information.145 The second rule was Rule 10b5-2 which illustrates when a duty of 
trust or confidence may arise under the misappropriation theory.146 The SEC also issued 
the Regulations of Fair Disclosure (FD) to require prompt or immediate disclosure 
whenever the issuer or someone acting on its behalf selectively discloses material non-
public information to outsiders.147 
The U.S. corporate insider trading regulations lack a statutory definition of what 
constitutes “material non-public information.”148 However, the terminology of materiality 
was defined by the Supreme Court to mean when there is “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”149 The SEC, in the 
matters of Investors Management Co.,150 defined non-public information as “when it has 
not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors generally.”151 
                                               
143 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n.   
144 For more discussion about this rule, see infra notes 646-59, 861-80, and 1092-109 and accompanying text.  
145 Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. §240. 10b5-1. See infra notes 1060-91 and accompanying text. 
146 Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. §240. 10b5-2. See infra notes 629-45 and accompanying text. 
147 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §243. See infra notes 827-60 and accompanying text. 
148 See infra notes 915-17 and accompanying text. 
149 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39 (2011) Citing Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 238 (U.S. 1988).  
150Investors Management Co., Inc. ET.AL, 44 S.E.C., 633 (1971).  
151 Id. at 643. Citing S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d. 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969). For more discussion about the definition of material non-public information, see infra notes 
881-1020 and accompanying text. 
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II. Saudi Arabian Regulatory Framework 
 
In Saudi Arabia, the subject of corporate insider trading is regulated by regulatory 
provisions under the Capital Market Law (CML) of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its 
implementing regulations. Before discussing the regulatory framework of corporate insider 
trading, this section provides an introduction to Saudi Arabian securities regulations and 
sources of corporate insider trading provisions, and the Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
as the regulatory body authorized to administer and enforce the CML.  
a. Saudi Arabian Securities Laws Framework 
 
In 2003, King Fahd Al Saud issued Royal Decree Number M/3, promulgating the 
first unified law of the securities industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Capital 
Market Law (CML).152 It governs the entire securities market in the Kingdom including 
the issuers and their insiders, Stock Exchange Market “TADAWUL,” and authorized 
persons.153 In addition to the CML, the securities market is governed by the implementing 
regulations issued by the CMA in accordance with Article (6)(2) of the CML.154 The CMA 
has issued 26 implementing regulations for a wide range of aspects covered by the CML.155 
The regulations related to corporate insider trading matter are (1) Market Conducts 
Regulations of 2004 (MCR);156 (2) the Rules on the Offer of Securities and Continuing 
                                               
152 The Capital Market Law [CML], Royal Decree No. (M/30) dated 2/6/1424H (corresponding to July 31, 
2003), https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/CMALaw/Pages/default.aspx. 
153 See Joseph W. Beach, The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A practical Study of the Creation of Law 
in Developing Markets, 41 Stan. J. Int’l L. 307, 20 (2005). 
154 CML, id, art. 6(2).  
155 See the website of Capital Market Authority: 
https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Pages/default.aspx.  
156 Market Conduct Regulations [MCR], Board of the Capital Market Authority’s decision No. 1-11-2004, 
dated 20/8/1425H (corresponding to Oct 10, 2004), amended by the Resolution No. 1-7-2018, dated 
1/5/1439H (corresponding to Jan 18, 2018),  
https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/Market_Conduct_Regulations_En.pdf. 
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Obligations of 2017 (ROSCO);157 (3) The Listing Rules of 2017 (LR);158 and (4) Corporate 
Governance regulations of 2017 (CGR).159 Furthermore, Islamic law, as a fundamental 
source of laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia, is the resort for judges when the rules and 
standards of the CML and CMA’s implementing regulations are silent about an issue in 
dispute.160 The CML does not allow bringing lawsuits against investors or related 
regulatory bodies before any courts in Saudi Arabia except the CMA’s judicial body, the 
Committee for Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD), and the Appeal Committee for 
Resolution of Securities Disputes (ACRSD).161 Article (25)(a) of CML states that the 
CMA:  
shall establish a committee known as the ‘Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes’ which shall have jurisdiction over the disputes falling under the provisions of 
                                               
157 The Rules on the Offer of Securities and Continuing Obligations [ROSCO], Board of the Capital Market 
Authority’s Resolution No. 3-123-2017, dated 9/4/1439H (Corresponding to Dec 27, 2017), amended by the 
Resolution No. 3-45-2018, dated 7/8/1439 (corresponding to April 23, 2018),  
https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/OSRCI_en.pdf. 
158 Listing Rules [LR of 2017], Board of the Capital Market Authority’s Resolution No. 3-123-2017, dated 
9/4/1439H (corresponding to Dec 27, 2017), amended by the Resolution No. 1-115-2018, dated 13/2/1440H, 
corresponding to Oct 22, 2018),  https://goo.gl/MhzgzN. 
159 Corporate Governance Regulations [CGR], board of the Capital Market Authority’s resolution No. 8-16-
2017, dated 16/5/1438H (corresponding to Feb 13, 2017), amended by resolution No. 3-45-2018, dated 
7/8/1439H (corresponding to April 23, 2018), available at: 
https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/CGRegulations_en.pdf. 
160 See Basic Law of Governance, Royal Decree No. (A/90) dated 27/8/1412H (corresponding to March 1, 
1992) available at: 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=4&VersionID=240. (Article 7 of the 
Basic Law states that: “Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the book of 
god and the Sunnah of the prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate source of reference for this Law and other 
laws of the state.” Id.  The supremacy of Islamic law status in Saudi Arabia is also emphasized in Article 48 
of the Basic Law where it states that “the courts shall apply rules of Islamic Shari’ah in cases that are brought 
before them, according to the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna, and according to laws which are decreed by the 
ruler in agreement with the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna.” Id. For more discussion about the constitutional 
law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, see Ali M. Al-Mehaimeed, The Constitutional System of Saudi Arabia: 
A Conspectus, Arab L.Q. Vol. 8, No. 1, 30 (1993), available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3381491; Ayoub 
M. Al- Jarbou, Judicial Independence: Case Study of Saudi Arabia, Arab L.Q. Vol. 19, No. 1/4, 12 (2004), 
available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3382105. See also Zaid Mahayni, An Analysis of Capital Market 
Regulation in Saudi Arabia, 29 (2012) available at 
https://lra.le.ac.uk/bitstream/2381/28140/1/2012mahaynizphd.pdf. 
161 See Bushra Gouda & Ali Gouda, The Saudi Securities Law Regulation of the TADAWUL Stock Market, 
Issuers, and Securities Professionals under the Saudi Capital Law of 2003, 18 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L., 
115, 19 (2012); Beach, supra note 153, at 328.  
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this Law, its Implementing Regulations, and the regulations, rules and instructions issued 
by the Authority and the Exchange, with respect to the public and private actions.162  
 
In addition, Article (25)(f) of the CML provides the right to appeal the Committees’ 
decisions before the Appeal Panel, ACRSD, which is formed by a Council of Ministers’ 
decision.163 Paragraphs (g) and (h) of Article (25) state that the decisions of the ACRSD 
shall be final and enforced through the government agency responsible for the enforcement 
of judicial judgments.164 It is noteworthy that judicial precedents in Saudi Arabia does not 
generally have a binding effect. However, the judicial decisions issued by the Saudi 
Arabian Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes typically carry a 
persuasive influence over lower committees.165 
The general objectives of the CML are (1) creating a regulatory body with the 
power to administer, supervise and, enforce the CML; (2) establishing a national stock 
exchange and securities deposit center; (3) regulating the issuance of securities and the 
trading securities transactions; (4) defining the general standards that market participants 
must comply with to achieve “fairness, efficiency and transparency in securities 
transactions;” (4) regulating brokers; and (5) protecting investors from “unfair and unsound 
practices” by enacting anti-fraud, manipulation, and insider trading provisions.166 The 
major characteristic of the CML is the extensive and sophisticated disclosure paradigm that 
has imposed upon issuers to ensure that investors are given enough and timely information 
                                               
162 CML, supra note 152, art. 25(a).  
163 Id. art. 25(f), (g).  
164 Id. art. 25 (g), (h).  
165 The CRSD and ACRSD’s decisions are published in the website of the General Secretariat of Committees 
for Resolution of Securities Disputes,  https://crsd.org.sa/en/Pages/default.aspx.   
166 See CML, supra note 152, at art. 5; Mahayni, supra note 160, at 56.  
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for the purpose of promoting public confidence in the market.167 The CML requires issuers 
to make full disclosure of specified information when securities are issued for the first 
time.168 It also requires listed companies to provide quarterly and annual reports of certain 
information, including their financial condition, and managerial assessments.169 The CML 
also requires issuers to continue to disclose all material developments as soon as such 
developments are discovered or occurred.170  
b. Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
 
The essential plan of enacting the CML was to be an enabling law that creates 
authorities to develop the Saudi stock market over subsequent years based on two main 
notions: administrative independence and professionalism.171 Article (4)(a) of the CML 
created the CMA as an independent agency with legal status and financial and 
administrative autonomy.172 In addition, it was given investigative and judicial powers.173 
The CMA was designated as the authority responsible for regulating and enforcing the 
CML.174 It was granted large and flexible rulemaking powers that include regulating and 
developing the Exchange, to achieve the goals of the CML including (1) the protection of 
investors from unfair practices that involve “fraud, deceit, cheating or manipulation,” and 
(2) achieving “fairness, efficiency and transparency in securities transactions.”175 To fulfill 
these goals, the CML granted the CMA the right to issue implementing regulations and to 
                                               
167 Beach, supra note 153, at 338.  
168 CML, supra note 152, arts. 40-44.  
169 Id. art. 45. 
170 Id. art. 46(a). See Beach, supra note 153, at 341.  
171 Beach, supra note 153, at 320. 
172 CML, supra note 152, art. 4(a). See Beach, supra note 153, at 341; Mahayni, supra note 160, at 66; Gouda, 
supra note 161, at 121.  
173 See id. arts. 5(c), 59(b).  
174 See id. arts. 5-6.  
175 Id. art. 5.  
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amend them to enforce the provisions of the CML.176 Although the CML granted the CMA 
vast rulemaking power to issue implementing regulations and develop its oversight of the 
capital market, the CML did not give the CMA the right to amend the provisions of the 
CML. These provisions describe the fundamental boundaries that the CMA’s 
implementing regulations shall comply with and serve to apply.177 
c. Companies Law 
 
Public listed companies in the national exchange of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul), must have the form of a joint-stock company (JSC).178 A JSC is a 
company in which its capital “shall be divided into negotiable shares of equal value” where 
the shareholders’ liability is limited to the value of their shares, and the company is “liable 
for debts and liabilities arising from its activities.”179 The legal relationship between a 
JSC’s insiders, directors and executives, and the company along with its shareholders is 
governed by the Companies Law of 2015 (CL of 2015). This is the primary law that 
governs the life-cycle of a JSC including the incorporation rules, and the directors and 
managers’ duties and shareholders’ rights.180 Public JSCs that are listed in the Exchange 
are also governed by the CML and its implementing regulations issued by the CMA, in 
particular, CGR.181 This regulation describes the standards and rules that govern the 
management of listed companies in addition to the rules stated in the CL of 2015.182  Judges 
                                               
176 Id. art. 6(2).  
177 Beach, supra note 153, at 326.  
178 ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 24(1).  
179 Companies Law [CL of 2015], Royal Decree No. (M/3) dated 28/1/1437H (corresponding to Nov 11, 
2015), available at https://boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=373&VersionID=352. 
See Mohammed Al-Jaber, Al-Qanun Al-Tijari Al-Saudi [The Saudi Commercial Law], 289 (4th ed. 1996). 
180 See id. arts. 52-150; Abdulhadi Al-Ghamdi, Al-Qanun Al-Tijari Al-Saudi (The Saudi Commercial Law), 
310 (2nd ed. 2017).  
181See ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 24(1); CGR, supra note 159. 
182 Id. arts. 1, 2. 
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are required to fill in the gaps of the written regulations based on Islamic law, as a 
fundamental source of laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia.183 
d. Regulatory Framework of Corporate Insider Trading  
 
The source of corporate insider trading regulations are statutory provisions and 
administrative articles. Article (68) of the ROSCO and Article (33) of the LR of 2017 
require companies’ insiders, directors, senior executives, and substantial shareholders, who 
hold 5 percent or more of any class of voting shares or convertible debt instruments of an 
issuer, to disclose their securities ownership and any change in their percentage of 
ownership that resulted after trading transactions.184 Article (69) of the ROSCO also 
imposes upon companies’ directors and senior executives lock-up periods preceding the 
announcement of quarterly and annual reports.185 
The source of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading is Article (50) of 
the CML.186 Article (50) of the CML prohibits corporate insiders and other statutory 
insiders who obtain inside information through a family, business or contractual 
relationship from trading in the related security or disclosing such information to trade in 
the related security.187 It also prohibits outsiders from trading on inside information 
obtained from insiders.188 It defines the meaning of inside information and the prohibited 
conduct in addition to the requisite state of mind.189 Article (50) reads:  
 (a) Any person who obtains, through family, business or contractual relationship, inside 
information (hereinafter an “insider”) is prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in 
                                               
183 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  
184 ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 68; LR of 2017, supra note 158, art. 33. See infra notes 1332-90 and 
accompanying text.  
185 ROSCO, id. art. 69. See infra notes 1449-63 and accompanying text.  
186 CML, supra note 152, art. (50).  
187 See infra notes 1478-529 and accompanying text. 
188 Se infra notes 1548-93 and accompanying text. 
189 See infra notes 1594-1714 and accompanying text. 
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the Security related to such information, or to disclose such information to another person 
with the expectation that such person will trade in such Security. Insider information means 
information obtained by the insider and which is not available to the general public, has 
not been disclosed, and such information is of the type that a normal person would realize 
that in view of the nature and content of this information, its release and availability would 
have a material effect on the price or value of a Security related to such information, and 
the insider knows that such information is not generally available and that, if it were 
available, it would have a material effect on the price or value of such Security. 
(b) No person may purchase or sell a Security based on information obtained from an 
insider while knowing that such person, by disclosing such insider information related to 
the Security, has violated paragraph (a) of this Article.190 
 
In November 2004, the CMA promulgated the MCR,191 which includes three 
articles defining and specifying the provisions of Article (50)(a) and (b) of the CML, 
pursuant to Article 50(c) which authorized the CMA to “establish the rules for specifying 
and defining the terms provided for under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article…”192  
Article (4) of the MCR defines a security related to inside information as any traded 
security whose price would be materially affected if the inside information were disclosed 
or made available to the public.193 It also defines who is an insider which includes 
companies’ insiders and outsiders who misappropriate confidential information obtained 
through a family, business, or contractual relationship. Inside information is defined as 
information that has not been disclosed to the public, and information that a normal person 
would realize in view of the nature and content of the information that disclosing it or 
making it available to the public would have a material effect on the price or value of the 
security.194 Article (5) of the MCR prohibits disclosure of inside information to outsiders 
where the disclosing person was an insider or an outsider obtained the information from an 
                                               
190 CML, supra note 152, art. 50.  
191 See MCR, supra note 156.  
192 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(c).  
193 See infra notes 1594-682 and accompanying text. 
194 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(a), (b), and (c).  
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insider.195 Article (6) provides a provision for the general prohibition on insiders and 
outsiders engaging in trading on inside information against insiders and outsiders.196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
195 Id. art. 5(a), (b).  
196 Id. art. 6(a), (b). 
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Chapter 2. U.S. Corporate Insider Trading Regulations 
  
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the U.S. corporate insider trading regulations by dividing 
the chapter into five parts. Part 1 describes the legal status of corporate insiders in the 
United States to understand why corporate insiders are a special class of traders. Part 2 
examines the U.S. regulations and restrictions of corporate insider trading under Section 
16 of the SEA. Part 3 focuses on the regulations governing illegal corporate insider trading. 
Part 4 examines the governmental enforcement of the prohibition of illegal corporate 
insider trading. Part 5 is a summary and concluding remarks of this chapter.  
Part 1. Legal Status of Corporate Insiders—Fiduciary Duty 
 
Introduction 
 
The main characteristic of corporate insiders in the United States is that they occupy 
a fiduciary position requiring them to solely act to further the interests of the corporation 
and to refrain from conducts that is in conflicts with this duty, including self-dealing and 
unjust-enrichment that arises from the wrongful use of the property of the corporation or 
its business. The principal ground for restrictions of U.S. corporate insider trading is based 
on the notion that corporate insiders as fiduciaries are entrusted to control and serve the 
corporation and should not breach their fiduciary duty when they trade in the corporation’s 
security.197 In addition, the U.S. prohibition from illegal corporate insider trading has been 
linked to outsiders who are subject to fiduciary or similar relations of trust and confidence. 
This makes the notion of fiduciary duty at the heart of illegal corporate insider trading 
regulations.     
                                               
197 See infra note 265 and accompanying text.  
 34 
 
This part defines the term “fiduciary” and how a fiduciary relationship is 
formulated. It then describes the legal status of corporate insiders and their general duties 
as fiduciaries under state corporate law.   
Definition of Fiduciary 
 
The word “fiduciary” is derived from the Latin word “fiduciarius,” from “fiducia” 
which means confidence and trust.198 The word “trust” in earlier times was not restricted 
to the narrow meaning of trust of property as used today,199 but it included other 
relationships that involve reposing confidence and trust by a person upon another.200 When 
the English Court of Chancery201 recognized the word “trust” as a legal term,202 other 
similar relationships that did not meet the strict definition of “trust” were labeled “fiduciary 
relationships.”203 Professor Deborah A. DeMott describes the origin of the legal definition 
of the word “fiduciary” as follows:  
As a legal principle, the [fiduciary] obligation originated in Equity…As Equity evolved, 
concrete rules in many instances supplanted the chancellors’ exercise of discretion based 
on broad principles; established usages for terms like “trust” and “confidence” replaced an 
earlier and imprecise vocabulary. The term “fiduciary” itself was adopted to apply to 
                                               
198Merriam-Webster’s website, Fiduciary, (last updated Dec 28, 2018), available at: https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/fiduciary.   
199 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts defines trust as “a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising 
from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the 
property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is 
not the sole trustee.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUST, §2 (2003).  
200 L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationship, 1962 Cambridge L.J. 69 (1962); See also AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, 
THE LAW OF TRUST, §2., 2d ed. (1956). 
201 The Court of Chancery is “A court of equity…derived from the court of the Lord Chancellor, the Original 
English Court of equity.” Black’s Law Dictionary, (10th ed. 2014). (“‘Chancery’s jurisdiction was 
complementary to that of the courts of common law—it sought to do justice in cases for which there was no 
adequate remedy at common law.” Id, quoting A.H. Manchester, Modern Legal History of England and 
Wales, 1750-1950, 135-36 (1980).  
202 For more information about the development of Trust, see SCOTT, supra note 200, at §1.1. 
203 Sealy, supra note 200, at 71; SCOTT, supra note 200, at §2. For more discussion about the history of trust 
and fiduciary relationships, see David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 
http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/seipp.pdf.  
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situations falling short of “trusts,” but in which one person was nonetheless obliged to act 
like a trustee.” 204   
 
Fiduciary relationships have gradually been recognized over several centuries and 
are found under several laws, such as the law of trust, agency, and partnerships and 
corporations.205 Therefore, several commentators argue that the justification of imposing 
fiduciary relationships by the courts is inconsistent, since it lacks an inclusive definition 
that could generally differentiate fiduciary from non-fiduciary relationships.206 However, 
courts often refuse to provide an inclusive definition of fiduciary relationships.207 This 
rejection may be based on the notion that the articulation of one inclusive definition for 
fiduciary relationships is unwarranted because of the unique characteristics of each 
fiduciary relationship under its related law. Moreover, formulating one definition would be 
                                               
204 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879, 880 
(1988).  
205 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 795, 797 (1983), available at: 
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol71/iss3/1/.  
206 DOBBS DAN B ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, 1143, (2nd ed. 2016); DeMott, supra note 204; Frankel, supra 
note 205. at 804.  
207 See for e.g., Warsofsky v. Sherman, 326 Mass. N.E.2d 290, 292-93 (1950). (“Similar situations for the 
circumstances which may create a fiduciary relationship are so varied that it would be unwise to attempt the 
formulation of any comprehensive definition that could be uniformly applied in every case.”); M.L. Stewart& 
Co. v. Marcus, 207 N.Y.S. 685, 689 (1924). (“The principles applicable to the more familiar relations of this 
character have been long settled by many well-known decisions, but the courts have always been careful not 
to fetter this useful jurisdiction by defining the exact limits of its exercise.”); Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36, 
41 (1982). (“This court has, however, specifically refused to define ‘a fiduciary relationship in precise detail 
and in such a manner as to exclude new situations,’ choosing instead to leave ‘the bars down for situations 
in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side and a resulting superiority and influence on the 
other.’”); Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 896, 906 (1931). (“The courts generally have declined to define 
the term ‘fiduciary relation” and thereby exclude from this broad term any relation that may exist between 
two or more persons with respect to the rights of persons or property of either.’”) Reebles Inc. v. Bank of 
America, N.A., 29 Kan.App.2d, 205, 209 (2001) (“[The] fiduciary relationship exists depends on the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case. The Kansas Supreme Court has refused for that reason to give an 
exact definition to fiduciary relationships.”) For more discussion, please see Frankel, supra note 205, at 804; 
DeMott, supra note 204, at 879; D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 Vand. 
L. Rev. 1399, 1413 (2002).  
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at the expense of the current flexible judicial approach, and it could hinder the court’s 
recognition of new types of fiduciary relationships.208   
Commentators offer several definitions of fiduciary relationships to rationalize and 
justify the application of fiduciary principles on new relationships.209  One of the recent 
attempts to define fiduciary relationships by Professor D. Gordon Smith focuses on the 
discretional use that the fiduciary has after the formation of a fiduciary relationship. 
Professor Smith concludes that: “Fiduciary relationships form when one party (‘the 
fiduciary') acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising discretion 
with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.”210 Another definition by 
Professor Deborah A. DeMott bases the definition on finding a justifiable expectation of 
loyalty.211 Professor DeMott finds that the “defining or determining criterion should be 
whether the plaintiff (or claimed beneficiary of a fiduciary duty) would be justified in 
expecting loyal conduct on the part of an actor and whether the actor’s conduct contravened 
that expectation.”212 
Courts now divide fiduciary relationships into two categories: (1) well-established 
fiduciary relationships, termed conventional or formal fiduciary relationships, such as the 
relationships between the trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, attorney and client, 
partner and fellow partners in partnerships, guardian-ward, and directors and 
corporation213; and (2) a new type of relationship, termed informal fiduciary relationships 
                                               
208 See Frankel, supra note 205, at 797; See id.  
209 For more discussion about other attempts by commentators to define fiduciary relationships, see, Smith, 
supra note 207, at 1423; DeMott, supra note 204, at 908.  
210 Smith, supra note 207, at 1402.  
211 Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their 
Consequences, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 925, 936 (2006). 
212 Id. 
213 Frankel, supra note 205, at 797.  
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or confidential relationships, in which the courts impose fiduciary principles on them “due 
to the factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the 
parties to each other and to the questioned transactions.”214  The courts treat conventional 
fiduciary relationships as being fiduciary by nature, and determine whether a relationship 
warrants the application of fiduciary principles on a case-by-case basis.215 Courts merely 
analogize the new relationship to one of the “well-established” fiduciary relationships that 
is functionally similar to the new type. Then, they apply the rules of that conventional 
relationship to the new type of relationship.216  
In their analysis, courts consider several factors or characteristics of the relationship 
under review to decide whether this new relationship warrants the imposition of fiduciary 
principles. However, none of these factors is absolute or determinative.  A mutual test that 
                                               
214See Martinez v. Associates Financial Services Co. of Colorado, Inc., 891 P.2d 785, 789(Wyo. 1995) (“Of 
the two essential kinds of fiduciary relationships, the first arises from specific legal relationships. ‘In cases 
of trustee and beneficiary, principal and agent, and the like, the relations are essentially fiduciary, and the 
inference or presumption follows of course.’…The second is less susceptible of exact definition, being 
‘implied in law due to the factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the 
parties to each other and to the questioned transactions.”); Warsofsky v. Sherman, 326 Mass. N.E.2d,  290, 
292-93 (1950) (“There are many familiar and well recognized forms of fiduciary relationships such as 
attorney and client, trustee and beneficiary, physician and patient, business partners, promoters or directors 
and a corporation, and employer and employee.”); Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 138 (Iowa. 1996). 
(“Fiduciary duties arise as a matter of law in certain formal relationships, including attorney-client, 
partnership, and trustee relationships... Outside of the cases in which formal fiduciary duties arise as a matter 
of law, confidential relationships may arise when the parties have dealt with each other in such a manner for 
a long period of time that one party is justified in expecting the other to act in its best interest.”); Reebles, 
Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., 29 Kan. App.2d 205, 209 (2001). (“Generally, there are two types of fiduciary 
relationships: (1) those specifically created by contract or by formal legal proceedings and (2) those implied 
in law due to the factual situation surrounding the involved transactions and the relationship of the parties to 
each other and to the questioned transactions. The determination of the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
in the second category is more difficult to determine.”); Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2009). “Minnesota caselaw recognizes two categories of fiduciary relationship: relationships of a 
fiduciary nature per se, and relationships in which circumstances establish a de facto fiduciary obligation… 
Per se fiduciary relationships include trustee-beneficiary, attorney-client, business partnerships, director-
corporation, officer-corporation, and husband-wife.”). See Smith, supra note 207, at 1412; DeMott, supra 
note 211, at 956; and Frankel, supra note 205, at 804.  
215Jack Peggs & Kevin B. Johnson, Fiduciary Fraud, 121 Am. Jur. Trials 129, §5. (2011) Westlaw (database 
updated May. 2018). 
216 See Frankel, supra note 205, at 804.  
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many courts use in their analysis is “(1) ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ reposed by one person in 
another; and (2) the resulting ‘domination’, ‘superiority’, or ‘undue influence’ of the 
other.”217 Or when “a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience 
is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interest of the one reposing 
confidence.”218  Other factors the court may consider include the past history of the 
relationship between the parties, the inequality between the parties, such as mental, 
knowledge, age, and other conditions that may give one party an advantage over another.219    
                                               
217 Smith, supra note 207, at 1413; See for e.g., Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn., 36, 41 (1982). (“This court has, 
however, specifically refused to define “a fiduciary relationship in precise detail…choosing instead to leave 
‘the bars down for situations in which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side and a resulting 
superiority and influence on the other.’”); Lopacich v. Falk, 5 F.3d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1993). (“In order to 
establish evidence of a fiduciary relationship, the plaintiff must show that she reposed confidence in the 
defendant and that he had influence and superiority over her.”); Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d, 596, 601 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Fiduciary relationships arise when one person trusts and confides in another who 
has superior knowledge and authority.”).  
218 Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N.C. 577, 896, 906 (1930) (“The relation may exist under a variety of 
circumstances; it exists in all cases where there has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity 
and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing 
confidence.”); see also, Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y.1991). (“Broadly stated, a 
fiduciary relationship is one founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and 
fidelity of another. It is said that the relationship exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and 
betrayed.”); Bloomfield v. Nebraska States Bank, 237 Neb. 89, 96 (1991). (“[A confidential] relationship 
exists between two persons if one has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with 
the other’s interest in mind.”); Bolton v. Crowley, Hoge & Fein, P.C., 110 A.3d 575, 584 (D.C. 2015). (“A 
fiduciary relationship is founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity 
of another.”; Peggs & Johnson, supra note 215, at §5.  
219 See Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 749, 755 (1965). “In redressing an abuse of trust and confidence 
equity will review such factors as the relation of the parties prior to the incidents complained of, the plaintiff’s 
business capacity or lack of it contrasted with that of the defendant, and the readiness of the plaintiff to follow 
the defendant’s guidance in complicated transactions wherein the defendant has specialized knowledge. 
Equity will, in sum, weigh whether unjust enrichment results from the relationship.”); Bishop, 779 F. Supp, 
at 325. (“Such a relationship might be found to exist, in appropriate circumstances, between close friends ... 
or even where confidence is based on prior business dealings....”) Id; Insurance Co. of North America v. 
Morries, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998). (“Outside of the cases in which formal fiduciary duties arise as 
a matter of law, confidential relationships may arise when the parties have dealt with each other in such a 
manner for a long period of time that one party is justified in expecting the other to act in its best interest.”) 
Id. For more discussion about the courts’ analysis, see, DeMott, supra note 211, at 936; STUART M. SPEISER 
ET AL, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS, §32:81 Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2018); Peggs & Johnson, supra 
note 215, at §5; Robert A. Kutcher, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, available at American Bar Association, 
https://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/5310344_chap1_abs.pdf.  
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Two caveats must be mentioned here. First, confidential relations are not always 
fiduciary relationships.220 Non-fiduciary confidential relationships can be found in several 
situations such as, when there is a confidential relation between parties arising from a 
contractual relationship,221 or from family222 or friendship relationships.223 Second, if 
federal action, state legislation, or courts recognize a new type of relationship as a fiduciary 
relationship, it does not mean this new relationship would be recognized as fiduciary in 
other U.S. states.224 
                                               
220 SCOTT, supra note 200, at §2.5. It should be notable that courts sometimes use the terms “fiduciary 
relationships” and “confidential relationships” interchangeably without distinguishing between them. See 
Frankel, supra note 205, at 825.  
221 Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A confidential relationship can be expressly established, as by 
the terms of an employment contract. It can also be implied when one person knows or should know that the 
information is confidential, and the other person reasonably believes that the first person has consented to 
keep the information confidential. A confidential relationship might be implied, for instance, between two 
people negotiating the sale of a business.”) Id.  
222 SCOTT, supra note 200, at §2.5. (“A fiduciary relation is to be distinguished from a merely confidential 
relation…it is particularly likely to exist where there is a family relationship…” Id; Frankel, supra note 205, 
at 825. Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 259 Va. 806, 812 (Vir.2000). (“A parent-child relationship, standing 
alone, is insufficient to create a confidential or fiduciary relationship.” Fix v. Fix, 847 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Mo. 
1993). (“A confidential, or fiduciary, relationship is not proven merely by a showing that the persons have 
ties of blood or family.”) Id; Olson v. Harshman, 668 P.2d 147, 151 (Kan. 1983) (“The mere relationship of 
parent and child does not raise a presumption of a confidential and fiduciary relationship....”) Id.  
223 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 2 (2003). (“A confidential relation may exist although there is no fiduciary 
relation and is particularly likely to arise between family members or close friends…”) Id; Smith, supra note 
207, at 1411; Smith v. Walden, 549 S.E.2d 750 (Ga. 2001). (“mere friendship and close fellowship, without 
more, do not create a fiduciary relationship.”) Id.  
224 The best example is the relationship between a husband and wife. In some states their relationship, without 
more, is not a fiduciary relationship, and other states find this martial relationship by itself a fiduciary 
relationship. For example, see Lasater v. Guttmann, 5 A.3d 79, 94 (Md.2010). (“In Maryland, a husband and 
wife are not true fiduciaries, as a matter of law, absent an agreement establishing that relationship… while 
there are some relationships that are presumed confidential, ‘otherwise, and particularly in family 
relationships, such as parent-child and husband-wife, the existence of a confidential relationship is an issue 
of fact and is not presumed as a matter of law.’”) Id; Nessler v. Nessler, 902 N.E.2d 701, 708 (NC. 2008). 
(“While a marital relationship alone may not establish a fiduciary relationship, a fiduciary relationship may 
arise in a marital relationship as the result of special circumstances of the couple's relationship, where one 
spouse places trust in the other so that the latter gains superiority and influence over the former…”) Id; 
Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d, 596, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). (“Per se fiduciary relationships include 
trustee-beneficiary, attorney-client…, and husband-wife.”) Id; Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 26 
(Conn.2011). (“Spouses have ‘confidential relationship’ and ‘stand as fiduciaries to each other’… It includes, 
but is not limited to, a fiduciary duty between the spouses, of the highest degree.”) Id; Charlton v. Charlton, 
413 S.E.2d 911, 911 (W.Va.1991) (“The relationship between husband and wife is one of confidence and 
trust.”) Id. See Francis C. Amendola et al., 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife §3, Westlaw (Database updated June. 
2018).  
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 Fiduciary Principles  
 
In corporate law, courts have used the principles of fiduciary in agency225 and 
trust226 relationships as prototypes or models to form the principles of fiduciary 
relationships.227 They share similar characteristics but have some differences.228 However, 
all fiduciaries, including trustees and agents, are subject to the duty “to act with the highest 
degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of the other 
person.”229 The fiduciary duty can be divided into the duty of care and duty of loyalty.230 
The intensity of the fiduciary duty depends on the type of fiduciary relationship and the 
power that a fiduciary is delegated to exercise.231 In general, the fiduciary duty of loyalty 
is the core principle that differentiates fiduciary relationships from non-fiduciary 
relationships.232 It is the duty that forbids a fiduciary, within the scope of the relationship 
                                               
225The Restatement (Third) of Agency states that “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one 
person (a “principal”) manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consent 
so to act.” Id. at §1.01 (2006). See Frankel, supra note 205, at 805.  
226 See supra note 199.  
227 Frankel, supra note 205, at 805.  
228 See SCOTT, supra note 200, at §8. (The differences between a trustee and an agent include (1) the trustee 
is not appointed by the beneficiary and is not subject to the control of the beneficiary. In contrast, the agent 
is appointed by the principal and subject to his control; (2) The trust cannot be terminated at the will of the 
beneficiary, but the principal has the power to terminate the agency relationships at his will; The trustee has 
title to the trust property; The agent usually does not have title to the property of the principal.) Id.  
229 Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); Swenson v. Bender, 764 N.W.2d, 596, 601 Minn. Ct. App. 2009) 
at supra note 16. (“The duty imposed on fiduciaries is the highest standard of duty implied by law.”).  
230 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts states that: “The trustee has a duty to administer the trust, diligently in 
good faith, in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law…” Id, at §76. The Restatement 
(Third) of Agency states that: “[A]n agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and 
diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances…” Id, at §8.08  The Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts states that: “A trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, or 
solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose.” §78 (2007).  The Restatement (Third) of Agency states that: 
“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the 
agency relationship.” Id. §8.01. (2006).  
231 Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 539, 541 (1949).  
232 The duty of care is not distinctively attached to the fiduciary principles.  Professor Deborah A. DeMott 
finds that fiduciary duty of care “is not distinctively fiduciary; many persons, by virtue of the law or their 
own contractual undertakings, owe duties of care to other persons with whom they have non-fiduciary 
relationships. For example, motorists owe duties of care to pedestrians and to fellow motorists but are not, 
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with the beneficiary, from “self-dealing…and other forms of self-advantaging conduct 
without the beneficiary’s consent.”233 It is an obligation that fiduciaries must act with the 
highest standard of fidelity for the benefit of the person for which these fiduciaries act.234 
All fiduciaries must put their personal interest aside while acting in fiduciary capacity 
within the scope of their relationships.235 When they transact with whom they act, they 
must be “candid” and demonstrate utmost “good faith” by providing full disclosure about 
any material information regarding the transaction, or the transaction may be void.236 
Justice Cardozo illustrates this principle by ruling that: “Many forms of conduct 
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those 
bound by fiduciary ties.”237 Moreover, the duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to not 
misappropriate the property entrusted to them including using confidential information for 
their personal benefit, or to communicate such information to others.238 Whatever the 
                                               
by virtue of these relationships, under any fiduciary constraint in their pursuit of self-interest!” DeMott, supra 
note 204, at 879.  See also, Smith, supra note 207, at 1409.  
233 DeMott, supra note 211, at 926. 
234 Peggs & Johnson, supra note 215, at §6. Professor Victor Brudney explains that: “the notion is that the 
fiduciary's duty of loyalty requires the trustee or agent to act as the beneficiary's (or principal's) alter ego and 
act only as the latter would act for himself. At least as between the fiduciary's interest and the beneficiary's 
interest the fiduciary is to serve only the latter.” Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. 
Rev. 595, 601 (1997).  
235 Robert W. Hallgring comments about the fiduciary duty of loyalty by asserting that: “Given human frailty, 
we cannot expect the fiduciary to put his personal advantage in second place…From this observation it 
follows that undivided and disinterested devotion by one person to the interest of another will be assured 
only where the possibility of conflicting interest is excluded…the exclusion of conflicting interests will be 
assured only when all possibilities of personal profit have been eliminated.” The Uniform Trustees' Powers 
Act and the Basic Principles of Fiduciary Responsibility, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 801, 803 (1966). 
236 Austin Wakeman Scott states that: “As to matters within the scope of the relation he [the fiduciary] is 
under a duty not to profit at the expense of the beneficiary. If the fiduciary enters into a transaction with the 
beneficiary and fails to make a full discourse of all circumstances known to him affecting the transaction, or 
if the transaction with the beneficiary is unfair to the beneficiary, it can be set aside by him” SCOTT, supra 
note 200, at §2.5, §2.3. See DeMott, supra note 204, at 908, 882.   
237 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463–64, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).  
238 See William A., GREGORY, LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, 13 (3rd ed. 2001); Scott, supra note 231, 
at 55. The Restatement (Third) of Agency states that: “An agent has a duty (1) not to use property of the 
principal for the agents’ own purpose or those of a third party; and (2) not to use to communicate confidential 
information of the principal for the agent’s own purpose of those of a third party” Id. at §8.05. (2006).  
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conduct of the breach of fiduciary duty, directors or other fiduciaries would be deemed 
liable of “tortuous conduct” toward the corporation for such a breach.239 Notice that if the 
breach was to gain personal benefit that involves taking advantage of the fiduciary position, 
the breach can also be termed fiduciary fraud or constructive fraud.240  
Nonetheless, the fiduciary duty of loyalty is a “residual concept” that cannot be 
narrowed down to specific situations upon which a breach of this duty is recognized. 
Indeed, courts and statutes seek to provide “bright-line” obligations that address 
reoccurring situations involving conflict of interest and self-dealing matters.241 
Fiduciary Position of Corporate Insiders and to Whom the Duty is Owed 
 
In the world of business, a corporation, as an artificial entity that only acts through 
natural persons, needs to hire employees and professionals to function including low-level 
employees, managers, directors, or advisors. The corporation needs to delegate power to 
these professionals to use its funds and assets for its interest.242 However, the authorized 
                                               
239 The Restatement (Second) of Tort § 874, comment (b) (1979).  
240 Robert S. Schwartz, SEC Rule 10b-5: Contrastive Fraud and the Liabilities of Fiduciaries, 35 Ohio St. 
L.J. 934, 936 (1974); Peggs & Johnson, supra note 215, at §4. Delaware Court of Chancery states that the 
concept of constructive fraud is “an ill-defined one, but generally exists to prevent wrongdoing by someone 
who occupies a special position of confidence or trust, such as that of a fiduciary. Our corporate case law has 
thrown this concept around in a not particularly precise way, but always in a context in which the court is 
examining whether directors have complied with their fiduciary duties.” Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., 
Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 643 (Del. Ch. 2013). Citing Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc, 794 A.2d. 
1211, 1235 (Del. Ch. 2001). See also Eggleston v. Kovacich, 742 N.W.2d 471, 482 (Neb. 2007) (Constructive 
fraud generally stems from a breach of duty arising out of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.) Id.  The 
difference between actual fraud and constructive fraud is that constructive fraud requires a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship as an element of the claim, but actual fraud does not require such relationship. 
Constructive fraud does not require showing intent to defraud or reliance other than relying on the confidence 
and trust of the fiduciary. In contrast, actual fraud requires showing of intent to defraud and reliance. See 
Peggs, & Johnson, supra note 215, at §7.  
241 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, 141 (1986); F. Hodge O’Neal & Robert B. Thompson, 
O’Neal and Thompson’s Oppression of Minority Shareholders and LLC Members, §7:3., Westlaw (database 
updated May. 2018).  
242 See DeMott, supra note 204, at 908, 917; Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Holding Corp., 132 A.3d 
35, 59-60 (Del. Ch. 2015). (“A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being a purely metaphysical creature, having no mind with which to think, no will 
with which to determine and no voice with which to speak, a corporation must depend upon the faculties of 
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use of the corporation’s property comes with an opportunity to abuse their delegated power. 
Therefore, the principle of fiduciary duty becomes an important role in organizing and 
governing the relationship between corporations and those professionals.243 
In the realm of corporate law, directors, officers, and to some extent, majority 
shareholders have a fiduciary duty to the corporation and shareholders.244 Directors are in 
a sui generis fiduciary relationship with the corporation245 since directors are not trustees 
or agents of the corporation and shareholders.246 Although they conduct a similar function 
to trustees and agents by acting for the benefit of another−the corporation and 
shareholders−they are distinguished from trustees and agents in several aspects. For 
example, they are elected by the shareholders, which differentiates them from trustees. 
They are free from shareholders’ control in managing the corporation, which differentiates 
                                               
natural persons to determine for it its policies and direct the agencies through which they are to be effectuated. 
Because it lacks a body and mind, a corporation only can act through human agents.”) Id. See FRANCIS C. 
AMENDOLA ET AL, 18 C.J.S. CORPORATIONS § 7, Westlaw (database updated June 2018).  
243 For more discussion about the connection between the theory of the economic firm and fiduciary 
principles, see Smith, supra note 207, at 1431. ( Professor Smith illustrates that “[T]he thesis of [] [his] Article 
is that fiduciary duties are imposed in relationships that have attributes similar to an economic firm. While 
some fiduciary relationships do not qualify as ‘firms’-a term that is limited to commercial enterprises-all 
share a common structure.”) Id. See also Frankel, supra note 205, 807. (“This Article shows that all fiduciary 
relations give rise to the problem of abuse of power, that the purpose of fiduciary law should be to solve this 
problem, and that the differences in the rules applicable to various fiduciary relations stem from differences 
in the extent of the problem.”) Id. 
244 CLARK, supra note 241, at 141; Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz properties, 40 A.3d 839, 850 (Del. Ch. 
2012). (“Corporate directors, general partners and trustees are analogous examples of those who Delaware 
law has determined owe a ‘special duty.’ Equity distinguishes fiduciary relationships from straightforward 
commercial arrangements where there is no expectation that one party will act in the interests of the other.”) 
Id. See O’NEAL & ROBERT, supra note 241, at §7:3.  
245 HAMILTON ET AL, supra note 111, at 363.  
246 See id; FREER & MOLL, supra note 117, at 270-71.  
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them from agents.247 In turn, corporate officers’ fiduciary duty is simply derived from the 
law of agency.248  
Shareholders of a corporation, in general, have no fiduciary duty owed to their 
corporations or to one another.249 They are free to act in their personal interest, disregarding 
the interest of the corporation or other shareholders.250 However, controlling or majority 
shareholders must carry out fiduciary obligations toward the corporation and minority 
shareholders.251  
                                               
247 For more discussion about this issue, see Frankel, supra note 205, at 805; FREER & MOLL, supra note 
117, at 271. See Wharton v. Fid-Baltimore Nat. Bank, 222 Md. 177, 183-84 (Md. Ct. App. 1960) (“A director 
occupies a special status, which has some aspects in common with that of ordinary workers variously called 
agents, servants and employees, and in some aspects in common with the corporate officers. 'The truth is that 
the status of director and corporation is a distinct legal relationship. It resembles in some respects those of 
agent and principal, of managing and dormant partners, of trustee and cestui que trust; but it is different from 
each.’”) Id.  
248 See note 28. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law, 114 (1986).  
249 FREER & MOLL, supra note 117, at 271; Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 445 (6th Cir. 1989). (“Minority 
shareholders owe no fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders.”) Id; Harris v. Carter, 582 A. 2d 222, 234 (Del. 
1990). (“[A] shareholder has a right to sell his or her stock and in the ordinary case owes no duty in that 
connection to other shareholders when acting in good faith.”) Id.  
250 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 622 (1947). 
(“Generally speaking, a shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and it 
is not objectionable that his motives may be for personal profit, or determined by whims or caprice, so long 
as he violates no duty owed his fellow shareholders.”) Id.  
251 See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW, 271 (4th ed. 2016). (“The 
basis for the controlling stockholder’s fiduciary obligation is the sound policy that, just as directors are bound 
by certain fiduciary obligations, one who has the potential to control the board’s actions should be subject to 
an obligation as rigorous as those applied to the directors. Quite separate is the belief that control in a 
corporation, whether publicly or closely held, carries with it the potential that the controlling stockholder 
may choose to exercise control to reap disproportionate benefits at the expense of the corporation or 
noncontrolling shareholders such that protection of their interests is desirable. That protection arises by 
imposing the fiduciary standards on the controlling stockholder exercising the controlling influence.”) Id; 
Kennedy v. Venrock Assocs., 348 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2003). (“[U]nder Delaware law, majority 
shareholders owe fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders.”) Id; Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C., 
483 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (D. Ariz. 2007). “Delaware law recognizes that not only do directors and officers 
‘stand in a fiduciary relationship to their corporation and stockholders’ but ‘a majority shareholder…has a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its minority shareholders if the majority shareholder dominates the 
board of directors and controls the corporation.’.”) Id.; Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. 
1990). (“Generally, a shareholder who owns less than 50% of a corporation's outstanding stock does not, 
without more, become a controlling shareholder of that corporation, with a concomitant fiduciary status…For 
controlling stock ownership to exist in the absence of a numerical majority there must be domination by a 
minority shareholder through actual exercise of direction over corporate conduct.”) Id. 
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The last question to be clarified in this section is: To whom do directors and officers 
owe fiduciary duty?  In general, directors and officers owe fiduciary duty to the corporation 
and to the shareholders collectively, not individually.252 This means that directors’ and 
officers’ task is to maximize the profit of the corporation itself upon which the shareholders 
will benefit derivatively.253 Although the rule says that no fiduciary duty is owed to 
shareholders individually, when directors and officers seek shareholder action, they act 
under fiduciary duty.254 This means that they must act in good faith and fully disclose all 
material information related to the action.255 
Summary 
 
Part 1 defines the fiduciary principle and describes when a fiduciary relationship is 
established. While there is no inclusive definition of who is a fiduciary, a fiduciary has 
been recognized in several types of relationships including the relationship between 
corporate insiders and their corporations. Courts have used multiple factors to find that a 
fiduciary relationship is established including when one person (fiduciary) is entrusted to 
                                               
252 GEVURTZ, supra note 47, at 314; FREER & MOLL, supra note 117, at 270; Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 
10 (Del. 1998). (“The directors of Delaware corporations stand in a fiduciary relationship not only to the 
stockholders but also to the corporations upon whose boards they serve.”) Id; International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers Local No. 129 Benfit Fund v. Tucci, 70 N.E.3d 918, 925–26 (Mass. 2017) “The general 
rule of Massachusetts corporate law is that a director of a Massachusetts corporation owes a fiduciary duty 
to the corporation itself, and not its shareholders—although, as indicated in the previous paragraph and as 
the motion judge recognized, there are at least two exceptions. First, there is a special rule for close 
corporations…Second, where a controlling shareholder who also is a director proposes and implements a 
self-interested transaction that is to the detriment of minority shareholders, a direct action by the adversely 
affected shareholders may proceed.”; Mary E. Bivins Found. v. Highland Capital Mgmt. L.P., 451 S.W.3d 
104, 111 (Tex. App. 2014) (“Corporate officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporations they serve…but they 
do not owe fiduciary duties to individual shareholders unless a contract or special relationship exists between 
them in addition to the corporate relationship.”) Some states extend the fiduciary duty to be owed to the 
shareholders individually. See AMENDOLA ET AL., supra note 242, at §552.  
253 GEVURTZ, supra note 47, at 314.  
254 Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1987).  
255 AMENDOLA ET AL., supra note 242, at §552; CARYL A. YZENBAARD ET EL, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES, §481.1., Westlaw (database updated June. 2018); Id; Sims v. Tezak, 694 N.E.2d 1015, 1018–19 
(Ill. App. 1998). (“Delaware courts have addressed the duty of disclosure only with respect to the following 
five scenarios: mergers, proxy solicitations, tender offers, self-tender offers and stockholder votes.”) Id.  
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act and serve the interest of another person (beneficiary) and the fiduciary has superiority 
or power over the beneficiary because of the trust reposed on him/her to act in good faith 
to fulfill his/her duty.  
Part 1 also defines the fiduciary position of corporate insiders and their general 
duties and to whom it is owed. Corporate directors, officers, and to some degree large 
shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation to solely act to serve the interests of 
the corporation and to refrain from conduct that is a conflict-of-interest unless informed 
consent has been given. Corporate insiders are not allowed to unjustly enrich themselves 
by misusing the property of the corporation including confidential information for their 
advantage. The fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation not to the shareholders 
individually.   
This understanding of the fiduciary principle and the legal position of corporate 
insiders help us to examine and discuss the U.S corporate insider trading regulations since 
the fiduciary position of corporate insiders that allows them to have legitimate access to 
material non-public information is what makes them a special class of traders regulated by 
securities laws.   
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Part 2. Regulations Governing Legal Corporate Insider Trading 
 
Introduction 
 
Section 16 of the SEA256 is the only statutory section that expressly governs the 
trading of corporate insiders in their corporations’ stock.257 Section 16 organizes corporate 
insiders’ trades under three rules. First, it requires corporate insiders to disclose securities 
ownership and trading transactions in their corporation. Second, it prevents them from 
profiting from speculative trading through the purchase and sale or the sale and purchase 
of their corporations’ stock within six months and making a profit. In addition, Section 16 
prohibits corporate insiders from short-selling transactions in their corporations’ stock.258 
Part 2 focuses on examining the structure of Section 16 to regulate the trading 
activities of corporate insiders. It starts by providing an overview of Section 16 including 
the legislative history and goals that Congress intended to accomplish by enacting this 
section. Then it discusses subdivisions (a) reporting requirements and (b) short-swing 
profit liability of Section 16 and the SEC’s rules promulgated thereunder.  
Overview of Section 16 
 
When Congress decided to enact regulations for federal stock exchange markets, in 
1934, corporate insider trading was one of major issues and problems that Congress 
addressed in establishing federal securities regulations.259 One Senate report expressly 
condemned corporate insiders’ unfair use of inside information and described it as a breach 
of reposed trust and confidence.   
                                               
256 15 U.S.C.A. §78p. (2012).  
257 Richard W. Painter et al., Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 Va. L. 
Rev. 153, 161 (1998). 
258 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 927.  
259 Arnold S. Jacobs, Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, §1:1, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019).   
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Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was 
the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who 
used their positions of trust and the confidential information which came to them in such 
positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the 
unscrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders who, while not 
directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to 
enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others.260 
 
For the purpose of preventing corporate insiders’ unfair use of inside information, 
Congress enacted Section16.261 This section now has seven subdivisions. Seciton16(a) 
requires corporate insiders (directors, officers, and holders of more than 10 percent of a 
class of equity) to publicly report their beneficial ownership. Section 16(b) prohibits 
corporate insiders from committing speculation practices, stating that profits made by the 
purchase and sale or sale and purchase of insiders’ corporation stock within six months 
must be disgorged to the corporation. Section16(c) makes it unlawful for corporate insiders 
to engage in specific types of speculative trading. This subdivision prohibits corporate 
insiders from transactions of short sales or selling against the box in their corporations’ 
stock.262 Section 16(d) provides an exemption from the prohibitions stated under Section16 
                                               
260 S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 55 (1934). 
261 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 1037 (2nd ed. 1961). (Professor Loss found that “[p]rior to the 
enactment of the Exchange, the SEC has said that ‘profits from’ ‘sure thing’ speculation in the stock of their 
corporations were more or less generally accepted by the financial community as part of the emolument for 
serving as a corporate officer or director notwithstanding the flagrantly inequitable character of such 
trading.”) Id. Citing 10 SEC Ann. Rep. 50 (1944). 
262 For more discussion about §16(c), see JACOBS, supra note 259, at §4:1. A short sale means a “sale of a 
security that the seller does not own or has not contracted for at the time of sale and that seller must borrow 
to make delivery. Such a sale is made when the seller expects the security’s price to drop. If the price does 
drop, the seller can make a profit on the difference between the price of the shares sold and the lower price 
of the shares bought to pay back the borrowed shares.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The sale 
against the box is similar to a short sale and has the same effects on the market. Jacobs, id. However, the sale 
against the box “is less risky than an ordinary short sale.” It is a “short sale of a security by a seller who 
owned enough shares of the security to cover the sale but borrows shares anyway because the seller wants to 
keep ownership a secret or because the owned shares are not easily accessible.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014). The purpose of prohibiting corporate insiders from making short sales and sales against the box is 
that because insiders have access to inside information, they are not allowed to sell based on bad news that 
is not known to the public. The goal of making selling against the box is to avoid losses based on the 
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(b) and Section 16(c). Section16(e) also states that foreign and domestic arbitrage 
transactions are out of the scoop of Section 16.263 Section 16(f) and 16(g) include 
transactions of security future products within this section and designate the SEC as the 
authority to regulate such transactions.264 
What Congress Intended to Accomplish by Enacting Section 16 
 
The legislative history shows that Congress determined that making corporate 
insiders answerable under the SEA for their unfair use of inside information and abuse of 
their positions as fiduciaries would restore investors’ confidence. Congress concluded that: 
A renewal of investors’ confidence in the exchange markets can be affected only by a 
clearer recognition upon the part of the corporate managers of companies whose securities 
are publicly held of their responsibilities as trustee for their corporation. men charged with 
the administration of other people’s money must not use inside information for their own 
advantage.265  
 
However, instead of articulating broad and general prohibition from misusing 
inside information, Congress chose to adopt a limited scope of provisions because it 
realized that there was no effective way to enforce a broad prohibition against abuse of 
inside information by corporate insiders or their tippees.266 Congress found that “it is 
                                               
expectation of a future decline in the price of the security. The goal of making a short sale is to gain profits 
from the decrease of the price. Jacobs, id.   
263 Arbitrage transactions are “the simultaneous buying and selling of identical securities in different markets 
with the hope of profiting from the price difference between those markets.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014). See Jacobs, supra note 259, at §6:1.  
264 JACOBS, supra note 259, at §1:1; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW, 138 (2nd ed. 2003).   
265 SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL OF 1934, H. R. No. 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 13 (1934). 
266 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading 
Prohibtion,52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1189, 1234 (1995). (“Congress could have struck at insider trading both 
more directly and forcibly, and given that congress chose not to do so.”) Id. In addition, the first draft of §16 
prohibited corporate insiders from disclosing inside information to other persons and allowed corporations 
to recover short-swing profits made by tippees. Id; STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION: HEARING ON H.R. 7852, 
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 73D Cong. 2nd Sess. 28-30 (1934). 
However, the House deleted the prohibition from disclosing inside information and the recovery of short-
swing profit made by tippees. The House only kept the requirement of disclosure under §16(a). See Michael 
P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 58 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 
24-26.  
 
 50 
 
difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of law between truly inside information and 
information generally known by the better-informed investors.”267 Therefore, Congress 
determined that the most effective mechanism to prevent insiders from the unfair use of 
inside information “was the imposition of a liability based upon an objective measure of 
proof.”268 The Securities Exchange Bill of 1934 also shows that Congress was aware that 
the measures adopted under Section 16 were not “air-tight and that the unscrupulous insider 
may still within the law, use inside information for his own advantage.”269 Nevertheless, 
they realized that the best weapon against insiders’ unfair use of inside information was to 
require them to make full and prompt disclosure. Congress hoped that the requirement of 
full disclosure about corporate insiders’ trades and securities ownership would help 
discourage the unfair use of inside information and encourage corporate insiders to 
maintain “voluntary” fidelity and loyalty by abstaining from abusing the inside information 
available to them as fiduciaries.270  
Although Congress stated that the purpose of Section16 was to prevent corporate 
insiders from abusing inside information, some commentators have described the measures 
taken by Congress under Section 16 as inadequate to sufficiently prevent insiders from 
trading on the basis of inside information.271 Therefore, they suggested that Congress 
enacted Section 16 to prevent speculative practices by insiders instead of outlawing the 
abuse of inside information itself.272 In doing so, using inside information as an 
                                               
267 H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 13.  
268 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.1943). 
269 H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 13. 
270 Id.  
271 Dooley, supra note 266, at 56; Bainbridge, supra note 266, at 1234.  
272 Id.  
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informational advantage was not a concern for Congress in regulating insiders’ trades 
under Section 16.273 The legislative history of Section 16 shows that Congress was 
concerned about preventing insiders from speculative practices that were common and 
accepted among corporate insiders at that time.274 Professor Michael Dooley argued that 
the congressional hearings preceding the enactment of SEA focused on preventing 
corporate insiders from using inside information to manipulate their corporations’ stock. 
During the hearings, he also found that abusing inside information was not an important 
issue. The witnesses were rarely asked about the use of inside information, and the few 
questions they were asked were about insiders’ manipulative practices.275  
The legislative history of Section 16 demonstrates that the intention of Congress to 
enact Section16 was to prevent corporate insiders from misappropriating inside 
information whether by using such information to manipulate the corporation stock or to 
trade without public disclosure.276 Congress intended to prevent corporate insiders from 
abusing inside information by consolidating the two main purposes of enacting the SEA. 
                                               
273 Loss, supra note 261, at 1037; Michael P. Dooley, at 56, Nt. 255.  
274 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d. Cir 1943) (“We look first to the background of the 
statute. Prior to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act, speculation by insiders- directors, officers, and 
principal stockholders- in the securities of their corporation was a widely condemned evil…the insiders’ 
failure to disclose all pertinent information gave them an unfair advantage of the general body of stockholders 
which was not to be condoned… the Congressional hearings indicate that Sec. 16(b), specifically, was 
designed to protect the ‘outside‘ stockholders against at least short-swing speculation by insiders with 
advance information.”) Id.  
275 Dooley, supra note 266. (Professor Dooley found that “[t]he conventional wisdom is that Congress enacted 
section 9 to deal with manipulation and expressed its concern with insiders’ informational advantage by 
enacting section 16.” “[T]he fact that Congress limited [] [section 16(b)] coverage to profits made form 
purchase and sales within a six-month period may reflect Congress’s concern with insider manipulations. 
Because most manipulation occur within a short time period, the purposes of section 9 are advanced by 
denying insiders short-swing profits.”) Id at 58.  
276 Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong, and S. Res. 56 § S. Res. 97, 73d Congress, 
before the Committee of Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 6466 (1934) [Hereinafter Hearings on Stock 
Exchange Practices] (testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran) (Section 16 was “designed to protect investors in 
the market from ignorance and from exploitation by corporate insiders. Lack of information on the part of 
investors and ignorance of what they are buying...” Id.  
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The legislative history also indicates that enacting the SEA was to restore investors’ 
confidence and to “insure…the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”277 Congress 
focused on accomplishing these purposes by developing a disclosure system for issuers 
and other participants in the exchange markets. In addition, it developed provisions to 
combat manipulative practices. Professor Luis Loss suggested that Congress consolidated 
“the registration, reporting and proxy provisions of the Exchange Act (§ 12, 13 and 14) 
…by §16 on insider trading.”278 Thus, by regulating corporate insiders, Section 16(a), 
required “full and prompt disclosure,” as the major mechanism to ensure the maintenance 
of honest exchange markets on corporate insiders.279 In addition, Section 16(b), which 
prohibits corporate insiders from using inside information for speculative practices in their 
corporations’ stock, was adopted to serve another purpose of enacting the SEA, which was 
to prevent manipulative practices.280 As Professor Michael Dooley concluded, Section 9 of 
the SEA prohibits committing manipulative acts, and this section was consolidated with 
Section 16(b), which prevents corporate insiders from speculative trading in their 
corporations’ stock.281 Professor Dooley noted that: “the fact that Congress limited [] 
[section 16(b)] coverage to profits made from purchases and sales within a six-month 
period may reflect Congress’s concern with insider manipulations. Because most 
manipulations occur within a short time period, the purposes of section 9 are advanced by 
denying insiders short-swing profits.”282 
                                               
277SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL OF 1934, H. R. No. 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 10 (1934). 
278 LOSS, supra note 261, at 1037.  
279 See id.  
280 H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 10. 
281 Dooley, supra note 266, at 57. 
282 Id.  
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The imposition of disclosure requirements under Section 16(a), in addition to 
preventing insiders from trading on the basis of inside information, was imposed to offer 
up-to-date and accurate trading information for investors.283 This requirement is meant to 
help them make informed investment decisions.284 Investors can use this information to 
adjust their ask biddings for related securities.285  In particular, investors may strongly 
suspect that such disclosed trading was based on inside information, so the timely 
disclosure enables them to adjust the market price of the security to reflect the new trading 
information.286 Even if the insider trades were not based on inside information, public 
disclosure helps investors receive reliable information about the prospect of the related 
corporation.287 For instance, if corporate insiders are buying in their corporations’ stock, it 
may indicate that the market value of the corporation stock is lower than its real value.288  
The following section examines and discusses subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 
16 since the two subdivisions are the major provisions under Section 16.  
Reporting Requirements of Securities Ownership and Trade Transactions 
 
Section 16(a) obligates corporate directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more 
than 10 percent of a class of any equity security registered pursuant to Section 12 of the 
SEA,289 to disclose their beneficial ownership publicly by reporting to the SEC and related 
                                               
283 See JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:1.  
284 This concern about investors’ lack of information was raised and discussed in the legislative history of 
§16, where §16 was “designed to protect investors in the market from ignorance and from exploitation by 
corporate insiders. Lack of information on the part of investors and ignorance of what they are buying...” 
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra note 276, at 6466.  
285 Jesse M. Fried, Insider Trading Via the Corporation, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 810 (2014); COX ET AL, supra 
note 7, at 944.  
286 Fried, supra note 285.  
287 Id; Cox COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 944. 
288 Id.  
289 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l.  
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exchange.290 Section 16 corporate insiders are required to report once they become subject 
to this section by disclosing a list of all aggregated equity securities they beneficially own 
in the issuer and all transactions in the corporation’s security that result in a change in their 
beneficial ownership.291 Two main questions arise about duty to disclose in Section 16(a) 
duty to disclose. The first question is who is statutorily within the status of a corporate 
insider under Section 16? Second, once corporate insiders are defined and determined, 
what are they required to disclose under Section 16(a)? These two questions are answered 
below.  
Who is a Section 16 Corporate Insider? 
 
The requirement of disclosure under Section 16(a) was enacted by Congress as it 
realized that “full and prompt disclosure” is the “best weapon against the abuse of inside 
information.”292 On this basis of this recognition, Section 16(a)(1) reads:  
(a) Disclosures required.— (1) Directors, officers, and principal stockholders required to 
file.—Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 
percent of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is 
registered pursuant to Section 12, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such 
security, shall file the statements required by this subsection with the Commission.293 
 
These corporate insiders are deemed most likely to have access to inside 
information; therefore, they are regulated as a special class of traders.294 However, defining 
who is a 10 percent beneficial owner, director, and officer is subject to complex and 
                                               
290 15 U.S.C.A. §78p.  
291 Id. See JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:1.  
292 See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 55 (1934). 
293 15 U.S.C.A. §78p.  
294 Lauren Cohen et al, Decoding Inside Information, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LXVII, No. 3, 1009 
(2012). The SEC states that §16 “was designed to provide the public with information on securities 
transactions and holdings of corporate insiders and to deter insiders from speculative short-swing trading in 
their corporations’ securities and from engaging in transactions in their corporations’ securities while in 
possession of material, non-public information.” SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17991, OWNERSHIP 
REPORTS & TRADING BY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS & PRINCIPAL SEC. HOLDERS (Feb. 8, 1991). 
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detailed statutory provisions and SEC rules.295 The determination of who is a 10 percent 
beneficial owner of equity securities, directors, officers of an issuer is discussed below.    
 
Ten Percent Beneficial Owners 
 
Section 16(a) requires 10 percent holders to disclose because it “is intended to reach 
those persons who can be presumed to have access to inside information because they can 
influence or control the issuer as a result of their equity ownership.”296 It is noteworthy that 
the SEC has specified two concepts and two separate definitions of beneficial ownership 
under Rule 16a-1(a).297 The first definition is used to determine who is a corporate insider 
holding more than 10 percent of an equity security of an issuer. The second definition is 
used to determine the beneficial ownership subject to the duty to report and the liability of 
short-swing profits after determining that someone is a corporate insider under Section16 
whether because such a person is a holder of 10 percent of an issuer’s equity security or a 
director or officer of the issuer.298 The SEC’s Rule 16a-1(a) reads as follows:  
(a) The term beneficial owner shall have the following applications: (1) Solely for 
purposes of determining whether a person is a beneficial owner of more than ten 
percent of any class of equity securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the Act, 
the term “beneficial owner” shall mean any person who is deemed a beneficial owner 
pursuant to section 13(d) of the Act and the rules thereunder…(2) Other than for 
purposes of determining whether a person is a beneficial owner of more than ten 
percent of any class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Act, the term 
beneficial owner shall mean any person who, directly or indirectly, through any 
contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise, has or shares a direct 
or indirect pecuniary interest in the equity securities.299  
 
                                               
295 However, defining directors and officers is less difficult than defining 10 percent beneficial owners. See 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 928.  
296 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17991, at 5.  
297 JACOBS, supra note 93, at § 4:13.  
298 Id. See JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:1. 
299 Rule 16a-1(a), 17 C.F.R. §240. 16a-1(a).  
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Accordingly, Rule 16a-1(a)(1) imports the definition of beneficial ownership 
promulgated under Section 13(d) of the SEA to define a beneficial owner of more than 10 
percent who will have the status of corporate insider for the purposes of Section 16.300  
Section 13(d) of the SEA is used to calculate the requisite percentage of equity 
securities of an issuer, more than 10 percent, upon which a stockholder would be deemed 
an insider under Section 16.301 The SEC Rule 13d-3 promulgated under Section 13(d) 
defines beneficial owners for the purpose of Sections 13(d) and (g) of the SEA to include 
“any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, 
relationship, or otherwise has or shares… (1) Voting power which includes the power to 
vote or direct the voting of such security; and/or, (2) Investment power which includes the 
power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, such security.”302 The Rule also includes 
any person who uses a device for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of 
Section 13(d) or (g) of the SEA.303 In addition, a person would be deemed a beneficial 
owner of a security “if the person has the right to acquire beneficial ownership of such 
security…within sixty days.” including the right to exercise any option, warrant, or right 
through the conversion of a security, pursuant to the power to revoke a trust, discretionary 
account, or similar arrangement, or pursuant to the automatic termination of a trust, 
discretionary account, or similar arrangement.304  
                                               
300 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m. (2012). §13(d) was one of five subsections the Congress added to the SEA of 1934, 
in 1968. All five provisions were enacted for the purpose of regulating tender offers and changes of control. 
Section 13(d) requires a person who acquires more than five percent of certain securities to file a statement 
disclosing the acquisition within ten days to the SEC. See James D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATIES 
ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, §24:2. (3d), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018); JACOBS, supra note 
93, at §6:46. 
301 JACOBS, supra note 93, at § 4:13. 
302 17 C.F.R. §240.13d-3.  
303 Id.  
304 Id.  
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To determine the requisite number of securities that makes a person a beneficial 
owner of more than 10 percent of any class of equity securities, Section 13(d) 
computational rules focus on determining who has actual control over the related securities, 
whether the person has the right to vote or to dispose of the related securities.305 The SEC 
designed the definition of beneficial ownership under Rule 13d-3 to provide objective 
standards that would allow the courts to have “case-by-case determination.”306 Beneficial 
ownership is calculated by accumulating the aggregate number of all equity securities307 of 
                                               
305 Christopher Scott Maravilla, Reopening the Loophole? Beneficial Ownership under §13(D) of the 1934 
Securities Act After Rosenberg v. Xm Ventures, 3 Charleston L. Rev. 145, 163 (2008). (“[T]he courts 
determining beneficial ownership under §13(d) of the Act look to who has actual ability to vote the shares or 
the powers to dispose of a large block of shares.”). Id.  (“In light of the purpose of § 13(d), as evidenced by 
the legislative history and as interpreted by other courts, the rule states one who possesses the power to 
dispose of a block of securities is a beneficial owner of any shares of the subject company and a member of 
a group within the meaning of § 13(d)(3).”) Id, at 166.  JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:67. (“By its literal 
words, Rule 16a-1(a)(1) merely establishes a test to determine if a person is the “beneficial owner” of a 
particular security; it does not address how to compute the 10 percent number. Rule 16a-1(a)(1) has been 
construed to incorporate Section 13(d) computational rules. For instance, a Section 13(d) rule provides that 
a person beneficial owns securities underlying convertible securities if the convertible securities are 
convertible within sixty days, but not if they are first convertible thereafter. This applies to Section 16 
computations”) Id.  §13(d) tests provide that: (1) “a number of a national securities exchange shall not be 
deemed to be a beneficial owner of securities held directly or indirectly by it on behalf of another person 
solely because such member is the record holder of such securities and,… may direct the vote [in certain 
circumstances]; (2) “A person who in the ordinary course of his business is a pledgee of securities under a 
written pledge agreement shall not be deemed to be the beneficial owner of such pledged securities until” a 
default is declared if the (a) the pledge is bona fide; (b) the pledgee is a person eligible to file a schedule 13G; 
(c) and the pledgee agreement, prior to default, does not grant the pledgee the power to vote or to direct the 
vote or dispose the pledged securities; (3) “an underwriter of securities who acquires securities through his 
participation in good faith in a firm commitment underwriting registered under the Securities Act of 1933 
shall not be deemed to be the beneficial owner of such securities until the expiration of forty days after the 
date of such acquisition.” Rule 13d-3(b)(2)-(4), 17 C.F.R. §240. 13d-3.  
306 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 34-64628, BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND 
SECURITIES BASED SWAPS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, File No. S7-10-11, at 7 (effective July 
16, 2011).  
307 The SEA, §3(11) defines the term “equity security” as: “any stock or similar security; or any security 
future on any such security; or any security convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, 
or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or 
any other security which the Commission shall deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary or 
appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors, to treat as an equity security.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c. The SEC defines the term “equity security,” for 
the purpose of §13, under Rule 13d-1(i), which in the pertinent part states that “the term ‘equity security’ 
means any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 12 of that Act, or any equity 
security of any insurance company which would have been required to be so registered except for the 
exemption contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Act, or any equity security issued by a closed-end 
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the same class308 and from all the sources of beneficial ownership, whether alone or with 
others, and either directly or indirectly.309 Rule 13d-3(c) states that: “All securities of the 
same class beneficially owned by a person, regardless of the form which such beneficial 
ownership takes, shall be aggregated in calculating the number of shares beneficially 
owned by such person.”310 For instance, convertible voting preferred stock is in the same 
class as the underlying common stock. In contrast, non-voting convertible preferred stock 
is considered a class by itself.311 In addition, Section 13(d)(3) of the SEA asserts that: 
“When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other 
group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such 
syndicate or group shall be deemed a ‘person’ for the purposes of this subsection.”312 
However, Section 13(d) excludes non-voting securities and derivative securities313 for the 
                                               
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940; Provided, Such term shall not 
include securities of a class of non-voting securities.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1.  
308 §12(g)(5) of the SEA of 1934 defines the term “class” to “include all securities of an issuer which are of 
substantially similar character and the holders of which enjoy substantially similar rights and privileges.” 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78l. For more discussion about the definition of the term “class,” see JACOBS, supra note 259, at 
§2:66. 
309 JACOBS, at §2:67. For the purpose of determining the number of equity securities, Rule 13d-1(j) states 
that:  “any person, in determining the amount of outstanding securities of a class of equity securities, may 
rely upon information set forth in the issuer’s most recent quarterly or annual report, and any current report 
subsequent thereto, filed with the Commission pursuant to this Act, unless he knows or has reason to believe 
that the information contained therein is inaccurate.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–1.  
310 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–3. See supra note 305.  
311 JACOBS, supra note 2593, at §2:67.  
312 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m. For more discussion about the group concept under §13(d) and its applicability to 
§16, see JACOBS, supra note 93, at 4:13; Peter J. Romeo & Alan L. Dye, Developments under Section 16, 
SR043 ALI-ABA 665 (2010); HAZEN, supra note 2, at §11:7. (“One consequence of using the approach 
under section 16(a) that is applicable to section 13(d) is the concept of a group. Under section 13(d), a group 
of persons acting together will count as one person for the purpose of computing the ownership threshold. 
The same group concept applies to section 16(a).”) Id, at §13:4.  
313 A derivative security is: “A financial instrument whose value depends on or is derived from the 
performance of a secondary source such as an underlying bond, currency, or commodity.” Black's Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
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purpose of determining beneficial owners under Section 13(d) except securities that are 
convertible or exercisable within sixty days.314 
Although Rule 16a-1(a) has incorporated Section13(d) rules to define the term 
“beneficial owner” for the purpose of determining whether a person is a beneficial owner 
of more than 10 percent of equity securities under Section 16, the SEC departed slightly 
from Section 13(d) of the SEA, and the rules promulgated thereunder. They waived the 
reporting requirement under Section 16, from certain institutions and persons even though 
they hold beneficial ownership of more than 10 percent of an issuer’s equity securities 
where the holding of ownership is for the benefit of another person and not for the purpose 
of directing the control of the issuer.315  
Directors  
 
The rules promulgated under Section 16 do not provide a special definition of 
corporate directors for the purpose of the requirement of filing reports under Section 16(a) 
and prohibition of short-swing profits under Section 16(b).316 The SEC simply imported 
the statutory definition of directors stated under Section 3(a)(7) of the SEA.317 This section 
                                               
314 See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17991, OWNERSHIP REPORTS & TRADING BY OFFICERS, 
DIRECTORS & PRINCIPAL SEC. HOLDERS, at 5 (Feb. 8, 1991). (“The Section 13(d) analysis, such as the 
exclusion of non-voting securities and counting only those derivative securities exercisable or convertible 
within 60 days, are imported into the ten percent holder determination for Section 16 purposes.”) Id. See 
HAZEN, supra note 2, at §13:4.  
315Romeo, supra note 312, at 677. For more information about the calculation of 10 percent ownership and 
exceptions under §13(d), see Rule 16a-1(a)(1)(i) through (xi), 17 C.F.R. §240. 16a-1. See JACOBS, supra note 
93, at §4:13.  
316 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 972.  
317 The SEC clarified that: “No definition for the term “director” is proposed because there appears to be little 
confusion about the definition of that term in section 3(a)(7) of the Exchange Act.” SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, 
RELEASE NO. 17991, at 8. See Id; JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:68.  
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defines directors as: “any director of a corporation or any person performing similar 
functions with respect to an organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated.”318  
The phrase “or any person performing similar functions…” indicates that others 
who perform functions that are similar to directors but have not been hired or elected to 
serve as directors are deemed directors under the SEA including Section 16.319 The courts 
use an objective standard to determine whether a person is a director which allows the 
courts to apply the term “director” to other persons who perform similar functions but are 
not officially serving as directors.320 The most important factor to determine whether a 
person is a director under Section 16 is whether the person has access to inside information 
and the nature of his/her responsibilities and duties within the corporation.321  
One of the most important issues related to the question of determining who is a 
director for the purpose of Section 16 is whether an entity can be regarded as a director of 
an issuer under Section 16 because the entity has a representative or deputy of the entity 
serves as a director of the issuer.322 However, the SEC has decided not to codify the 
                                               
318 SEA, §3(a)(7), 15 U.S.C.A. §78c(a)(7). The term “person” used in the definition of the term “director” is 
also defined under §3(a)(9) of the SEA. “The term ‘person’ means a natural person, company government, 
or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government.” Id. at §3(a)(9), §78c(a)(9). 
319 JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:68. Citing Reliance Elec Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 Nt. 
4, (1927). “[I]n deciding whether an investor is an ‘officer’ or ‘director’ within the meaning of s 16(b), courts 
have allowed proof that the investor performed the functions of an officer or director even though not 
formally denominated as such.” Id.  
320 Id.  
321 Gold v. Sloan, 486 F. 2d, 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1993). (“The purpose of the statute was to take ‘the profits out 
of a class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great’ and to prevent 
the use by ‘insiders’ of confidential information, accessible because of one’s corporate position or status, in 
speculative trading in the securities of one’s corporation for personal profit.”) Id. See J JACOBS, supra note 
259, at §2:68. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, supra 
note 63, at 9; SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17991, at 4. (“in determining whether an advisory, emeritus 
or honorary director is a director for Section 16 purposes, the person's title is not determinative.”). Id.  
322 MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATIONS: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES, §4.03 (Lexis).  
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deputization doctrine and left the doctrine to be determined by the courts. The SEC found 
that:  
[A] corporation, partnership, trust or other person can be deemed a director for purposes of 
section 16 where it has expressly or impliedly “deputized” an individual to serve as its 
representative on a company’s board of directors. In determining whether a person has 
been deputized for purposes of section 16, the courts have looked at a variety of factors, 
focusing primarily on the alleged deputy’s position of control within the deputizing entity 
and the deputy’s independent qualifications to serve on the board of the issuing 
corporation. This fact-intensive analysis appears best left to a case-by-case 
determination.”323 
 
Although the courts have recognized the deputization doctrine and held that an 
entity may be found in the position of a director of an issuer under Section 16 by deputizing 
one of its members or employees to represent the entity in the issuer’s board of directors,324 
the rules that determine the presence of deputization are not “bright-line” once.325 Thus, 
the determination of whether a deputization exists is a question of fact and determined 
case-by-case.326 
Officers 
 
The regulatory definition of officers under Section 16 follows the same path as 
defining directors, where officers who have policy making roles inside the issuer are 
subject to Section 16.327 Rule 16a-1(f) reads as:  
The term “officer” shall mean an issuer’s president, principal financial officer, principal 
accounting officer (or, if there is no such accounting officer, the controller), any vice-
president of the issuer in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as 
                                               
323 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 24768, OWNERSHIP REPORTS AND TRADING BY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS 
AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS, at 8 (Dec. 2, 1988) see JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:68; THOMAS LEE, 
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 564 (7th ed. 2017). 
324 See note 88,  
325STEINBERG, at §4.03. (“The factors that are necessary for a finding of deputization, however, are somewhat 
ambiguous due to the ad hoc approach employed by the courts.”) Id.  
326 Hazen, supra note 323, at 565. 
327 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 976; HAZEN, supra note 2, at §13:3.  
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sales, administration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy-making function, 
or any other person who performs similar policy-making functions for the issuer.328 
 
Rule 16a-1(f) defines the term “officer” narrowly to exclude others who have the 
title of officer but preform no substantial policy functions.329 The SEC has clarified the 
Rule 16a-1(f) approach stating that the definition of the term “officer” must be applied to 
“[t]hose exercising a policy-making function, by the very nature of that responsibility, have 
routine access to material non-public information.”330 The SEC also asserted that “the 
proper focus should be on whether a person is a corporate employee performing important 
executive duties of such character that he would be likely, in discharging these duties, to 
obtain confidential information about the company’s affairs that would aid him if he 
engaged in personal market transactions.”331 Therefore, the Rule includes specific titled 
officers under the definition of “officer” since they are most likely to perform a policy-
making function and have access to inside information. Those officers are the president of 
the issuer, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or the controller if there 
is no principal accounting officer), or any vice president who is also in charge of a principal 
business unit. In addition to these named officers, under the definition of “officer,” the Rule 
includes any person who performs the function of an officer but does not have the title of 
an officer.332 The Rule excludes persons who have the title of “officer” but do not perform 
significant policy-making functions within the corporation. In particular, it excludes 
                                               
328 Rule 16a-1(f), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-1(f).  
329 STEINBERG, supra note 322, at §4.04 4-53.  
330 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 24768, OWNERSHIP REPORTS AND TRADING BY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS 
AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS, at 8 (Dec. 2, 1988).  
331 Id. at 4.  
332 Hazen, supra note 323, at 564; SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17991, at 4. (“A person’s title alone 
should not determine whether that person is subject to Section 16… If title were determinative, persons with 
executive functions could avoid responsibility by forgoing title.”) Id.  
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persons who hold the position of vice president but are not in charge of a principal business 
unit or do not perform policy-making functions.333  
Definition of Beneficial owners—Pecuniary Interest 
  
When a person is determined to be a beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of 
any class of issuer’s equity securities or a director or officer of an issuer, the person 
becomes subject to Section 16. To determine what securities are subject to Section 16(a) 
reporting requirements as well as Section 16(b), corporate insiders are subject to the 
definition of “beneficial owners.”334 Rule 16a-1(a)(2) defines a beneficial owner as: “any 
person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, 
relationship or otherwise, has or shares a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the equity 
securities.”335 The term “pecuniary interest” means “the opportunity, directly or indirectly, 
to profit or share in any profit derived from a transaction in the subject securities.”336  
Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii) provides six examples of an indirect pecuniary interest. It 
includes securities held by immediate family members, and a partnership’s portfolio 
securities if the beneficial owner is a general partner in such partnership.337 It also includes 
                                               
333 Rule 16a-1(f) “Policy-making function” is not intended to include policy-making functions that are not 
significant.” Id, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f). See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and 
Principal Stockholders, supra note 63, at 8; STEINBERG, supra note 322, at §4.04 4-53; JACOBS, supra note 
259, at §2:69. 
334 Id, at 930; JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:14; SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17991.  
335 Rule 16a-1(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2).  
336 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(i). 
337 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §240. 16a-1(a)(2)(ii). (This rule, in the pertinent part, states that (ii) The 
term indirect pecuniary interest in any class of equity securities shall include, but not be limited to: (A) 
securities held by members of a person’s immediate family sharing the same household; provided, however, 
that the presumption of such beneficial ownership may be rebutted. see also § 240.16a–1(a)(4) and (B) a 
general partner’s proportionate interest in the portfolio securities held by a general or limited partnership.”) 
The general partner’s pecuniary interest attribution is “in proportion to the greater of their capital account or 
interest in the profit of the partnership at the time of the transaction.” SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 
17991, OWNERSHIP REPORTS & TRADING BY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS & PRINCIPAL SEC. HOLDERS, at 6 (Feb. 
8, 1991). Rule 16a-1(e) states that “The term immediate family shall mean any child, stepchild, grandchild, 
parent, stepparent, grandparent, spouse, sibling, mother-in-law, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, 
 
 64 
 
performance-based fees “received by any broker, dealer, bank, insurance company, 
investment company, investment adviser, investment manager, trustee or person or entity 
performing a similar function,”338 and in the event that a “person’s right to dividends that 
is separated or separable from the underlying securities.”339 The fifth example of an indirect 
pecuniary interest is the person’s interest held by a trust with certain details stated in Rule 
16a-8.340 The last example is the right to “acquire equity security through the exercise or 
conversion of any derivative security, whether or not presently exercisable.”341  
This definition of beneficial owners is not exclusive for the purpose of determining 
what securities beneficial owners of more than 10 percent must disclose, but rather the 
definition is applied to all Section 16 corporate insiders including directors and officers.342 
The determination focuses primarily on whether profits made from trading on securities 
                                               
brother-in-law, or sister-in-law, and shall include adoptive relationships.” Id, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(e). See 
HAZEN, supra note 2, at §13:4. (“The determination of beneficial ownership, as between an insider and spouse 
frequently presents difficult factual questions. For example, within the context of a 16(b) action to recover 
proscribed short-swing profits, it has been held that a wife’s sale of securities is attributed to her husband 
who is a director of the issuer even where the husband and wife maintain separate brokerage accounts but 
engaged in some joint planning…the current section 16 rules codify this result.”) Id. 
338 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(C).  
339 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(D). 
340 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(E), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(E). 
341 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(F), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(F). The term “derivative securities” has certain 
exemptions under Rule 16a-1. Paragraph (c) of Rule 16a-1 states that: “(c) The term derivative securities 
shall mean any option, warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation right, or similar right with an exercise 
or conversion privilege at a price related to an equity security, or similar securities with a value derived from 
the value of an equity security.” Rule 16a-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(c). However, Rule 16a-1(c) provides 
7 exemptions from the definition of derivative securities, as follows: (1) Rights of a pledgee of securities to 
sell the pledged securities; (2) Rights of all holders of a class of securities of an issuer to receive securities 
pro rata, or obligations to dispose of securities, as a result of a merger, exchange offer, or consolidation 
involving the issuer of the securities; (3) Rights or obligations to surrender a security, or have a security 
withheld, upon the receipt or exercise of a derivative security or the receipt or vesting of equity securities, in 
order to satisfy the exercise price or the tax withholding consequences of receipt, exercise or vesting; (4) 
Interests in broad-based index options, broad-based index futures, and broad-based publicly traded market 
baskets of stocks approved for trading by the appropriate federal governmental authority; (5) Interests or 
rights to participate in employee benefit plans of the issuer; (6) Rights with an exercise or conversion 
privilege at a price that is not fixed; or (7) Options granted to an underwriter in a registered public offering 
for the purpose of satisfying over-allotments in such offering.” Id.  
342 See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17112, OWNERSHIP REPORTS & TRADING BY OFFICERS, 
DIRECTORS & PRINCIPAL SEC. HOLDERS, at 8 (Aug. 18, 1989). 
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would increase the beneficial owner’s wealth.343 Thus, the definition of beneficial owners 
and the pecuniary interest tests include a wide range of scenarios of having or sharing 
profits from securities trading. Professor Arnold S. Jacobs suggested that there are four 
situations when a beneficial owner under Section 16 will be deemed to have or share a 
pecuniary interest for the purpose of the definition of beneficial owners stated in Rule 16a-
1(a)(2):  
1- A corporate insider directly having or sharing a pecuniary interest, e.g., the 
beneficial owner owns the securities;   
2- A corporate insider directly having or sharing an indirect pecuniary interest, 
e.g., the spouse of the corporate insider owns the securities, or the beneficial 
owner is a general partner in a partnership that owns the securities;  
3- A corporate insider indirectly having or sharing direct pecuniary interest, e.g., 
when the beneficial owner has “a contract with natural person who owns the 
securities.”  
4- A corporate insider indirectly having or sharing indirect pecuniary interest, e.g., 
the beneficial owner is not a partner and has a contract with the partnership that 
possesses the securities.344  
It is important to mention that the pecuniary interest can only be derived from 
trading activities whether such trading is in the form of purchase or sale of related 
securities. This means that the profit or interest that results from non-trading transactions 
does not constitute a pecuniary interest, such as the opportunity to profit from or share the 
                                               
343 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §10:4.  
344 JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:15.  
 
 66 
 
profit from dividends.345 This observation is emphasized by Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(D) which 
states that: “a right to dividends alone shall not represent a pecuniary interest in the 
securities.”346  
Rule 16a-1 also grants certain exemptions from deeming some securities 
transactions or the opportunity to profit from having a pecuniary interest. Corporations or 
similar entities that are held in portfolio securities are not attributed to the corporations’ 
shareholders as having a pecuniary interest in such portfolio securities under two 
conditions: (1) the shareholder is not a “controlling shareholder” of the corporation or 
similar entity; and (2) does not have investment control, either alone or with other, over 
the portfolio securities.347 Rule 16a-1(a)(5) also states that certain pecuniary interest is not 
recognized as a part of the definition of beneficial ownership under Section 16. These 
exempted interests are “[i]nterests in portfolio securities held by any investment company 
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940;348 and (ii) Interests in securities 
comprising part of a broad-based, publicly traded market basket or index of stocks, 
approved for trading by the appropriate federal governmental authority.”349  
 
 
 
                                               
345 Id. The SEC explained that: “Indirect pecuniary interest represents the insider's ability to profit from 
purchases and sales in securities held by family members, or through derivative securities, partnerships, 
corporations, trusts and ‘other arrangements.’ An indirect pecuniary interest arising from “other 
arrangements” would include, among other things, any formal or informal agreement to share profits from 
transactions in a particular issuer's securities. For example, this would include parking arrangements and 
specified interests in fee arrangements.” SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 17112, at 8.  
346 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(D), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(ii)(D).  
347 Rule 16a-1(a)(2)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(iii). 
348 15 U.S.C. 80a–1 et seq. 
349 Rule 16a-1(a)(5)(i) and (ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(5)(i) and (ii). See JACOBS, supra note 259, at §4:15.  
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Times and Forms of Section 16(a) Filing Reports  
 
Section 16 of the SEA requires directors and officers of an issuer in addition to 
beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of any class of equity security to file certain 
statements with the SEC at certain times.350 Section 16(a)(2) reads:  
(2) Time of filing The statements required by this subsection shall be filed-- (A) at the time 
of the registration of such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date 
of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 12(g) (B) within 10 days after he or she 
becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, or within such shorter time as the 
Commission may establish by rule (C) if there has been a change in such ownership, or if 
such person shall have purchased or sold a security-based swap agreement involving such 
equity security, before the end of the second business day following the day on which the 
subject transaction has been executed, or at such other time as the Commission shall 
establish, by rule, in any case in which the Commission determines that such 2-day period 
is not feasible.351 
 
The SEC used its authority under Section 16 and issued Rule 16a-3 for the purpose 
of implementing the requirement of disclosure under Section 16(a).352 Rule 16a-3 imposes 
three filing forms, Forms 3, 4, and 5.353 Form 3 is the initial report that is required when a 
person occupies the status of corporate insider under Section 16.  Filing Form 3 is due on 
the same day as the effective date of the registration of securities pursuant to Section 12(g) 
of the SEA.354 In the absence of the event of the registration for securities with the SEC, 
Form 3 is due within 10 days when a person becomes a corporate insider of an issuer in 
                                               
350 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 929; Galanti, id.  
351 §16(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(2).  
352 Rule 16a-3(a), 17 C.F.R § 240.16a-3(a). 
353 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 34-46421, OWNERSHIP REPORTS AND TRADING BY OFFICERS, 
DIRECTORS AND PRINCIPAL SECURITY HOLDERS (August 27, 2002),  
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-46421.htm.  
354 §12(g) of the SEA requires issuers who have, at the end of their fiscal year, total assets of more than $10 
million and a class of equity security held of record by either: (1) 2000 person; or (2) 500 persons who are 
not accredited investors. The filings of the registration must be done within 120 days of the end of the fiscal 
year that triggers §12(g) registration requirement. §12(g)(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l. 
See HAZEN, supra note 2, at §9:3.  
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accordance to Section 16.355 Through Form 3, a corporate insider must disclose his/her 
beneficial ownership of equity securities of the issuer as required under rule 16a-1(a)(2).356  
Form 4 is filed with the SEC when there is a change regarding the beneficial 
ownership of the corporate insider of the issuer. Filing Form 4 is required by the end of the 
second business day following the execution of a transaction that results in a change.357 
Disclosure of the occurrence of a change in beneficial ownership by filing Form 4 covers 
most transactions including securities transactions between officers or directors and the 
issuer.358 This includes transactions such as issuances, cancellations, registrants, and re-
pricing of stock options.359 Section 16 corporate insiders are exempted from filing Form 4 
for certain transactions including a change in beneficial ownership or an increase or 
decrease in the number of held securities as a result of a stock split or stock dividends 
applying equally to all holders of a class of equity security.360 It also includes all pro rata 
granting of rights to all holders of the same class of equity security,361 and small 
acquisitions of the issuer’s equity security or the right to acquire the security if the security 
does not exceed $10,000 in market value.362  
                                               
355 §16(a)(2)(A)(B); Rule 16a-3(a), 17 C.F.R § 240.16a-3(a).  
356 Id.  
357 §16(a)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(2)(C). Pursuant to Rule 16a-3(g), there are two exemptions from the 
two business days requirement to disclose securities transactions that result in a change of beneficial 
ownership. The two exemptions involve transactions that a §16 corporate insider has no control over: (1) 
Rule 10b5-1 trading plans if the insider does not select the dates of trades, Rule 16a-3(g)(1), 17 C.F.R § 
240.16a-3(g)(1); and (2) discretionary transactions involving employee benefit plans when the insider also 
does not assign the dates of trades, Rule 16a-3(g)(3), 17 C.F.R § 240.16a-3(g)(3). The time of the execution 
of the transaction is deemed at the date when such insider is notified about the execution of the transaction. 
Then, the filing of Form 4 must be submitted by the end of the second business day following the date of the 
notification. Rule 16a-3(g)(2)(3), 17 C.F.R § 240.16a-3(g)(2)(3).  
358 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §13:2.  
359 Id.  
360 Rule 16a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-9(a)  
361 Rule 16a-9(b), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-9(b); See HAZEN, supra note 2, at §13:7.  
362 Rule 16a-6(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-6(a). Other exemptions include (1) transactions that only change the 
form of beneficial  ownership, Rule 16a-13, 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-13; (2) Acquisitions or dispositions of 
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Form 5 is the third form that must be filed with the SEC.363 Section 16 corporate 
insiders must file Form 5 within 45 days after the end of the issuer’s fiscal year.364 Form 5 
is used to report transactions that were not reported in Forms 3 and 4 either because these 
transactions were exempted or they were not exempted but the corporate insider did not 
disclose them in Forms 3 or 4. Form 5 must disclose all transactions in the last fiscal year, 
including exempted transactions from §16(a) and (b).365 Forms 3, 4, and 5 must be filed 
with the SEC electronically through EDGAR. If the issuer has a website, it is required to 
make the information in the forms available on the official website the day after filing with 
the SEC.366 
Section 16(b) Short-Swing Profit Liability 
 
Section 16(b) of the SEA is a statutory provision that expressly prohibits Section 
16 corporate insiders from using inside information for trading activities.367 This Section 
allows the issuer to recover profits made by the insider from speculative trading 
transactions that occur within six months, called “short-swing” profits. Congress 
determined that allowing issuers to recover these profits is the most visible and effective 
                                               
securities pursuant to a domestic relations order meeting certain condition codes, Rule 16a-12, 17 C.F.R. 
§240.16a-12; (3) Exempt transactions pursuant to tax-conditioned plans, Rule 16a-3(f)(1)(i)(B), 17 C.F.R. 
§240.16a-3(f)(1)(i)(B), and Rule 16b-3(c), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(c); (4) The disposition or closing of long 
derivative securities as a result of cancellation or expirations, Rule 16a-4(b), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-4(b); (5) 
Transactions by former officers or directors after six months of an opposite transaction subject to §16(b) or 
the transaction is exempted from the scope of §16(b), Rule 16a-2(b),  17 C.F.R. §240.16a-2(b). See WANG 
& STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 933.For more discussion about the exempted transactions from filing in 
Form 4, see HAZEN, supra note 2, at §13:7. 
363 Rule 16a-3(f), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-93(f).  
364 Id.  
365 Rule 16a-3(f)(1).  
366 §16(a)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(a)(4). See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 817, IN RE MANDATED ELEC. 
FILING & WEBSITE POSTING FOR FORMS 3, 4 & 5 (Dec. 20, 2002). For more discussion about §16(a) filing 
forms, see Hazen, supra note 88, at 564; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 928; HAZEN, supra note 2, 
at §13:2; JACOBS, supra note 259, at §2:71.  
367 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §10:1.  
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weapon against insiders’ unfair use of inside information.368 However, only private 
enforcement of this section is available, and it depends on the issuer’s willingness to seek 
payment of such ill-gotten profit. If the issuer is not willing to enforce Section 16(b) short-
swing profit liability, a shareholder, through a derivative suit, could judicially bring such a 
claim.369 Section 16(b) of the SEA reads:  
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained 
by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any 
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity 
security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) or a security-based swap 
agreement involving any such equity security within any period of less than six 
months…shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on 
the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of 
holding the security or security-based swap agreement purchased or of not repurchasing 
the security or security-based swap agreement sold for a period exceeding six months.370 
 
Section 16(b) prohibits the unfair use of inside information by Section 16 corporate 
insiders through designing straightforward liability from the gain of short-swing profits 
that have resulted from speculative trades. Short-swing profit is defined as “profit made by 
a corporate insider on the purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) of company stock within 
a six-month period.”371  This section can also be considered a prophylactic rule designed 
to find liability for misusing inside information based on an objective standard upon which 
there is no need to question the intent of the corporate insider or his/her possession of inside 
information at the time of the trades in question.372 It is important to mention that the 
liability of short-swing profits under Section 16(b) was designed to prevent Section 16 
                                               
368 SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL OF 1934, H. R. No. 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess. 13 (1934). See Id.  
369 Id; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 924. 
370 Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p.  
371 Short-swing profits, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
372 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at § 10:1; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 924; Hazen, supra note 
88, at 556.  
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corporate insiders from unfair use of inside information, but it was not meant to provide a 
compensatory remedy for the issuer.373   
Section 16(b) contains two important points that are under the scrutiny of the courts 
and the SEC: the determination of when a purchase and sale occur, and the exempted 
transactions from short-swing liability. These two issues are discussed below.  
Purchase or Sale   
 
Although Section 16(b) was designed to be straightforward liability to prevent 
insiders from unfair use of inside information, the rapid development of business 
transactions and financial instruments have led to a highly complex era where the 
determination of whether a transaction is a purchase or sale may become obscure.374  
Section 3(a)(13) of the SEA defines the terms “buy” and “purchase” as: “any contract to 
buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire.”375 In addition, Section 3(a)(14) of the SEA defines 
the terms “sale” and “sell” to mean “any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.”376 
To find a Section 16 corporate insider liable under Section 16(b), the insider must 
purchase and sell (or sell and purchase) the issuer’s securities within a six-month period. 
A purchase of securities can occur in straightforward transactions in the form of cash-for- 
stock transactions. It can also occur in the form of “unorthodox” transactions, such as the 
conversion of debt securities or exercising of options “or the exchange of one security for 
another” security.377  In addition, Section 16(b) does not require that the purchase and sale 
                                               
373 Hazen, supra note 88, at 556. 
374 JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:155.  
375 Section 3(a)(13) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(13).  
376 Section 3(a)(14) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(14). See JACOBS, supra note 93, at 
§4:155. (Finding that “the terms ‘purchase’ and ‘sale’ reach many transactions not ordinarily deemed to be a 
purchase or a sale, and go well beyond the contracts to buy or to sell referenced in the statutory definitions.”) 
See also WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 994. 
377 HAZEN, supra note 264, at 143.  
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be through the same type of security, but it covers exercisable and converted securities. For 
instance, “the purchase of a convertible debenture can be matched with the sale of common 
stock” whether or not a conversion occurs.378 The finding of purchase transactions can also 
be found when a Section 16 corporate insider acquires a derivative security, such as a call 
option; thus, this acquisition of the derivative security can be matched against the sale or 
the disposition of the same derivative security or the underlying securities if the two 
transactions occur within a six-month period.379   
Two judicial tests have evolved to establish whether a transaction is a “purchase” 
or “sale” under Section 16(b): the “objective” test and the “pragmatic” test.380 The 
objective test is defined as “a transfer that constitutes a purchase or a sale is in fact a 
statutory purchase or sale, regardless of the voluntary or involuntary nature of the exchange 
and whether or not the insider has access to inside information.”381 In early Section 16(b) 
cases, courts tended to construe the language of this section to maintain strict liability 
standards that were general and would be applied to any transactions that could be 
construed to be within the statutory meaning of the “purchase and “sale.”382 The Second 
Circuit in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,383 stated that “the language of Sec. 16(b) [] as well 
as from the Congressional hearings, [indicate] that the only remedy which its framers 
deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a liability based on an objective 
measure of proof.”384  
                                               
378 COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 950.  
379 Hazen, supra note 88, at 569. (“However, the exercise of the option at a fixed exercise price is neither a 
sale nor purchase for Section 16 purposes.” Citing 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-6.)  
380 Id.  
381 JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:155. 
382 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 995.  
383 136 F.2d 231 (1943) 
384 Id. at 235.  
 
 73 
 
The pragmatic test is applied to transactions that are in doubt under the statutory 
definition of “purchase” and “sale.”385 This type of doubtful transactions is called 
“unorthodox” transactions. However, the pragmatic test applied to unorthodox transactions 
is unclear and ill-defined.386 The pragmatic test applied to unorthodox transactions can be 
defined as: 
[A]transfer that constitutes a purchase or a sale is in fact a statutory purchase or sale unless, 
as to the subject insider, (1) the transfer was involuntary, in the sense that the insider had 
an utter inability to control the transaction, and (2) the insider neither had nor was likely to 
have had access to material inside information by virtue of his insider status.387  
 
The leading case that approved the pragmatic test was the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kern County Land Co., v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.388 The court analyzed 
the types of trading transactions and realized that traditional cash-for-stock transactions 
that result in a purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) within six months, are clearly within 
the purview of Section 16(b). However, the Supreme Court noted that the statutory 
                                               
385 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §10:11. 
386 See JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:155.; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 997, citing Tomlinson, 
Section 16: A Single Analysis of Purchase and Sales—Merging the Objective and Pragmatic Analysis, 1981 
Duke L.J. 941, 947(footnotes omitted).  
387 JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:155. See also  
388 411 U.S. 582 (1973).  The case involved Occidental Petroleum Corps (Occidental) who unsuccessfully 
attempted to acquire Kern County Land Co. (Old Kern) by a tender offer that resulted in acquiring more than 
10 percent of the outstanding shares of Old Kern. While Occidental extended its tender offer to buy additional 
shares of Old Kern, the management of Old Kern defeated the hostile takeover by agreeing to merge with 
Tenneco, Inc. (Tenneco) in which the shareholders of Old Kern would receive in exchange for each share, a 
share of Tenneco cumulative convertible preference stock. The merger formed a new company (New Kern) 
a wholly owned subsidiary of Tenneco Corp.   Because Occidental involuntary “would have to exchange its 
old shares for Tenneco stock and would be locked into monitory position in Tenneco,” Occidental negotiated 
“an arraignment with Tenneco a share of Tenneco cumulative convertible preference stock… By the terms 
of the option agreement, the option could not be exercised prior to…[A] date six months and one day after 
expiration of Occidental’s tender offer.” The option was exercised after that date and was designed to be the 
date of exercising the option. The New Kern filed a suit under §16(b) “against Occidental to recover the 
profits which Occidental had realized as a result of its dealings in Old Kern stock.” The allegation was based 
on the fact that the execution of the Occidental-Tenneco option, and the exchange of Old Kern shares for 
shares of Tenneco pursuant to the merger were both sales within the meaning of §16(b) because both of these 
events took place within six months of the date on which Occidental became a holder of more than 10 percent 
of Old Kern stock. Id. at 584-590.  
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definitions of purchase and sale “reach many transactions not ordinarily deemed a sale or 
purchase,”389 and they found that “the courts have wrestled with the question of inclusion 
or exclusion of certain ‘unorthodox’ transactions.”390 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled 
that:  
In deciding whether borderline transactions are within the reach of the statute, the courts 
have come to inquire whether the transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which 
Congress sought to prevent—the realization of short-swing profits based upon access to 
inside information—thereby endeavoring to implement congressional objectives without 
extending the reach of the statute beyond its intended limits… [T]he prevailing view is to 
apply the statute only when its application would serve its goals. ‘(W)here alternative 
constructions of the terms of s 16(b) are possible,...‘[I]n interpreting the terms ‘purchase’ 
and ‘sale,’ courts have properly asked whether the particular type of transaction involved 
is one that gives rise to speculative abuse.”391 
 
                                               
389 Id. at 593.  
390 Id. at 593. Nt. 24, the Supreme Court observed that the term “unorthodox” transaction “has been applied 
to stock conversions, exchange pursuant to mergers and other corporate reorganizations, stock 
reclassifications and dealings in options, rights, and warrants.” Citing LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION, 1069 
(2d ed. 1961). Id. At 594 Nt. 24.  
391 Id. at 594. Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court observed that the exchange of 
Old Kern stock for Tenneco stock pursuant to the merger was not a “sale” under §16(b). The Supreme Court 
observed that it is “totally unrealistic to assume or infer from the facts…[T]hat Occidental either had or was 
likely to have access to inside information, by reason of its ownership of more than 10% of the outstanding 
shares of Old Kern, so as to afford it an opportunity to reap speculative, short-swing profits from its 
disposition within six months of its tender-offer purchases.” Id. at 596. In addition, “[t]here is no basis for 
finding that, at the time the tender offer was commenced, Occidental enjoyed an insider’s opportunity to 
acquire information about Old Kern’s affairs.” Id.  Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that: “We do not 
suggest that an exchange of stock pursuant to a merger may never result in s 16(b) liability. But the 
involuntary nature of Occidental’s exchange, when coupled with the absence of the possibility of speculative 
abuse of inside information, convinces us that s 16(b) should not apply to transactions such as this one.” Id. 
at 600. In regard to the second allegation, the Supreme Court did not “find in the execution of the Occidental-
Tenneco option agreement a sufficient possibility for the speculative abuse of inside information.” Id. at 601. 
The Supreme Court realized that the mutual advantage of the agreement was clear. Occidental did not want 
to be in the position of a minority stockholder with no control and in a company that it had not chosen to 
invest in. Tenneco did not want to have a “troublesome minority stockholder that had just been vanquished 
in a fight for the control of Old Kern.” Id. Therefore the Supreme Court concluded that: “Motivations like 
these do not smack of insider trading.” Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court concluded that “the option 
agreement, as drafted and executed by the parties, offered [no] measurable possibilities for speculative 
abuse.” Id. According to the option agreement, Tenneco was not required to buy stock. Occidental could not 
benefit from the increased market value of Tenneco stock. If the fixed price fell more than $10 per share 
before the exercising date, the option may not have been exercised, and Occidental may have suffered a loss 
if the marker value of the stock continued to fall to a point where it was forced to sell. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court concluded that: “The option[] does not appear to have been an instrument with potential for speculative 
abuse, whether or not Occidental possessed inside information about the affairs of Old Kern.” Id. at 602. See 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 998; JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:156.  
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In their review of subsequent cases and scholarly commentary, Professors William 
Wang and Marc Steinberg392 concluded that the pragmatic test is “apparently” applied if 
the answer to the first of the three following questions is “yes” and the rest are answered 
“no”:  
(1) Is the transaction in question of a type that may be characterized as unorthodox? 
(2) Did the insider have control over the timing of the decision involved in the transaction?  
(3) Did the insider have access to inside information, irrespective of whether that information was 
in fact used?393 
 
Section 16(b) Exemptions  
 
Although Section 16(b) was designed objectively as a “flat-rule” to prevent gaining 
short-swing profits from speculative trading activities, Congress exempted from Section 
16(b) liability any equity securities “acquired in good faith in connection with a debt 
previously contracted.”394 Congress also exempted transactions that were executed while 
“such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale 
and purchase.”395 In addition, Section 16(d) exempted the coverage of bona fide market-
making transactions from Sections 16(a), 16(b), and 16(c).396 Section 16(e) also exempted 
foreign and domestic arbitrage transactions.397 Moreover, Congress granted the SEC the 
                                               
392 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 1004. 
393 Id.  
394 Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b); Dreiling v. Am. Exp. Co., 458 F.3d 
942, 947 (9th Cir. 2006).  
395 Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(b).  
396 Section 16(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(d); HAZEN, supra note 323, at 563. Market 
making is a “broker-dealer engaged in this practice, which is regulated by both the NASD and the SEC, buys 
and sells securities as a principal for its own account, and thus accepts two-way bids (both to buy and to 
sell).” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
397 Section 16(e) of the Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p(e). Rule 16-e-1 prohibits directors and 
officers of an issuer to engage in arbitrage transactions in any equity of such issuer, whether registered or 
not, unless they shall include such transaction in the statements required by Section 16(a) and shall account 
to such issuer for the profits arising from such transaction, as provided in Section 16(b). However, Section 
16(c), which prohibits short-selling and sales against the box, does not apply to such arbitrage transactions. 
This rule states that other than officer and directors, bona fide foreign or domestic arbitrage transactions are 
excluded from the coverage of Section 16. Therefore, the exemption includes beneficial owners of more than 
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regulatory power to exempt transactions “as not comprehended within the purpose of this 
subsection.”398 On the basis of its regulatory power granted under Section 16(b), the SEC 
considered whether specific transactions carry “significant risk of abusive insider trading 
with less informed investors,” before finalizing exemptions.399  
The SEC eventually issued several rules under Section 16(b) containing exemptions 
from short-swing profit liability for certain transactions that they are deemed to be out of 
the purpose of the statute.400 One of the most important rules under Section 16(b) is the 
requirement of the times of the two matched transactions that trigger Section 16(b) liability. 
It is noteworthy that Section 16 covers registered securities pursuant to Section 12 of the 
SEA as well as securities that have not been registered.401 That said, Section 16(b) requires 
that the beneficial owner must be in this capacity at the time of the purchase and sale 
transactions to be liable for short-swing profits.402 A transaction that makes a beneficial 
owner a holder of more than 10 percent of the issuer’s equity securities is not a covered 
transaction under Section 16(b).403 In addition, the sale of the held securities must occur 
while the beneficial owner is a holder of more than 10 percent.404 If the beneficial owner 
                                               
10 percent who are not officers or directors. Rule 16e-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.16e-1. See HAZEN, supra note 323, 
at 563. The term arbitrage means: “the simultaneous buying and selling of identical securities in different 
markets, with the hope of profiting from the price difference between those markets.” Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014).  
398Dreiling v. Am. Ex, 458 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2006); LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §10:06; HAZEN, 
supra note 323, at 562. 
399 Dreiling, 458 F.3d, at 949.  
400 Fransic J. Burke, Jr., Insider Trading Securities Violations, ABA Section of Litigation 2012 Corporate 
Counsel CLE Seminar, 29, (February 16-19, 2012) available at https://tinyurl.com/yaq83vpk.  
401 Id. (The rules under section 16 of the Act apply to any class of equity securities of an issuer whether or 
not registered under section 12 of the Act.) Id.  
402 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §10:06. 
403 Rule 16a-2(c) 17 C.F.R. §240. 16a-2(c). (“The transaction that results in a person becoming a ten percent 
beneficial owner is not subject to section 16 of the Act unless the person otherwise is subject to section 16 of 
the Act.”) Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 982.  
404 JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:153; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 984.  
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of more than 10 percent purchased and subsequently sold the held securities is a holder of 
10 percent or less and the owner continued selling the held securities, the first sale would 
be matched with the purchase executed within a six-month period, but the second separable 
sale would not be covered under Section 16(b).405 In contrast, directors and officers may 
be subject to short-swing profit liability if one of the two transactions was executed while 
they were in the position of a director or officer.406 However, transactions that occur prior 
to becoming a director or officer are exempted from Section 16 and short-swing profit 
liability.407 In contrast, transactions executed in the prior six months of the issuer going 
public under Section 12 of the SEA are covered under Section 16 including Section 16(b) 
short-swing profits.408 Moreover, when an officer or director ceases to be an officer or 
director, the subsequent transaction that occurred during the next six months from the date 
of ceasing to be in these capacities is covered under Section 16(b) under two conditions: 
“(1) [t]he executed [transaction was] within a period of less than six months of an opposite 
transaction subject to section16(b) of the Act that occurred while that person was a director 
or officer; and (2) [The executed transaction was not] otherwise exempted from section 
                                               
405 Rule 16a-2(c) 17 C.F.R. §240. 16a-2(c). (“A ten percent beneficial owner not otherwise subject to section 
16 of the Act must report only those transactions conducted while the beneficial owner of more than ten 
percent of a class of equity securities of the issuer registered pursuant to section 12 of the Act.”) Id. Even 
though this paragraph exempts them from a reporting requirement under 16(a) for transactions when a 
beneficial owner is no longer an owner of more than 10 percent, this paragraph also covers §16(b), rule 16a-
10 states that “any transaction exempted from the requirements of Section 16(a) of the Act, insofar as 
otherwise subject to the provisions of section 16(b), shall be likewise exempt from section 16(b) of the Act. 
Rule 16a-10, 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-10. See JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:153; WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 5, at 984. 
406 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §10:06. 
407 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 984. 
408 Rule 16a-2(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-2(a). (“A transaction(s) carried out by a director or officer in the six 
months prior to the director or officer becoming subject to section 16 of the Act shall be subject to section 
16 of the Act and reported on the first required Form 4 only if the transaction(s) occurred within six months 
of the transaction giving rise to the Form 4 filing obligation and the director or officer became subject to 
section 16 of the Act solely as a result of the issuer registering a class of equity securities pursuant to section 
12 of the Act.”) Id. See JACOBS, supra note 93, at §4:153; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 988.  
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16(b) of the Act.”409 This different treatment of the short-swing profit liability under 
Section 16(b) imposed on corporate insiders because of their ownership and insiders 
because of their position as directors or officers, comes from the perception that directors 
and officers have access to inside information. Therefore, their trading transactions are 
more “vulnerable” to misappropriating inside information available to them because of 
their fiduciary positions. In contrast, owners of more than 10 percent are presumed to have 
the opportunity to abuse inside information only when they have the requisite ownership 
percentage that gives them the right to influence the corporation and have access to inside 
information. When they no longer have more than 10 percent ownership, they are no longer 
subject to Section 16(b) liability because they are presumed to have no opportunity to 
acquire inside information.410  
The second major exemption from Section 16(b) coverage is the securities 
transactions that occur between a corporate director or officer and the issuer involving the 
issuer’s equity securities.411 The SEC rule 16b-3 contains four exempted transactions 
including transactions related to employee benefit plans.412 The first category of exempted 
transactions is transactions pursuant to tax-conditioned plans (other than a discretionary 
                                               
409 Rule 16a-2(b), 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-2(b). See JACOBS, id, at §4:154.  
410 This analysis of the statute is derived from the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Foremost-
McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232, 253 (1976). (“The legislative discourse revealed 
that Congress thought that all short-swing trading by directors and officers was vulnerable to abuse because 
of their intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading by mere stockholders was viewed as being 
subject to abuse only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential for access to corporate 
information. These different perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life.”) Id. See WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 983.  
411 See HAZEN, supra note 323, at 562; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 1016.  
412 This rule, however, is not available to beneficial owners of more than 10 percent who are not directors or 
officers. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 1016; COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 945.  
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transaction).413 This includes stock appreciation rights or phantom stock.414 The second 
category is discretionary transactions415 that are exempted if they are affected pursuant to 
an election by the corporate insider that is made at least six months following the date of 
the most recent “opposite way” election regarding any plan of the issuer.416 The third 
exemption involves transactions (other than a discretionary transaction) of grants/awards 
of securities and other acquisitions from the issuer by directors and officers.417  For a 
transaction to be exempted, one of three conditions must be fulfilled, (1) the transaction is 
approved by the board of directors or by a committee that is composed solely of two or 
more non-employee directors; (2) the transaction is approved or ratified at a subsequent 
date no later than the next annual meeting, by a majority of the securities of the entitled to 
vote under the applicable laws; or (3) the related security is held by the officer or director 
                                               
413 Rule 16b-3(c), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(c). Tax-conditioned plans are defined by the rule as: “Any 
transaction (other than a Discretionary Transaction) pursuant to a Qualified Plan, an Excess Benefit  Plan, or 
a Stock Purchase  Plan shall be exempt without condition.” An Excess Benefit Plan is: “an employee benefit 
plan that is operated in conjunction with a Qualified Plan, and provides only the benefits or contributions that 
would be provided under a Qualified  Plan but for any benefit or contribution limitations set forth in the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any successor provisions thereof.” Rule 16b-3(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-
3(b)(2). A Qualified Plan means: “an employee benefit plan that satisfies the coverage and participation 
requirements of sections 410 and 401(a)(26) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any successor 
provisions thereof.” Rule 16b-3(b)(4), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(b)(4). A Stock Purchase Plan means: 
“an employee benefit plan that satisfies the coverage and participation requirements of  sections 423(b)(3) 
and 423(b)(5), or  section 410, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any successor provisions thereof.” 
Rule 16b-3(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(b)(5). 
414 HAZEN, supra note 323, at 562. Stock appreciation right is: “[a] right, typically granted in tandem with a 
stock option, to be paid the option value (in cash) when exercised along with the simultaneous cancellation 
of the option.” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Phantom Stock is “[i]maginary stock that is credited 
to a corporation executive account as part of the executive’s compensation package.” Stock, Black's Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) available at West Law. Phantom stock plan is a “long-term benefit plan under 
which a corporate employee is given units having the same characteristics as the employer's stock shares. It 
is termed a ‘phantom’ plan because the employee does not actually hold any shares but instead holds the right 
to the value of those shares.” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
415 Rule 16b-3(b)(1) defines, in general, a discretionary transaction as a transaction pursuant to an employee 
benefit plan that “results in either an intra-plan transfer involving an issuer equity security fund, or cash 
distribution funded by a volitional disposition of an issuer equity security.” Rule 16b-3(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. 
§240.16b-3(b)(1). See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 1016.  
416 Rule 16b-3(f), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(f); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 1017. 
417 Rule 16b-3(d), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(d).  
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for no less than six months following the date of the acquisition.418 The last exempted 
securities transactions under SEC rule 16b-3 are transactions that involve the disposition 
to the issuer (other than a discretionary transaction).419 Transactions that involve the 
disposition to the issuer of issuer equity security are exempted from the coverage of Section 
16(b) if the disposition is approved in advance in which it meets one of the first two 
conditions of exempting acquisitions from the issuer stated in paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of 
the Rule 16a-3(d).420  
Other exemptions from the coverage of Section 16(b) short-swing profit liability 
are the acquisition and disposition of bona fide gifts and inheritance of securities. The 
acquisition or disposition of securities pursuant to a merger, reclassifications, consolidation 
in exchange for securities of a company that before such exchange owned 85 percent  or 
more of the equity securities of all other companies party to the merger or consolidation, 
or 85 percent of the combined assets of all companies undergoing a merger or 
consolidation.421 In addition, the exercise or conversion of derivative securities, other than 
the acquisition or disposition, are exempted from Section 16(b) coverage. 422 
                                               
418 Rule 16b-3(d)(1), (2), (3), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(d)(1), (2), (3). See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, 
at 1018.  
419 Rule 16b-3(e), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-3(e) 
420Either the disposition is approved by (1) “the board of directors of the issuer, or a committee of the board 
of directors that is composed solely of two or more Non-employee Directors;” or (2) “the affirmative votes 
of the holder of a majority of the securities of the issuer present, or represented, and entitled to vote at a 
meeting duly held in accordance with the applicable laws.” Rule 16b-3(d)(1), (2), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-
3(d)(1), (2). See WANG & STEINBERG, at 1021.  
421 Rule 16-b (7)(1), (2), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-(7)(1), (2); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 33-8600, 
OWNERSHIP REPORTS AND TRADING BY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND PRINCIPAL SECURITY HOLDERS, SEC. 
(Aug. 3, 2005); HAZEN, supra note 323, at 563.  
422 Rule 16-b(6)(b), 17 C.F.R. §240.16b-(6)(b). See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 1004. The 
exemptions include an increase or decrease in the number of securities held as a result of a stock split or stock 
dividend applying equally to all securities of a class, and the acquisition of rights including pre-emptive rights 
pursuant to a pro rata grant to all holders of the same class of equity security. Rule 16a-9(a),(b), 17 C.F.R. 
§240.16a-9(a),(b). In addition, the acquisition or disposition of equity securities involved in the deposits or 
withdrawals from a voting trust or deposit agreement is exempted from Section 16(b) coverage. Rule 16b-8, 
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Summary  
 
Part 2 part explores Section 16 of the SEA, which is the only U.S. statutory 
provision governing corporate insider trading. In particular, this part discusses the two 
major mechanisms that Section 16 was intended to apply: the duty to report beneficial 
ownership under subdivision (a) of Section 16 and the private liability for gaining short-
swing profits under subdivision (b) of this section.   
Section 16 defines corporate insiders to include directors, certain officers, and 
beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of equity security of an issuer registered 
pursuant to Section 12 of the SEA. The SEC’s determination of these insiders focused on 
whether a person has actual or potential control over the issuer that allows such a person 
to have legal access to inside information. The requirement of disclosure of security 
ownership imposed upon corporate insiders goes beyond what these insiders actually own 
but includes any equity security in which they have or share an economic interest including 
securities held by immediate family members. Corporate insiders are required to report in 
a timely manner once they become subject to Section 16 and when there is a change in 
their beneficial ownership.  
Corporate insiders are deemed civilly liable under Section 16(b) when they gain 
short-swing profits realized from the purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) within a six-
month period. However, there are several exemptions from such liability because of the 
nature of the two matched transactions where one of the transactions involves a 
                                               
17 C.F.R. §240.16b-8. The acquisition of securities resulting from the reinvestment of dividends or interest 
on securities of the same issuer is also exempted from section 16 including §16(b) coverage if the plan is 
made for the regular reinvestment of dividends or interest and the plan provides for broad-based participation, 
does not discriminate in favor of employees of the issuer, and operates on substantially the same terms for 
all plan participants. Rule 16a-11, 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-11.  For more discussion about the exemptions from 
the coverage of §16(b) see also HAZEN, supra note 323, at 563; Burke, supra note 400, at 29.  
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nontraditional purchase or sale, or other transactions that are deemed not to involve abusive 
trading conduct by the insider. 
While Section 16 was designed to prevent corporate insiders from abusing their 
privy position inside the issuer by using inside information for personal benefit in breach 
of their fiduciary duty, Section 16 does not prohibit insiders from trading on the basis of 
inside information. The next part discusses this issue of whether corporate insiders are 
prohibited from having an informational advantage over public investors by trading on 
material non-public information while such information has not been publicly disclosed.  
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Part 3. Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Regulations 
 
Introduction  
 
Unlike many countries, the United States has no statutory provisions that expressly 
prohibit corporate insiders or their tippees from trading in their corporations’ stock on the 
basis of material non-public information.423 Nevertheless, the regulation of illegal 
corporate insider trading has been a concern for judicial theories and administrative rules 
along with congressional attempts to expressly rationalize and regularize the prohibition of 
this type of trading.424 In 1988, Congress considered enacting a statutory definition for 
illegal corporate insider trading but decided to avoid codifying such a definition because 
                                               
423 See Painter et al., supra note 257, 211; Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of 
Fiduciary Principles, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1315, 1366 (2009). 
424 The United States Congress has attempted to regulate illegal corporate insider trading multiple times, but 
none of these attempts have been successful. Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 
and Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 to fill the gap in important aspects under 
corporate illegal insider trading law and to increase the sanctions for violations. However, Congress did not 
offer a definition to explain the illegal conduct and the persons subject to the prohibition. In 1987, the Senate 
and the House proposed bills to define illegal insider trading. In the Insider Trading Prevention Act of 1987, 
H.R. 1238, 100th Cong. (1987), and Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987). 
However, the SEC and the Senate and House were divided on whether contemporaneous traders have private 
right of action against illegal insider trading or if it is only a criminal act. They also disagreed about whether 
an insider must use the inside information in his trade or if it is enough that the insider is in possession of 
such information. This attempt did not produce legislative action. See Cindy A. Schipani; H. Nejat Seyhun, 
Defining Material, Nonpublic: What Should Constitute Illegal Insider Information, 21 Fordham J. Corp. & 
Fin. L. 335 (2016). In 2015, there were two bills. One was introduced in the House, Ban Insider Trading Act 
of 2015, and the other one was introduced in the Senate, Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act of 2015. The 
proposed legislation in the House proposed an amendment to Section 10 of the SEA to make it unlawful 
under a new paragraph (d) (1) for any person to purchase or sell any security on the basis of material inside 
information that is not available to the public. The bill also states that nothing in this bill may be construed 
to effect liability under section 10(b). The bill defines “inside information” as information that is (1) non-
public; (2) obtained illegally, directly or indirectly from an issuer with an expectation of confidentiality or 
that such information only be used for a legitimate business purpose; or (3) in violation of a fiduciary duty. 
The Ban Insider Trading Act, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. §(a) (2015) The other bill introduced in the Senate 
makes “it unlawful for any person to: (1) purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any security on the 
basis of material information that the person knows or has reason to know is not publicly available; or (2) 
knowingly or recklessly communicate material information that the person knows or has reason to know is 
not publicly available to any other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
communication is likely to result in a violation of this prohibition.” The Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, 
S.702, 114th Cong. (2015). For more discussion about the two bills, see Shannon Seaforth, No More Quid 
Pro Quo: Abandoning the Personal Benefit Requirement in Insider Trading Law, 50 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 
175, 201 (2016).  
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of the negative effect. It “could potentially be narrowing,” and used as a blueprint to evade 
the law by unscrupulous traders.425 Congress also noticed that the courts had drawn the 
parameters of illegal corporate insider trading and established clear guidelines and widely 
known principles for the vast majority of traditional illegal corporate insider trading 
cases.426 
The law that governs illegal corporate insider trading is a judge-made law on the 
basis of the interpretation of broad language under Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-
5, promulgated thereunder. Section 10(b) reads as follows:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange…(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered or 
any securities based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commissions may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.427  
 
Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, b. To make 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.428 
 
The absence of an express statutory provision regulating illegal corporate insider 
trading resulted in the lack of a statutory definition to determine the prohibited conduct and 
                                               
425 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
to the Whole House on the State of the Union, 100-910, 10th 2d Cong. (1988), at 11. 
426 Id.  See Roberta S. Karmel, the Law on Insider Trading Lacks Needed Definition, 68 SMU L. Rev. 757, 
766 (2015); Oliver Perry Colvin, A Dynamic Definition of and Prohibition Against Insider Trading, 31 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 603-617 (1991). For more discussion about legislative recommendations by 
commentators, see Painter et al., supra note 257, at 200.  
427 15 U.S.C.A. §78j.  
428 17 C.F.R. § 240. 
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what constitutes material non-public information.429 As a result, there are several theories 
about who is subject to the prohibition of trading on the basis of material non-public 
information along with divided opinions about the extent of this prohibition. In fact, the 
prohibition of trading on the basis of material non-public information has been expanded 
to cover not only corporate insiders, but also outsiders who are strangers to the corporation 
and its shareholders.430  
Although nothing in the language of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 refers to the 
imposition of prohibition upon corporate insiders or others to trade on the basis of material 
non-public information, the SEC, at first and later the courts, construed Rule 10b-5 as it 
prohibits this trading conduct. In particular, it establishes a practice that operates or would 
operate as fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.431 
This part seeks to determine the regulations of illegal corporate insider trading in 
the United States federal securities laws. It begins with a discussion of the language of 
Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-5 and how the language of Rule 10b-5 has been 
interpreted to prohibit corporate insiders and their tippees from trading on material non-
public information. This part goes on to determine who is subject to the prohibition of 
illegal corporate insider trading by examining the judicial insider trading theories. In most 
instances, these theories constitute the law about illegal corporate insider trading. This part 
follows the discussion of the definition of material non-public information based on the 
judicial and administrative determination and the required level of a “culpable state of 
mind” regarding knowledge about material non-public information.  
                                               
429 See Painter et al., at 211.  
430 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:160.  
431 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-223 (1980).  
 86 
 
Early Development of the Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Doctrine 
 
Corporate illegal corporate insider trading was developed in case-law before the 
enactment of the federal securities laws in 1930s. Therefore, a brief overview of the early 
common law opinions regarding corporate insider trading with shareholders without the 
disclosure of material non-public information can help us to understand the background of 
the development of the law under Rule 10b-5.432  
Common Law Action for Deceit—Non-disclosure433  
 
To make a claim under common law tort action for deceit,434 the allegation must 
show that the defendant has intentionally misrepresented a material fact or non-complete 
true statement that made the statement misleading (half-truth).435 However, the mere non-
disclosure of a material fact was not actionable under common law action for deceit unless 
                                               
432 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:2.  
433 Common law means: “The body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or 
constitutions.” Common Law, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
434 In torts law, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation are used interchangeably as the name of the economic 
tort. DOBBS ET AL, supra note 206, at 1117.  
435 The other elements of the common law action for deceit are as follows: The false statement was with the 
intent to induce reliance in the representation; the plaintiff acted in reliance on the false statement which was 
justified to rely on; and the false statement was the proximate cause of resulting pecuniary harm to the 
plaintiff. DOBBS ET AL, supra note 206, at 1118.  The Restatement (First) of Torts, states that “[o]ne who 
fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another 
to act or refrain from action in reliance thereon in a business transaction is liable to the other for the harm 
caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 525 
(1938). The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides a similar definition of fraud. It states that “[o]ne who 
fraudulently makes a material misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law, for the purpose of inducing 
another to act or refrain from acting, is subject to liability for economic loss caused by the other’s justifiable 
reliance on the misrepresentation.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 9 TD No 2 
(2014). See, DOBBS ET AL, at 1118, Nt. (45); Loss, Supra note 266, at 1430; Ellen Virginia Hines, A New 
Concept of Fraud on the Securities Exchange—A Comment on In Re Cady Roberts & Co., 15 S. C. L. Rev. 
557, 568 (1962); MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW, 79 (4th ed. 2016). citing Hanson v. Ford 
Motor CO., 278 F.2d 586, 590-91 (8th Cir. 1960). (“A person is liable for fraud if he makes a false 
representation of a past or existing material fact susceptible of knowledge, knowing it to be false, or as of his 
own knowledge without knowing whether it is true or false, with intention to induce the person to whom it 
is made to act in reliance upon it, or under such circumstances that such person is justified in acting in reliance 
upon it, and such person is thereby deceived and induced to act in reliance upon it, to his pecuniary damage.” 
Id.  
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there was a duty to disclose arising from a fiduciary or confidential relationship between 
the parties in question.436 Finding that a non-disclosure of a material fact was a fraud 
because of the fiduciary or confidential relationship (constructive fraud) between the 
parties was even narrower and more limited and did not cover all fiduciary or confidential 
relationships.437  
In the corporate context, three opinions divided the courts on whether the 
relationship between the corporate insiders and shareholders was sufficient to impose a 
duty to disclose when corporate insiders deal in their corporations’ stock with the 
shareholders.438 The first opinion was the majority opinion or what was described as the 
“strict” rule.439 The majority opinion in common law found that corporate insiders have a 
                                               
436 The Restatement (First) of Torts states that: “(1) One who fails to disclose to another a thing which he 
knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the 
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter which he has failed to 
disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in 
question. (2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the 
other before the transaction is consummated (a) such matter as the other is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.” Restatement (First) of Torts § 551 
(1938). Under common law fraud, there were other scenarios that impose a duty to disclose but were 
distinguished from mere “non-disclosure.”  Professor Werdner Page Keeton enumerated three fact-situations 
that courts found as a failure to disclose actionable under common law fraud and were distinguished from 
mere “non-disclosure.” These fact-situations are: (1) active concealment which constitutes both words and 
acts for the purpose of preventing “the other from ascertaining some material fact which he would have 
discovered had it not been for the interference”; (2) failing to correct statements which were true statements 
when it was made but it is, subsequently, discovered to be false, or they were false but the representor did 
not know that the statement was false; (3) when good faith requires one to correct a misrepresentation made 
by third persons. W. Page Keeton, Fraud – Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 3 Current Legal Thought 315 
(1937) citing McGinn v. McGinn, 50 R.I. 278, 146 Atl. 626 (1929), O’Leary v. Tillinghast, 22 R.I.161, 46 
Atl. 754 (1900), and Aortson v. Ridgway, 181 III, 23 (1856). In this regard, the Restatement (First) of Torts 
imposed a duty to disclose of “(b) any subsequently acquired information which he recognizes as making 
untrue or misleading a previous representation which when made was true or believed to be so, (c) the falsity 
of a misrepresentation which when made was not made for the purpose of its being acted upon if he 
subsequently ascertains that the other is about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him.” 
Restatement (First) of Torts § 551 (1938). See also LOSS, supra note 266, at 1434.  
437 Keeton, at supra note 436, at 317. 
438 See LOSS, supra note 266, at 1446; Hines, supra note 435, at 561; Roberts Walker, The Duty of Disclosure 
by a Director purchasing Stock from his Stockholders, 32 Yale L. J. 637 (1923); LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, 
at §2:2; Keeton, at 317.  
439 LOSS, supra note 266, at 1446; Hines, at 561. 
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fiduciary duty to disclose material non-public information to the shareholder only when 
they deal with the shareholders on behalf of the corporation.440 However, corporate insiders 
do not have a fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders individually.441 Thus, they are not 
under a duty to disclose material non-public information when they personally trade in the 
corporation’s stock with the shareholders unless they engage in affirmative 
misrepresentation, half-truth, or active concealment.442 The second opinion in common law 
was the minority opinion or the “fiduciary” rule.443 This opinion stated that corporate 
insiders assume fiduciary duty when they deal with the corporate shareholders. Therefore, 
they must make a full disclosure of material facts that are not readily available to the 
shareholder.444 The third opinion in common law was the “special circumstances” 
                                               
440 LOSS, supra note 266, at 1446; Hines, at 561; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:2.  
441 Id.  
442 The major case for this opinion is Carpenter V. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). (The 
Supreme Court of New York stated that directors are in a trust relation with the stockholders “only to the 
management of the general affairs of the corporation, with a view to dividends of profit, and therefore that 
the trust relation between the stockholder and director extended no further.” Id.  The court concluded that the 
sale of stock by a shareholder to a director is not subject to the trust relation between them requiring the 
director to disclose every fact known to him to the seller because there is no confidential relation between 
the stockholder and director. The sale of the shareholder’s stock “was not the subject of trust between them, 
nor had the trust relation between them any connection with the shareholder’s stock, except so far as the good 
or bad management of the general affairs of a corporation by its directors, indirectly affects the value of its 
stock .”) Id. 
443 LOSS, supra note 266, at 1446; Hines, supra note 435, at 562; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:2.  
444 The major case for this opinion was Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903). (The Supreme 
Court of Georgia found that the fact that corporate directors are trustees for the corporation and all 
shareholders collectively does not mean that they do not have fiduciary duty to disclose to shareholders 
individually. The Court ruled that each stockholder has undivided interest in the property of the corporation. 
Therefore, “[t]he fact that he must serve the company does not warrant him in becoming the active and 
successful opponent of…who in the last analysis are the real parties at interest. No process of reasoning and 
no amount of argument can destroy the fact that the director is, in a most important and legitimate sense, 
trustee for the stockholder.” Id., at 233.  The Court described inside information as “a quasi asset of the 
company and the shareholder is as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of an asset as to any other 
regularly entered on the list of the company’s holding.” Id., at 234. The Court held that if the inside 
information at the hand of the director is “of a character calculated to affect the selling price,” the director 
must make a full disclosure before dealing with the shareholders, and if the director is under an obligation to 
the corporation to not disclose such information, the director must refrain from dealing with the shareholders.) 
Id.   
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doctrine.445 This doctrine was adopted by some courts as an “in-between decision”446 which 
held that even though corporate insiders are not in a fiduciary relationship with the 
shareholders individually, they have a duty to disclose to the shareholders with whom they 
deal when special facts in regard to the value of the shares are present.447 It is important to 
mention that the common law majority opinion has emerged into the special circumstances 
doctrine.448 In addition, the “special circumstances” doctrine and the later majority rule 
treated the relationship between corporate insiders and shareholders as a special type of 
relationship that is not fiduciary in character and is also different from the relationship 
between arm’s length traders.449  
                                               
445 LOSS, supra note 266, at 1447; Hines, supra note 435, at 562; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:2. 
446 Loss, at 1447.  
447 The major case for this opinion was Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). (The United Sates Supreme 
Court found that a defendant (a corporate director and manager) who purchased the plaintiff shares without 
disclosing an extreme profitable contract and concealed his identity in which the shares were artificially 
bought by his agent “was fraudulent because the director concealed from the plaintiff’s agent facts affecting 
the value of the stock which the defendant was in good faith bound to reveal.” Id., at 422 The special facts 
were that the defendant was a director of the corporation, the owner of three-fourth of the shares in the 
company, the general manager of the company, and he was leading the negotiations that led to the sale of the 
only valuable assets of the company which was the company’s lands at a price that resulted in the increase 
of the value of the stock. The defendant was acting in this negotiation as an owner in his part of the company 
and as an agent of the other shareholders. The details of the deal and its probability was unknown to any 
other shareholders except the director. In addition, the director concealed his identity from the plaintiff to 
avoid any affirmative misrepresentation and the concealment continued by giving a check from a third person 
for the purchase money. Id.at 431-32. While agreeing that corporate directors do not owe fiduciary duty to 
individual shareholders in regard to their shares in the corporation, the Supreme Court concluded that “under 
the circumstances detailed, there was a legal obligation on the part of the defendant to make these 
disclosures.” Id. at 434. See LOSS, supra note 266, at 1447.  
448 The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 508 (1925), emphasized that the 
general rule is that directors do not have fiduciary duty when they deal directly with the shareholders, and 
the mere non-disclosure of material facts without more is not sufficient to constitute fraud. However, the 
Court ruled that this general rule is subject to modification in certain exceptional circumstances. The Court 
defined this exceptional modification to the general rule as: “special circumstances producing exceptional 
cases seem to be an assured sale, merger, or other fact or condition enhancing the value of the stock, known 
by the officer or officers, not known by the stockholder, and not to be ascertained by an inspection of the 
books. Id.  
449 LOSS, at 1446. (Professor Loss commented about Strong v. Repide by stating that “’special circumstances’ 
were found in this case…because the defendant was entrusted with the negotiation to sell the corporate assets, 
but certainly if he had not been a director he never would have had an affirmative duty to make disclosure.”) 
Id. See Hines, supra note 435, at 563. 
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Early Development of Illegal Insider Trading under Rule 10b-5 
 
Section 10(b) is a broad statutory provision that Congress added to the SEA as a 
powerful weapon to catch all types of deceptive and manipulative practices that were 
known before the enactment of the SEA or thereafter. However, the legislative history of 
Section 10(b) does little to exhibit the intention of Congress over its extent or the meaning 
of its terms.450 The available legislative history shows that the addition of this section was 
to empower the SEC to confront new types of manipulative or deceptive practices that 
emerged so it would not have any regulatory obstacles because of some restricted statutory 
provisions within the SEA.451  
After enacting the SEA, Section 10(b) remained a non-operative section in that it 
depended on the SEC regulatory authority to operate Section 10(b).452 This section granted 
the SEC the regulatory power to issue rules and regulations that prohibit any deceptive or 
manipulative practices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.453 Eventually, 
in 1942, the SEC used its regulatory power and issued regulations under Section 10(b), 
                                               
450 The earlier draft of Seciton10(b) of the SEA was inserted as subsection (c) under Section 9 which was a 
broader version than the current one. Section 9(c) focused solely on prohibiting the use of manipulative 
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The older version read “(c) To use or employ 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange any device 
or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner which the Commission may by its 
rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors.” Stock 
Exchange Regulation: H.R. 7852, 73D Cong 2nd Sess. Section 9(c)(1934). LOSS, supra note 266, at 1424; 
WILLIAM H. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 254 (1979). 
451 The only legislative piece disclosed that Section 10(b) was that “of course subsection () (b) is a catch-all 
clause to prevent manipulative devices I do not think there is any objection to that kind of clause. The 
commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices.” Stock Exchange Regulation 
Hearings before House Committee on Interstate & Foreign commerce on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, a draftsman of the Statute) [H.R. 7852 and 
H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.]. The Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. V. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 
473 Nt (13) (1977), stated that: “The only specific reference to § 10 in the Senate Report on the 1934 Act 
merely states that the section was ‘aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been 
demonstrated to fulfill no useful function.’.” Id. Citing S.Rep.No.792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). 
452 PAINTER, supra note 450, at 254. 
453 Id; LOSS, supra note 266, at 1426. 
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Rule 10b-5.454 The apparent purpose of the issuance of this rule was to close a legal 
loophole within the SEA.455 The gap was that there was no provision within the SEA that 
prohibited fraudulent purchases of securities by any person other than brokers and 
dealers.456 The SEC clarified its motivation behind the promulgation of Rule 10b-5 in the 
release of its decision stating that:  
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a rule 
prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities. The 
previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers 
and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered 
by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they 
engage in fraud in their purchase.457 
 
As Milton V. Freeman the drafter of the rule described, the goal of enacting this 
rule was that “a very simple Rule…outlaws fraud in securities transactions.”458 However, 
corporate illegal corporate insider trading was not considered nor was it intended to be 
prohibited under Rule 10b-5.459  
The development of Rule 10b-5 was not consistent or clear from the beginning due 
to the simplicity of the intent of the drafters of this rule.460 In subsequent years after the 
                                               
454 Id.  
455 Id. 
456 LOSS, at 1426.  
457 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 3230, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (May. 21, 1942), 
 http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1940/1942_0521_SEC_PR_
RuleX_10b5.pdf. The story of the purpose of enacting Rule 10b-5 was retold by the drafter of the Rule, 
Milton Freeman. Mr. Freeman was working as an assistant solicitor at the SEC, in 1942.  He asserted that the 
purpose of promulgating Rule 10b-5 was as a reaction to a Boston company president who was purchasing 
shares from the shareholders and telling them that the company was doing badly, but, in truth, it was not. Mr. 
Freeman stated that I was asked what to do to prevent such a practice. With help from some SEC staff, he 
drafted Rule 10b-5. Mr. Freeman said that: “I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put 
them together.” The only discussion that SEC staff had about Rule 10b-5 was where the phrase “in connection 
with the purchase or sale” should be placed. The staff agreed that it should be at the end of the rule. Milton 
V. Freeman, Administrative procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 921 (1966). See Painter et al., supra note 257, at 
160 Nt. 29. 
458 Milton V. Freeman, Foreword, 61 Fordham, L. Rev. S1, S5 (1993).  
459 Painter et al., supra note 257, at 160 Nt. 29) 
460 PAINTER, supra note 450, at 254. 
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issuance of Rule 10b-5, judges and lawyers interacted with this rule based on the already 
established rules under common law fraud or tort action for deceit.461 These rules were 
established because anti-fraud provisions were built essentially on common law action for 
deceit, and were due to the novelty of these statutory provisions.462 However, courts also 
considered that even though Rule 10b-5 was found to be built on common law fraud, the 
definition of fraud under Rule 10b-5 is not limited to actionable fraud circumstances that 
arise under common law.463 Nevertheless, the boundaries of circumstances that can be 
classified as fraudulent practices under Rule 10b-5 were not clear at that time.464 
In the 1960s, the development of Rule 10b-5 was influenced by a notable legal 
movement advocating for a federal intervention to protect investors by regulating the 
relationship between corporate management and shareholders.465 In particular, they urged 
lawmakers to prevent corporate insiders from taking unfair advantage of their position at 
the expense of corporate shareholders.466 They called for a broad interpretation of Rule 
10b-5 to outlaw not only ordinarily fraudulent practices as established in common law 
fraud, but also unfair corporate transactions including a breach of fiduciary duty by 
corporate insiders when they deal in the corporation’s stock with the shareholders.467 
                                               
461 LOSS, supra note 266, at 1430. 
462 Id.  
463 Id.at 1435.  
464 LOSS, supra note 266, at 1435. (Professor Luis Loss suggested that the determination of how much further 
Rule 10b-5 could go beyond common law action for deceit “is difficult to say definitely.” Id. Professor Loss 
found that the basic problems that arise under Rule 10b-5 are similar to the issues that arise under common 
law action for deceit and he suggested that: “It seems reasonable to assume at the very least that the most 
liberal common law views on these questions should govern under the statutes.” Id. Professor Loss 
enumerated three basic problems that arise under both common law action for deceit and Rule 10b-5. These 
problems are the determination of (1) what is false; (2) what is fact; and (3) what is material.) Id. 
465 PAINTER, supra note 450, at 255. 
466 Id.  
467 See Id; Hines, supra note 435, at 565. (Professor Hines suggested that “[t]he anti-fraud provisions, 
especially Rule 10b-5, provide a broad framework within which the courts and the Securities Exchange 
Commission may prohibit any practice or device which they might deem unfair.” Id.  
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However, most parts of this broad approach were defeated by multiple decisions from the 
United States Supreme Court.468 Specifically, the Supreme Court established a clear and 
sharp rule for one of the most repeated and critical problems that arose under the discussion 
of the scope of Rule 10b-5 regarding corporate mismanagement’s conduct and breach of 
fiduciary duty by directors and managers.469 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. V. Green,470 the 
Supreme Court ruled that a breach of corporate insider’s fiduciary duty can be actionable 
under Rule 10b-5 only if the breach also constitutes deception or manipulation in 
                                               
468 PAINTER, supra note 450, at 256; Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 42 Sta. L. Rev. 385(1990). See for e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, (U.S. 
1952). (The United States Supreme Court stated that minority shareholders do not have a standing to sue 
under Rule 10b-5 for an allegation regarding the control sale by a director of a corporation and its controlling 
shareholder that was alleged to result in the breach of fiduciary duty and certain misrepresentations by the 
director. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations since they were not purchasers or sellers of 
the securities in question. The Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen Congress intended to protect the 
stockholders of a corporation against a breach of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders, it left no doubt as to 
its meaning. Thus Section 16(b) of the Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. 78p(b) expressly gave the corporate issuer 
or its stockholders a right of action against corporate insiders using their position to profit in the sale or 
exchange of corporate securities. The absence of a similar provision in Section 10(b) strengthens the 
conclusion that that section was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually 
associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate 
affairs, and that Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.”) Id.at 464; 
Superintendent of Insurance. Of States of N/Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). (The United 
States Supreme Court found that when a corporation was duped into selling its stock by a fraudulent scheme 
by its president and others it has standing to sue under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 since “there was a ‘sale’ 
of a security and since fraud was used ‘in connection with’ it, there is redress under s 10(b).” Id.at 12. The 
Supreme Court, in this case held, basically, that the form of fraud or deception must be in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security whether the form of fraud committed was usually associated with the 
purchase or sale of a security or was a new type of fraudulent scheme disregarding whether the new type also 
involves a breach of fiduciary duty which gives the plaintiff the right to seek state remedy.) Id.at 10, Nt (7); 
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. V. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). (The Supreme Court rejected the allegation that a 
breach of fiduciary duty by majority shareholders by unfairly appraising the minority shareholders’ stock in 
a squeeze-out merger is actionable under Rule 10b-5. The Supreme Court found that mismanagement and 
breach of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders alone is not enough to find deceptive or manipulative conduct 
under Rule 10b-5. Id. at 476. The Supreme Court rejected the proposition of the Court of Appeals and the 
plaintiff that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrepresentation, 
or nondisclosure violates the statute and Rule 10b-5. Id. In regard to the rejection of finding a manipulative 
practice in the allegation of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court stated that “[n]o doubt Congress meant to 
prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices. But we do not 
think it would have chosen this ‘term of art’ if it had meant to bring with the scope of s 10(b) instances of 
corporate mismanagement such as this, in which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated 
unfairly by a fiduciary.” Id. at 477.  
469 PAINTER, supra note 450, at 255.  
470 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
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connection with the purchase or sale of a security.471 In summary, the Supreme Court has 
limited the scoop of Rule 10b-5 to be strictly interpreted in light of the specific terms under 
Section 10(b) which prohibits only the use of deceptive or manipulative devices in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The Supreme Court also provided that 
mismanagement and a breach of fiduciary duty without misrepresentation or full non-
disclosure is not considered deceptive conduct under Rule 10b-5.472  
The SEC Declared that Trading on Material Non-Public Information Is Fraud—
The Abstain or Disclose Doctrine  
 
The turning point in the history of illegal corporate insider trading was when 
William L. Carry became the chairman of the SEC on March 27, 1961.473 In the 1960s, 
Chairman Carry was one of the main players in the legal movement, which was advocating 
for strong “self-restraint and accountability” in corporate law and securities markets.474 
The concept was that insiders who have access to inside information should be prevented 
from pursuing self-interest by abusing inside information in violation of their responsibility 
                                               
471 See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. (The Supreme Court in this case stated plainly that the language of Section 
10(b) controls the interpretation of Rule 10b-5. In addition, the Court stated that the SEC was given authority 
to “adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute,” Id. at 472, not the 
power to make law. Id. Then, the Supreme Court stated that: “‘When a statute speaks so specifically in terms 
of manipulation and deception, . . . and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite 
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute . . ..’ Thus the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint 
states a cause of action under any part of Rule 10b-5 only if… the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 
‘manipulative or deceptive’ within the meaning of the statute.”) Id. at 473.  
472 See Id; Thel, supra note 468, at 386.  
473 The Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm; Langevoort, supra note 49, at 1329. 
474 Langevoort, id. See also Louis Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate 
“Insiders” in the United States, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, 34 (1970) (Advocating against 
insiders trades on the basis of inside information, Professor Loss suggested that the SEA has to develop a 
dominant theme in two aspects “the prevention of market manipulation and the regulation of insider trading”. 
Professor Loss illustrated the morality reason underlying the prohibition of trading on inside information by 
telling a story of a female law student, which professor Loss described as having “had a healthier reaction to 
insider trading than her professor when she stamped her foot and declaimed “I don’t care; it’s just not right.”) 
Id. at 35-37.  
 
 95 
 
as fiduciaries. In addition, illegal corporate insider trading should be prohibited because of 
its inherent unfairness that would undermine investors’ confidence in the integrity and 
honesty of the securities markets.475 The chairman of the SEC found that state corporate 
law was inadequate to provide the right protection for investors. Therefore, he wanted to 
create a federal fiduciary responsibility law under Rule 10b-5 that would prohibit trading 
on the basis of inside information based on the justification of protecting investors’ 
confidence in the securities markets.476  
While the common law majority continued to refuse to impose fiduciary duty to 
disclose inside information on corporate insiders when they traded in their corporations’ 
stock in the exchange,477 in 1961, the SEC, through its administrative-judicial power, 
issued, In the Matter of Cady, Reports& Co, an enforcement action against a broker-dealer 
for trading on the basis of inside information without disclosure to the public.478 The SEC’s 
decision created a novel approach to prohibition of conduct or practice that was predicated 
                                               
475 Langevoort, Id. at 1928; Hines, supra note 435, at 570.  
476 See Loss, supra note 50, at 44; William L. Carry et al, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. Law. 1009, 1010 
(1966). (William Cary suggested that: “Everyone representing management may tend to forget the underlying 
importance of the stockholder in the capital market. We sometimes forget that integrity in the capital markets 
is essential for mass capitalism.”) Id. 
477 Langevoort, supra note 49, at 1321; Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the 
Common Law, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 845, 847 (1982). Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 MASS. 358, 186 N.E. 659 
(1933). The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that directors of corporations have a duty of trust to their 
corporations in which they are bound to operate its business and property with good faith, but do not stand 
in a relation of trust to individual stockholders, and the mere silence in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities in an impersonal market does not result in a breach of duty of trust. Id. at 358, 361. See also, 
Carpenter V. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868). The Supreme Court of New York stated that 
directors are in a trust relation with the stockholders “only to the management of the general affairs of the 
corporation, with a view to dividends of profit, and therefore that the trust relation between the stockholder 
and director extended no further.” Id. The court concluded that the sale of stock by a shareholder to a director 
is not subject to the trust relation between them requiring the director to disclose every fact known to him to 
the seller because there is no confidential relation between the stockholder and director. The sale of the 
shareholder’s stock “was not the subject of trust between them, nor had the trust relation between them any 
connection with the shareholder’s stock, except so far as the good or bad management of the general affairs 
of a corporation by its directors, indirectly affects the value of its stock.” Id.  
478 Cady, Roberts & Co., Re, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The writer of the opinion of the SEC its chairman, William 
Cary. See Id.at 1.  
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on the broad language of Rule 10b-5(c). It established that trading with nondisclosure of 
possessed inside information by persons having access to such information is an “act, 
practice or course of business’ operating ‘as a fraud or deceit’”479  
The facts of this enforcement action involved a broker-dealer, Robert M. Gintel, a 
selling broker and a partner of Cady, Roberts &Co, who sold a large number of shares of 
Curtiss-Wright Company for discretionary accounts based on inside information he 
received from his partner and a director of Curtiss-Wright, J. Cheever Cowdin. The 
information received was about the company’s board of directors’ decision to reduce the 
dividends for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year of 1959. During the board of directors 
meeting, Cowdin informed Gintel about the upcoming reduction in dividends. However, 
the transformation for public disclosure by the company about the reduction was delayed 
for a short time because of a typing problem in their telegram. During this time, Gentel was 
able to sell a large number of shares for discretionary accounts before the news about the 
reduction of dividends was publicly disclosed.480  
The SEC interpreted Rule 10b-5 as follows: it offers a broad remedy for fraudulent 
activities whether or not such activities are actionable under common law action for deceit. 
The SEC suggested that: “the securities acts may be aid to have generated a wholly new 
and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law.”481 The SEC declared that the 
justification of making trading on inside information illegal was is enhance the regulations 
to protect investors. It stated that:  
                                               
479 Insider Liability under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 121, 122 (1962); See also Hines, supra note 435, at 557-58; Langevoort, supra note 49, at 1319.  
480 Cady, Roberts & Co., Re, 40 S.E.C. 907, at 2 (1961). (Gintel was suspended form exchange for 20 days 
and fined $3,000.) Id. 
481 Id. at 3. 
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So many times that citation is unnecessary, we have indicated that the purchase and sale of 
securities is a field in special need of regulation for the protection of investors. To this end 
one of the major purposes of the securities acts is the prevention of fraud, manipulation or 
deception in connection with securities transactions.482  
 
While noting that the duty to disclose inside information was traditionally required 
on corporate directors, officers, and controlling shareholders, the SEC noted that these 
persons do not exhaust the classes of persons that the duty to disclose could be imposed 
upon.483 Rule 10b-5 is phrased in terms of “any person.”484 Thus, the SEC, then, based the 
obligation of a duty to disclose non-public information or refrain from trading in the related 
security on two elements: (1) the existence of a relationship giving access to information 
that was intended to be available only for a corporate purposes and not for the personal 
benefit of anyone; and (2) the existence of inherent unfairness involved where a party takes 
advantage of non-public information knowing it to be unavailable to those with who the 
party is dealing.485 The SEC, however, neglected to explain how these elements are derived 
from Rule 10b-5 since the text of Rule 10b-5 does not refer to these requisites.486 The SEC 
responded by saying:  
In considering these elements under the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions we are 
not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications. Thus our task here is 
to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its 
internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy 
demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited.487 
                                               
482 Id. 
483 Id.at 4.  
484 Id.  
485Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C, at3. 
486 A.C. Pritchard, The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider Trading, 69 Stan. L. Rev. Online 55, 57 
(2016-2017).  
487 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C, at 4. Professor Donald C. Langevoort clarified the SEC’s decision by finding 
that: “The decision implicitly relies on the insider's duty to act affirmatively to prevent the other party's 
disadvantageous trade, apparently based on the duty of loyalty. In theory, had disclosure been made to the 
public, marketplace buyers or sellers would not have traded (at least not at that price). By so stating the duty 
to disclose and resulting marketplace harm, the unfair conduct could be treated as a fraud, which would 
satisfy the statutory prerequisite for rule 10b-5 liability.” Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the 
Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, California Law Review, Vol, 1,  6 (1982).   
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The SEC based its decision upon the common-law minority’s opinion, which 
requires corporate insiders to disclose inside information in face-to-face transactions.488 
However, the SEC broadened the minority’s opinion to also be applied in impersonal 
transactions undertaken in securities exchange markets, and upon any person who is in a 
special relationship with the issuer of a security.489 The SEC described the common-law 
minority’s opinion by stating that:  
An affirmative duty to disclose material information has been traditionally imposed on 
corporate ‘insiders,’ particularly officers, directors, or controlling stockholders. We, and 
the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they 
deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. Failure to make 
disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions.490  
 
                                               
488 Hines, supra note 435, 557, 569; Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C, at 3. (The SEC noted in its decision that 
“Although the ‘majority’ state rule apparently does not impose an affirmative duty of disclosure on insiders 
when dealing in securities, an increasing number of jurisdictions do impose this responsibility either on the 
theory that an insider is generally a fiduciary with respect to securities transactions or ‘special facts’ may 
make him one.” Cady, Roberts & Co., Re, 40 S.E.C. 907 Nt.20 (1961). Special facts doctrine was adopted 
by the United States Supreme Court in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See supra note 447; Speed v. 
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). (“Parent Corporation which had made written offer to 
all minority stockholders of subsidiary, offering to purchase their shares at fixed price without disclosure of 
fact that true inventory value of subsidiary was far in excess of that shown by annual report and of 
accompanying intent on part of parent to liquidate and thereby capture such appreciated value, had, by failure 
to disclose such pre-existing intent to liquidate, perpetrated fraud upon minority stockholders and must 
respond in damages.”); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947). (The 
defendants, who were board directors, purchased the plaintiff stock and sold the corporate asset with profit, 
and the plaintiff sought damages alleging that the defendants failed to disclose that they made a sale deal 
before purchasing the stock. The Court found that the “acts of the defendants specified in the complaint 
constitute a violation of the Act. Sec. 10(b)…Rule X-10B-5… Under any reasonably liberal construction, 
these provisions apply to directors and officers who, in purchasing the stock of the corporation from others, 
fail to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their position, which would materially affect 
the judgment of the other party to the transaction…[T]he broad terms of the Act are to be made effective in 
a case like the present one through application of well known and well established equitable principles 
governing fiduciary relationships. These principles are fundamental in all jurisdictions and the decisions of 
both Pennsylvania and of Michigan fully support the conclusions reached above.”) Id.at Nt. 13. For more 
discussion about the SEC development of prohibiting illegal corporate insider trading under Rule 10b-5, see 
Hugh T. Wilkinson, The Affirmative Duty to Disclose after Chiarella and Driks, 10 J. Corp. L. 581, 583 
(1985).  
489 See, Langevoort, supra note 49, at 7.  
490 Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C, at 4.  
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As a result, the SEC’s decision interpreted Rule 10b-5 as it prevents any inherent 
unfair informational asymmetry between traders in second markets to maintain the 
protection of investors from the misuse of inside information.491 The chairman of the SEC, 
William Cary, later clarified the rationale of the duty to disclose inside information adopted 
in the SEC’s decision in Cary, Roberts, stating that: “insiders having access to material 
information available for a corporate purpose may not take advantage when it is not yet 
known to the public. If disclosure would be improper or unrealistic, he should forego the 
transaction-in other words, keep out of the market.”492 
Following the SEC’s decision in Cady, Reports, the federal courts endorsed the 
SEC’s opinion and provided complete support for the application of the duty to disclose or 
refrain from the trading doctrine.493 The Second Circuit’ decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur,494 was the first case in which a federal court found a violation of Rule 10b-5 
because of trading on the basis of inside information.495 While adopting the SEC’s liberal 
interpretation of Rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit applied the more general prohibition 
                                               
491 Pritchard, supra note 486, at 58. Citing Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C, at 5; Hines, supra note 435, at 561 
(“While the trend of the law has been a gradual ascent toward higher standards based on ethical 
considerations, Cady Roberts marks the highest point thus far in using the theory of complete disclosure as 
the principle to eliminate the dichotomy between legal rules and ethical standards.”) Id.  
492 Carry et al, supra note 476, at 1011.  
493 Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 23, at §19:3.   
494 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). (This case involved several insiders of Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., a mining company, who purchased and tipped others to purchase shares of the company 
on the basis of inside information related to the company’s discovery of a large deposit of ore. During that 
time, the company released an ambiguous statement about drilling, then released a detailed statement a few 
days later. After the disclosure, the price of the company's stock increased substantially. The district court 
found some employees guilty of violating securities laws but dismissed claims of others and of the company. 
The Second Circuit affirmed the portion of the judgment finding certain employees liable; however, the court 
reversed the portion of the judgment dismissing the complaint against other employees and the company 
itself. The allegations against those employees and the company were remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with the court's opinion.) Id. at 843.  
495 Bloomenthal, supra note 55. 
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doctrine termed the “parity of information” theory.496 The Second Circuit ruled that “all 
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material 
information.”497 The Second Circuit interpreted Rule 10b-5 based on the general intent of 
Congress by enacting the SEA.498 It stated that, as a whole, enacting the SEA was to prevent 
unfair practices and ensure fairness in securities dealings whether conducted face-to-face, 
over the counter, or on exchange.499 Drawing from this notion of fairness in securities 
transactions, the Second Circuit’s decision disregarded the requirement of the existence of 
a special relationship as an element of the prohibited trading conduct that was required in 
the Cady, Roberts case.500 The Second Circuit found that any person, a corporate insider 
or outsider, must not trade on or provide a tip about any possessed material non-public 
information unless a disclosure is made.501  
Despite this judicial endorsement to expand the scope of fraud under Rule 10b-5 to 
cover unfair informational asymmetry that would undermine investors’ confidence 
including trading on inside information, the SEC and courts failed to provide  a clear 
standard on who is subject to the duty to disclose and who is not. This oversight led to a 
broad gap and uncertainty about the law of illegal corporate insider trading.502 In addition, 
this theory of parity of information did not offer any justification of how illegal corporate 
                                               
496 Wilkinson, supra note 488, at 586. 
497 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 848; Wilkinson, at 586. For more information about the 
“parity of information” theory, see Brudney, supra note 10, at 339.    
498 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 847.  
499 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 843. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:3.  
500 Cady, Roberts & Co., Re, 40 S.E.C. 907, at 3 (1961).  
501 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 848. (“[A]nyone in possession of material inside 
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to 
protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the 
securities concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.” Id. See Wilkinson, supra note 488, 
at 586.  
502 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:3. 
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insider trading deceives the public or how it is the cause of an economic injury to anyone. 
In particular, it did not clarify how trading on inside information in impersonal markets is 
a deceptive act by virtue of informational asymmetry between the parties because of one 
party’s access to inside information, where there was no inducement by the violator or 
reliance by the other party.503 As discussed earlier, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected the expansion of the scope of Rule 10b-5 to include mismanagement conducts and 
a breach of fiduciary duty, and found that fraud means only real deception.504 Thus, to state 
that a practice is deceptive, they must show pecuniary harm because of such a practice.505 
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. U.S.,506 had the first 
chance to review the preceding judicial and administrative rulings over the prohibition of 
illegal corporate insider trading under Rule 10b-5. Unlike earlier judicial justification for 
Cady, Roberts, the United States Supreme Court found that the idea of inherent unfairness 
of the informational asymmetry in illegal corporate insider trading is not a concern of Rule 
10b-5. Rather, they ruled that the abuse of inside information for trading purposes through 
a breach of fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence is a volitional conduct 
under Rule 10b-5.507 In Chiarella, the United States Supreme Court reshaped the law of 
illegal corporate insider trading. They ruled that it is linked to finding a breach of duty of 
trust rather than basing the prohibition upon a broad notion of inherent unfairness of 
wrongful informational asymmetry. Chiarella is discussed below along with later 
                                               
503 Donald C. Langevoort, ‘Fine Distinction’ in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, Georgetown 
Public Law Research Paper No. 13-032, at 2 (2013). 
504 See supra note 468 and accompanying text; Santa Fe Industries, Inc. V. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473; 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §2:3; Dooley, supra note 266, at 56.  
505 Dooley, id. For more information about the elements of the common law action for deceit, see supra note 
435 and accompanying text.  
506 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). 
507 Crag W. Davis, Misappropriators, Tippees and the Intent-to-Benefit Rule: What we Can Learn from Cady, 
Roberts, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 263, 267 (2004). 
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developments of the illegal corporate insider trading law for the purpose of defining 
persons subject to the prohibition of trading on the basis of inside information is discussed 
below.  
Who is Subject to Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Prohibition?  
 
After contemplating the lack of a statutory definition of who is subject to illegal 
corporate insider trading prohibition under Rule 10b-5 phrased as “any person,” the SEC 
declined to specifically define administratively who is subject to this prohibition; instead, 
they preferred to make the law flexible so the courts could develop it when confronting 
newly developed violations.508 However, since then, the SEC has issued rules under Rule 
10b-5 to clarify some legal aspects of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading as 
is developed by the case-law.509  
The judicial development  of illegal corporate insider trading is based on the “duty 
to disclose or abstain” doctrine recognized by the Supreme Court in Chiarlella.510 It 
requires a finding of a non-disclosure of material non-public information in violation of a 
duty to speak, arising from a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence. Such 
a relationship is a necessary prerequisite to finding a violation of illegal corporate insider 
trading prohibition under Rule 10b-5. There are three judicial theories that determine who 
is subject to the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading liability. The first theory is 
the classical theory, which prohibits traditional corporate insiders, including directors, 
                                               
508Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 424, at 335. Citing Jill E. Fisch, Letter to the Editor, The Muddle of Insider 
Trading Regulation, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 1991).  
509 Id. For more information about the SEC’s rules in this regard, see supra notes 142-47 and accompanying 
text. 
510 This duty requires, according to Chiarlella, that insiders while in possession of material non-public 
information must disclose or abstain from trading. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 26.  
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officers, and large shareholders from trading while in possession of material non-public 
information in a breach of their fiduciary duty owed to the corporation and its 
shareholders.511 The second theory is the misappropriation theory, which expands the 
extent of the duty to disclose or abstain from trading to include certain corporate outsiders. 
The Supreme Court adapted this theory in United States v. O’Hagan.512 The Supreme Court 
held that “a person commits fraud in connection with a securities transaction, and thereby 
violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information 
for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the 
information.”513 The third theory is the tipper/tippee liability theory which includes 
investors termed “tippees” who receive “material nonpublic information from someone in 
a fiduciary relationship with the company to which that information pertains.”514 The 
Supreme Court held, in Dirks v. SEC,515 that a tippee lacks an independent fiduciary duty 
to the corporations and its shareholders, in which the tippee’s liability is a derivative from 
the insider’s duty.516 
The general understanding of these theories is that persons subject to the prohibition 
include any person who is entrusted with material non-public information where his/her 
trading on the basis of such information without disclosure would constitute a breach of 
their fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence with the party in a transaction 
or to their employer or its clients. Corporate insiders, directors, officers, large shareholders 
are on the top of the list of persons who are subject to this prohibition. Low-level employees 
                                               
511 Id. at 227; Alexander M. Short, Insider Trading and the Presumed Circuit Split: Why Newman and Salman 
Are not Discordant, 5 (2016). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2812653 
512 U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (U.S.1997). 
513 Id. at 652-653.  
514 Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
515 Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983).  
516 Id.  
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and private contractors such as lawyers, accountants, and underwriters are also within the 
status of corporate insiders. In addition, their tippees are subject to illegal corporate insider 
trading prohibition when the disclosure was made in breach of a fiduciary duty for personal 
benefit. The three theories are discussed below to further determine who is subject to the 
prohibition of trading on the basis of inside information.  
Classical Theory  
 
The classical theory states that corporate insiders and others who are in a fiduciary 
or similar relationship of trust and confidence with the shareholders of the issuer are under 
a duty to disclose material non-public information before they trade with the 
shareholders.517 The classical theory was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
Chiarella.518 In this case, the Supreme Court rejected the “parity of access to information” 
theory and continued its approach to narrow the scope of Rule 10b-5 to situations involving 
deception under common law action for deceit.519  
Chiarella v. United States  
 
The issue of this case was whether a person who learns from confidential 
documents of one corporation that it is planning an attempt to secure control of another 
corporation violates Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, 
when the person fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading in the target 
company’s securities.520 
                                               
517 Howard J. Kaplan, Joseph A. Matteo, and Alan Pfeffer. The Law of Insider Trading, ABA Section of 
Litigation 2012 Section Annual Conference April 18-20 (2012), https://goo.gl/LxkzXg.  
518 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222.  
519 Richard Painter et al., supra note 257 at 163; Crag W. Davis, supra note 507, at 271.  
520 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 224.  
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Vincent Chiarella, the petitioner, was an employee, as a markup man, of Pandick 
Press, a financial printer that engaged in printing takeover bids announcements.521 During 
his employment term, he received five takeover bids announcements of five concealed 
company names. The target companies also were concealed. He could deduce the names 
of the target companies from other information contained in the documents, and without 
disclosing the information, Chiarella purchased shares in the target companies and when 
the takeovers  were made public, he sold his shares and gained profits of approximately 
$30,000 over 14 months.522 Chiarrlla was convicted in United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York for criminal violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for 
intentionally misusing material non-public information in connection with the purchase 
and sale of securities523   The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the 
conviction. The Second Circuit supported the theory of “parity of access to information”524 
The Second Circuit ruled that “anyone—corporate insider or not—who regularly receives 
material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without 
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.”525 Chiarella appealed before the Supreme Court 
against the judgment of the Second Circuit’s decision.526 The Supreme Court reversed the 
Second Circuit Convection and held that the duty to disclose does not arise merely from 
the possession of material non-public information, but it is imposed when there is a duty 
to speak because of being an insider or fiduciary with whom they trade. However, corporate 
outsiders, such as Chiarella, are not subject to such duty.527  
                                               
521 Id.  
522 Id.  
523 U.S. v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 (1978).  
524 Id.at 1365.  
525 Id. 
526 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980).   
527 Id. at 235. See Richard Painter et al., supra note 257, at 155.  
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The Supreme Court’s decision was predicated on the idea that the duty to disclose 
material non-public information under Rule 10b-5 is based on the notion that Rule 10b-5 
prohibits only those practices that are held to be actionable under common law action for 
deceit which are either an affirmative misrepresentation of material facts or silence when 
there is a duty to speak.528 The Supreme Court found that trading on the basis of material 
non-public information constitutes silence, and to make silence fraudulent, there must be a 
fiduciary or another similar relation of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction 
in which one party is entitled to know because of this special relationship.529  Based on this 
analysis, the Supreme Court held that corporate insiders always owe a fiduciary duty and 
they are prohibited from trading on their corporation’s securities on material non-public 
information to personally benefit at the expense of the shareholders.530 “Application of a 
duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation 
to… place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through 
fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.”531 The Supreme Court found that 
Chiarella could not be convicted on the theory of a duty to disclose to shareholders of target 
companies.532 The reason was that the element that makes silence fraudulent was absent in 
this case. The Supreme Court held that Chiarella was not under a duty to speak because 
“he was not a corporate insider and he received no confidential information from the target 
company.”533 He also was not an agent of the sellers or a fiduciary, and “he was not a 
                                               
528 Alison Grey Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 341, 346 (1982). 
529 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 228; Anderson, at 346.   
530 Wilkinson, supra note 488, at 590.  
531 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 230.  
532  Id, at 231. 
533 Id.  
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person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a 
complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market 
transactions.”534  
a. The Supreme Court Rejected the “Parity of Access to Information” Theory  
The Supreme Court rejected the “parity of access to information” theory that had 
been applied by the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court found that the Second Circuit erred 
in believing that “the federal securities laws have ‘created a system providing equal access 
of information necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decision.’”535 In addition, 
the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning used by the Second Circuit in holding that the 
use of material non-public information by any trader in connection with securities 
transactions is a fraudulent act because it gives certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage 
over less informed buyers and sellers. After reviewing the legislative history of Section 
10(b), the Supreme Court concluded that, “neither the Congress nor the [] [the SEC] ever 
has adopted a parity-of-information rule.”536 The Supreme Court held that this theory had 
two defects:  
First not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under 
§10(b). Second, the element required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to 
disclose—is absent in this case…Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs 
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship 
between two parties, should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent.537 
 
b. The Supreme Court Rejected to Consider the Misappropriation Theory   
                                               
534 Id.at 232.  
535 Id.  
536 Id.  
537 Id.  
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The government claimed that Chiarella breached a duty owed to the acquiring 
corporations when he traded on information obtained through his position as an employee 
of a printer employed by the acquiring corporation.538 Thus, this breach supported finding 
that Chiarella had committed fraud on the acquiring corporation.539 However, the Court 
decided not to apply this theory because it was not submitted to the jury.540 The Supreme 
Court stated that “the jury was not instructed on the nature or elements of a duty owed by 
petitioner to anyone other than the sellers…we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the 
basis of a theory not presented to the jury.”541  
Who is an Insider under the Classical Theory?  
 
                                               
538 Id. at 235.  
539 Id.  
540 Id. at 236.  
541 Id. Justice John Stevens, joined the Court’s opinion that Chiarella did not owe a duty to disclose to the 
sellers. Id.at 237. He then answered the question of whether Chairella breached his duty of silence owed to 
his employers and the clients could be actionable under Rule 10b-5. Justice Stevens stated that Chiarella 
owed “unquestionably” a duty of silence to his employer and its customers which “could give rise to criminal 
liability under Rule 10b-5.” Id. He noted that there are “respectable arguments” that Chiarella breached his 
duty of silence owed “to the acquiring companies that had entrusted confidential information to his 
employer.” Id.at 238. However, because this theory was not presented to the jury, Justice Stevens found that 
“the Court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for another day.” Id. Justice William Brennan concurred 
in the judgment. Id. He agreed with the Court’s opinion that a duty to disclose under §10(b) does not arise 
from the mere possession of material non-public information. However, he joined the Chief Justice’s 
dissenting opinion that “a person violates §10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his own 
benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.” Id.at 
239. Then, Justice Brennan agreed with the Court that this theory of the Chief Justice was not presented to 
the jury. He stated that: “The simple fact is that to affirm the conviction without an adequate instruction 
would be tantamount to directing a verdict of guilty, and that we plainly may not do.” Id. Chief Justice Warner 
Burger dissented the Court’s opinion and asserted that he “would read § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to encompass 
and build on this principle: to mean a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute 
duty to disclose nonpublic information or to refrain from trading.” Id.at 240. The Chief Justice supported the 
view that Rule 10b-5 liability can be held against any person who trades on the basis of material non-public 
information that has been obtained unlawfully. Consequently, people who have acquired such information 
through legal practices are out of Rule 10b-5 liability. Id. Justice Harry Blackman, with whom Justice 
Thurgood Marshall joined, dissented the Court’s opinion. Id.at 245. While agreeing with the Chief Justice’s 
opinion that informational advantage acquired through legal means is not within the scope of lability under 
Rule 10b-5, Justice Blackman went further to argue that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should be read flexibly 
and broadly to find liability whenever a person has access to material non-public information “that the honest 
investor no matter how diligently he tries, could legally obtain.” Id.247. He asserted that this is unfair dealing 
because the informational advantage effects the integrity of the securities dealing and investors’ confidence 
in which the securities regulations were enacted to protect. Id.at 248. 
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In Chiarella, The Supreme Court did not provide an inclusive list of persons subject 
to the prohibition of trading on the basis of material non-public information. However, it 
recognized certain situations that impose a duty to disclose material non-public 
information.542 The Supreme Court restricted the application of a duty to disclose under 
Rule 10b-5 to situations that are actionable under the common law fraud minority 
opinion.543 This restriction is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s reference to the two 
elements articulated in Cady, Roberts, which states that a “duty arose from (i) the existence 
of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a 
corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage 
of that information by trading without disclosure.”544 The Supreme Court found that the 
SEC applied the right principles because it “recognized a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained 
confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation.”545 The Supreme 
                                               
542 Wilkinson, supra note 488, at 589.  
543 Langevoort, supra note 487, at 4; Anderson, supra note 528, at 354; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 
(1977) (“One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law for the purpose 
of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in 
deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”) Professor 
Nagy asserted that “although an affirmative misstatement is generally required for a plaintiff to aver fraud, 
courts have recognized a number of circumstances under which a defendant’s ‘pure silence’ may also 
constitutes fraudulent conduct. One such circumstance occurs in transactions where the defendant is under a 
duty to disclose material information ‘because of a fiduciary or other similar relationship of trust and 
confidence..’ indeed, the classical theory of insider trading liability is premised precisely on this exception 
to the general rule of caveat emptor.” Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation theory of Insider 
Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1223, 1288 (1998). 
544 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 227. 
545 Hazen, supra note 477, at 850 (1982). (Professor Hazen has suggested that “[t]he Court distinguished the 
earlier ‘disclose or abstain’ decision of the SEC in Cady, Roberts on the ground that the insider trader in 
Cady, Roberts had wrongfully obtained information from a corporate insider while in the special position of 
broker-dealer.” Id. See also Hines, supra note 435, at 566. (Professor Hines has suggested that the decision 
of Cady, Roberts was based mostly on “the existence of an imputed corporate insider relation since the 
director who gave the information was also an associate of the brokerage firm…It has been traditionally held 
[] that persons knowingly joining with a fiduciary in a transaction constituting a breach of duty or scheme to 
defraud are liable to the same extent as the one who breach his fiduciary duty.” Id.  
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Court also referenced the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §551 (1971).546  This Section 
reads: 
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, (a) matters known to him that 
the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence between them.547 
 
As a result, the Supreme Court’s test to determine the persons covered under the 
classical theory of illegal corporate insider trading is whether a person is in a fiduciary or 
similar relation of trust and confidence (special relationship) with the corporation whose 
securities are being traded.548 In addition, the Supreme Court stated, specifically, that the 
relationship between corporate insiders and the shareholders of their corporation “gives a 
rise to a disclosure obligation… by reason of their position with that corporation.”549  
By referencing Cady, Roberts’ two elements, the Supreme Court determined that 
the concept of corporate insiders “status” is based on “the existence of a relationship 
affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose.”550 On the basis of this analysis, the status of corporate insiders includes directors, 
                                               
546 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).  
547 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) (a) (1977). This Section also finds a duty to disclose in situations 
other than a fiduciary relationship with the other party as follows: “(b) matters known to him that he knows 
to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and (c) 
subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation 
that when made was true or believed to be so; and (d) the falsity of a representation not made with the 
expectation that it would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance 
upon it in a transaction with him; and (e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to 
enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the 
customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.” 
Id.§551(2)(b) to (e). 
548 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:2. For more information about the 
determination of the existence of fiduciary duty, see Chapter Corporate Insider As Fiduciaries.  
549 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.  
550 Id. at 227; Langevoort, supra note 487, at 20. “The insiders who will always have such an obligation are 
corporate directors, officers, and employees. Each of these acts in an agency…capacity, with the corporate 
entity itself as principal.” Id; Wilkinson, supra note 488, at 583 Nt. 18.   
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officers, controlling shareholders, low-level employees, and certain outsiders “temporary-
insiders” who are under a special relationship with the corporation and receive material 
non-public information for corporate purposes, such as lawyers, accountants, and 
underwriters.551  
Corporate directors, officers, and controlling shareholders are deemed the core 
group of insiders covered by the classical theory due to the long and well-established 
common law rules that have subjected them to the duty to disclose.552 The rationale is that 
directors, officers, and to some extent controlling shareholders are under a duty to disclose 
because they assume control over the corporation which, derivatively, provides them 
private access to inside information.553 The Supreme Court, in Chairella, specifically 
named these groups by referring to Cady, Roberts’s rule that: “[a]n affirmative duty to 
disclose material information, [which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate 
‘insiders,’ particular officers, directors, or controlling stockholders.”554  The Supreme 
Court justified the imposition of a duty to disclose upon these corporate insiders when they 
deal with the shareholders because of their key position as fiduciaries inside the 
corporation.555 This is based on the notion that corporate insiders, as fiduciaries, are 
entrusted to consider the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.556 When they 
deal with the property of the corporation and its business opportunities, they must act solely 
for the goal of maximizing the corporations’ profit, not their personal interests.557 They 
                                               
551 Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 300. 
552 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:3; See page 4 of this chapter.  
553 Id; Brudney, supra note 10, at 343.  
554 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 227. 
555 Id; Wilkinson, supra note 488, at 590. 
556 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:3.  
557 Michael Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 Cornell L. Rev. 
53, 55 (1960).  
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must refrain from self-dealing and taking advantage of their position by exploiting material 
nonpublic information unless they disclose all material information that is unknown to the 
shareholders.558 
Low-level employees, as agents of the corporation, are prohibited from 
misappropriating inside information to which they have access for their personal 
advantage.559 The Supreme Court, in Chairella, referenced the Second Circuit’s decision, 
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, where some of the defendants were both officers and low-
level employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur including Mollision, a mining engineer and vice 
president, Darke, a geologist, Holyk, chief geologist,560 and Huntington, an attorney of 
Texas Gulf Sulphur.561   
Independent contractors or “temporary-insiders” who are in a special relationship 
with a corporation, such as lawyers, accountants, and financial advisors, are subject to the 
same standard applied to corporate insiders.562 This is because these temporary-insiders are 
being entrusted with access to inside information for legitimate business reasons.563 The 
Supreme Court, in Chairella, applied this determination reasoning that Chiarella was not 
                                               
558 Id; Brudney, supra note 10, 326 Nt. 22. (“[T]he obligation of the corporation and its insiders to disclose 
nonpublic information in dealing with security holders may be appropriately be seen as an extension of the 
arrangement protecting beneficiaries against overreaching by fiduciary, which the common law was haltingly 
fashioning to constrain corporate insiders when the federal securities legislation was enacted.”) Id.  See also, 
Hazen, supra note 477, at 850. (“[W]hen an insider relies on inside information in making a trade, his or her 
short-term investment interests are being placed in potential conflict with the corporation interest. The agent 
is thus put in a dual role that is traditionally forbidden.”) Id.  
559 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:5; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 304. Citing U.S. v. Heron, 
323 Fed. Appx. 150, 154 (2009). The Third Circuit ruled that a defendant’s low level position inside a 
corporation “is not determinative of his insider status…‘liability follows form the existence of a relationship 
with the corporation that makes it more probable than not that the individual has access to inside 
information.’.”) Id.  
560 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968).  
561 Id.at 855. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:5; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 304. 
562 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:8; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 308; Painter et al., supra 
note 257, at 154. 
563 Id.  
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subject to a duty to disclose to the shareholders of the target corporations because “[h]e 
was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, [and] he was not a person in whom the sellers 
had placed their trust and confidence.”564 The Supreme Court also, in Dirks v. SEC,565 
reemphasized this determination by stating that: 
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately 
to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these 
outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this 
fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, 
but rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of 
the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate 
purposes.566 
 
 
 
Misappropriation Theory  
 
Introduction  
 
The misappropriation theory expands the extent of the duty to disclose or abstain 
from trading on the basis of material non-public information to include corporate outsiders 
bound by the fiduciary principle.567 Under this theory, a person commits fraud when he/she 
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of 
fiduciary duty owed not to the persons with whom he trades, but to the source of the 
information.568 “The misappropriation theory focuses not on the insider's fiduciary duty to 
the issuing company or its shareholders but on whether the insider breached a fiduciary 
duty to any lawful possessor of material non-public information.”569 
                                               
564 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980). 
565 Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646,655 (1983).  
566 Id.at Nt. 14.  
567 Nagy, supra note 423, at 1330. 
568 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,652 (1997).  
569 SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991); Richard J. Hunter et al, Insider Trading Since Carpenter: 
The Misappropriation Theory and Beyond, 41 Howard L.J. 79, 98 (1997-1998).  
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The misappropriation theory was first presented before the United States Supreme 
Court, in Chairella, where the government argued that Chiarella breached a duty of  silence 
owed to his employer and its clients by trading on the basis of confidential information and 
that was a violation of Rule 10b-5.570 However, the Supreme Court did not consider this 
theory because it was not submitted to the jury.571  
The misappropriation theory was again presented before the Supreme Court in 
1987, in Carpenter v. United States.572 The indictment was that Foster Winans, a Wall 
Street reporter and one of three writers of a daily column, “Heard on the Street,” along with 
others engaged in a scheme of fraud in which the reporter revealed prepublication 
information in the column.573 They traded on the prepublication information and made a 
significant profit and thus benefiting from the effect of the column in the related securities 
prices.574 This scheme of misusing the prepublication information was in violation of the 
policy of the Wall Street Journal which considered content of the column before 
publication the Journal’s confidential information that belonged to the Journal.575  
The District Court convicted576 and the Second Circuit affirmed the convection of 
committing securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud.577 The courts concluded that 
                                               
570 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).  
571 Id. at 236.  
572 484 U.S. 19 (1987).  
573 Id.at 22.  
574 Id.at 23.  
575 Id.  
576 U.S. v. Winans, 612 F.Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). (“Winans is said to have misappropriated a certain type 
of market-sensitive confidential information—the nature and timing of Wall Street Journal articles. The theft 
of this information is said to have operated as a fraud on the Wall Street Journal, which was in connection 
with the purchase and sale of securities in the featured stocks”) Id.at 840.  
577 U.S. v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir. 1986). (“We hold that Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act and Rule 10b-5 proscribe an employee’s unlawful misappropriation from his employer, a financial 
newspaper, of material nonpublic information in the form of the newspaper’s forthcoming publication 
schedule, in connection with a scheme to purchase and sell securities to be analyzed or otherwise discussed 
in future columns in that newspaper…”) Id.  
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Winans’ deliberate breach of his duty of confidentiality and concealment of the scheme 
was a fraud and deceit against the Journal under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that 
constitutes misappropriation of confidential information regarding the timing and the 
content of the column.578 The lower court concluded that even though the victim of the 
fraud was not a market participant and had  no any interests in the traded securities at issue, 
the fraud was in connection with the purchase and sale of a security within the meaning of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the sole purpose of engaging in the scheme was to 
purchase and sell securities on the basis of the timing and content of the column.579 
On appeal before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners argued that the alleged victim 
of the fraud, the Wall Street Journal, had no interest in the securities traded.580 Thus, there 
can be no criminal liability under Rule 10b-5.581  The Supreme Court was evenly divided 
in regard to the conviction of securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.582 
Consequently, it affirmed the judgment of the lower courts.583 The Supreme Court stated 
that: the Supreme Court’s deadlocked decision in Carpenter, left the validity of the 
misappropriation theory unresolved.584 Eventually, in 1997, the misappropriation theory 
was upheld by the Supreme Court, in United States v. O’Hagan.585 
                                               
578 Id; Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).  
579 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).  
580 Id.  
581 Id.   
582 Id.  
583 Id. (The Supreme Court states that “he Court is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the 
securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those counts.”) Id.  
584 Painter et al., supra note 257, at 170. (“Because the Court issued no written opinion on the 
misappropriation convection, it is impossible to discern whether the justices voting against conviction under 
the misappropriation theory did so because they rejected the misappropriation theory entirely, or merely 
because they rejected its application to the particular facts presented in Carpenter.”) Id. See also, Hunter et 
al, supra note 569, at 79.  
585 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  
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United States v. O’Hagan  
 
In 1988, James Herman O’Hagan was a partner in the Dorsey & Whitney Law Firm 
in Minneapolis, Minnesota.586 In that year, the law firm represented Grand Metropolitan 
Company, based in London, England, as a local counsel for a potential tender offer for the 
common stock of Pillsbury Company in Minneapolis, Minnesota, company. The law firm 
and its client took precautions to maintain confidence about the tender offer, and O’Hagan 
had no role in Grand Metropolitan representation.587 However, during the time of Dorsey 
& Whitney’s representation of the potential tender offer, O’Hagan bought call options and 
shares of Pillsbury common stock, and when Grand Metropolitan announced the tender 
offer to the public, O’Hagan sold his call options and common stock in Pillsbury at a profit 
of more than $4.3 million.588 The U.S. government charged O’Hagan with committing mail 
fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering.589 The government’s indictments for 
violations under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were based on the misappropriation theory. 
The indictment was that O’Hagan breached a fiduciary duty owed to Dorsey & Whitney 
and its client, Grand Metropolitan, when he obtained confidential information regarding 
the potential tender offer, and subsequently traded on the basis of this information in the 
target company.590  
The United States District Court of Minnesota convicted O’Hagan on all 
indictments, but he appealed to the United Stated Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
                                               
586 Id. at 647.  
587 Id.  
588 Id.  
589 Id.at 684.   
590 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (1996). The government also charged O’Hagan for trading on the basis of 
material non-public information related to a tender offer in violation of §14(e) of the Securities Exchange 
Act  1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n, and Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e–3, and violations of the federal mail fraud 
and money laundering statutes. Id.at 614. 
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Circuit.591 The Eighth Circuit rejected to apply the misappropriation theory and reversed 
all of the District Court’s convictions.592 The Eighth Circuit’s decision gave two 
justifications for their rejection of the misappropriation theory. First, this theory imposes a 
liability based on the mere breach of a fiduciary duty without requiring any material 
misrepresentation or nondisclosure as deception means according to the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the language of Section 10(b).593  Second, “it permits liability for a breach 
of duty owed to individuals who are unconnected to and perhaps uninterested in a securities 
transaction,” which renders the requiring of fraud to be “in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security” meaningless.594 
In 1997, The United States appealed to the Supreme Court, and Certiorari was 
granted.595 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision and held that the 
misappropriation theory is a valid theory under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and it 
“satisfies Section 10(b)’s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a ‘deceptive device 
or contrivance’ used ‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities.”596 The 
Supreme Court determined that the misappropriation theory “outlaws trading on the basis 
of nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a trading 
                                               
591 Id.at 614.  
592 Id.at 622. The Eighth Circuit held that “the misappropriation theory is not a valid basis upon which to 
impose criminal liability under § 10(b). Thus, because O’Hagan’s convictions for securities fraud under § 
10(b) and Rule 10b–5… were premised solely on the misappropriation theory, these convictions must be 
vacated.” Id. For the charges under Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3, the Eight Circuit held that: “the SEC 
exceeded its rulemaking authority under §14(e) when it promulgated Rule 14e-3(a) without including a 
requirement of a breach of a fiduciary obligation, Accordingly, we must vacate O’Hagan’s securities fraud 
convictions under these provisions.” Id.at 627.  
593 Id.at 618.  
594 Id. The Court concluded that: “the misappropriation theory essentially turns §10(b) on its head 
‘transforming it from a rule intended to govern and protect relations among market participants’ into an 
expensive ‘general fraud-on-the-source theory’ which seemingly would apply to an infinite number of trust 
relationships.” Id.at 619.  
595 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  
596 Id.642, 653.  
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party, but to the source of the information.”597 The Court stated that: “the undisclosed 
misappropriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty…constitutes fraud 
akin to embezzlement…”598 
How the Misappropriation Theory Satisfies the Requirement of Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 
 
The Supreme Court determined that the misappropriation theory satisfies the 
requirements of conduct that is actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The 
requirements are that the alleged conduct must be deceptive or manipulative conduct, and 
it is in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.   
a. Trading on Misappropriated Confidential Information in Breach of a 
Fiduciary Duty is Deceptive Conduct.  
 
The Supreme Court justified how the misappropriation theory satisfies the 
requirement of a “deceptive device” under Section 10(b). First, it established that a 
company’s confidential information “qualifies as property to which the company has a 
right of exclusive use”599 Second, it observed that deception occurs under the 
misappropriation theory through nondisclosure by a fiduciary who is entrusted to have 
access to confidential information.600 Therefore, a fiduciary deals in deception under the 
misappropriation theory when he “pretends loyalty to the principal while secretly 
converting the principal’s information for personal gain…’dupes’ or defrauds the 
principal.”601 The Court also found that if the fiduciary discloses his plan to the principal 
                                               
597 Id.  
598 Id.642, 654.  
599 Id. at 654.  
600 Id.  
601 Id. at 653.  
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to trade on the basis of the confidential information, “there is no ‘deceptive device’ and 
thus no Section 10(b) violation.”602  
b. Trading on Misappropriated Confidential Information in a Breach of a 
Fiduciary Duty is Connected to the Purchase or Sale of a Security.   
 
The Supreme Court concluded that the misappropriation theory meets the Section 
10(b) requirement that the alleged deception must be “in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.” This is because the fiduciary’s fraud was committed, not at the time 
he obtained the confidential information, but when he, without disclosure, used the 
confidential information to trade. “The transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide.”603 
Moreover, while connecting the fraudulent conduct under the misappropriation theory with 
the purchase or sale of a security, the Supreme Court distinguished between the 
misappropriation of confidential information for securities trade purposes and 
embezzlement of money.604 It limited the application of the misappropriation theory to 
fraudulent acts involving capitalizing on confidential information “to gain no-risk-profits” 
through securities transactions.605 The Supreme Court agreed with the government that “the 
misappropriation theory would…not apply to a case in which a person defrauded a bank 
into giving him a loan or embezzled cash from another, and then used the proceeds for the 
misdeed to purchase securities” because the proceeds would have independent value from 
the subsequent use in securities transactions. Thus, “the fraud would be complete as soon 
                                               
602 Id. at 655.  
603 Id. at 656.  
604 Id.  
605 Id.  
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as the money was obtained.” In contrast, confidential information has value “ordinarily” 
when it is used in securities trading.606  
After determining the coincidence of committing fraud and trading, which connects 
the fraud to the purchase or sale of a security, the Supreme Court noted that the 
misappropriation theory serves one of the main purposes of the SEA, which is “to insure 
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence.”607 Therefore, the 
Court stated that misappropriating confidential information for securities trading in a 
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information harms public investors 
and “undermines the integrity of, and investor confidence in, the securities markets…[thus] 
investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on 
misappropriated nonpublic information unchecked by law.”608 The Court concluded that 
                                               
606 Id. The Supreme Court also found that the SEC acted within its rulemaking authority under §14(e) of the 
SEA 1934 by promulgating Rule 14e-3. Id.at 667. The Supreme Court stated that “under § 14(e), the 
Commission may prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent under the common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition 
is ‘reasonably designed to prevent … acts and practices that are fraudulent.” Id.at 673. The Supreme Court 
reversed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part. 
His disagreement was with the Court’s opinion with regard to the validity of the misappropriation theory 
under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Justice Scalia pointed out that “the Court’s explanation of the scope of §10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5…does not seem to accord with the principle of lenity we apply to criminal statutes (which 
cannot be mitigated here by the Rule, which is no less ambiguous than the statute).” Id. at 679. Justice Scalia 
asserted that “the unelaborated statutory language…[of] §10(b) must be construed to require the manipulation 
or deception of a party to a securities transaction.” Id. Justice Clarence Thomas joined by the Chief Justice, 
William H. Rehnquist, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. Id.at 680.  Justice Thomas 
rejected the misappropriation theory because it failed to comply with the “in connection with” 10(b)’s 
requirement. Id.at 681. He stated that the Court and the SEC did not provide a coherent explanation of how 
the fraud committed under the misappropriation theory satisfies the “in connection with” requirement while 
embezzlement of money used to purchase securities lacks thereof. Id. Justice Thomas asserted that O’Hagan 
could deprive Grand of its right “to exclusive use” of the confidential information in several ways other than 
trading securities. Id.at 685. He could sell the confidential information for publication or even sell the 
information to the target company, and that would constitute embezzlement of Grand Met property. Id. Then, 
Justice Thomas stated that: “whether the majority’s new theory has merit, we cannot possibly tell on the 
record before us. There are no findings regarding the ‘ordinary’ use of misappropriated information, much 
less regarding the ‘ordinary’ use of other forms of embezzled property… We simply do not know what would 
or would not be covered by such a requirement, and hence cannot evaluate whether the requirement embodies 
a consistent and coherent interpretation of the statute.” Id.at 688. 
607 Id. at 658.  
608 Id.  
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the negative impact of the misappropriation theory upon securities markets and the 
congressional purpose of enacting Section 10(b) makes clear that it is not required “to hold 
a lawyer like O’Hagan a §10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target 
of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder.”609 
Who is Subject to the Misappropriation Theory?  
 
The misappropriation theory, as O’Hagan stated, requires a duty to disclose 
material non-public information before trading upon corporate outsiders who have no 
special relationship with the shareholders of the corporation whose securities are traded. 
This theory is also termed “fraud on the source of information.”610 The standard applied by 
O’Hagan was that to find a person liable under the misappropriation theory, such a person 
must obtain or have access to material non-public information because of a fiduciary or 
similar relationship of trust and confidence with the source of the information.611 In 
addition, trading on the basis of this misused confidential information must occur without 
disclosure to the source of the information.612 In other words, any person, while being a 
fiduciary to another person (the source of the information), is subject to the 
misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5 if the person misappropriates confidential 
                                               
609 Id.at 659. See Nagy, supra note 543, at 1276. (Professor Nagy suggested that the Supreme Court’s adoption 
of the misappropriation theory that requires fraud on the source of the misappropriated information “allows 
courts to ‘catch’ unfairness to investors within the proscriptions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b- 5 without the 
necessity of having to character the unfairness as ‘fraud.’”) Id.  
610 Nagy, supra note 131, at 1223.  
611 The Supreme Court, in O’Hagan, stated that: “Under the complementary ‘misappropriation theory’ urged 
by the Government here, a corporate ‘outsider’ violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 when he misappropriates 
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of 
the information, rather than to the persons with whom he trades.” U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997).  
612 The Supreme Court asserted that “full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: 
Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of 
information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there 
is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain 
liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655. See Langevoort, supra 
note 50, at 1223; Nagy, supra note 423, at, 1356.  
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information, available to the person because of the fiduciary position, for trading purposes 
while pretending to be loyal to the source of the information, and without disclosure of 
such misappropriation.613 Therefore, the question of whether a fiduciary or similar 
relationship of trust and confidence exits or not is a determinative question to find a duty 
to disclose to the source of the information and the subsequent breach of the fiduciary duty 
and to find liability under the misappropriation theory.614 However, O’Hagan did not 
clarify how to determine the establishment of fiduciary or similar relationships for the 
purpose of finding liability under the misappropriation theory.615  
For the purpose of finding a duty to disclose under Rule 10b-5, the determination 
of the relationships as to whether they involve fiduciary or similar relationships has been 
developed by federal courts since Chairella.616 In corporate relations, the determination 
was already established by the Supreme Court where, under the classical theory, corporate 
directors, employees, and large shareholders are deemed to be in a fiduciary relationship.617 
In addition, the Supreme Court, in Dirks, has recognized that persons who are under the 
                                               
613 Id.  
614 Painter et al., supra note 257, at 175.  
615 Id.at 177. See Rebecca S. Smith, O’Hagan Revisited: Should A Fiduciary Duty Be Required Under the 
Misappropriation Theory? 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1005, 1015 (2006). Some commentators have suggested 
that four main types of persons could skip liability for trading on the basis of material non-public information 
under this misappropriation theory adopted by the Supreme Court, in O’Hagan. The first group is fiduciaries 
who, before trading on confidential information, obtained consent of the source of the information to trade. 
The second group is fiduciaries who disclosed to the source of the information their intent to breach their 
fiduciary duty and trade based on confidential information. The third group includes persons who obtain 
confidential information through theft or otherwise while not being in a fiduciary relationship with the source 
of the information. The fourth group is persons who acquire confidential information by accident. Smith, at 
1014; Nagy, supra note 423, at, 1350. See infra notes 660-83 and accompanying text. 
616 Smith, at 1015; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:6.  
617 Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 227; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:6.   
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status of temporary insider through business relationships, such as lawyers, accountants, 
and financial advisors are under a fiduciary duty.618  
The problem is that the misappropriation theory extended the scope of the duty to 
disclose beyond already recognized fiduciary relationships within the sphere of fiduciary-
shareholder relations to also cover non-business fiduciary relationships.619 For example, is 
whether a relationship between family members is a fiduciary relationship? Or is whether 
the contractual agreement to maintain confidentiality is a fiduciary relationship?  To 
provide some guidance on this issue, the Second Circuit analysis in United States v. 
Chestman620 was the most important case.621  
The Second Circuit observed that common law has recognized that certain 
relationships are inherently fiduciary. These relationships include, “attorney and client, 
executor and heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee and trust beneficiary, 
and senior corporate official and shareholder.”622 Moreover, the Second Circuit noted that 
the misappropriation theory requires an inquiry into whether other non-traditional fiduciary 
relationships that are similar in characteristics to well-established fiduciary relationship 
can be recognized.623 The Second Circuit asserted that “the term ‘similar’ implies, a 
‘relationship of trust and confidence’ [that] must share the essential characteristics of a 
                                               
618 Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646,655 Nt (14) (1983); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 666 (2nd Cir. 
1991).  
619 Smith, at 1015; Chestman, 947 F.2d at 667.  
620 Id. (Robert Chestman, a stock broker, received information related to the tender offer to Waldbaum, Inc., 
a publicly held company, from his client Keith Loeb. Keith Loeb received the information from his wife, 
Susan Loeb. Susan Loeb is the granddaughter of Julia Waldbaum, a member of the board of directors of 
Waldbaum and the wife of its founder, and the mother of Ira Waldbaum, the president and controlling 
shareholder of Waldbaum. Id.at 555. The Second Circuit reversed the convictions for violating Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, and affirmed the conviction for violating Rule 14e-3 by trading while in possession of 
material non-public information related to a tender offer.) Id. at 571.  
621 Smith, supra note 615, at 1016.  
622 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 658.  
623 Id.  
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fiduciary association.”624 The Second Circuit ruled that the essential characteristics of a 
fiduciary relationship are reliance, control, and dominance.”625 Therefore, the Second 
Circuit concluded that a similar relationship must share the same qualities as these 
characteristics.626 On the basis of this analysis, the Second Circuit noted two factors that 
do not by themselves, create fiduciary or a similar relationship of trust and confidence. 
“First, a fiduciary duty cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person with 
confidential information…Second, marriage, [or other familial relationship] [] [do] not, 
without more, create a fiduciary relationship.”627 However, the Second Circuit found that 
“the repeated disclosure of business secrets between family members may substitute for a 
factual finding of dependence and influence and thereby sustain a finding of the functional 
equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.”628  
Rule 10b5-2: The SEC’s Determination on Whether a Duty of Trust or Confidence 
Exists. 
 
In response to many commentators urging for a federal bright-line rule determining 
when a similar relationship of trust and confidence exists under the misappropriation 
theory,629 the SEC issued Rule 10b5-2 in 2000,630 which reads:  
(b)…[A]“duty of trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among 
others: (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) 
Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the 
person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing 
                                               
624 Id.  
625 Id.  
626 Id.at 659.  
627 Id.at 657-58.  
628 Id.at 569. For more discussion about various relationships that were found to involve fiduciary or similar 
relationships under the misappropriation theory, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 432. 
(Enumerating eight types of relationships that at least one Court found to be fiduciary or similar relationships 
under the misappropriation theory: (1) Employer/employee; (2) Independent contractors; (3) Government 
employees; (4) journalist/employer; (5) familial relationships; (6) attorney/client; (7) partnerships; and (8) 
incorporated partners.) Id. at 432-569.  
629 See Painter et al., supra note 257, at 213; Smith, supra note 615, 1020.  
630 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 
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confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should 
know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects 
that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or (3) Whenever a person 
receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, 
child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the 
information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with 
respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor 
reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the 
information expected that the person would keep the information confidential, 
because of the parties’ history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining 
confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the 
confidentiality of the information.631 
 
The SEC noted that the common law precedents developing similar relationships 
of trust and confidence under the misappropriation theory were not sufficient to protect 
investors’ confidence and the integrity of securities markets from the improper use of 
confidential information for trading purposes.632 In particular, the SEC found that 
Chestman’s rule was narrow and unwarranted where the Second Circuit found that the 
disclosure of confidential information to a close family member or friend with the mere 
expectation of maintaining confidentiality is inadequate to create a fiduciary 
relationship.633 The SEC noted that Chestman’s requirements of an express agreement of 
confidentiality or a pre-exiting fiduciary relationship between family members and friends 
ignored the fact that parties who are close to family and personal relationships have a 
reasonable and legitimate expectation of confidentiality in their communication.634  
Therefore, the SEC issued this rule to provide a broader standard for the purpose of giving 
                                               
631 Id.  
632 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590-01, 72602 (Dec. 28, 1999). For more 
information about the cases developing the determination of relationships of trust and confidence under the 
misappropriation theory, see LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 
432; Smith, supra note 615, at 1015.  
633 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72602.  
634 Id.  
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more clarity to the application of the misappropriation theory to non-business 
relationships.635  
Paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 10b5-2 is a codification of the SEC-preferred answer of 
whether a mere agreement of maintaining confidentiality is enough to create a relationship 
of confidence actionable under the misappropriation theory.636 Under this paragraph, the 
SEC does not require the agreement to be in writing or even an express agreement. By 
providing a soft standard of the existence agreement of confidentiality, the SEC took into 
consideration that, in some situations, it can be unrealistic or socially undesirable to insist 
that a close friend or family member should sign a confidentiality agreement or expressly 
agree to an oral agreement.637 
                                               
635 Id.at 72603; Smith, supra note 615, 1020;  
636 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7 
637 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72603. Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is considered by 
commentators as an extension of the law of illegal corporate insider trading under Rule 10b-5 to include 
nonfiduciary parties bound by a confidentiality agreement with no expectation of loyalty. See, 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7; Nagy, supra note 423, 1361; Smith, supra note 207, at 1421. An 
agreement of maintaining confidentiality was ratified by many courts as a source of finding a duty of trust or 
confidence under the misappropriation theory. However, the agreement of confidentiality was questioned by 
some other courts. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7. The famous case in this regard was, SEC v. 
Cuban, 620 F.3d 551(2010). The Fifth Circuit questioned the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) that a duty of 
trust or confidence exists for the application of the misappropriation theory when a person agrees to maintain 
information in confidence. Mark Cuban was a large minority shareholder of Mamma.com. He received a call 
from the company’s CEO. In that phone conversation, the CEO told Cuban that he would tell him confidential 
information and he wanted him to agree that he would keep the information in confidence. Cuban agreed. 
The CEO told Cuban that the company would have a private investment in a public equity (PIPE) offering. 
Cuban was upset about this news. He said, “I am screwed, I cannot sell.” At a later time, Cuban sold his 
entire ownership in the company. Id.at 555. The district court dismissed the SEC’s complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6). SEC v. Cuban, 634, F.Supp.2d 713, 731 (N.D.Tex.2009). The District Court stated that a duty 
sufficient to support liability under the misappropriation theory can arise by agreement absent a preexisting 
fiduciary or similar relationship, but the agreement must consist of more than an express or implied promise 
merely to keep information confidential. Id.725. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. SEC v. Cuban, 620 
F.3d 551. The Court declined to determine whether the District Court erred in its legal analysis that the 
confidentiality agreement does not by itself create a duty of trust or confidence under the misappropriation 
theory; however, it reached a different conclusion that the District Court erred in deeming the complaint 
inadequate. Id. at 558 It held that “the allegations, taken in their entirety, provide more than a plausible basis 
to find that the understanding between the CEO and Cuban that was he want to trade, that it was more than a 
simple confidentiality agreement.” Id.at 557. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7.  
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Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) says that a duty of trust or confidence exists when the person 
disclosing confidential information expects the recipient to maintain confidentiality due to 
history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidentiality.638 The history, pattern, or practice of 
sharing confidentiality need not be related to business subjects, but rather the type of 
confidential matters shared in the past can demonstrate the reasonable expectation of 
maintaining confidentiality.639 However, this paragraph does not describe specific 
relationships, but provides a circumstantial test of whether the past, pattern, or practice of 
the two parties would lead to a legitimate expectation of confidentiality.640 The burden of 
proof of this legitimate reasonable expectation is on the government.641   
Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) specifies close family relationships stating that whenever 
confidential information is obtained from a parent, spouse, child, or sibling, there is a 
presumption that the person obtaining the information is under a duty of trust or confidence 
not to trade on the basis of such information.642 Unlike Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) where the 
government has the burden to prove circumstantial evidence that the disclosing person and 
the recipient had a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidentiality, Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) 
makes a reputable presumption that the information is shared under a relationship of trust 
or confidence.643 However, it provides an affirmative defense that there is no duty of trust 
or confidence between the trader and the disclosing close family member.644 To prove the 
absence of a duty of trust or confidence, the trader must demonstrate that the disclosing 
                                               
638 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72603. 
639 Id.  
640 Id.  
641 For more discussion about this paragraph, see LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7.  
642 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590-01, 72604 (Dec. 28, 1999); LANGEVOORT, 
supra note 6, at §6:7; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 445.  
643 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7. 
644 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72604.  
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family member has no reasonable expectation of maintaining confidentiality because they 
have no (1) history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidence; or (2) there was no 
agreement or understanding to maintain the information in confidence.645    
 
 
 
Rule 14e-3: The SEC Expanded the Misappropriation Theory in a Tender Offer 
Context646 
 
After the United States Supreme Court decision in Chairella, which rejected the 
“parity of information” doctrine adopted by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, the SEC issued a new rule, Rule 14e-3, in 1980, under Section 14(e) of the SEA647 
to regulate illegal corporate insider trading in a tender offer context.648 The SEC noted that 
                                               
645 Id; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:7; Smith, supra note 615, at 1015. 
646 A tender offer is: “[a] public offer to buy a minimum number of shares directly from a corporation’s 
shareholders at a fixed price. [] at a substantial premium over the market price, in an effort to take control of 
the corporation.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Tender Offer (10th ed. 2014). “Other means to acquire a company 
include a sale of assets or a merger, [] are governed by state law primarily.” MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ ET AL, 
SECURITIES CRIMES, § 7:30 Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018).  
647 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n.  Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that: “It shall be unlawful 
for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with 
any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or 
in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, 
by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices 
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.” Section 14(e) which provides rulemaking authority to the SEC 
was added to the Securities Exchange Act, in 1970, within the William Act amendment. The William Act 
was concerned about regulating tender offers and conduct by the bidders and target companies. See Michael 
T. Raymond, Validity Challenges to SEC Rule 14e-3, 23 J. Marshall L. Rev.  308-16 (1999).  
648 This Rule was under questioning about its validity because it was argued that the SEC exceeded its 
authority under Section 14(e) to prohibit trading on inside information in relating to a tender offer without 
requiring a pre-existing fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence. Se Raymond, supra note 
244, at 313. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 726.  However, the Supreme Court, in O’Hagan, 
affirmed Rule 14e-3. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997). The Supreme Court concluded that the 
rulemaking power of the SEC “under § 14(e), [enables the SEC to] prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent 
under the common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition is ‘reasonably designed to prevent … acts and practices 
that are fraudulent.’” Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 733;  
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trading by persons in possession of material non-public information related to a tender offer 
results in unfair disparities in market information, prevents shareholders from making 
informed investment decisions, and causes market disruption.649 Pursuant to this rule, the 
SEC requires any person in possession of material non-public information related to a 
tender offer to disclose the information and identify the source or refrain from trading until 
public disclosure.650 The SEC, in civil lawsuits, and the DOJ, in criminal proceedings, use 
this Rule in cases that involve trading on confidential information related to a tender offer 
based on the misappropriation theory.651 The main difference between persons subject to 
the misappropriation theory under Rule 10b-5 and others subject to Rule 14e-3 is that 
unlike Rule 10b-5, Rule 14e-3 does not require that the court find a violation of illegal 
insider trading, but must find a breach of fiduciary duty.652  Therefore, the question of 
whether there is a breach of fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence is 
irrelevant to the liability under Rule 14e-3 for trading while in possession of material non-
public information in a tender offer context.653 Rule 14e-3 reads:  
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has 
commenced, a tender offer (the “offering person”), it shall constitute a fraudulent, 
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the 
Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to 
such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic 
and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly 
                                               
649 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 5 (Sept. 4, 1980); Raymond, supra note 243, 
at 314.  
650 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Id.  
651 Karmel, supra note 426, at 761; Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 465, 472(1990).  
652 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2nd Cir 1991). The Second Circuit reversed the 
conviction for violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because of the lack of fiduciary duty or its functional 
equivalent. Id. However, it affirmed the conviction for violating Rule 14e-3 by trading while in possession 
of material non-public information related to a tender offer derived from the target company.) Id.at 563. For 
more information, see LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:1; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 713. 
653 Painter et al., supra note 257, at 167. 
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from:(1) The offering person, (2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought 
by such tender offer, or (3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other 
person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or 
cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible 
into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to 
dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to 
any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press 
release or otherwise.654  
 
Rule 14e-3 makes it unlawful to purchase or sell or cause the sale or purchase of 
any security of the issuer upon any person who is in possession of material non-public 
information related to a tender offer that was commenced by another or has taken a 
substantial step or steps to commence a tender offer when the possessor of the information 
knows or has reason to know that this information is non-public and was directly or 
indirectly derived from (1) the tender offeror, (2) the target company, or (3) any officer, 
director, partner, or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the tender offeror or 
the target company.655 This rule applies to a wide range of persons whether they acquired 
the confidential information about the tender offer while being actual corporate insiders or 
as securities professionals, or others.656  The SEC indicated that the “disclose or abstain 
from trading” rule imposed under Rule 14e-3 “is similar to the approach taken in Texas 
Gulf and Cady, Roberts.” 657 However, the scope of this rule is limited as it only governs 
trading on material non-public information related to a tender offer.658 Therefore, trading 
                                               
654 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(a). 
655SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 5 (Sept. 4, 1980); WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 5, at 717.  
656 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 717.  
657 Tender Offers, Release, supra note 245.  
658 Bainbridge, supra note 266, at 1196. 
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on material non-public information that is not related to a tender offer is still subject to 
liability under Rule 10b-5.659   
Recent Cases have Broadened the Scope of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading to 
Cover Outsiders Beyond the O’Hagan Scope  
 
The Supreme Court, in O’Hagan, has clearly stated that trading on the basis of 
material non-public information is prohibited under Rule 10b-5 only when there is a breach 
of fiduciary duty to disclose information owed to the source of the information.660 This is 
because the Supreme Court analyzed illegal corporate insider trading as it involves silence 
or omission of material facts and silence is deceptive only when it is in a breach of fiduciary 
duty by the trader.661 Therefore, the Supreme Court, in O’Hagan, noted that if the fiduciary 
told his/her principal about his/her intent to trade on material non-public information, the 
trading is not deceptive under Rule 10b-5 even though it is a breach of fiduciary duty 
actionable under State law.662 However, some courts have been willing to go beyond the 
O’Hagan misappropriation theory and based the liability of illegal corporate insider trading 
upon the wrongful or improper acquisition of inside information.663   
The traditional understanding of the reach of the misappropriation theory under 
O’Hagan was that disclosure by the fiduciary to the source of the information before 
trading negates liability of illegal corporate insider trading under Rule 10b-5.664 Eventually, 
this understanding was tested by the First Circuit, in SEC v. Rocklage,665 The court 
                                               
659 Id.  
660 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997). See Robert Steinbuch, Outsider Trading: “Mere Thieves” 
Affirmed, S.D.N.Y. Reversed, 37 No. 4 Securities Regulation Law Journal ART 2 (2009); Painter et al., supra 
note 257, at 181. 
661 Id.  
662 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. See Nagy, supra note 423, at, 1344. 
663 Nagy, supra note 423, at, 1369.  
664 Painter et al., supra note 257, at 180. 
665 470 F.3d 1. (1st Cir. 2006).  
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concluded that disclosure to the principal or the source of the information about the intent 
of the fiduciary to trade or tip inside information does not foreclose the fiduciary from 
illegal corporate insider trading liability in the event of deceptive acquisition of material 
non-public information.666 The facts of this case involved trading by a brother-in-law of a 
corporate insider on the basis of confidential information received from the insider’s wife, 
Patricia B. Rocklage. Ms. Rocklage had an agreement with her brother that she would 
inform him about any confidential information received from her husband. After the insider 
told his wife negative information about the company, Ms. Rocklage tipped her brother 
about this information. However, before she tipped her brother, Ms. Rocklage told her 
husband that she would give her brother the information. Her brother sold his stock in the 
company on the next day and told another person to do the same.667 The three defendants 
claimed that Ms. Rocklage’s pre-tip disclosure to her husband, foreclosed them from any 
liability under the misappropriation theory, in accordance with O’Hagan.668 The First 
Circuit distinguished O’Hagan from the facts presented in this case by finding that 
O’Hagan received the confidential information from his employer legitimately so the way 
of obtaining the information was not an issue in O’Hagan.669 However, in this case, the 
First Circuit stated that “the SEC squarely alleges that Ms. Rocklage deceptively obtained 
information, and that she did so as part of a preexisting scheme to assist her brother in the 
sale of securities.”670 Then, the Second Circuit concluded that: “In light of her disclosure 
                                               
666 Nagy, supra note 423, at, 1369; § 4:11.Misappropriation theory—Deception, Corp Couns Gd to Insider 
Trading & Rep § 4:11, Westlaw (database updated Sep. 2018). 
667 Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 3.  
668 Id.  
669 Id.at 9.  
670 Id.   
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to her husband, Ms. Rocklage’s mechanism for ‘distributing’ the information to her brother 
may or may not have been rendered non-deceptive by her stated intention to tip. But 
because of the way in which Ms. Rocklage first acquired this information, her overall 
scheme was still deceptive.”671 
Although O’Hagan was understood to be excluded from liability of illegal 
corporate insider trading on material non-public information that was wrongfully obtained 
by non-fiduciaries who may have acquired the information through theft, industrial spies 
and other unlawful means,672 the Second Circuit, in S.E.C. v. Dorozhko, 673 found corporate 
outsiders may be held liable for trading on stolen material non-public information through 
computer hacking without any pre-existing fiduciary relationship with the source of the 
information.674 The case involved the defendant, Oleksandr Dorozhko, who traded on IMS 
Health Inc. by purchasing a “put” option before the announcement of a reduction by 28 
percent of its earnings per share. After the public announcement of the unexpected earnings 
result, the defendant sold all his IMS options, realizing a net profit of $286,456.59.675 The 
allegation by the SEC was that the defendant obtained IMS’s earning reports by hacking 
Thomson Financial, Inc. who was hired by the IMS to provide investor relations and web-
hosting services.676 The SEC alleged that the defendant committed fraud when he hacked 
Thomason software which involved several misrepresentations in violation of Section 
                                               
671 Id.at 13-14. For more discussion about this case, see Nagy, supra note 423, at, 1344; Misappropriation 
theory—Deception, supra note 666.  
672 U.S. v. O'Hagan, 1997 WL 182584 (U.S.), 5 (U.S.Oral.Arg.,1997). (“QUESTION: Well, Mr. Dreeben, 
then if someone stole the lawyer's briefcase and discovered the information and traded on it, no violation? 
MR. DREEBEN: That's correct, Justice O'Connor.”) Id. Painter et al., supra note 257, at 181.  
673 574 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
674 Steinbuch, supra note 660; Nagy, supra note 423, at, 1370.  
675 Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 44-45.  
676 Id.  
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10(b) and Rule 10b-5.677 The SEC claimed that the defendant affirmatively misrepresented 
himself to gain access to material, nonpublic information, which he then used to trade.678 
The Court noted that the SEC claim was that the defendant committed simple fraud by 
misrepresenting himself to gain access to confidential information rather than alleging that 
the “defendant fraudulently remained silent in the face of a ‘duty to disclose or abstain’ 
from trading.”679 The Second Circuit also noted that the SEC allegation did not fit any of 
the generally accepted theories of illegal corporate insider trading.680 However, the Second 
Circuit concluded that the question herein was not whether the defendant violated corporate 
insider trading law, but whether the defendant committed a simple fraudulent act under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by hacking Thomson’s software and gaining access to 
confidential information.681 The Second Circuit found that “misrepresenting one’s identity 
in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off limits, and then stealing that 
information is plainly ‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of the word.”682 However, 
the Second Circuit was cautious about supporting any generalization of the issue and stated 
that computer hacking could not be deceptive if it involved only “exploiting a weakness in 
an electronic code to gain unauthorized access... Accordingly, depending on how the 
hacker gained access, it seems to us entirely possible that computer hacking could be, by 
                                               
677 Id.at 45.  
678 Id.at 49.  
679 Id.  
680 Id.at 45.  
681 Id.at 50.See  Steinbuch, supra note 660. 
682 Id.at 51. (The Second Circuit also noted that “no precedent of the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit 
that forecloses or prohibits the SEC’s straightforward theory of fraud.”) Id at 49.  
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definition, a ‘deceptive device or contrivance’ that is prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b–5.”683 
Tipper/ Tippee Liability  
 
The rationale that underlies tipper/tippee liability is that corporate insiders and other 
fiduciaries are not only prohibited from trading on material non-public information for their 
personal advantage but also are prohibited from tipping material non-public information to 
others to trade for the same improper purpose of taking advantage of their fiduciary 
position to further their personal benefit.684 Based on this rationale, investors termed 
“tippees,” who receive “material nonpublic information from someone in a fiduciary 
relationship with the company [or source] to which that information pertains,”685 are within 
the zone of illegal corporate insider trading law. The theory of tipper/tippee liability was 
established by the Supreme Court in Dirks.686 They established that tipper/tippee liability 
exists when (1) an insider has breached his fiduciary duty by disclosing material non-public 
information to a tippee in exchange for direct or indirect personal benefit; and (2) the tippee 
knows or should have known about the tipper’s breach.687 The Supreme Court provided 
objective circumstances that could infer that the tipper’s disclosure was for personal 
benefit, such as if the disclosure was for pecuniary gain, or a reputational benefit that would 
translate into future earnings.688 Dirks also stated that: “[t]he elements of fiduciary duty 
and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of 
                                               
683 Id. for more discussion about this case, see Steinbuch, supra note 660; Nagy, supra note 423, at 1370; 
James A. Jones II, Outsider Hacking and Insider Trading: The Expansion of Liability Absent A Fiduciary 
Duty, 6 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 111 (2010).  
684 Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 659 (1983). 
685 Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
686 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
687 Id.at 660 
688 Id.at 663.  
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confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”689 Recently, the Supreme Court, in 
Salman v. U.S.,690 revisited the tipper/tippee liability issue in a narrow decision regarding 
whether a tip to a relative by itself constitutes a personal benefit in the form of a gift from 
the tipper to the tippee or if it is required that the tipper receives something of tangible 
value in exchange for the tip.691 The following discussion describes the two Supreme Court 
decisions followed by analysis of the standard of tipper/tippee liability.  
Dirks v. S.E.C.  
 
On March 7, 1973, when Raymond Dirks was serving as an officer of a broker 
dealer who specialized in providing investment analysis of an insurance company security 
for institutional investors, he received information from Ronald Secrist, a former officer of 
the insurance company (the Equity Funding Corporation of America), listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange. The information indicated that the company was involved in 
fraudulent security practices by vastly overstating its assets.692 The former officer added 
that the Securities Exchange Commission had failed to act upon previous complaints made 
by some employees of the company.693 Eventually, Dirks decided to launch his own 
investigation about the alleged fraud scheme and successfully determined that certain 
company employees corroborated the fraud charges.694 However, senior management 
denied any wrongdoing.695 Neither Dirks nor his firm owned any of the company’s stock, 
but during Dirks’ investigation, he discussed and disseminated the information he obtained 
                                               
689 Id.at 664.  
690 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).  
691 Id.at 423. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:6. 
692 Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. at 648-49 
693 Id. at 649.  
694 Id.  
695 Id.  
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from the former officer to various clients and investors.696 Consequently, some of them 
sold their securities in the company.697 After the price of the Equity Funding’s stock fell 
during Dirks’ investigation, the New York Stock Exchange halted trading in the stock and 
state insurance authorities impounded the company’s records and uncovered evidence of 
fraud.698 After a hearing by an administrative law judge, the SEC found that Dirks had 
aided and abetted violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, 
including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by repeating the allegation of fraud to members of 
the investment community who later sold their stock in the company.699 The SEC 
concluded that when tippees, disregarding their position or motivation, come into 
possession of material non-public information that they know is confidential information 
and know or should know came from a corporate insider, they must publicly disclose the 
information or abstain from trading until public disclosure.700 The SEC only censured Dirks 
due to his role of disclosing the fraud allegation to several investors.701 
Dirks sought a review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit.702 The D.C. Circuit entered a judgment against Dirks for the reasons 
                                               
696 Id.  
697 Id.  
698 Id.at 650.  
699 Id. 
700 Id.at 650-51. 
701 Id.at 651-52.  
702 Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See Whistle Blowing as a Rule 10b-5 Violation: Dirks v. 
SEC, 36 U. Miami L. Rev. 987 (1982). 
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presented by the SEC.703 Eventually, Dirks appeared before the Supreme Court which 
granted Dirks a writ of certiorari to seek a review of the decision of the D.C. Circuit.704 
The issue that the Supreme Court reviewed was whether Dirks violated the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws by his disclosure of material non-public 
information.705 The court established its review of the case by citing its ruling in Chiarella 
where it stated:  
A duty to disclose or abstain does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information. Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a fiduciary relationship… 
There must also be manipulation or deception to bring a breach of fiduciary duty in 
connection with a securities transaction within the ambit of Rule 10b–5. Thus, an insider 
is liable under the Rule for inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic 
information before trading on it and thus makes secret profits.”706  
 
After review, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit707 and rejected the 
SEC’s position that a tippee who merely and knowingly receives material non-public 
information from an insider is under a fiduciary obligation to disclose before trading.708 
SEC’s position, as the Supreme Court explained, runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Chiarella,709 where it stated that a duty to disclose arises from the relationship 
between parties and not merely from one’s ability to receive information due to his position 
                                               
703 Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824. (The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed that “Dirks had a duty to disclose what he knew about Equity Funding to the public or to refrain 
from trading (or fostering trades) in Equity Funding securities. He violated that duty, and with it Rule 10b-5, 
when he passed his information to investors who were likely to sell their Equity Funding securities before 
the public learned about the Equity Funding fraud.” Id.at 837. The Court based its decision on that “the 
obligations of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to whom they disclose their information before it has 
been disseminated to the public at large. Thus Dirks (and through him his clients) became subject to his 
informants’ disclose-or-refrain obligation.” Id. at 839. See Whistle Blowing as a Rule 10b-5 Violation: Dirks 
v. SEC, id. at 990.  
704 Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 652 (1983).  
705 Id. at 648.  
706 Id. at 647.  
707 Id.at 667.  
708 Id.at 655-56. 
709 Id.  
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in the market.710 Therefore, the Court concluded that a tippee lacks an independent 
fiduciary duty to both the corporation and its shareholders,711 but a tippee has a duty to 
disclose or abstain in a derivative obligation from the insider’s duty.712 As a result, a tippee 
assumes a fiduciary duty not to trade on material non-public information only when the 
tipper has breached his fiduciary duty by disclosing the information to the tippee and the 
tippee knows or should have known that there was a breach.713  
The Supreme Court concluded that Dirks did not violate illegal corporate insider 
trading and tipping rules.714 The Court reasoned that Dirks himself had no pre-existing 
fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders.715 In addition, it is clear that the tippers 
did not violate their duty to disclose or abstain from trading to the corporation’s 
shareholders by providing information to Dirks because of no personal benefit was gained 
from the disclosure.716 The lack of personal benefit is illustrated by the fact that the tippers 
received no monetary or personal benefit from revealing the corporation’s fraudulent 
activities, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.717 In fact, 
the tipper’s motivation for the disclosure was to expose the fraud.718 As a result, the Court 
concluded that because the tipper did not breach his fiduciary duty by the disclosure, there 
was no derivative fiduciary duty on Dirks. Therefore, Dirks breached no duty when he 
                                               
710 Id.at 657-58.   
711 Id.at 655.  
712 Id.at 659.  
713 Id.at 660.   
714 Id.at 665. 
715 Id.  
716 Id.at 666.  
717 Id.at 667. 
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passed the information to others who subsequently traded on this information.719 The Court 
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.720 
The Supreme Court was cautious about a general prohibition on tipper/tippee 
liability as it realized that not every disclosure constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.721  In 
addition, it realized that the imposition of a general prohibition of trading on material non-
public information knowingly received from an insider “could have an inhibiting influence 
on the role of market analysts, which the SEC recognizes is necessary to the preservation 
of a healthy market.”722  
The Supreme Court noted that a typical scenario about whether the disclosure was 
in breach of duty to disclose is when insiders disclose material non-public information to 
analysts.723 The Court stated that this disclosure can be in breach of the insider duty to 
disclose or abstain from trading based on the circumstances.724 This is because it may be 
unclear whether “[c]orporate officials may mistakenly think the information already has 
been disclosed or it is not material enough to effect the market.”725 In addition, the insider 
may sometime disclose material non-public information without a breach of his/her 
                                               
719 Id.  
720 Id.  
721 Id.at 662. 
722 Id.658-59. (The Supreme Court noted that it “is commonplace for analysts to ‘ferret out and analyze 
information,’ and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are 
insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market 
worth of a corporation’s securities. The analyst’s judgment in this respect is made available in market letters 
or otherwise to clients of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets 
themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s 
stockholders or the public generally.”) Id. For more discussion about the policy reasons underlying the 
Supreme Court’s decision, see Adam C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 S.M.U.L. 
Rev 857, 859 (2015).  
723 Id.at 662. 
724 Id.  
725 Id.  
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fiduciary duty.726 On the basis of this understanding of the varying legal status scenarios 
of disclosure of material non-public information, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
determination of whether the disclosure was in breach of the insider’s duty to disclose or 
abstain from trading depends on the purpose of the disclosure.727  
The Supreme Court stated that since the SEC’s opinion was that the purpose of 
securities laws was to eliminate the use of material non-public information for personal 
advantage. Thus, the test herein “is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or 
indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain there has been no breach of duty 
to stockholders. And a absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.”728 The 
Supreme Court, however, noted that that determination of whether a tipper benefits from a 
disclosure is a question of fact and it would not be easy for courts to exclusively determine 
the circumstances under which such a benefit may be received.729 Therefore, the court 
provided objective criteria to define whether the tipper obtained a direct or indirect personal 
benefit from the disclosure as follows:  
• A pecuniary gain 
• A reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings 
• A relationship between the tipper and the tippee that suggests a quid pro que 
from the latter 
• An intention to benefit the particular recipient 
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727 Id.  
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• When an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative 
or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by 
a gift of the profits to the recipient.730  
These objective circumstances can be reduced to three possible situations that a 
personal benefit could be gained by the tipper from the disclosure: a reciprocal exchange 
for pecuniary gain, a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings, or a gift to 
a relative or a friend.731 The major issue that has been under judicial scrutiny among these 
objective circumstances is the gift scenario of which the disclosure is made as a gift to a 
relative or friend.732 This issue resulted in a contradictory interpretation of Dirks’ personal 
benefit test between the Second Circuit733 and the Ninth Circuit734 and eventually went to 
the Supreme Court in January 2016, to resolve this issue.735 
                                               
730 Id. See, Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading, Faculty Scholarship Paper 
1679, 46-50 (2016). The Supreme Court’s decision, in Dirks, was dissented by Justice Harry Blackmun with 
whom Justice William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall joined. Justice Blackmun rejected the personal 
benefit test created by the Court as it added a new requirement to the fiduciary duty doctrine. Dirks v. SEC., 
463 U.S. 646, 667. “This innovation excuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider’s duty to 
shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of personal gain.” Id.at 668.  Justice Blackmun argued 
that the Court’s innovation of personal motivation is not justified even on the facts of this case. “Secrist could 
not do by proxy what he was prohibited from doing personally. But this is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist 
used Dirks to disseminate information to Dirks’ clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing purchasers. 
Secrist thus intended Dirks to injure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom Secrist had a duty 
to disclose. Accepting the Court’s view of tippee liability, it appears that Dirks’ knowledge of this breach 
makes him liable as a participant in the breach after the fact.” Id.at 671. Justice Blackmun opposed the 
creation of the personal benefit test because “[i]t makes no difference to the shareholder whether the corporate 
insider gained or intended to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has lost because of 
the insider’s misuse of nonpublic information. The duty is addressed not to the insider’s motives, but to his 
actions and their consequences on the shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the breach of this duty.” 
Id.673-74.  
731 Fisch, supra note 730, at 50.  
732 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 390.  
733 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2nd Cir. 2014) 
734 U.S. v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015). 
735 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT. 420 (U.S. 2016). For more discussion about the apparent split between Newman 
and Salman, see Ronald J. Colombo, Tipping the Scales against Insider Trading: Adopting a Presumption of 
Personal Benefit to Clarify Dirks, Forthcoming, 45 Hofstra L. Rev. 117 (2016); Short, supra note 511, at 5; 
Seaforth, supra note 424, 175; Pritchard, supra note 722; Donna M. Nagy, beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping 
and Insider Trading, 42 J. Corp. L. 1 (2016); Katherine Drummonds, Resuscitating Dirks: how the Salman 
Gift Theory of Tipper-Tippee personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
833 (2016).  
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Salman v. United States  
 
 The split between the Second and Ninth Circuits prompted the United States 
Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari in January 2016, to review whether an insider’s 
gift of material non-public information to a trading relative or friend is not enough to 
establish securities fraud unless the tipper’s goal of the disclosure is to obtain money, 
property or something of tangible value.736 The assumed judicial spilt between the Second 
and Ninth Circuits was imputed to the decision of the Second Circuit, in Newman, as it 
created an additional requirement that the government needed to prove that the disclosure 
was made as a gift to a relative or friend. The government must prove “a meaningfully 
close relationship” between the tipper and tippee “that generates an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of tangible value.”737 In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Salman, found that no further proof is required from the 
government to show that the tipper received a personal benefit by disclosing material non-
public information as a gift to a relative or friend.738  
 The facts of Salman as presented in the Supreme Court’s decision was as follows: 
Maher Kara, worked as an investment banker in Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking 
                                               
736 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT. 420, 425 (U.S. 2016).   
737 U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2nd Cir. 2014).  (The fact of this case involved two defendants, Todd 
Newman and Anthony Chiasson, who were analysts and portfolio managers at different firms. The allegation 
was that they traded on the basis of material non-public information regarding earnings information about 
two corporations, Dell and NIVDIA. Id.at 443. The allegation showed that the defendants were remote 
tippees and were three and four levels removed from the original insider tipper. Id. The issue the Second 
Circuit reviewed was whether the District Court’s instruction to the jury misled or inadequately informed 
them about the applicable law when it refused to instruct the jury to find whether Newman and Chiasson 
knew the corporate insiders had disclosed confidential information for personal benefit in order to find them 
guilty. Id.at 444-45. The Court agreed and held that “the district court was required to instruct the jury that 
the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Newman and Chiasson knew that the tippers 
received a personal benefit for their disclosure.”) Id. at 450-51. 
738 Salman, 792 F.3d, 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2015). See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:6. See also supra 
note 741. 
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group.739 Maher tipped his older brother, Mounir Kara (Michael), confidential information 
about upcoming mergers and acquisitions of and by clients of Citigroup.740 Michael then 
traded on this information and passed the information to Yacoub Salman, Michael’s friend 
and Maher’s future brother-in-law, who made over $1.5 million in profit.741 The evidence 
established that Maher and Michael enjoyed a very close relationship.742 Michael was like 
“a second father to Maher” including paying his college tuition. 743 Michael was also the 
best man at Maher’s wedding to Salman’s sister.744 Furthermore, Maher testified that he 
leaked material non-public information to his brother with the intent of benefiting him and 
he expected that his brother would trade on it.745 Maher also said that he tipped his brother 
to “help him and to fulfill whatever needs he had.”746 Michael testified that after he and 
Salman became friends, he began to tip Salman confidential information at any time a 
major deal came in.747 Finally, Salman was aware that the information was coming from 
Maher and Michael testified that he informed Salman that the information was coming 
from Maher.748 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction finding that Salman’s awareness 
that Maher was the source of the information was sufficient to demonstrate that Salman 
knew that Maher intended to benefit Michael by tipping him material non-public 
                                               
739 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT. 420, 424 (U.S. 2016).  
740 Id.  
741 Id.  
742 Id.  
743 Id.  
744 Id.  
745 Id.  
746 Id. 
747 Id.at 425.   
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information as a gift of confidential information to a trading relative, which is precisely 
what Dirks constructed.749 
 In January 2016, the United Stated Supreme Court granted Salman a writ of 
certiorari to resolve this issue. Salman argued before the Supreme Court that “a tipper does 
not personally benefit unless the tipper’s goal in disclosing inside information is to obtain 
money, property, or something of tangible value.”750 He also argued that defining a gift as 
a personal benefit makes the insider-trading offense uncertain and vastly general.751 First, 
it may make the offense indeterminate because it does not specify the closeness of the 
relationship between the tipper and tippee and the tipper’s purpose for the disclosure.752 
Second, determining that a gift is a personal benefit is an overly broad standard because 
the government would be released from proving a specific personal benefit by simply 
arguing that the tipper intended to disclose the information as a gift to the tippee.753 
Furthermore, Salman asserted that the gift standard generates problems for remote tippees 
who were unaware of the relationship between the tipper and first tippee. Thus, they may 
not know the tipper’s purpose of the disclosure.754 In contrast, the government argued that 
a gift of material non-public information to any person, not just a trading relative or friend, 
is solely enough to demonstrate securities fraud.755 According to the government’s 
argument, a tipper would personally benefits whenever he disclosed material non-public 
information for non-corporate purposes.756 Therefore, the mere tipping of such information 
                                               
749 U.S. v. Salman, 792 F.3d, 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2015). See Pritchard, supra note 722, at 858.  
750 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT. 420, 426 (U.S. 2016).  
751 Id.  
752 Id.  
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as a gift to a relative, a friend, or any other person infers that the tipper has exploited the 
trading value of the information for personal purposes and thus personally benefited from 
the disclosure.757 Moreover, the government asserted that the concern about indeterminate 
criminal liability for remote tippees is mostly alleviated by other statutory elements. The 
government explained that to establish a tipper liability in a criminal offense, it must 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the tipper expected that the information he 
disclosed would be used in securities trading. In addition, the government must prove that 
the tippee knew that the tipper’s purpose of disclosing such information was for a personal 
benefit in which the tipper expected the recipient to use this information to trade.758  
 The Supreme Court started its analysis of Salman by adhering to its decision in 
Dirks where the Court asserted that: “We adhere to Dirks, which easily resolves the narrow 
issue presented here.”759 The Court reemphasized that disclosure of confidential 
information without personal benefit is not enough to find liability.760 The Court also 
asserted that the standard to infer gaining a personal benefit is based on objective criteria 
as it articulated in Dirks.761 “whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal 
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings.762 The Court reemphasized that “the elements of fiduciary 
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”763 The Court illustrated this type 
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of personal benefit as “the tip and trade resemble trading by the insider followed by a gift 
of the profit to the recipient.”764  
 The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s conviction, finding 
that Maher, the tipper, tipped confidential information to a close relative, Michael. Dirks 
made it clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative.765 The Supreme Court stated that Dirks, specifically, 
found that when an insider tips confidential information to a trading relative or friend, “the 
jury can infer that the tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift.”766 Thus, “the 
tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the same thing as 
trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds.”767 The Court concluded that when 
Maher disclosed material non-public information as a gift to his brother with the awareness 
that he would trade based on this information, he breached his duty of trust and confidence 
to Citigroup and its clients.768 Salman, in turn, breached this inherited duty for himself by 
trading on it when he knew that this information had been improperly disclosed.769  In 
addition, the Supreme Court rejected part of the Second Circuit’s holding in Newman that 
the tipper must obtain something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature in exchange 
for a gift to family or friends.”770 Thus, the Supreme Court described the Newman 
requirement as inconsistent with its decision in Dirks.771   
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769 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. 420, 428-429.  
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 Finally, the Supreme Court acknowledged that demonstrating whether an insider 
personally benefits from a disclosure is a question of fact and is not always easy for 
courts.772 However, the Court stated that “there is no need for us to address those difficult 
cases today, because this case involves ‘precisely the ‘gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative’ that Dirks envisioned.”773 
Tipper/Tippee Liability Standard  
 
Before discussing the standard of tipper/tippee liability, it is worth mentioning 
some basic points that underlie the purpose of establishing the standard of tipper/tippee 
liability and whether this standard is also applied under the misappropriation theory. In 
Dirks, the Supreme Court rejected the SEC’s argument that any person in possession of 
material non-public information received from an insider is under a duty to disclose or 
abstain from trading under Rule 10b-5.774 However, the Court asserted that tippees may 
assume fiduciary duty to the shareholders when they receive material non-public 
information from an insider. The Court reasoned that since insiders are prohibited from 
trading on confidential information for their personal benefit, they are also prohibited from 
tipping others information for the same propose.775 Therefore, tippees’ duty to disclose or 
abstain from trading under Rule 10b-5 is derived or inherited from the insider’s duty owed 
to the shareholders.776 The Supreme Court also noted that not every disclosure constitutes 
a breach of fiduciary duty, such as if the disclosure was made mistakenly and whether the 
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information disclosed was material or non-public.777 Thus, the Supreme Court created an 
objective standard that any disclosure that will derive fiduciary duty to the tippee not to 
trade is based on whether the tipper’s purpose of the disclosure was to receive direct or 
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure.778 The Supreme Court’s reasoning for the 
adoption of this objective rule was that the SEC and courts are not required to read the 
parties minds and because one of the purposes of securities law is to prevent exploitation 
of inside information for personal advantage.779  
Before Salman, the lower courts disagreed on whether Dirks’ approach applies in 
its entirety under the misappropriation theory.780 However, the Supreme Court, in Salman, 
assumed that tipper-tippee liability may also be found under the misappropriation theory.781 
While the tipper-tippee insider trading liability under the classical theory involves a 
tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty owed to the shareholders of the corporation, the 
misappropriation theory involves a tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty owed to the source of 
the information.782 The Supreme Court mostly based this assumption, in most part, on the 
government’s acknowledgment that “Dirks‘s personal-benefit analysis applies in both 
classical and misappropriation cases.”783    
                                               
777 Id. at 662. (“In some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty to shareholders, 
and yet release of the information may affect the market. For example, it may not be clear—either to the 
corporate insider or to the recipient analyst—whether the information will be viewed as material nonpublic 
information. Corporate officials may mistakenly think the information already has been disclosed or that it 
is not material enough to affect the market.”) Id.  
778 Id.  
779 Id.at 662-63. See Dirks v. SEC: The Supreme Court Established the Standard for Tippee Liability Under 
Rule 10B-5, 36 Baylor L. Rev. 217, 230 (1984); Pritchard, supra note 486, at 860. 
780 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:13. See Seaforth, supra note 424, at 187.  
781 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT. 420, Nt. 2 (U.S. 2016).  
782 Colombo, supra note 735, at 126; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:13.  
783 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT., at 420 Nt. 2.  
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Dirks’ standard of tipper/tippee liability is that the tippee may be found liable 
whenever the tip is in breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty upon which the purpose of the 
breach is to receive direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, and the tippee 
“knows or should know” about the breach. 784  
Personal Benefit Test 
 
A personal benefit received from the disclosure can be inferred from objective 
criteria established in Dirks,785 where the tipper receives economic or personal benefit.786 
The objective criteria established in Dirks, can be narrowed down to three types of personal 
benefit.787 First, pecuniary gain788 is the easiest type to infer the receiving of personal 
benefit where the tipper economically profits in an intangible way from the tippee’s 
trade.789 This can occur, for instance, through a pre-arranged agreement between the tipper 
and the tippee to share the profits of the trade.790 Second, a reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings791 is received by the tipper not at the time of the tip but the 
tipper hopes the disclosure will help him/her receive something of value in the future.792 
For example, a CEO of a corporation may tip a security analysist confidential information 
with the hope that the security analysist will say some good things about the CEO in the 
future.793 The third type of personal benefit is the disclosure in the form of a gift to a relative 
                                               
784 BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK, §17:25, Westlaw (database updated 
Oct. 2018); HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:167.  
785 Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 663-64 (1983).  
786 Id. See Hazen, supra note 9, at §12:167. 
787 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:6.  
788 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64.  
789 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:6.  
790 Id; PICKHOLZ ET AL, supra note 646, at §7:27.  
791 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64.  
792 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:6. 
793 Id.  
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or friend.794   Lower Courts have been flexible with the personal benefit and applied it 
broadly instead of strictly.795 In addition, the SEC assumes that the mere fact of a friendship 
relationship between the tipper and the tippee is enough to infer that the disclosure was for 
personal benefit.796 However, in 2014, the Second Circuit, in Newman v. United Statas, 
decided to strictly read Dirks personal benefit test and refused to accept that the fact of a 
mere friendship satisfies Dirks personal benefit test.797 The Second Circuit reasoned that 
accepting the mere fact of friendship of a casual or social nature to infer a personal gain 
would make the personal benefit requirement a nullity.798 Therefore, the Court held that 
“such an inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and 
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”799 However, 
the Supreme Court, in Salman, rejected the Second Circuit’s holding that the tipper must 
obtain something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,” because, as the Supreme 
Court claimed that it is inconsistent with Dirks.800 The Supreme Court’s core analysis was 
that the tip by itself to a relative or friend is the equivalent of the tipper trading and giving 
the proceeds as a gift to a relative or friend.801 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not 
expressly overturn the other part of Newman’s holding that the government must prove a 
                                               
794 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. See Id; Colombo, supra note 735, at 134. Drummonds, supra note 735, at 841.   
795 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:167; Seaforth, supra note 424, at 187. 
796 HAZEN, id. 
797 PICKHOLZ ET AL, supra note 646, at §7:27.  
798 U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2ND CIR. 2014). 
799 Id.at 452-53. (The court held that to hold a tippee liable, the government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt: “that (1) the corporate insider was entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the corporate insider breached 
his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confidential information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a personal benefit; 
(3) the tippee knew of the tipper’s breach, that is, he knew the information was confidential and divulged for 
personal benefit; and (4) the tippee still used that information to trade in a security or tip another individual 
for personal benefit.”) Id.at 452.  
800 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT. 420, 428 (U.S. 2016).   
801 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:6. 
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meaningfully close relationship between the tipper and the tippee to meet the personal 
benefit test.802 More broadly, the Supreme Court referred to the government’s argument 
that a gift of material non-public information to anyone, including relatives and friends, is 
enough to create securities fraud.803 This is because the government argued that a tipper 
would personally benefit whenever the disclosure was not for corporate purposes.804 The 
Supreme Court also did not either approve or reject the government’s argument of whether 
the mere disclosure of material non-public information to anyone without a legitimate 
business reason would ensue federal securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 disregarding the 
nature of the relationship between the tipper and tippee.805    
In the wake of Salamn, the Second Circuit’s recent decision, in United States v. 
Martoma,806 understood the Salman decision as repealing the first part of Newman’s 
                                               
802 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:7.  
803 Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427-28.  
804 Id.  
805 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:7. 
806 869 F.3d 58 (2nd Cir. 2017). (Martoma was convicted by the District Court for committing securities fraud 
and conspiracy to commit securities fraud in connection with an insider trading scheme. U.S. v. Martoma, 48 
F.Supp.3d 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  Martoma was employed as a portfolio manager at S.A.C., a hedge fund. 
Id.at 558. Through the use of an expert networking agency, Martoma could arrange a two-years’ relationship 
with Dr. Sidney Gilman and Dr. Joel Ross, two experts in the field of Alzheimer’s disease, who had been 
given access from Elan and Wyeth, in which Martoma had large securities holdings, to confidential 
information about the phase II clinical trial for an experimental drug to treat Alzheimer’s disease. Id.  The 
evidence showed that Dr. Gilman alone had 43 sessions with Martoma, mostly by phone. Id. The doctor 
shared confidential safety data concerning the clinical trial with Martoma. Id. Martoma paid $1000 per hour 
for each consultation with Dr. Gilman. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61. Dr. Joel Ross met 
Martoma on many occasions and charged Martoma $1,500 per hour. Id.at 62. Dr. Roes shared with Martoma 
confidential information about the clinical trial, including information about his patients’ responses to the 
drug and the total number of participants in the study that Dr. Ross recognized was not public. Id. After Dr. 
Gilman was “unblinded as to the final efficacy result of the trial…Dr. Gilman spoke with Martoma for about 
90 minutes by telephone about what he had learned.” Id. In a few days, S.A.C. “began to reduce its position 
in Ellan and Wyeth securities by entering short-sale and options trades that would be profitable if Ellan’s and 
Wyeth’s stock fell.” Id. After the final result of the drug, “the share prices of Elan’s and Wyeth had declined 
by about 42% and 12%, respectively.” Id. Martoma and its firm gained “approximately $80.3 million in gains 
and $194.6 million in adverted losses for SAC. Martoma personally received a $9 million bonus based in 
large part on his trading activity in Elan and Wyeth.” Id.at 62-63. The Second Circuit rejected Martoma’s 
argument that there was no sufficient evidence presented in the trial based on the Newman standard to find 
illegal insider trading liability since the relationships with Dr. Gilman  was not a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” and the doctor did not receive any “objective consequential…gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
 
 153 
 
requirement: a “meaningful close personal relationship.”807 This is because the Second 
Circuit noted that the right question under Dirks is whether a tipper personally benefits 
from a disclosure of confidential information upon which he/she violates his/her fiduciary 
duty.808 The holding of Martoma was that a gift of confidential information is inferred 
when the disclosure was made with the expectation that the recipient will trade on the 
information where the disclosure is the same as trading by the tipper followed by a gift of 
the profits to the recipient.809 The Second Circuit stated that although Salman did not 
specifically hold that gifts of confidential information to anyone satisfies the personal 
benefit test, the straightforward logic of Salman is that the disclosure by the tipper is the 
functional equivalent of trading on the information by the tipper and giving a cash gift to 
the recipient.810 “[N]othing in Salman’s reaffirmation of this logic supports a distinction 
between gifts to people with whom a tipper shares a ‘meaningfully close personal 
                                               
valuable nature” in exchange for the disclosure of confidential information .Id.at 65-67.  The Second Circuit 
held that “where Dr. Gilman regularly disclosed confidential information in exchange for fees, ‘a rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime [of insider trading] beyond a reasonable 
doubt” under a pecuniary quid pro quo theory.’” Id.at 67. “That is exactly what happened in this case. 
Martoma was a frequent and lucrative client for Dr. Gilman, who was paid $1,000 per hour for approximately 
43 consultation sessions. At the same time, Dr. Gilman was regularly feeding Martoma confidential 
information about the safety results of clinical trials involving bapineuzumab. When Dr. Gilman gained 
access to the final clinical study efficacy data in July 2008, he immediately passed it along to Martoma.” Id. 
The Second Circuit also rejected the second argument presented by Martoma that “even if the evidence was 
sufficient to support his conviction, the district court’s jury instructions were inadequate in light of Newman 
because they did not inform the jury about the limitations on ‘personal benefit’ developed in Newman. This 
inadequate instruction, Martoma argued, warranted a retrial.” Id. at 65. “Martoma focuses on the language 
about developing friendships, arguing that gifts given to develop future friendships do not give rise to the 
personal benefit needed to trigger insider trading liability.” Id.at 73. The Second Circuit held that: “Even if 
the jury instruction was obviously erroneous—which we hold it was not—that error did not impair Martoma’s 
substantial rights in light of the compelling evidence that Dr. Gilman, the tipper, received substantial financial 
benefit in exchange for providing confidential information to Martoma.” Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the 
judgement of the District Court.) Id. at 74.  
807 United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 69. (2nd Cir. 2017).  
808 Id. at 68. 
809 Id.at 70. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:7. 
810Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69. 
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relationship’ and gifts to those with whom a tipper does not share such a relationship.”811 
The Second Circuit clarified that its holding did not eliminate the personal benefit test but 
it merely found that it is possible for an insider to personally benefit from the disclosure of 
confidential information to a tippee with whom the insider does not share a meaningfully 
close relationship.812 The Court also noted:  
Although we hold that Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” requirement 
is no longer good law, we do not hold that the relationship between the tipper and tippee 
cannot be relevant to the jury in assessing competing narratives as to whether information 
was disclosed “with the expectation that [the recipient] would trade on it,” and whether the 
disclosure “resemble[d] trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the 
recipient.813 
 
Professor Donald C. Langevoort stated that “sufficient evidence suggests that a 
breach of duty satisfying the Dirks test exist whenever a corporate insider passes valuable 
information to the tippee without an apparently legitimate business or personal 
justification.”814 Professor Lnagevoort suggested that this inference “makes a great deal of 
sense. Disloyalty occur anytime that a fiduciary treats information entrusted to him as if it 
were his own to do with as he pleases.”815 Langevoort strongly predicted that this 
presumption of personal benefit “will become a standard enforcement tactic in situations 
where the relationship between the tipper and tippee is not all that close, or where the gift 
occurs in a business rather than personal setting.”816  
“Know or Should Know” Test  
 
                                               
811 Id.  
812 Id.at 71.  
813 Id.at 71 Nt. 8. See PICKHOLZ ET AL, supra note 646, at § 7:27. 
814 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:7.  
815 Id.  
816 Id.  
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After demonstrating that the tip was for a personal benefit, the tippee liability 
depends on the other part of the tippee liability standard, established in Dirks: whether the 
tippee knows or should have known that the disclosure was a breach of the tipper fiduciary 
duty in exchange for a personal benefit.817 This element was clarified by the Second 
Circuit, in S.E.C. v. Obus,818 that stated a “tippee liability can be established if a tippee 
knew or had reason to know that confidential information was initially obtained and 
transmitted improperly (and thus through deception).”819 In Newman, the Second Circuit 
reaffirmed its stance in Obus and added that even for remote tippees, to be found liable for 
illegal inside trading, the government must prove, among other elements, that “the tippee 
knew of the tipper’s breach, that is, he knew the information was confidential and divulged 
for personal benefit.”820  
This element was not an issue in Salman; however, the Supreme Court referred to 
the government’s acknowledgement that: “to establish a defendant’s criminal liability as a 
tippee, it must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper breached a duty—in other words, 
that the tippee knew that the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that 
the tipper expected trading to ensue.”821 Therefore, the Newman requirement that the 
tippee, including a secondary or remote tippee,822 must know that the tipper disclosed the 
                                               
817 PICKHOLZ ET AL, supra note 646, at §7:27; HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:167. 
818 693 F.3d 276 (2012) 
819 Id.at 288.  
820 U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d  438, 450 (2014). (The Court rejected the government’s argument that it was 
not required to prove that the defendants knew that the inside tippers received a personal benefit, but rather 
it was required, based on the Second Circuit’s decision in Obus, that defendants knew that insiders had 
disclosed this information in a breach of a duty of confidentiality. Id.at 448. See Pritchard, supra note 486, 
at 858. However, Professor Donald C. Langevoort noticed that “the court was being more stringent because 
of the criminal nature of the case, leaving the broader Dirk language and its interpretation in Obus to control 
in civil cases.” LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:10.  
821 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. CT. 420, 427 (U.S. 2016).  
822 Remote tippees are “tippees who receive inside information from another tippee, rather than the tipper” 
Salman, 137 S. CT. at 426. For more discussion about remote tippees liability see, Francisco A. Loayza, The 
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information for a personal benefit was still in effect after Salman and Martoma.823 
Professor Langevoort suggested that “Salman implicitly made clear that such knowledge 
relates solely to the original tipper’s motivation even when the tippee is a step or more 
removed from the tip.”824 
Professor Thomas Lee Hazen further analyzed the standard of tipper/tippee lability 
after Salman825 and finds it involved four rules: (1) tipping without a personal benefit is 
insufficient to find a tippee liable for trading on material non-public information; (2) a 
personal benefit does not need to be pecuniary in nature and disclosing confidential 
information as a gift to a relative or friend is by itself enough to establish liability; (3) if 
the personal benefit is alleged to be in the form of a gift to a friend, it “is not necessary to 
weigh the closeness of the friendship,” but rather the personal benefit is established when 
the tipper “providing the tip, knowing he or she will trade on it, in lieu of a cash gift to the 
tippee;” and (4) the tippee must know about the personal benefit to the tipper.826  
 
 
 
 
SEC’s Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) 
 
                                               
Remote Tippee Dilemma: Resolving Tippee more than Thirty Years After Dirks v. SEC, California Western 
Law Review, Vol. 52: No. 1, Article 6 (2015); Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 
Gonzaga. L. Rev. 181, 217 (2006).  
823 PICKHOLZ ET AL, supra note 646, at §7:27; HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:167; LANGEVOORT, supra note 
6, at §4:10. 
824 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §6:13.  
825 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:167.  
826 Id.  
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 Another issue that the SEC has been concerned about is selective disclosure of 
material non-public information from issuers and persons acting on their behalf, of material 
non-public information to securities analysts and other market professionals, but not to the 
general public.827 One of the main concerns of the SEC about selective disclosure of inside 
information without public disclosure is its adverse effect on investors’ confidence in the 
integrity and fairness of the capital markets. Investors realize that selective disclosure to 
selected securities analysts, institutional investors or other market professionals would help 
them unfairly trade or tip on the basis of the information and make profits or avoid loses 
but others would lack the same opportunity.828 This is a practice that the SEC has viewed 
as closely resembling tipping and illegal corporate insider trading violations.829 However, 
the SEC has not successfully targeted this practice through traditional tipping and illegal 
corporate insider judicial charges under Rule 10b-5 because of Dirks’ personal benefit 
test.830 The SEC noted that “many have viewed Dirks as affording considerable protection 
to insiders who make selective disclosures to analysts, and to the analysts (and their clients) 
who receive selectively disclosed information.”831In 2000, the SEC adopted Regulation FD 
with the goal of leveling the playing field by requiring issuers to publicly disclose 
whenever they make a selective disclosure or to keep material non-public information 
undisclosed.832   
                                               
827 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 
 2 (Aug. 15, 2000); LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:12.  
828 Id.  
829 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 2.  
830 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:12. 
831 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590-01, at 72593. 
832 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 3; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:12; HAZEN, supra 
note 2, at §12:186.   
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 Rule 100(a) of Regulation FD requires public disclosure “[w]henever an issuer,833 
or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information regarding 
that issuer or its securities”834 to particular persons: “(1) [s]imultaneously, in the case of an 
intentional disclosure; and (2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.”835  
The requirement to make a public disclosure is triggered when the disclosure of material 
non-public information is made to specific enumerated persons who are most likely to trade 
on the basis of the disclosed information or to advice others to trade in the related 
security.836 Rule 100(b)(1) enumerates four types of persons to whom selective disclosure 
shall not be made without public disclosure.837 These persons are (1) brokers or dealers and 
their associated persons; (2) investment advisers, institutional investment managers, or 
persons associated with either of them; (3) investment companies, hedge funds and their 
affiliated persons;838 and (4) holders of the issuer’s securities in which it is reasonably 
foreseeable that such security holder will purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis 
of the information disclosed.839 However, Regulation FD does not apply to persons 
engaged in ordinary-course business communication with the issuer, such as 
communication with the issuer’s customers, or suppliers.840 It also does not include the 
                                               
833 Rule 101(b) of Regulation FD states that this regulation applies to any issuer with securities registered 
under §12 of the SEA or issuers required to file reports under § 15(d) of the SEA. This includes closed-end 
investment companies but excludes other investment companies, foreign government, and foreign private 
issuers. Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.101(b). See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 19; WANG 
& STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 346.  
834 Rule 100, 17 C.F. R. §243.100(a).  
835 Id. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:12; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 338.  
836 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 7; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:12.  
837 Regulaiton FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.100(b)(1). 
838 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 7. (These three “categories will include sell-side analysts, 
many buy-side analysts, large institutional investment managers, and other market professionals who may be 
likely to trade on the basis of selectively disclosed information.”) Id.  
839 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.100(b)(1)(i) to (iv). 
840 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 8; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 338. 
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disclosure by the issuer to the media or government agencies.841 Rule 100(b)(2) excludes 
from coverage of Regulation FD communications made to (1) persons who owe the issuer 
a duty of trust or confidence, such as temporary insiders (e.g., an attorney, investment 
banker, or accountant); and (2) persons who expressly agree to maintain the disclosed 
information in confidence;842 It also excludes disclosures made (3) in connection with a 
securities offering registered under the Securities Act with certain rules and exceptions.843  
Rule 101(c) of Regulation FD defined a “person acting on behalf of an issuer” to 
apply upon (1) any senior official of the issuer;844 or (2) any other officer, employee, or 
agent of an issuer who regularly communicates with those enumerated persons under Rule 
100(b)(1).845 This covers senior management, investor relations professionals and others 
who regularly communicate with market professionals or security holders.846 However, a 
disclosure by low-level employees who do not have investor relations responsibility is not 
covered by Regulation FD unless the disclosure was directed by the issuer or other covered 
persons.847 In addition, a disclosure by these officials is not deemed to be on behalf of an 
issuer if the disclosure is in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.848 For example 
                                               
841 Id.  
842 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 8. (The SEC noted that any misuse of the information for 
trading by the persons in these two exclusions would thus be covered under either the ‘temporary insider’ or 
the misappropriation theory of insider trading.”) Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 339. 
843 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.100(b)(2)(i) to (iii). See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 339; 
HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:186; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:18. 
844 Rule 101(f) of Regulation FD defines “senior official” as “any director, executive officer[], investor 
relations or public relations officer, or other person with similar functions.” Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. 
§243.101(f).  
845 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.100(c). See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 340.  
846 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 
 9 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
847 Id; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:13. 
848 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.100(c). See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:13. 
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unauthorized disclosure by an officer to a friend does not trigger the public disclosure 
requirement under Regulation FD.849  
Rule 101(e) gives the issuer broad flexibility to determine how to make public 
disclosure.850 It gives the issuer the option to disclose either (1) by furnishing to or filing 
with the SEC a Form 8-K to disclose the information;851 or (2) to disseminate the 
information through another method or combination of methods “of disclosure that is 
reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to 
the public.”852  
The timing of public disclosure varies according to whether the selective disclosure 
is “intentional” or “non-intentional.”853 Rule 101(a) defines intentional selective disclosure 
as “when the person making the disclosure either knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that 
the information he or she is communicating is both material and nonpublic.”854 Therefore, 
if the disclosure is intentional, the public disclosure must be made at the same time as the 
selective disclosure.855 Issuers also are required to “promptly” make public disclosure 
whenever non-intentional selective disclosure is made.856 Rule 101(d) defines “promptly” 
as soon as reasonably practicable, but not later than 24 hours or the commencement of the 
next day’s trading on the New York Stock Exchange, after a senior official of the issuer 
                                               
849 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:13. 
850 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 13. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.101(e). 
851 Form 8-K is an “SEC form that a registered corporation must file if a material event affecting its financial 
condition occurs between the due dates for regular SEC filings.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 8-K (10th ed. 2014) 
available at West Law.  
852 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.101(e)(1), (2). See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 342. 
853 See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 12; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:16. 
854 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.101(a). See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:16; WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 341.  
855 The standard of materiality liability arises “when no reasonable person under the circumstances would 
have made the same determination.” SEC Release Notice, Release No. 7881, supra note 423, at 12. 
856 Rule 100, 17 C.F. R. §243.100(a). 
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learns about the non-intentional disclosure of information that the senior official knows or 
is reckless in not knowing is both martial and nonpublic.857  
Rule 102 of Regulation FD makes it clear that failure to make a public disclosure 
required solely by Regulation FD shall not be deemed to be a violation of Rule 10b-5.858 
However, liability under Rule 10b-5 may arise if the selective disclosure meets Dirks’ 
personal benefit test.859 A sole violation of Regulation FD can result in SEC enforcement 
action as a violation of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the SEA.860  
Rule 14e-3(d): The Anti-Tipping Rule in a Tender Offer Context  
 
Rule 14e-3(a) prohibits classical and temporary insiders of both the offeror and the 
target company as well as their tippees from trading on material non-public information 
related a tender offer unless they disclose the information and its source to the public.861 In 
addition to the prohibition of trading on such information, Rule 14e-3(d)(1) imposes an 
anti-tipping provision upon certain persons enumerated under Rule 14e-3(d)(2). Rule 14e-
3(d)(1) reads:  
As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative 
acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act, it shall be unlawful 
for any person described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section to communicate 
material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any other person under 
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is 
likely to result in a violation of this section.862  
 
                                               
857 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.101(d). See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:16. (The SEC did not 
provide a special definition of “material” and “nonpublic information” under Regulation FD noting that the 
definition of these terms is the same as it was established in case law under securities laws.) SEC. EXCH. 
COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 9; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:14.  
858 Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.102. 
859 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 20; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 346. 
860 Id.  
861 See Supra §1.2.2.3.2. See also, ARNOLD S. JACOBS, THE WILLIAMS ACT -- TENDER OFFERS AND STOCK 
ACCUMULATIONS, §5:40, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019).  
862 Rule 14e-3(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(d)(1).  
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Rule 14e-3(d) is designed to prevent market disparities in market information by 
proscribing certain persons in possession of material non-public information about a tender 
offer from selective communications and leaking this information to anyone.863 The SEC 
clarified that this anti-tipping rule contains two elements: (1) the communicating person 
must possess material non-public information related to a tender offer;864 and (2) such 
person tips this information to another person.865  
Rule 14e-3(d)(2) enumerates the persons subject to the anti-tipping rule which can 
be grouped into two categories as follows: (1) persons occupy certain status.866 This include 
the offeror, the target company, any officers, directors, partners, employees, advisors of 
the offeror or the target company, or any other persons acting on behalf of the offeror or 
the target company; (2) tippees of the foregoing persons who possess material information 
related to a tender offer which information that they know or have reason to know is 
nonpublic and that they know or have reason to know has been acquired directly or 
indirectly from any of the above.867 Thus, this rule covers intermediate-level tippees who 
although do not  trade on the information, but they leak the information to others.868  
                                               
863 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 12 (Sept. 4, 1980). See LANGEVOORT, supra 
note 6, at §7:9.  
864 Id. (The SEC noted that the person in possession of material non-public information can be a person who 
creates such information such as the offeror or it can be a person who receives or obtains the information 
from the offeror or the target company or another person who is “in a chain” from the offeror or the target 
company) Id. See JACOBS, supra note 860, at §5:43. 
865 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, at 12.  
866 Id.  
867 Rule 14e-3(d)(2), 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(d)(2). See Id; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:9; WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 724.  
868 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 12 (Sept. 4, 1980). See LANGEVOORT, supra 
note 6, at §7:9. (Professor Donald Langevoort notes that “[t]his portion of the rule does not address tippee 
liability. Tippee liability is included in the primary trading prohibition, because a tip creates the circumstances 
under which a person can have sufficient awareness of the nonpublic nature of the information and the source 
from which it came. Courts have tended to invoke case law from tipper-tippee liability generally in assessing 
the awareness questions.” Id. at Nt. 1.  
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The standard of tipping liability under this rule is that the communicating person 
tips the information to another while it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication 
is likely to result in a violation of Rule 14e-3(a) or 14e-3(d).869 However, the SEC ensured 
that “this rule is not intended to have an impact on casual and innocently motivated social 
discourse.”870 Rather, the rule applies when the circumstances make it reasonably 
foreseeable that a violation of Rule 14e-3 is likely to occur.871 Such circumstances include, 
the identity, position, reputation, or prior actions of the listener that a reasonable person 
would find it reasonably foreseeable that the communicated information would be used in 
violation of Rule 14e-3.872 Professor Donald C. Langevoort suggested that “the insider is 
safe if he simply ‘lets slip’ confidential information to friends or associates. But once he is 
aware that potential listener is active investor, or regularly in contact with active investor, 
then he must be careful to keep the information to himself.”873 Thus, the SEC urges persons 
in possession of material non-public information related to a tender offer to exercise all 
due care in their communication.874  
Rule 14e-3(d)(1) provides an exception from the anti-tipping rule for the purpose 
of protecting the offeror and target company conducting a tender offer from undesirable 
exposure to liability under Rule 14e-3.875 Rule 14e-3(1) provides that the anti-tipping 
provision does not apply to communication made in good faith to (1) any officers, directors, 
partners, employees of the offeror or the target company; (2) to other persons involved in 
                                               
869 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, at 12.  
870 Id.at 13.  
871 Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 723.  
872 Tender Offers Release, supra note 245, at 13.; JACOBS, supra note 860, at §5:43.  
873 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:9. 
874 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, at 12., at 13.  
875 Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 723; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:9; JACOBS, 
supra note 860, at §5:43.  
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the planning, financing, preparation, or execution of the tender offer; and (3) to any person 
pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule or regulation.876 Therefore, insiders of the 
offeror or the target company may disclose material non-public information about the 
tender offer to brokers/dealers or investment advisors and others who are engaged in the 
tender offer deal without being subject to the proscription of the anti-tipping rule.877 
Nevertheless, the standard of this affirmative defense against liability under this rule hinges 
on whether the communication was conducted in good faith.878 Therefore, a person who 
claims the availability of this good faith exception must establish evidence showing that 
the information was communicated in good faith.879 As a result, the exception is available 
if the communicating person proves that he/she did not know or have reason to know that 
the exempted recipient of the information was going to violate Rule 14e-3.880  
Definition of Material Non-public Information  
 
 The strategic position that corporate insiders occupy inside their corporations gives 
them the opportunity to be more sophisticated about the financial condition of their 
corporations and empowers them to form more accurate investment decisions compared to 
outsiders.881 However, the law of illegal corporate insider trading does not proscribe 
trading based on financial sophistication nor does it prohibit insiders from trading on the 
basis of their superior insight and more accurate assessment about their corporation and the 
                                               
876 Rule 14e-3(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(d)(1); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, at 12., at 13; 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 723.  
877 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:9.  
878 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 13 (Sept. 4, 1980). See JACOBS, supra note 
860, at §5:43; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:9. 
879 Id.  
880 Id.  
881 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:1. 
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value of its traded security.882 The objective of illegal corporate insider trading law is to 
prevent insiders from gaining free-risk profits by trading on information that could affect 
future changes and which has not yet been made public will substantially affect the security 
market price.883 By doing so, corporate insiders breach their duty of trust and confidence 
by not disclosing the information to the virtual beneficiaries before they unfairly trade and 
reap ill-gotten profits or avoid loses. Nevertheless, in securities laws, it has been judicially 
established that not all information is equal in terms of value and importance to the 
shareholders.884 Therefore, the concept of materiality was established, and insiders were 
required to disclose only material information.885  
 The terms “material” and “non-public” information under the law of illegal 
corporate insider trading lack statutory definitions.886 Courts and the SEC, on the other 
hand, have not provided a bright-line rule for the purpose of determining “materiality” or 
what is considered “non-public” in an illegal corporate insider trading context.887 However, 
                                               
882 See Id. The Second Circuit, in SEC & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), stated that: 
“An insider is not, of course, always foreclosed from investing in his own company merely because he may 
be more familiar with company operations than are outside investors... Nor is an insider obligated to confer 
upon outside investors the benefit of his superior financial or other expert analysis by disclosing his educated 
guesses or predictions.” Id. at 848.  
883 Id.  
884 Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities 
Laws, 62 Bus. Law. 317, 318 (2007). 
885 The Supreme Court, in Basic Inc., v. Levinsion, illustrated the standard of materiality it adopted, in TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976), noting that the adopted standard 
“[a]cknowledging that certain information concerning corporate developments could well be of ‘dubious 
significance,’ the Court was careful not to set too low a standard of materiality; it was concerned that a 
minimal standard might bring an overabundance of information within its reach, and lead management 
“simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to 
informed decisionmaking.” 485 U.S. 224, 233 (1988). 
886 See Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 424, at 341.   
887 In Basic Inc., v. Levinson, the United States Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim urging the Court 
to adopt a bright-line rule by stating that “[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always 
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or 
underinclusive.” 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). This opinion was cited and reemphasized by the Supreme Court, 
recently, in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39 (2011). LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at 
§5:2; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 99; HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:60. See also Joan Macleod 
 
 166 
 
courts have established a fact-based inquiry focusing on the surrounding circumstances and 
all available information to the public when the trading took place.888 This part seeks to 
define “material” and “non-public” information by determining the current judicial and 
administrative definitions of these terms. It also discusses the mechanisms that have been 
used in the analysis of the materiality and public nature of information.  
Material Information  
 
Courts took the concept of materiality from the common law fraud context and have 
applied it to cases brought under Rule 10b-5.889 In an illegal corporate insider trading case, 
to determine that an insider has violated the duty to disclose or abstain from trading, the 
information must be material to invoke the duty to disclose.890 Immaterial non-public 
information is out of the scope of the duty to disclose or abstain.891.  
The Supreme Court adopted an objective standard of materiality under Rule 10b-5 
that the Court established, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., in the context of 
omissions of material facts in proxy-solicitation under Rule 14a-9 promulgated under 
Section 14(a) of the SEA.892 The Supreme Court stated that the “materiality requirement is 
satisfied when there is ‘a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would 
                                               
Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1131 (2003); Sauer, supra note 884, at 324.  
888 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:60.  
889 Id.  
890 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 107. 
891 Id; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2.  
892 Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988). (The Supreme Court stated that: “[t]he Court also 
explicitly has defined a standard of materiality under the securities laws, concluding in the proxy-solicitation 
context that ‘[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.’ It further explained that to fulfill the materiality 
requirement ‘there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.’ We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b–
5 context.”) Id.  
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have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ 
of information made available.’”893 The Supreme Court, in TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway, rejected another standard of materiality that includes “all facts which a 
reasonable shareholder Might consider important.”894 The Court’s rationale for its rejection 
to this standard was that it imposes a low standard that would expose management to 
liability for insignificant omissions, and may cause management to “simply bury the 
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information a result that is hardly conducive to 
informed decision making.”895  
This materiality standard, however, was not applied by the Supreme Court in an 
illegal corporate insider trading case before the Supreme Court, in Basic Inc., v. 
Levinson.896 However, it noted that “no authority in the statute, the legislative history, or 
[] previous decisions for varying the standard of materiality depending on who brings the 
action or whether insiders are alleged to have profited.”897 Subsequently, Courts have 
applied this standard as the general authority to determine materiality in illegal corporate 
insider trading cases.898 The question of materiality is a question of law and fact.899 Based 
                                               
893 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39 (2011). Citing Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 238.  
894 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976).  
895 Id.at 448-49.  
896 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 108.  
897 Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 Nt. 18. (1988). See id.  
898 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; Sauer, supra note 884, at 320-21; WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 5, at 107. See U.S. v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136 (2nd Cir. 2012); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 12 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
899 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 108 Nt. 36. See SEC V. 
Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 1040 (S.D. Tex. 1995). (The District Court of Southern Texas stated that the 
TSC’s standard of materiality is applied in illegal insider trading cases noting that materiality is a mixed 
question of law and fact.) Id; SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2nd. Cir. 1997). (The Second Circuit noted 
that “[t]he legal component depends on whether the information is relevant to a given question in light of the 
controlling substantive law. The factual component requires an inference as to whether the information would 
likely be given weight by a person considering that question.’”) Id.  
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on this standard, material information is information that if it were available to a reasonable 
investor in addition to other available information, it would be likely but not certain, to 
cause a reasonable investor to reevaluate the stock price and whether to purchase or sell.900 
However, the reasonable investor standard can be described as a general framework that 
was not designed for immediate application in various cases.901 For the purpose of the 
determination of materiality in illegal corporate insider trading cases, courts have applied 
multiple factors to determine the materiality of the information based on the reasonable 
investor standard.902 While declining to provide an inclusive definition of materiality, the 
SEC provides some clarity by giving examples of facts that may be material under the 
circumstances.903   
Judicial Analysis of Materiality   
 
 In general, the ultimate question of materiality is whether the information question 
would be viewed by a reasonable investor to alter his/her knowledge of what is already 
known publicly. This question is mostly answered positively by showing that the disclosure 
has impacted the market price of the related security whether in terms of an increase or 
decrease of the market price of the security.904  Thus, the issue of materiality is less likely 
to be an issue in illegal corporate insider trading cases except when the information 
includes probable news of a change in the future, or the disclosure of the information has 
no impact on the related security market price.905 There are three main factors that courts 
                                               
900 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; Heminway, supra note 887, at 1137.  
901 Sauer, supra note 884, at 321; Heminway, at 1139.  
902 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 111; Heminway, supra 
note 887, at 1137. 
903 See infra notes 979-82 and accompanying text.  
904 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2. 
905 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2;  WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 116-17.  
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have considered to determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure 
of such information would be viewed by a reasonable investor as a significant change in 
the “total mix” of information that is publicly available.906 The test focuses on the 
probability and magnitude, the market reaction after the disclosure, and the importance 
attached to the information. These tests are examined below.  
a. The Probability and Magnitude Test—Corporate Acquisitions  
The probability and magnitude test is one of the factors used by courts to determine 
the materiality of information that the insider was aware of at the time of trading.907 This 
test is used in various types of situations where the information is related to events that are 
uncertain to occur in the future or are speculative in nature.908 Courts apply the probability 
magnitude test, mostly to proposed tender offers, merger negotiations, and other corporate 
acquisitions.909 The test is also applied when the information is unreliable or vague.910 
The probability and magnitude test was adopted by the Supreme Court, in Basic,911 
The Supreme Court noted that: 
Where the impact of the corporate development on the target’s fortune is certain 
and clear, the TSC Industries materiality definition admits straightforward 
                                               
906 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2;  WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 111; Heminway, 
supra note 887, at 1153; HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:60; Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 424, at 341; Sauer, 
supra note 884, at 323. 
907 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2;  WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 118.  
908 Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).  
909 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 118. 
910 Id.  
911 485 U.S. 224. (One of the issues reviewed by the Supreme Court in this case was the issue of the 
determination of materiality in the context of preliminary corporate merger discussions. Id.at 230. The related 
facts were that Basic Corporation was approached by Combustion Corporation representatives concerning 
the possibility of a merger. The conversations were held with officers and directors of Basic. However, Basic 
issued three public statements denying that it was engaged in merger negotiations. On December 18, 1978, 
Basic announced for the first time that it had been approached by another company concerning a merger.  
The following day Basic announced its Board of Directors approval for Combustion’s tender offer for all 
outstanding shares for $46 per share. Id.at 227-28. The respondents were former shareholders of Basic who 
sold their shares during the time of the three denying statements issued by Basic alleging that the denying 
statements of merger negotiations were misleading and false and thus in violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
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application. Where, on the other hand, the event is contingent or speculative in 
nature, it is difficult to ascertain whether the “reasonable investor” would have 
considered the omitted information significant at the time. Merger negotiations, 
because of the ever-present possibility that the contemplated transaction will not be 
effectuated, fall into the latter category.”912 
 
The Supreme Court endorsed the fact-specific test that had been applied by the 
Second Circuit, in Texas Gulf Sulphur.913 The Supreme Court determined that the Second 
Circuit had indicated that the materiality requirement concerning contingent or speculative 
information is to be applied on a case-by-case basis. It “will depend at any given time upon 
a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated 
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.”914 The Supreme 
Court expressly agreed with this analysis.915 In assessing the probability part of the test, 
the Supreme Court asserted that the factfinder would need to look to signs of interest at the 
highest corporate levels. Such signs include, for example, “board resolutions, instructions 
to investment bankers, and actual negotiations between principals or their intermediaries 
may serve as indicia of interest.”916 The magnitude part of the test can be assessed by 
looking to “such facts as the size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums 
over market value.”917  
On the basis of the probability and magnitude test, information related to potential 
mergers or other corporate acquisitions is material when the probability of the occurrence 
of such a merger is significant enough to change the total mix of publicly available 
                                               
912 Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232. 
913 Id.at 232-39. See SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 849 (2nd Cir.1968).  
914 Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988) Citing SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 
849.  
915 Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239.  
916 Id.  
917 Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 118. 
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information.918 The mere invitation to consider the possibility of a merger, is not by itself 
a material fact.919 However, if the invitation was positively received by the target company, 
such as by sharing confidential information with the potential acquirer, then the probability 
of the merger occurring would become greater and the materiality requirement may be 
satisfied.920  
In illegal corporate insider trading cases, finding materiality based on the insider’s 
awareness of potential mergers ranges from finding facts that the insider was certain that 
the merger or other types of acquisitions would occur to facts merely showing that the 
conclusion of the merger was speculative and uncertain.921 In SEC v. Mayhew,922 the 
Second Circuit found that the information was material when an outsider traded on the 
basis of confidential information received originally from an insider of the target company 
that the company “was being pursued and/or was actively pursuing companies to merge or 
integrate or acquire” and that “the company had been approached and was discussing 
alternatives as an active ongoing part of their life.”923 The Second Circuit applied the 
probability and magnitude test and concluded that although the information was general, it 
was material because it was received from an insider and it was related to a serious merger 
which was very important information that made it material, even at an early stage.924 The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in S.E.C. v. Wyly,925 
found that controlling shareholders’ desire to sell a corporation was immaterial 
                                               
918 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2.  
919 Id.  
920 Id.  
921 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 118. 
922 121 F.3d 44 (1997).  
923 Id. at 48. 
924 Id.at 52. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2. 
925  (2014).   
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information.926 The Second Circuit stated: “While bright line rules regarding when merger 
negotiations become material are disfavored, this Circuit's cases establish that something 
beyond desire to transact is necessary.”927 
This test of materiality could also be relevant in other contexts.  The issue is whether 
general or unverified non-public information is material information. This issue is more 
likely to be argued by tippees who may allege that the information received form an insider 
was too general and thus immaterial.928 The Second Circuit, in Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Monarch Fund,929 analyzed this issue and concluded that: “[c]ertainly the 
ability of court to find a violation of the securities laws diminishes in the proportion to the 
extent that disclosed information is so general that the recipient is still undertaking a 
substantial economic risk that his tempting target will prove to be ‘white elephant.’”930 The 
Court found that the general confirmation of a rumor that the company was seeking a 
private placement was immaterial since  
the information disclosed…by any standard, lacked the basic elements of specificity. No 
revelation was made of any underlying facts concerning the contemplated financing. No 
specific terms were divulged. Nor were the lenders identified. Nor was the date of the 
financing indicated, but only that the company ‘expect(ed) it to be done shortly.’931 
 
                                               
926 Id.at 301.  
927 Id.at 300. For more discussion about this test, see LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 118; COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 732. See also supra note 483.  
928 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 117.  
929 698 F.2d 938 (2nd Cir. 1979).  
930 Id.at 942.  
931 Id.at 942. Id. See S.E.C. v. Wyly, 33 F.Supp. 3d 290, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). See also Stuart Sinai, Rumors, 
Possession v. Use, Fiduciary Duty and Other Current Insider Trading Considerations, 55 Bus. Law. 743, 
766 (2000). (The author suggests that “[t]his case may seem to indicate that the level of culpability under 
section 10(b) is somehow related to the specificity of the information received and that information from an 
insider that the company is merely attempting to effectuate a transaction that has already been widely rumored 
is no violation. That is, confirmation of something that is already the subject of speculation which reveals no 
more specific information than is already rumored, still leaves the investor with a ‘substantial economic 
risk.’”) Id.  
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 The Court distinguished between corporate insiders and outsiders recognizing that 
insiders “almost by definition have a degree of knowledge that makes them culpable if they 
trade on inside information.”932 In contrast, the Court realized that it “may not make the 
same assumptions with regard to outsiders…since the kinds of factual situations in which 
they acquire their information are innumerable.”933 The Court found that there are two 
types of outsiders, a tippee “who knows or ought to know that he is trading on inside 
information, as against the outsider who has no reason to know he is trading on the basis 
of such knowledge.”934   
Subsequent cases, however, have distinguished Monarch in several aspects.935 In 
Dirks v. S.E.C.,936 the Second Circuit rejected Dirks’ argument citing Monarch that the 
information he tipped to other investors was not specific enough to be considered a fact 
and it was received from a former insider whose words could be doubted.937  The Second 
Circuit concluded that although the information was not specific, “by the end of Dirks' 
investigation there was no doubt that the information he possessed and passed on to his 
clients had enough specificity to satisfy Rule 10b-5. Thus, the information involved in this 
case was totally unlike the general rumors in the Monarch Fund, and thus the court  found 
it was not specific enough to support Rule 10b-5 liability.”938 In SEC v. Mayhew, the 
Second Circuit distinguished Monarch in the context of general information regarding a 
                                               
932 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Monarch Fund, 698 F.2d 938, 41-42 (2nd Cir. 1979).  
933 Id.  
934 Id. See S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 288 Nt.2 (2nd Cir. 2012) 
935 See Sinai, supra note 931, at 766.   
936 681 F.2d 824.  
937 Id.at 843.  
938 Id.  
 
 174 
 
merger “where information regarding a merger originates from an insider, the information, 
even if not detailed, ‘takes on an added charge just because it is inside information.’”939  
Courts are more likely to find trading by a corporate insider on non-public 
information as material information even if it is vague or unspecific.940 In S.E.C. v. 
Happ,941 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found the information 
received through two voice messages was material information. A CEO of a company sent 
a message to the director and chairman of the Board of Directors’ Audit Committee saying 
that the company was having some difficulties.942 The First Circuit noted that “[i]n the 
circumstances…[W]e believe a rational jury could find that the information that Galileo 
was experiencing “difficulties,” communicated by Hanley to Happ in voicemail messages 
near the end of the third quarter, constituted material, nonpublic information triggering his 
stock sale.943 
 
 
                                               
939 SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2nd Cir. 1997). See U.S. v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136,143-44 (2nd Cir. 
2012). (The Second Circuit reviewed the case of illegal insider trading on inside information related to a 
corporate acquisition. In this case, the Court noted that “[i]nformation [] comes in varying degrees of 
specificity and reliability, and the extent to which a newly reported item of information alters the total mix 
may depend on the specificity or reliability of that information.” Id.at 143. The Second Circuit concluded 
that a “trier of fact may find that information obtained from a particular insider, even if it mirrors rumors or 
press reports, is sufficiently more reliable, and, therefore, is material and nonpublic, because the insider tip 
alters the mix by confirming the rumor or reports.”) Id.144.  
940 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2. 
941 392 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004).  
942 Id.at 22. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2. 
943 Id. See also S.E.C. v. Trikilis, No. CV 92-1336-RSWL(EEX), 1992 WL 301398, (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992). 
(The District Court for the Southern District of California rejected the defendants’ argument that a general 
and vague recommendation to buy shares in a corporation was immaterial because events occurring at the 
corporation would probably result in a price increase is immaterial. (The events were related to a tentative 
agreement to conduct a tender offer.) Id.at 4. The Court distinguished Monarch’s test from this case in that 
this case involved an explicit recommendation to trade in a stock and an explicit prediction that the stock 
would arise, and a statement that this passed information was not public. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded 
that this conveyed information was not immaterial as a matter of law. The Court, finally, noted that the 
ultimate question in similar situations rests on the credibility of the source of the information.) Id.  
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b. Reaction of the Market after the Disclosure    
Under an efficient capital market model, a security market price reflects all 
available public information about the related security, and the price of the related security 
reacts impartially and without delay to any new information.944  Economics studies find 
that in a competitive market where many securities analysts and market professionals 
analyze the same information, the security market price will be a consensus price among 
these competing experts.945 Observing this notion, Professor Donald C. Langevoort defined 
material information as “any information the disclosure of which would be likely to result 
in a substantial change in the price of the security.”946  
Courts and the SEC often cite the impact of the disclosure on the security market 
price to demonstrate a finding of materiality.947 The Second Circuit, in Elkind v. Liggett & 
Myers, Inc.,948 noted that the meaning of materiality in illegal corporate insider trading 
cases is that “the disclosed information must be ‘reasonably certain to have a substantial 
effect on the market price of the security.’”949 They based their finding that the mere 
confirmation of already common knowledge among public investors on “the fact that there 
would be a release added little to the already available wisdom of the market place 
(reflected by stock prices which had been falling for two weeks) that Liggett might be in a 
downturn.”950 In U.S. v. Carpenter,951 the Second Circuit applied the TSC’s reasonable 
                                               
944 Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A recipe from the Total Mix, 25 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 373, 374 (1983).  
945 Id.at 379.  
946 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2.  
947 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 113; Heminway, supra note 887, at 1158. 
948 635 F.2d 156 (2nd Cir. 1980).  
949 Id.at 166. Citing Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2nd Cir. 
1977).  
950 Id.  
951 791 F.2d 1024, (2nd Cir. 1986).  
 
 176 
 
investors standard and noted that: “In our view, the satisfaction of this standard, even 
narrowly defined, is beyond question, given that the ‘Heard’ columns had undisputed 
significant market impact.”952 The SEC has also used this standard, in Cady, Roberts,953 
where it found that “It was obvious that a reduction in the quarterly dividend by the Board 
of Directors was a material fact which could be expected to have an adverse impact on the 
market price of the company’s stock.”954 
The absence of a market reaction to the disclosure of the related information can be 
used as an indicator that the information is immaterial.955 However, Courts and the SEC 
repeatedly have stated that the materiality requirement is a fact-specific question and hence 
the lack or presence of a market reaction because of the disclosure is only one factor among 
others to be considered under the TSC’s reasonable investor standard.956 Only the Third 
Circuit held that, “If a company’s disclosure of information has no effect on the company’s 
                                               
952 Id.at 1032 Nt.9. See also S.E.C. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 47(2nd Cir. 1998). (The Second Circuit found that 
“The facts that Hanson was accumulating Kidde stock and contemplating a tender offer, that KKR was also 
interested in bidding for Kidde, and that management was contemplating a leveraged buyout to fend off the 
unwelcome bids had a very high likelihood of affecting the price of Kidde’s stock, as confirmed by the fact 
that the stock price jumped when this information was made public. The evidence was clearly sufficient to 
support the jury’s conclusion that this inside information was material.”) Id.  
953 Cady, Roberts & Co., Re, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
954 Id.at 4. See JACOBS, supra note 93, at § 12:20. 
955 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; Sauer, supra note 884, at 323. 
956 Sauer, supra note 884, at 323; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 113; Heminway, supra note 887, 
at 1159. See No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Tr. Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 
920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003). (The Ninth Circuit rejected the “[d]efendants' argument for adoption of a bright-line 
rule requiring an immediate market reaction. [Finding that] [t]he market is subject to distortions that prevent 
the ideal of ‘a free and open public market’ from occurring…Because of these distortions, adoption of a 
bright-line rule assuming that the stock price will instantly react would fail to address the realities of the 
market. Thus, we decline to adopt a bright-line rule, and, instead, engage in the “fact-specific inquiry” set 
forth in Basic.”)Id. See also SEC V. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1995). (The District Court 
rejected the SEC’s argument that “the same information could be insufficiently material to require immediate 
disclosure, yet sufficiently material to require that an insider abstain from trading.”) Id.  
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stock price, ‘it follows that the information disclosed...was immaterial as a matter of 
law.’”957 
c. Importance Attached to the Information  
Courts may satisfy the materiality requirement by looking at the circumstances 
surrounding the insiders’ or their tippees’ decisions to trade on the basis of the information 
in question.958 This test is applied after concluding that the trader, as a reasonable investor, 
was convinced to trade on this information because it altered the total mix of information 
publicly available about the related security.959 This occurs often when an insider or tippee 
is in possession of non-public information, and subsequently trades largely and in unusual 
amounts and volumes in the related security. As a result, the courts may infer that the trader 
treated the non-public information as material information.960  
The Second Circuit, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, stated that: “a major factor in 
determining whether the [non-public information] was  material is the importance attached 
to [it] by those who knew about it.”961 In applying this standard, the United States Court of 
                                               
957 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3rd Cir. 2000). Citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities 
Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (1997). (The Third Circuit quoted from Burlington and stated that: “[T]his 
Court fashioned a special rule for measuring materiality in the context of an efficient securities market. This 
rule was shaped by the basic economic insight that in an open and developed securities market like the New 
York Stock Exchange, the price of a company's stock is determined by all available material information 
regarding the company and its business. In such an efficient market, “information important to reasonable 
investors ... is immediately incorporated into the stock price.”  As a result, when a stock is traded in an 
efficient market, the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc by looking to the 
movement, in the period immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm's stock.”) Id. See Sauer, 
supra note 884, at 324. (Richard Sauer, a former Director of the Division of Enforcement at the SEC, found 
that “[w]hile declining to accept market reaction as the final arbiter of materiality in all instances, the SEC 
routinely relies on price and volume data as evidence of the importance investors place on a particular 
disclosure, as do other parties in securities litigation, at least, in the experience of the author, when it serves 
their interests to do so…Thus, market reaction through changes in stock price and trading volume may be 
both the best evidence of the materiality of information disclosed.”)Id.  
958 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 111; Sauer, supra 
note 884, at 326.  
959 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:2.  
960 Sauer, supra note 884, at 326. See also Heminway, supra note 887, at 1158.  
961 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 843, 851. See Heminway, at 1158. 
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Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in S.E.C. v. Maio,962 found that “immediate trading upon receipt 
of inside information provides evidence of materiality.”963 
In S.E.C. v. Binette,964 the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts applying the Texas Gulf Sulphur’s test found that subsequent actions after 
acquiring confidential information may indicate that the information was sufficiently 
material.965  
SEC Provides Examples of Material Information  
 
In the release of Regulation FD, the SEC declined to provide an inclusive or bright-
line rule for the purpose of defining the terms “material” and “non-public.”966 However, 
the SEC asserted that it relied on TSC’s materiality standard as a general definition of 
materiality.967 The SEC acknowledged that the application of the materiality standard can 
be difficult, but it “has always been understood to encompass the necessary flexibility to 
fit the circumstances of each case.”968 The SEC, for the purpose of giving more 
“interpretative guidance” on what information is more likely to be considered material but 
not per se material, provided the following examples of information:  
(1) earnings information  
(2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets  
(3) new products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers 
(e.g., the acquisition or loss of a contract) 
(4) changes in control or in management  
                                               
962 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).  
963 Id. at 637. See S.E.C. v. Michel, 521 F.Supp. 2d 795, 826 (N.D. Ill. 2007). (The United States District 
Court, Northern District of Illinois stated that “[p]erhaps the best evidence of the materiality of the 
information comes from the conduct of the Defendants themselves.”) Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra 
note 5, at 112.  
964 679 F.Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2010). 
965 Id.at 156.  
966 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 9 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 141; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:14.   
967 Id.  
968 Id.at 9-10. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §12:14. 
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(5) change in auditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on 
an auditor's audit report  
(6) events regarding the issuer's securities -- e.g., defaults on senior securities, calls 
of securities for redemption, repurchase plans, stock splits or changes in dividends, 
changes to the rights of security holders, public or private sales of additional 
securities  
(7) bankruptcies or receiverships.969  
 
Non-Public Information970  
 
Non-public information can be defined as: “nonpublic facts concerning the business 
of an issuer, one of its security, or the market for its security, and insofar as the fact relate 
to the issuer’s business, in the usual case are intended to be available only for a corporate 
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”971 
Courts and commentators analyzing non-public information in illegal corporate 
insider trading contexts have noted an overlap between the concepts of non-public and 
materiality of the information.972 The Second Circuit observing this notion stated that:  
While the concepts of materiality and nonpublic status refer to different things, there is 
considerable overlap for purposes of insider trading analysis. The content of a piece of 
information may be of importance in affecting the share price but so well-known that it 
does not alter the mix of available information and is therefore not deemed to be material. 
Conversely, the same information, if previously unknown to the public, may alter 
substantially the mix of information and thus be deemed very material.973 
 
The cornerstone of illegal corporate insider trading liability is the misuse of non-
public information for personal gain through trading without disclosure of such 
                                               
969 Id.at 10.  
970 Non-public information can be divided into three types: (1) corporate information which is related to an 
issuer business, such as information relating to the assets or earning’s power of the issuer; (2) market 
information related to the issuer’s security that originated outside the issuer, such as tender offers or other 
forms of mergers and acquisitions; and (3) outside information related to the business of the issuer but 
received or acquired from outside the issuer. See JACOBS, supra note 93, at §12:140; WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 5, at 109; Karmel, supra note 426, at 758-59.  
971 JACOBS, supra note 93, at §12:140.  
972 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4. 
973 U.S. v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 143 (2nd Cir. 2012).  
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information. If the information is already public, then a corporate insider is legally allowed 
to trade.974 The major factor that determines that the information in question is public or 
non-public is the dissemination of the information to the public and whether the public 
investors have been given a reasonable time to absorb the information and make their 
investment decisions on the basis of the new disclosed information.975  
Although this test may seem easy to comprehend, the application of this test is more 
complex and complicated.976 It goes without saying that non-public information becomes 
public when the issuer discloses the information by filing Form 8-K or/and sending a press 
release to traditional news services.977 However, the distinction between public and non-
public information can be complicated.978  Although material, the information is sometime 
already known to the public through multiple means but not to the general public.979 For 
example, the information could be circulated through non-traditional means whether by 
intentionally leaking the information to the press, reporting the information as rumors or 
speculative news, or legitimately disclosed to a small number of securities analysts and 
large institutional investors.980 Thus, the question is whether this availability of the 
information makes the information public, and thus an insider is allowed to trade. The SEC 
and courts have not provided a straightforward answer to this crucial question leaving the 
                                               
974 See Bradley J. Bondi& Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal Theories, Common 
Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, New York University Journal of Law and Business, 
Vol. 8, 151, 170 (2012).  
975 Id; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 141; JACOBS, supra note 93, at §12:156; Schipani & Seyhun, 
supra note 424, at 341.   
976 See Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 170; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 146.  
977 Bondi& Lofchie, at 170; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 146 Nt.238. 
978 See Bondi& Lofchie, at 170-171; Sinai, supra note 931, at 758.  
979 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4; Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 170.  
980 See Id; Sinai, supra note 931, at 758. 
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issue to judicially develop as a question of fact.981 Courts have provided two theories to 
answer the question of when the information is public and when an insider is allowed to 
trade after public disclosure.982  
The first theory views information as public if it is disseminated to reach the general 
public through widespread means.983 The major case that has articulated this theory is 
Texas Gulf Sulphur.984  In this case, the Second Circuit stated that “[b]efore insiders may 
act upon material information, such information must have been effectively disclosed in a 
manner sufficient to insure its availability to the investing public.”985 This theory is favored 
by the SEC which has repeatedly supported it.986 In an administrative case, In the Matters 
of Investors Management Co.,987 the SEC quoted the Texas Gulf Sulphur’s theory and 
asserted that: “Information is non-public when it has not been disseminated in a manner 
making it available to investors generally.”988 In the release notice of Regulation FD, the 
SEC also quoted this test.989 The SEC also provided a broad approach to determine the 
means of how the information became public for the purpose of Regulation FD.990 It stated 
that information becomes public by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by disseminating 
the information through another means that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-
                                               
981 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 144; Bondi& Lofchie, 
supra note 974, at 170.  
982 Id.   
983 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 143; Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 171. 
984 401 F.2d 833, 843, 854. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 144.  
985 Id.  
986 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 144; Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 171; Schipani & 
Seyhun, supra note 424, at 341; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4. (Professor Donald C. Langevoort 
suggests that “Caution thus dictates that this is the test to apply in advising whether trading is permissible or 
not.”) Id.  
987 44 S.E.C. 633 (July 29, 1971).  
988 Id.at 7. 
989 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 9 Nt. 40 (Aug. 15, 
2000). 
990 See Regulation FD, 17 C.F. R. §243.101(e); Id.at 14.  
 
 182 
 
exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.991 For example, non-public 
information becomes public if it is distributed using a press release through nationwide 
media news, such as the Wall Street Journal and Reuters Economics Services and 
Bloomberg.992  
The question of when the information is absorbed by public investors after 
disclosure and the insider can legally trade lacks a bright-line answer.993 The Second 
Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur noted that after the public dissemination of public disclosure, 
there is a “reasonable waiting period” to ensure that the disclosed information has been 
absorbed and evaluated by public investors.994 It also noted that: “[W]here the news is of a 
sort which is not readily translatable into investment action, insiders may not take 
advantage of their advance opportunity to evaluate the information by acting immediately 
upon dissemination.” The SEC, in turn, has not yet used its rule-making authority to issue 
a rule determining when corporate insiders and others can trade after the dissemination of 
non-public information.995 However, it provides a “fact-oriented approach.”996 The SEC, 
In Re Certain Trading in the Common Stock of Faberge, Inc.,997 asserted that: “Obviously, 
what constitutes a reasonable waiting period must be dictated by such surrounding 
circumstances as the form of dissemination and the complexity of the information, i.e., 
whether it is ‘readily translatable into investment action.’”998 Therefore, tn most instances, 
                                               
991 Id.  
992 Id. see JACOBS, supra note 93, at §12:156. 
993 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 145; JACOBS, supra note 93, at §12:156; COX ET AL, supra 
note 7, at 910. 
994 SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833, 843, 854 Nt. 18 (2nd Cir. 1968).   
995 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 145.  
996 Id. See Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 172. 
997 Matter of Certain Trading in the Common Stock of Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249 (May 25, 1973). 
998 Id.at 6.  See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 9 Nt. 
40 (Aug. 15, 2000).; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 145. 
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the waiting period, therefore, depends on whether and under what circumstances, the public 
investors have already been aware of the information, and made their investment decisions. 
A waiting period is not always the same but differs based on the size of the issuer, the 
content of the information, the trading volume, the price of the security after disclosure, 
and the means through which the information has reached the general public.999 In Shapiro 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc,1000 the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York doubted that “disclosure is instantaneously achieved upon release of 
the information to the press.”1001 The Court also noted that “It could not be said…that full 
disclosure had been achieved within two minutes of its release.”1002 Professor Donald C. 
Langevoort noted that research suggests that a reasonable period can be hours when the 
disclosure is made by a large issuer that is followed by market professionals and the kind 
of information is easily assessed.1003  
The second theory of when information becomes public focuses on whether the 
information is known legitimately by the investment community in which the price of the 
related security has already impounded the information even though it is not made available 
to the general public through widespread channels.1004 According to the efficient market 
theory, “if a significant portion of those trading in a certain security have knowledge of the 
information by any means, the price will reflect that information and deprive the insider of 
any illegal gains.”1005 This theory has been used by courts and is suggested by 
                                               
999 See JACOBS, supra note 93, at §12:156; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 145. 
1000 Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).   
1001 Id.at 279.  
1002 Id. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4. 
1003 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4.  
1004 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 148; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4; Bondi& Lofchie, 
supra note 974, at 171; COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 910. 
1005 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 149.  
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commentators.1006 The major case that supported this theory is U.S. v. Libera.1007 In this 
case, the Second Circuit asserted that information can become public even though there is 
no general public disclosure and only a small number of people know about the 
information.1008 The Second Circuit found that: “The issue is not the number of people who 
possess it but whether their trading has caused the information to be fully impounded into 
the price of the particular stock. Once the information is fully impounded in price, such 
information can no longer be misused by trading because no further profit can be made.”1009  
Under this theory, the question of whether the information is public is answered by 
determining whether the market price of the related security has fully reflected or 
incorporated the information in question.1010 Therefore, in U.S. v. Libera, the Second 
Circuit found that the information was non-public because after the public disclosure, the 
increase in trading volume and price of the security continued after the traditional public 
disclosure.1011 As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that: “the jury was correct in 
                                               
1006 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4. (Professor Donald C. Langevoort finds that: “This approach 
to defining nonpublic information suggests that information can be “publicly” available even though it has 
not yet been reported in the press or in a filing with the SEC—and thus not really available to all investors… 
The market approach is indeed theoretically appealing and sound.”) Id. See also Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 
974, at 171. (The authors suggest that “this second approach, [which is] inspired by the efficient market 
theory, seems more sophisticated in taking account of new forms of online media and communications.”) Id.  
1007 United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2nd Cir. 1993). See Id.  
1008 Id.at 601.  
1009 Id. See also, SEC v. Mayhew 121 F.3d 44, 50 (2nd Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136 (2nd Cir. 
2012). (The definition of material nonpublic information given in the District Court’s instruction was as 
follows: “If information is available in the public media or in SEC filings, it is public. However, the fact that 
information has not appeared in a newspaper or other widely available public medium does not alone 
determine whether the information is nonpublic. Sometimes a corporation is willing to make information 
available to securities analysts, prospective investors, or members of the press who ask for it even though it 
may never have appeared in any newspaper publication or other publication. Such information would be 
public. Accordingly, information is not necessarily nonpublic simply because there has been no formal 
announcement or because only a few people have been made aware of it.” Id.at 142. The Second Circuit 
concluded that “the district court’s instructions adequately conveyed the applicable standards.”) Id.at 144.  
1010 Libera, 989 F.2d at 601. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4; Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 
171; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 148; Sinai, supra note 931, at 758. 
1011 Libera, 989 F.2d at 601 
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finding that the information was not fully impounded in the price at the time of appellants' 
trades and was not public for purposes of Section 10(b) prior to the magazine's release.”1012 
The waiting period for a corporate insider to wait under this test depends on the period that 
the market price of the security has been fully incorporated the information.1013 If the 
information is already known legitimately by security analysts and other market 
professionals, then the current traded price of the security will reflect this information even 
though it is unknown to the general public, and thus, an insider can legally trade.1014 
However, this can be differed based on the size of the issuer and the number of 
professionals studying such issuer.1015 In most cases, a large issuer’s disclosure of 
significant information, in contrast to small issuers, takes a shorter time to be absorbed and 
incorporated into the market security price.1016  
If, however, the information in question carries more information than what the 
investment community already knows (e.g., the information is more specific or reliable), 
courts are more likely to consider the information to be non-public.1017 The Second Circuit, 
in U.S. v. Mylett,1018 affirmed the District Court’s finding that the information in question 
                                               
1012 Id.   
1013 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4; Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 171; Cox et al, supra note 
520, at 910-11; Sinai, supra note 931, at 758. 
1014 Id.  
1015 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4.  
1016 Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 150. (The authors reviewed a number of cases where 
defendants unsuccessfully claimed that at the time of their trading, the security market price had already 
reflected the value of the information in their hands because the information was already known such as 
through circulated rumors or speculated reports. The rejection of relying on the efficient market theory by 
the courts in these cases can be attributed to several points, including (1) the market price has continued to 
increase after the disclosure which means that the market price did not fully incorporate the value of the new 
information when the defendant traded; (2) the information was more specific than  rumors and the mix of 
available information at the time of trading; or (3) where the information was acquired improperly.) Id.at 
150-153.  
1017 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 151; Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 174.  
1018 97 F.3d 663 (2nd Cir.1996).  
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was non-public because although “papers such as the Wall Street journal has speculated” 
before the public disclosure, the information in question “was both more specific and more 
certain than any reports in the press.”1019 Also in in U.S. v. Contorins, the Second Circuit 
noted that:  
Insiders often have special access to information about a transaction. Rumors or press 
reports about the transaction may be circulating but are difficult to evaluate because their 
source may be unknown. A trier of fact may find that information obtained from a particular 
insider, even if it mirrors rumors or press reports, is sufficiently more reliable, and, 
therefore, is material and nonpublic, because the insider tip alters the mix by confirming 
the rumor or reports.1020 
 
In summary, according to the equal access theory, non-public information, which 
the SEC supports, is information that is not disclosed to the general public through official 
channels, and the waiting period for insiders before trading is after the general public is 
aware of the information from widespread media or other recognized general dissemination 
channels and after they can evaluate the information for the purpose of making their 
investment decisions. According to the efficient market theory, non-public information is 
not legitimately in the hands of the investment community and the related traded security 
has not yet reflected the value of this information. The waiting period for insiders after 
market professionals and others in the investment community have knowledge of the 
information in question is until the market price of the related security fully reflects the 
value of the information in which the insider is unable to gain ill-gotten profits by trading 
on the basis of such information.  
                                               
1019 Id.at 666. See SEC v. Mayhew 121 F.3d 44, 50 (2nd Cir. 1997). (The Second Circuit found that the 
information in question “effectively confirming information about which there had been speculation and 
lending a degree of immediacy to it, was nonpublic.” Id.at 51. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 
151; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:4.; Bondi& Lofchie, supra note 974, at 174; Sinai, supra note 931, 
at 759.  
1020 U.S. v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 144 (2nd Cir. 2012).  
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Requisite State of Mind: The Knowing Possession Rule vs. the Actual Use of 
Material Non-public Information  
 
Overview 
 
A common defense in illegal corporate insider trading cases is that I would have 
bought or sold anyway; therefore, I did not misuse any information.1021 The question that 
arises regarding this issue, however, is whether after being in possession of material non-
public information, corporate insiders simply are prohibited from trading until the 
information becomes public or if they are prohibited solely from using this information for 
trading.  The problem mainly arises when an insider claims that he/she had decided to buy 
or sell the related security for several reasons before receiving the material non-public 
information. For example, imagine if a corporate director had decided to sell a substantial 
number of his/her shares in the corporation to pay a debt, but before selling the shares, the 
director discovered and possessed material non-public information regarding the 
corporation. Does the mere possession of the material non-public information prohibit 
trading? Or does the prohibition not come into play by the sole possession of material non-
public unless the decision to trade on that information is the motivation or the reason for 
the trade? In short, is there a requirement that the possessed material non-public 
information must be the reason for the trade? 
The requisite state of mind is an essential elements of illegal corporate insider 
trading liability, the requisite state of mind. To prevail in an illegal corporate insider trading 
case under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must demonstrate, among other factors, that the 
                                               
1021 See Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the Scienter Requirement, 
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 12-111, at 4 (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2120141.  
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defendant acted with scienter.1022 Scienter means “a mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”1023 To suffice this element in a criminal case brought 
under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must show evidence that the defendant, at the time of 
trading, “willfully” or intentionally violated Rule 10b-5.1024 In a civil case, the plaintiff is 
allowed to establish the scienter element by producing evidence showing that the defendant 
at least acted recklessly.1025 However, negligent conduct is not enough to establish that the 
                                               
1022 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13; Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10B5-1 Trading Plans and Insider’s 
Incentive to Misrepresent, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 313, 316 (2010); Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: 
Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of Scienter, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 147, 154 (2003); Langevoort, supra note 621, at 
2; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 158; J. Kelly Strader, (Re)concpualizing Insider Trading United 
States v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 1419, 1459 (2015). 
1023 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 Nt.12 (1976). 
1024 Id. at 197. (“Section 10(b) makes unlawful the use or employment of ‘any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance’ in contravention of Commission rules. The words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in 
conjunction with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that s 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or 
intentional misconduct.”) Id. In U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665(1997), The Supreme Court stated that 
“[t]o establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b–5, the Government must prove that a person “willfully” 
violated the provision.” Id. Willfulness was defined by the Second Circuit to mean: “in this context ‘[] a 
realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act under the securities laws.’.” U.S. v. 
Newman, 773 F.3d 438,447 Citing United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir.2005). The Dictionary 
of Meriam Webster defines “willfulness” as “done deliberately: intentional.” “willfulness” Merriam-
Webster.com, visited on Nov 3, 2018, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/willfulness. 
U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,447. ([T]o establish willfulness, the Government must ‘establish a realization 
on the defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act ... under the securities laws’ and that such an act 
‘involve[d] a significant risk of effecting the violation that occurred.’.”) Id. See Strader, supra note 1022, at 
1446.  
1025 The Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, rejected to consider whether reckless acts suffice 
the scienter element. It stated that: “In this opinion the term ‘scienter’ refers to a mental state embracing 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form 
of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here the question 
whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under s 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.” Ernst & Erns, 425 U.S. 185, 193 Nt. 12. The Federal Courts of Appeals concluded that recklessness may 
satisfy the scienter requirement under Rule 10b-5. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 158. (The authors 
examined the judicial definition of ‘recklessness’ and concluded that it “has been variously defined by courts, 
with ‘severe’ recklessness being the prevailing view.”) Id. Severe recklessness is defined as “a highly 
unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme 
departure from the standard of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers 
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.” Id.at 162 
Nt.313 Citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Sundstand 
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044—1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 875 (1977). The 
Second Circuit defines recklessness as “conduct which is highly unreasonable and which represents an 
extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care”. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286 Citing SEC v. 
McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (1998). See Langevoort, supra note 621, at 3. (Professor Donald C. Langevoort 
finds that the prevailing view in federal courts is that recklessness suffices scienter requirement. However, 
Professor Langevoort noted that “recklessness must have a subjective dimension to it, something akin to 
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defendant acted with scienter.1026 Since material non-public information constitutes one of 
the essential elements of illegal corporate insider trading liability, the question arise in such 
cases is how much evidence the plaintiff (e.g., the SEC) must provide to meet the definition 
of scienter with respect to material non-public information.1027 To prove scienter, is the 
plaintiff merely required to show that the defendant traded while in possession of material 
non-public information (knowing possession rule)? Or must the plaintiff prove the 
defendant used of this information (actual use rule) by the defendant in his/her trades and 
the motivation of the trade was the knowledge of this information?1028  
Judicial Debate  
 
The SEC’s opinion was that the mere possession of material non-public information 
triggers the prohibition of trading until public disclosure occurs.1029 However, Federal 
                                               
conscious or deliberate avoidance of the truth.” Id.  While willfulness requires an intent to defraud the victim 
and knowing that this intent to defraud is wrongl, recklessness requires that the defendant is aware of facts 
that his/her acts can be fraudulent or misleading, but he/she disregards these facts and acts anyway.  
1026 Ernst & Ernst 425 U.S. 185, 202. (The Supreme Court concluded that “s 10(b) was addressed to practices 
that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.”) 
Id. Negligence means “[T]he failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would 
have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect 
others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully 
disregardful of others' rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person would not do under the 
particular circumstances, or the failure to do what such a person would do under the circumstances.” 
NEGLIGENCE, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). See SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286.  
1027 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13.  
1028 Id; Swanson, supra note 1022, at 181; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 169; Strader, supra note 
1022, at 1446. 
1029 See id; Langevoort, supra note 49, at 1332. The opinion of the SEC was that: “Rule 10b–5 does not 
require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of taking advantage of material nonpublic 
information.... If an insider sells his securities while in possession of material adverse non-public information, 
such an insider is taking advantage of his position to the detriment of the public.” U.S. v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 
112, 120 (1993) Citing Sterling Drug Inc. Investigation, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.L.Rep (CCH), ¶ 
81,570, P. 80, 289. See also. Donna M. Nagy, The Possession vs. Use Debate in the Context of Securities 
Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence can Never Be Golden, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1129, 1147 (1999); 
Sinai, supra note 931, at 758. Many commentators agree with the SEC’s “knowing possession” rule because 
the disclose or abstain rule, basically, requires disclosure of possessed material non-public information from 
a fiduciary before trading or it prohibits such fiduciary from the trade disregarding whether the fiduciary 
would use the information or not. In addition, the requirement of scienter in illegal insider trading cases does 
not nullify the possession test. This is because scienter is related to the defendant’s knowledge or awareness 
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Courts have provided inconsistent opinions regarding this issue.1030 The Second Circuit, in 
U.S. v. Teicher,1031 concluded that the “knowing possession” would be sufficient for illegal 
corporate insider trading conviction.1032 The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
jury instruction that: “It is sufficient if the government proves that the defendants purchased 
or sold securities while knowingly in possession of the material nonpublic information.”1033 
In addition, the Court rejected the defendants’ citations to cases using the phrase “trading 
on the basis of” to show that the government must prove a causal connection between the 
possessed material non-public information and their trades.1034 The Second Circuit found 
that these cases “did not address the possibility that the trading was not causally connected 
to inside information.”1035 The Court endorsed the SEC’s “knowing possession” rule based 
on several factors.1036 One of these factors is that the phrase “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security” under Rule 10b-5 “must be interpreted flexibly to include 
deceptive practice ‘touching’ the purchase or sale of a security.”1037 In addition, the Second 
Circuit found that as a matter of policy, “a ‘knowing possession’ standard has the attribute 
of simplicity. It recognizes that one who trades while knowingly possessing material inside 
                                               
of such information as against negligence. The motive is irrelevant to find the intent to defraud. 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13. See Nagy, id. at 1132. 
1030 See Swanson, supra note 1022, at 181; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 169; LANGEVOORT, 
supra note 6, at §3:13; Nagy, supra note 1029, at 1137; Allan Horwich, Possession Versus Use: Is There a 
Causation Element in the Prohibition on Insider Trading, 52 Bus. Law. 1235 (1996).  
1031 987 F.2d 112 (1993).  
1032 Id.at 120 
1033 Id.at 119. 
1034 Id.at 120. 
1035 Id.  
1036 See Id.  
1037 Id.  
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information has an informational advantage over other traders. Because the advantage is in 
the form of information… can not lay idle in the human brain.”1038 
The Eleventh Circuit, in S.E.C. v. Adler,1039 refused to apply the “knowing 
possession” rule and decided that the use test is the “best comports with precedent and 
Congressional intent, and that mere knowing possession—i.e., proof that an insider traded 
while in possession of material nonpublic information—is not a per se violation.”1040 
However, the Eleventh Circuit found that trading while in possession of material non-
public information is a strong inference that such information was used by the insider in 
trading.1041 “The insider can attempt to rebut the inference by adducing evidence that there 
was no causal connection between the information and the trade—i.e., that the information 
was not used. The factfinder would then weigh all of the evidence and make a finding of 
fact as to whether the inside information was used.”1042 The Court based its decision on the 
notion that the justification of prohibiting trading on material non-public information is 
because it gives the insider an unfair advantage.1043 Such trading is unfair only when its 
abusive and it is abusive only when it is used.1044 After reading on the Supreme Courts’ 
precedents, in Chiarella, O’Hagan and Dirks, the court analyzed that the language of these 
cases suggested that the use of material non-public information is what constitutes a 
                                               
1038  Id. at 120-21. (The Second Circuit also state that “As a matter of policy then, a requirement of a causal 
connection between the information and the trade could frustrate attempts to distinguish between legitimate 
trades and those conducted in connection with inside information.”) Id. See Swanson, supra note 1022, at 
181; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 176; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13. See Nagy, supra 
note 1029, at 1139-1144. 
1039 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).  
1040 Id.at 1336.  
1041 Id.  
1042 Id.  
1043 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13. See Nagy, supra note 1029, at 1139-1140.  
1044 Id. 
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violation of Rule 10b-5.1045  The Court noted that the Supreme Court found that the 
justification of prohibiting insider trading on material non-public information is the 
unfairness of allowing insiders to take advantage of this information without disclosure.1046 
The Supreme Court, in Dirks, stated that, in dicta: “motivation is not irrelevant to the issue 
of scienter. It is not enough that an insider’s conduct results in harm to investors; rather a 
violation may be found only where there is ‘intentional or willful conduct designed to 
deceive or defraud investors.’”1047 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the knowing 
possession rule concluding that this rule is not “limited to situations involving fraud.”1048 
Recognizing that the SEC may have a difficult task proving the use of material non-public 
information, the Court found that it alleviated this difficulty by adopting a rebuttable 
presumption of use.1049 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Smith,1050 adopted the use test without a 
rebuttable presumption of use. The Court concluded that “the weight of authority supports 
a ‘use’ requirement…[t]he Supreme Court has consistently suggested, albeit in dictum, that 
Rule 10b–5 requires that the government prove causation in insider trading 
prosecutions.”1051 The Ninth Circuit also found that to establish that the defendant acted 
with scienter, there must be evidence of use of material non-public information rather than 
                                               
1045 Id.at 1333. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 172; Nagy, at 1140 
1046 Id.  
1047 Id.at 1334 Citing Dirks 463 U.S. at 663 n. 23.  
1048 Id.  
1049 Id.at 1339. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 172; 
Nagy, supra note 1029, at 1138; Swanson, supra note 1022, at 183.  
1050 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir.1998).  
1051 Id.at 1067. 
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mere possession.1052 The Court also noted that the knowing possession rule would “go a 
long way toward making insider trading a strict liability crime.”1053 It stated that:  
Like our colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit, we are concerned that the SEC’s “knowing 
possession” standard would not be—indeed, could not be—strictly limited to those 
situations actually involving intentional fraud. For instance, an investor who has a 
preexisting plan to trade, and who carries through with that plan after coming into 
possession of material nonpublic information, does not intend to defraud or deceive; he 
simply intends to implement his pre-possession financial strategy.1054 
 
The Court concluded that the mere possession of material non-public information 
without proof of use of this information is insufficient to prove the requisite state of mind 
for a criminal conviction.1055 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, in Adler, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the presumption of use.1056 The Court reasoned that: “[W]e deal here with 
a criminal prosecution, not a civil enforcement proceeding, as was the situation in Adler. 
We are therefore not at liberty, as was the Adler court, to establish an evidentiary 
presumption that gives rise to an inference of use.”1057 
Regarding the SEC’s concern about the difficulty of proving the use instead of the 
mere possession of material non-public information, the Court stated that: “The difficulties, 
however, are by no means insuperable. It is certainly not necessary that the government 
present a smoking gun in every insider trading prosecution.” For example, there could be 
a voice recording of the defendant admitting that the trade was because of the possessed 
                                               
1052 Id.at 1068. See Nagy, supra note 1029, at 1138.  
1053 U.S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 Nt. 25. 
1054 Id.at 1068.  
1055 Id.at 1069. 
1056 Id.at 1069. 
1057 Id.at 1069.  
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material non-public information.1058 The Court also asserted that circumstantial evidence 
may prove the use of the information.1059 
Rule 10b5-1: The Awareness Standard  
 
In the wake of the judicial debate over whether illegal corporate insider trading 
liability is present from the use of material non-public information or from the mere 
possession of such information, in 2000, the SEC issued Rule 10b5-11060 with the goal of 
providing clarity and certainty on this crucial matter.1061   
The SEC noted that in Adler, the Eleventh Circuit justified its adoption of the 
presumption of use standard rather than the mere possession by stating that the Supreme 
Court used the term “on the basis of” or “on” material non-public information which refers 
to a preference of use standard even though this issue was not discussed by the Supreme 
Court.1062 Therefore, the SEC decided to adopt a new rule that defines the term “on the 
basis of.”1063 Rule 10b5-1(b) reads:  
(b) Definition of “on the basis of.” Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph 
(c) of this section, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is “on the basis of” 
material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making 
                                               
1058 Id.  
1059 Id. (The Court stated that: “Any number of types of circumstantial evidence might be relevant to the 
causation issue. Suppose, for instance, that an individual who has never before invested comes into 
possession of material nonpublic information and the very next day invests a significant sum of money in 
substantially out-of-the-money call options. We are confident that the government would have little trouble 
demonstrating ‘use’ in such a situation, or in other situations in which unique trading patterns or unusually 
large trading quantities suggest that an investor had used inside information.”) Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, 
supra note 5, at 172; Nagy, supra note 1029, at 1141; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13.  
1060 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1. 
1061 See SEC Release Notice, Release No. 7881, supra note 423, at 21; Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, supra note 218, at 72600; See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 181; LANGEVOORT, supra 
note 6, at §3:14; Swanson, supra note 1022, at 190; Horwich, supra note 1030, at 918.  
1062 S.E.C v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1333. (For example, the Court referred to the Supreme Court’s description, 
in O’Hagan, of the illegal insider trading conduct as it involves trading “on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information,” which “trading on such information qualifies as a ‘deceptive device under § 10(b).” Id.at 1334 
Citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 117. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 179.  
1063 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590-01, 72600 (Dec. 28, 1999).  
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the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the 
person made the purchase or sale.1064  
 
In Rule 10b5-1, the SEC adopted the “awareness” standard which triggers the 
prohibition of trading on material non-public information when the person making the trade 
is aware of such information.1065 However, the SEC declined to define “aware” for the 
purpose of this rule, but it noted that “aware” is a clear term “a commonly used and well-
defined English word, meaning ‘having knowledge; conscious; cognizant.’”1066 Thus, the 
SEC adopted the “awareness” standard to accomplish two main goals: (1) adopting a closer 
standard to the “knowing possession” rule to pursue the purpose of illegal corporate insider 
trading law, “protecting investors and the integrity of securities markets”1067 by preventing 
unfair informational advantage; and (2) to avoid the broadness of an absolute “knowing 
possession” rule, in which it  may lead to illegalize trading activities that “a reasonable 
standard would not make such trading automatically illegal.”1068 This ruling is mostly about 
a trader who has made a decision to trade before becoming in possession of material non-
public information.1069 In this event, a knowing possession rule would lead to an 
unwarranted prohibition since the unfair informational advantage is absent in such a 
scenario.1070 With respect to the use standard, the SEC found that when someone knows or 
becomes aware of material non-public information, in most instances, it is highly unlikely 
that such a person would utterly disregard such knowledge while making a decision to 
                                               
1064 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(b). 
1065 Id; SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 21 (Aug. 15, 
2000).  
1066 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 22 Nt.105; Swanson, supra note 1022, at 194.  
1067 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, id. 
1068 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72600. See Horwich, supra note 1030, at 918; 
LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:14.  
1069 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72600.  
1070 Id. See Swanson, supra note 1022, at 197. 
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trade.1071 The SEC stated that: “The awareness standard reflects the common sense notion 
that a trader who is aware of inside information when making a trading decision inevitably 
makes use of the information.”1072 
Although the SEC rejected the argument that the adoption of Rule 10b5-1 
“awareness” standard was to modify the scienter requirement in illegal corporate insider 
trading claims,1073 a number of commentators noted that the “awareness” standard is 
correctly based on “subjective consciousness” rather than the motivation of the trader and 
that is what scienter means.1074 Thus, the SEC may be required to provide evidence 
demonstrating the state of mind of the trader with respect to the knowledge or awareness 
of the material non-public information not just the mere possession of it.1075 “The 
information was ‘not just in the pocket but also in mind’”1076 
  Rule 10b5-1(c)(i) provides three exclusive affirmative defenses to help corporate 
insiders and others shield themselves from illegal corporate insider trading lability if they 
comply with one of these affirmative defenses.1077 The SEC illustrated that “taken as a 
whole, the affirmative defenses are designed to cover situations, in which a person can 
                                               
1071 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72600. 
1072 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 22. (The SEC acknowledged that the “awareness” standard 
would lead to the same results as Adler’s presumption of use test. However, the SEC suggested that the 
adoption of the “awareness” standard would help to make the law of illegal corporate insider trading more 
certain and clearer so that insiders can have straightforward guidelines to comply with the law.) Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72600. 
1073 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 22 (Aug. 15, 
2000). 
1074 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:14. 
1075 Id; Horwich, supra note 1030, at 921; Swanson, supra note 1022, at 197. 
1076 Swanson, supra note 1022, at 198 citing Tamara Loomis, Insider Trading; A New SEC Rule is about to 
Go into Effect, N.Y. L.J., 5 (2000) (David Levine’s, the senior advisor to the SEC’s director of enforcement, 
comments). 
1077 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 182; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:14; Horwich, supra 
note 1030, at 922. 
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demonstrate that the material non-public information was not a factor in the trading 
decision.”1078 
 Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i) reads:  
(1)(i) Subject to paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section, a person's purchase or sale is not “on 
the basis of” material nonpublic information if the person making the purchase or sale 
demonstrates that: (A) Before becoming aware of the information, the person had: (1) 
Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security, (2) Instructed another 
person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing person’s account, or (3) Adopted 
a written plan for trading securities; (B) The contract, instruction, or plan described in 
paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) of this Section: (1) Specified the amount of securities to be 
purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on which the securities were to be 
purchased or sold; (2) Included a written formula or algorithm, or computer program, for 
determining the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the 
date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold; or (3) Did not permit the person 
to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or whether to effect purchases or 
sales; provided, in addition, that any other person who, pursuant to the contract, instruction, 
or plan, did exercise such influence must not have been aware of the material nonpublic 
information when doing so; and (C) The purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the 
contract, instruction, or plan. A purchase or sale is not “pursuant to a contract, instruction, 
or plan” if, among other things, the person who entered into the contract, instruction, or 
plan altered or deviated from the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities 
(whether by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or entered into 
or altered a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those 
securities.1079 
 
Pursuant to Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i), corporate insiders and others would not be 
deemed trading on the basis of material non-public information even though they were 
aware of such information at the time of trading if before becoming aware of the 
information, they had entered into a binding contract, instructed another person; or adopted 
a written plan to purchase or sell the related security.1080 In addition, this Rule requires 
corporate insiders and others who claim the availability of one of these defenses to 
                                               
1078 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 23.  
1079 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i).  
1080 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 21. See Wang & Steinberg, supra note 139; Horwich, supra 
note 1030, at 922; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:14.  
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demonstrate that the binding contract, instruction, or written plan either (1) specified the 
amount,1081 price,1082 and dates of the trades;1083 (2) adopted a written formula or algorithm 
for the purpose of determining the amount, price and dates; or (3) did not allow the person, 
to whom the trading is made to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or 
whether to effect purchases or sales of the related security.1084 Any other person who had 
the power to exercise such influence must not be aware of material non-public information 
at the time of exercising such power.1085 In addition, Rule 10b5-1(c) requires that the 
purchase or sale occurred in accordance with the binding contract, instruction, or written 
plan.1086 For example if a corporate insider formulated a written plan to trade in his/her 
corporation’s stock in a specified amount and on exacts dates, but at a later date and before 
executing such trades, the corporate insider changed the written plan to increase or decrease 
the amount of shares wanted or the dates of trading execution, then such trades would be 
deemed executed not in compliance with the affirmative defenses under Rule 10b5-1.1087 
Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii) states that these affirmative defenses are available under the 
condition that the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell the related security “was 
                                               
1081 Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(A) defines “Amount” to mean: “either a specified number of shares or other 
securities or a specified dollar value of securities.” 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(A). 
1082 Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(B) defines “Price” to mean: “the market price on a particular date or a limit price, 
or a particular dollar price.” 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(B). 
1083 Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(C) defines “Date” to mean: “in the case of a market order, the specific day of the 
year on which the order is to be executed (or as soon thereafter as is practicable under ordinary principles of 
best execution). “Date” means, in the case of a limit order, a day of the year on which the limit order is in 
force.” 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(1)(iii)(C).  
1084 Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B),(C). 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B),(C).  
1085 Id.at (B)(3). See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 23; Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590-01, 72601 (Dec. 28, 1999).   
1086 Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C), 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C). 
1087 Id. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, at 23; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 184.  
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given or entered into in good faith and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
prohibitions of this section.”1088 
Rule 10b5-1(c)(2) provides another affirmative defense available only to entities 
(other than natural persons) where such entity can demonstrate that the purchase or sale of 
a security was not “on the basis of” material non-public information under two conditions: 
(1) “The individual making the investment decision on behalf of the [entity] to purchase or 
sell the securities was not aware of the information;” and (2) the entity “had implanted 
reasonable policies and procedures…to ensure that individuals making investment 
decisions would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on material nonpublic 
information.”1089 Reasonable procedures include Chinese Walls or other informational 
barriers for the purpose of preventing persons who make the investment decision to 
purchase or sell the security from being aware of material non-public information that is 
available to another department inside the entity.1090 Reasonable procedures also include 
applying restricted lists preventing the purchase or sale of a security while the entity has 
material non-public information regarding this security.1091  
                                               
1088 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii). See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg., at 72602. 
(The SEC asserted that “[t]his requirement is designed to prevent persons from devising schemes to exploit 
inside information by setting up pre-existing hedged trading programs, and then canceling execution of the 
unfavorable side of the hedge, while permitting execution of the favorable transaction. By altering the 
corresponding position, the insider would lose any defense for the transaction that he or she permitted to be 
executed.”) Id.  
1089 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(2)(i),(ii). See Id; SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 7881, Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, at 24 (Aug. 15, 2000). (The SEC asserted that this defense is “derived from 
the defense against liability codified in Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, regarding insider trading in a tender offer 
situation.” See Tender Offers, Release No. 6239, supra note 251, at 9-10. (Chinese Walls are “used to isolate 
the nonpublic flow of information from one department to the rest of the institution.”) Id. See WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 184. (The authors define Chinese Walls procedures as “policies and procedures 
designed to control the flow of material nonpublic information within a multiservice financial firm.”) Id.at 
845.  
1090 Rule 10b5-1(c)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(c)(2)(ii). See Id.  
1091 Id.  
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Rule 14e-3 
 
The language of Rule 14e-3 expressly states that any person “in possession of 
material” non-public information relating to a tender offer who knows or has reason to 
know that it is derived from the bidder or target company is prohibited from trading on 
such information unless a public disclosure was made first.1092 Thus, the SEC expressly 
has adopted the “knowing possession” rule under Rule 14e-3.1093 Although the SEC did 
not define “in possession of,” one commentator defined this term to be associated with 
“actual knowledge.”1094 When a person has actual knowledge of such information, he/she 
is under a duty of inquiry to the information and its source.1095 
Rule 14e-3 prohibition of trading while in possession of material non-public 
information related to a tender offer arises when the offeror or the bidder takes substantial 
steps to commence a tender offer.1096 This means that the prohibition from trading arises 
                                               
1092 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(a). See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 5 (Sept. 4, 
1980). See supra note 646-59 and accompanying text.  
1093 Karen Scheon, Insider Trading: The “Possession Versus Use” Debate, 184 U. Pa. L. Rev. 239, 259 
(1999); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 187. See S.E.C v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1339 (9th Cir. 1998).  
1094 JACOBS, supra note 860, at 5:40.  
1095 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 6 Nt. 36; JACOBS, supra note 860, at 5:40; 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 719.  
1096 In the release accompanying the rule, the SEC provided nonexclusive examples of what consists of 
substantial steps to commence a tender offer. The SEC stated that: “The Commission believes that a 
substantial step or steps to commence a tender offer include, but are not limited to, voting on a resolution by 
the offering person’s board of directors relating to the tender offer; the formulation of a plan or proposal to 
make a tender offer by the offering person or the person(s) acting on behalf of the offering person; or activities 
which substantially facilitate the tender offer such as: arranging financing for a tender offer; preparing or 
directing or authorizing the preparation of tender offer materials; or authorizing negotiations, negotiating or 
entering into agreements with any person to act as a dealer manager, soliciting dealer, forwarding agent or 
depository in connection with the tender offer.” SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 
6 Nt. 33. In SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s 
argument that there was not enough evidence to infer that substantial steps had been taken to commence a 
tender offer as it is required under Rule 14e-3. Id.at 1302-03. The Court noted that the activities of the 
defendant did not “fall into the specifically enumerated examples of activities derived as ‘substantial steps’ 
in the SEC release.” Id.at 1303. However, it concluded that these examples “are not complete list of 
‘substantial steps’.” Id. The Court concluded that: “In this case there was a meeting between executives, 
which was followed by due diligence procedures, a confidentiality agreement, and by a meeting between 
Ginsburg and Olds—from which Ginsburg realized that the deal had to go down fast. These activities, which 
did result in a tender offer, were substantial steps for purposes of Rule 14e–3. Were it otherwise, liability 
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before and after commencing of the tender offer.1097 The SEC clarified the characteristics 
of the information and the knowledge about the tender offer under Rule 14e-3.1098 The SEC 
stated that the information itself must be (1) non-public;1099 (2) material;1100 (3) related to 
a tender offer; and (4) acquired directly or indirectly from the offeror, the target company, 
or any other persons working on their behalf as stated under the Rule.1101 However, a 
person subject to liability under Rule 14e-3 must know or have reason to know that the 
information is non-public and derived directly or indirectly from the offeror, the target 
company, or any other persons working on their behalf as is enumerated under the Rule.1102 
The SEC, however, asserted that in “materiality and  relation to a tender, there is no ‘knows 
or has reason to know’ standard.”1103  
Some courts have disagreed with the SEC in that Rule 14e-3 does not require the 
person to know or have reason to know that the information is related to a potential tender 
offer as against other types of mergers and acquisitions.1104 The Second Circuit, in U.S. v. 
                                               
could be avoided by taking care to tip only before the formal steps finalizing the acquisition are completed, 
leaving a substantial gap between the acquisition of inside information and the regulation of its 
disbursement.” Id.at 1304. In SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit stated that 
determination of whether an offeror has taken a substantial step towards commencing its tender offer is to be 
made on the facts of each case. In this case, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that their trading 
before signing the confidentiality agreement did not violate Rule 14e-3 because it was occurred before the 
offeror had taken a substantial step to commence the tender offer. The court concluded that a meeting between 
the chief executives of the two companies was “substantial steps” by the offeror toward commencing its 
tender offer, noting that, “it is true that the companies had talked about some form of merger for years.” See 
JACOBS, supra note 860, at §5:40; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 718. 
1097 WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 719.  
1098 Tender Offers, Release No. 6239, supra note 251, at 6. 
1099 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:5. (Professor Donald C. Langevoort suggested that the meaning of 
non-public information under Rule 14e-3 is the same as the definition of non-public information under Rule 
10b-5.) Id.  
1100 Id. (The author suggests that materiality under Rule 14e-3 has the same meaning of materiality under 
Rule 10b-5.) Id.  
1101 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 6 (Sept. 4, 1980).  
1102 Id.  
1103 Id. See JACOBS, supra note 860, at 5:40; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 721.  
1104 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:7. (Professor Donald C. Langevoort argued that “[t]he better 
approach might be to read the Rule’s explicit requirement that the trader know or have reason to know that 
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Cassese,1105 affirmed the District Court’s decision that in criminal prosecutions under Rule 
14e-3, to prove that the defendant acted willfully, the government must prove that the 
defendant knew that the material non-public information was related to, or most likely was 
related to a tender offer.1106 
Rule 14e-3(b) provides an exception from liability to large financial institutions and 
other entities other than natural persons even when such an entity is in possession of 
material non-public information related to a tender offer at the time of the trading in the 
related security.1107 This exception applies under two conditions: (1) when making the 
investment decision on behalf of such an entity to purchase or sell the related security or 
to cause the purchase or sale of the security, the individuals did not know that the 
information was material non-public information; and (2) the entity had implemented 
procedures and policies that were reasonable under the circumstances, to ensure that the 
individuals making the investment decisions regarding the related security would not know 
it the material non-public information when they made the investment decision.1108 Such 
procedures include (a) restricted lists to prevent the purchase or sale of such a security; or 
(b) Chinese Walls and other information barriers to prevent knowing such information by 
the individuals who made the investment decisions.1109 
 
                                               
the information has been acquired from the bidder, the target, or an associated person to require implicitly 
that the trader at least be on notice that the source in question was acting in its status as bidder, target, or 
associated person in a tender offer setting.”) Id. For more discussion about this issue, see WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 719 Nt.19.  
1105 428 F.3d 92 (2nd Cir. 2005).  
1106 Id.at 97. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, at 6; PICKHOLZ ET AL, supra note 646, at §7:30; 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 721 Nt. 21.  
1107 Rule 14e-3(b), 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(b). SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, at 8.  
1108 Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 724.  
1109 Id.  
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Summary 
 
Part 3 discusses the U.S. illegal corporate insider trading regulations by focusing 
on three questions: (1) Who is subject to the prohibition? (2) What does material non-public 
information mean?  and (3) What is the requisite state of mind to violate the prohibition?  
While the U.S. illegal corporate insider trading law lacks a statutory provision 
answering these questions, the discussion of the judicial and administrative developments 
offers some clarity on the current state of the law. The judicial and administrative 
developments of the illegal corporate insider trading prohibition under Section 10(b) of the 
SEA and Rule 10b-5 thereunder reveals that the prohibition of trading on material non-
public information goes beyond Section 16 corporate insiders to include any person who 
has legal access to material non-public information because of a fiduciary-like relationship 
with the issuer, another party in security transaction (the classical theory), or the source of 
information (the misappropriation theory). In general, this includes family members, 
friends, employees, and others entrusted with material non-public information. The 
prohibition also includes any other person (tippee) who acquires material non-public 
information directly or indirectly from one of these persons (tipper) when the disclosure is 
made for personal benefit and the tippee knows or has reason to know that the disclosure 
was in a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence for personal 
benefit.  
The prohibition of trading on material non-public information relating to a tender 
offer under Rule 14e-3 covers any person in possession of material nonpublic information 
acquired directly or indirectly from the offeror, the target company, or any person acting 
on behalf of the offeror or the target company.   
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 Material non-public information is a question of fact and law and it means any 
information that its disclosure would be considered by a reasonable investor to have 
significantly changed the total mix of information that is publicly available. This includes 
information that is probable or certain to occur when the disclosure of such information 
would have a significant effect on the related security market price. Information is public 
when it is disclosed through traditional channels that include a filing with the SEC and 
press statements. Non-public information can be made public if it is available to even a 
small number of traders when the market price of the related security fully reflects the 
value of the information.  
 Courts have inconsistent opinions about whether a proof of mere possession of 
material non-public information is enough to find illegal corporate insider trading liability 
or it is required to prove the use of the information. The SEC has offered three affirmative 
defenses that could shield insiders from liability even if the trade is made while being in 
possession of material non-public information including when the trade is executed 
pursuant to a written trading plan before the insider becomes aware of such information.  
 Once a violation of illegal corporate insider trading is committed, the violator is 
vulnerable to face several sanctions and penalties. The next part explores the governmental 
enforcement of illegal corporate insider trading.  
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Part 4. Governmental Enforcement of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading  
 
Overview 
 
Although Congress has avoided defining illegal corporate insider trading leaving 
the issue to courts, where most of the parameters of this conduct have been determined, 
Congress has repeatedly been eager to increase civil penalties and criminal sanctions 
against illegal corporate insider trading violators. The goal is to ensure that the sanctions 
deter insiders and others from violating the prohibition of illegal corporate inside trading 
and to strengthen investors’ confidence in the integrity and honesty of securities 
transactions.1110  
In 1984, Congress issued the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) to 
increase the sanctions and provide new civil penalties that the SEC could seek before 
federal courts.1111 This Act granted the SEC the right to seek civil penalties against illegal 
corporate insider trading violators up to three times the ill-gotten gains or losses they 
avoided.1112 It also increased the financial sanctions, under Section 32 of the SEA, from 
$10,000 to $100,000.1113 In 1988, Congress again issued the Insider Trading and Securities 
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) that added additional civil penalties and 
increased criminal sanctions against illegal corporate insider trading wrongdoers.1114 The 
ITSFEA provided a civil penalty that the SEC could seek against persons who control the 
                                               
1110 See Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 424, at 355; Nagy, supra note 423, at 1366.  
1111 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), Pub. L. No. 98–376, 98 Stat. 1264, (1984). WILLIAM M. 
PRIFTI, 24A SECURITIES PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS, § 10:3., Westlaw (database updated by Nov. 
2018.), Updated by Joy M. Brayan and Paul Richter. 
1112 ITSA, at §2. This Section is now Section 21A(a) of the SEA. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(a).  
1113 Id. at §3.  
1114 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), Pub. L. 100-704, 100 Stat. 
4677 (1988). See Prifti, supra note 1111, §10:4.  
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violators of the illegal corporate insider trading prohibition.1115 It also authorized the SEC 
to award bounties to informants regarding illegal corporate insider trading violations of up 
to ten percent of the civil penalties recovered.1116 The ITSFEA also increased criminal 
sanctions imposed under Section 32 of the SEA.1117 It increased the maximum fine penalty 
for natural persons from $100,000 to $1 million and set the maximum fine penalty for 
entities other than natural persons at $2.5 million.1118 In addition, it increased the maximum 
prison sentence from five to ten years.1119 The ITSFEA also granted an express private 
cause of action for contemporaneous buyers or sellers to seek damages against insiders 
who traded with such buyers or sellers.1120 In 2010, Congress provided the SEC with 
additional enforcement power that can be used against illegal corporate insider trading 
violators. Under Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank),1121 Congress granted the SEC the right to impose 
civil penalties in an administrative action before the SEC’s law administrative judges 
against any person for securities violations including illegal corporate insider trading 
conducts.1122  
                                               
1115 ITSFEA, §3. This Section was added to the new Section 21A of the SEA as Section 21A(a)(1)(B). 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78u-1(a)(1)(B).  
1116 ITSFEA, §3. This provision was added to Section 21A(e) of the SEA.  
1117 Id. §4.  
1118 Id.  
1119 Id. § 32 of the SEA now imposes a fine penalty of up to $5 million against natural persons and or 
imprisonment not exceeding 20 years. For entities other than natural persons, the maximum fine is $25 
million. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff.   
1120 ITSFEA, §5. This section is now Section 20A of the SEA. 15 USCA § 78t-1. 
1121 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. 111-
203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).  
1122 Id. §929P. This section was added to Section 21B(a) of the SEA. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-2. See Stephen J. 
Choi: A. C. Pritchard, The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 Yale J. 
on Reg., 5-12 (2017).  
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It is noteworthy that violations of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading 
essentially impose civil liability since illegal corporate insider trading acts are fraudulent 
in nature in violation of Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 
as well as Rule 14e-3 regarding trading while in possession of inside information related 
to a tender offer.1123 However, Section 32 of the SEA makes such violations or fraudulent 
activities criminal offenses punishable by severe and extreme penalties.1124 
The SEC is responsible for enforcing the civil liability of illegal corporate insider 
trading violations whether through civil litigations or administrative proceedings.1125 
However, criminal enforcement of the illegal corporate insider trading prohibition is 
referred to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ).1126  It is common for civil and 
criminal proceedings to be parallel in that the SEC can file civil suits against illegal 
corporate insider trading wrongdoers simultaneously when criminal charges have been 
commenced against the same wrongdoers.1127 However, not all civil litigation can result in 
criminal indictments and only a fraction of cases can result in criminal suits.1128 One of the 
                                               
1123 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 616; Jacobs, supra note 547, at §20:1.  
1124 See WANG & STEINBERG, at 617; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:1.  
1125 See id; JACOBS, supra note 93, at §20:1. See also Newkirk & Robertson, supra note 1.  
See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, How Investigations Work, 
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html.  
1126 Id. See Office of Chief Counsel of Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement, 
Enforcement Manual, 5.2., 5.2.1, (November 28, 2017), available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.  
1127 Id. at 5.2., 52.1. (The Enforcement Manual of the SEC states that “Parallel civil and criminal proceedings 
are not uncommon. In furtherance of the SEC’s mission and as a matter of publicly policy, the staff is 
encouraged to work cooperatively with criminal authorities, to share information, and to coordinate their 
investigations with parallel criminal investigations when appropriate.”) Id. at 5.2.1. See HAZEN, supra note 
2, at §16.24. 
1128 The DOJ’s decision whether or not to seek criminal enforcement against illegal corporate insider trading 
potential wrongdoers or others is guided by the Justice Manual. The United States Department of Justice, 
Justice Manual, 1-1.200, available at: https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-title-1-organization-and-functions. 
According to this Manual, the attorney for the government should seek federal prosecution when the attorney 
“believes that the person’s conduct constitute a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will 
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction; unless (1) the prosecution would serve no substantial 
federal interest; (2) the person is subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (3) there exists an 
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main differences between civil and criminal liability is that criminal liability under Section 
32 of the SEA requires that the prosecution show that the alleged violation is committed 
willfully.1129 To prove that the defendant acted willfully in addition to other elements of an 
illegal corporate insider trading violation, the prosecution must present enough evidence 
that demonstrates the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.1130 In contrast, civil liability 
does not require that the prosecution proves willfulness of the defendant1131 and can be 
sustained based on the preponderance of evidence.1132 Therefore, since civil liability 
requires a lower standard of proof, making it easier to uphold, the likelihood of civil 
litigation is far higher than criminal proceedings.1133 
                                               
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” Id. at 9-27.220. See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:1. 
(Professor Langevoort indicates that parallel criminal prosecution against illegal corporate insider trading 
wrongdoers is estimated to be around 20% of illegal insider trading cases. Id.  See Criminal Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Insider Trading Cases: Let’s Look At the Numbers, 2, available at: 
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Commercial_Federal_Litigation/ComFed_Display_Tabs/Reports/CRIMIN
ALPROSECUTORIALDISCRETIONINTHEINSIDERTRADINGCASES_pdf.html. (This study shows that 
the DOJ sought criminal prosecution against 65 out of 159 potential illegal corporate insider trading violators 
for whom the SEC filed civil suits in the New York Federal Courts from 2004 to 2010.) Id. Roberta S. Karmel 
reported that the SEC prosecuted more than 590 defendants from 2010 to 2015 in civil illegal corporate 
insider trading cases. Karmel, supra note 426, at 757. The SEC Enforcement Annual Report of 2018 reports 
that the SEC took 51 enforcement civil actions against illegal corporate insider trading violations which 
equals 6% of SEC’s total enforcement actions. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report 
Divison of Enforcement 2018, 14 (Nov 2, 2018), available at: https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-
annual-report-2018.pdf. See Langevoort, supra note 49, at 1331. (Professor Donald Langevoort has found 
that “supporting insider trading enforcement as a priority, then, became a way of signaling one’s commitment 
to the commission’s identity.” Id. 
1129 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff; Strader, supra note 1022, at 1445-46; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 
620. See U.S. v. O’Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 647 (1998). (The Ninth Circuit stated that: “we think it is clear that 
the Supreme Court was simply explaining that the statute provides that a negligent or reckless violation of 
the securities law cannot result in criminal liability; instead, the defendant must act willfully…‘willfully’ 
simply requires the intentional doing of the wrongful acts”) Id. See also supra note 600.  
1130 Newman, 773 F.3d 438, at 451. See Strader, supra note 1022, at 1466. For more information about the 
standard of proof in criminal proceedings, see Broun Kenneth S. et al, Evidence, §341, 724-25 (7th ed. 2014). 
1131 However, it is required to prove that the defendant acted at least with recklessness. See supra note 1022-
28 and accompanying text.  
1132 See SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292,1298 (11th Cir. 2004); JACOBS, supra note 93, at §21:23; Kenneth, 
supra note 705, §339, 720-21. 
1133 See supra note 1128.   
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This part seeks to determine the elements of illegal corporate insider trading 
violations. Then it discusses the standard of proof and admissible evidence. It finishes by 
describing the usual civil and criminal penalties available after a conviction or liability is 
found.  
Elements of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Liability 
 
Illegal corporate insider trading liability that is actionable under Section 10(b) of 
the SEA and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, requires the existence of requisites or 
elements of fraudulent conduct that is prohibited under the provision. This involves 
deception in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.1134 In an illegal corporate 
insider trading context, fulfillment of these elements is sustained if the trading conduct 
involves silence or nondisclosure of material non-public information of which the trader is 
aware and has a duty to disclose but fails to do so.1135 To prevail in an illegal corporate 
insider trading lawsuit, federal courts require the demonstration of a purchase or sale of a 
security on the basis of material non-public information in a breach of a duty of trust and 
confidence, with scienter.1136  These two elements are discussed below.  
 
 
 
                                               
1134 See U.S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d. 1051, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998). Courts define the phrase “in connection with” 
flexibly to include prohibited conduct such as “touching” the purchase or sale of a security. U.S. v. Teicher, 
987 F.2d 112, 120 (2nd Cir. 1993). Citing Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. 6, 12. WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 199.  
1135 Id.  
1136 See. S.E.C. v. Fox, 654 F. Supp. 781, 789–90 (N.D. Tex. 1986). (The Northern District of Texas stated 
that “By alleging that the defendants traded on material inside information, plaintiff must prove the following: 
(1) that the defendants were insiders; (2) that the information in defendants' possession was material; (3) that 
the defendants had a duty to disclose the alleged information or to abstain from trading; and (4) that the 
defendants acted with scienter.”) Id. 
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a. Purchase or Sale of a Security on the Basis of Material Non-public 
Information in a Breach of a Duty of Trust or Confidence.  
 
This element covers the actus reus of illegal corporate insider trading activity where 
the defendant commits the prohibited conduct, which is the purchase or sale of a security 
on the basis of material non-public information without disclosure of such information in 
violation of a duty to disclose, which arises from a duty of trust and confidence.1137 The 
requirement of purchasing or selling a security means that refraining from purchasing or 
selling a security on the basis of material non-public information is not prohibited 
conduct.1138 In addition, the purchase or sale must be on the basis of material non-public 
information that is unknown to the public and has not been disclosed. A reasonable investor 
would also consider that the information, if disclosed, would have significantly altered the 
total mix of information available.1139 Furthermore, the purchase or sale must be in a breach 
of a duty of trust and confidence, whether the trade is committed by classic corporate 
insiders, or misappropriators, or derivatively by tippees who inherit the duty of trust and 
                                               
1137 See Salman v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (U.S. 2016). (The Supreme Court stated that: “Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b–5 prohibit 
undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by individuals who are under a duty of trust and 
confidence that prohibits them from secretly using such information for their personal advantage… 
Individuals under this duty may face criminal and civil liability for trading on inside information (unless they 
make appropriate disclosures ahead of time.”) Id. Rule 10b5-1(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.10b5-1(a). (“The 
‘manipulative and deceptive devices’ prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and  §240.10b-
5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of 
material nonpublic information about that security or the issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence 
that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, 
or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information.”) Id. See also Strader, supra 
note 1022, at 1464.  
1138 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 208. (The authors state that the “decision not to trade would 
almost certainly not violate Rule 10b-5.” This is because it is not “conduct ‘in connection with’ the purchase 
or sale of a security.” Id. Courts define the phrase “in connection with” flexibly to include prohibited conducts 
“touching” the purchase or sale of a security. U.S. v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2nd Cir. 1993). Citing 
Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. 6, 12.  
1139 See Salman v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. at 423. For more information about the definition of material non-public 
information, see supra notes 801-1021 and accompanying text.  
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confidence from the disclosing insider.1140 If the defendant is a classic insider, he/she 
commits illegal corporate insider trading through the purchase or sale of his/her 
corporation’s security without disclosure of material nom-public information in a breach 
of the insider’s fiduciary duty owed to the corporation’s shareholders.1141 Under the 
misappropriation theory, the defendant commits the illegal trade by purchasing or selling 
a security on the basis of material non-public information in a breach of his/her duty of 
trust and confidence owed not to the party who trades with but to the source of the 
information.1142 Furthermore, since tippees assume a duty of trust and confidence 
derivatively from the tipper, their purchase or sale is in a breach of such a duty when the 
disclosure is in a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty.1143  
b. With Scienter    
This element is about the mens rea of the prohibited conduct of the illegal corporate 
insider trading.1144 Courts define scienter as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”1145 To suffice the element of scienter, the insider must 
intentionally commit trading on the basis of material non-public information in a breach of 
a duty of trust and confidence.1146 This requirement means that a standard lower than 
                                               
1140 See supra note 1137. See S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 284 (2nd Cir. 2012).  
1141 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235; U.S. v. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 1998); Obus, id.   
1142 O'Hagan, 521 U.S., at 652; id. See also WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 192.  
1143 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. at 423; United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 446 (2nd Cir. 2014); Obus, 693 
F.3d at 284. See supra notes 774-84 and accompanying test.  
1144 See Strader, supra note 1022, at 1460; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 164.  
1145 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 Nt.12 (1976). See supra notes 1022-28 and accompanying 
text. See also Langevoort, supra note 597, at 3. 
1146 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665-66 (1997). (The Supreme Court stated that: “[W]e emphasize…two 
sturdy safeguards Congress has provided regarding scienter. To establish a criminal violation of Rule 10b–
5, the Government must prove that a person ‘willfully’ violated the provision. Furthermore, a defendant may 
not be imprisoned for violating Rule 10b–5 if he proves that he had no knowledge of the Rule.”) Id. O’Hagan, 
139 F.3d. at 647.  (The Ninth Circuit stated that: “we think it is clear that the Supreme Court was simply 
explaining that the statute provides that a negligent or reckless violation of the securities law cannot result in 
criminal liability; instead, the defendant must act willfully…‘[W]illfully’ simply requires the intentional 
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deliberate and willful intent of committing the prohibited conduct does not suffice to 
sustain a conviction in a criminal suit.1147 Courts define willfulness as “a realization on the 
defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act under the securities laws’ and that such 
an act ‘involved a significant risk of effecting the violation that occurred’.”1148  However, 
in civil proceedings, the element of scienter may suffice if the defendant acts recklessly.1149 
The Second Circuit has defined the standard of recklessness as a “conduct which highly 
unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary 
care.”1150  
To establish the element of scienter for an insider defendant, courts require that the 
insider must purchase or sell a security while having actual knowledge, or being reckless 
in not knowing in regard to civil liability, of possessed material non-public information.1151 
                                               
doing of the wrongful acts” The Eighth Circuit illustrated that to establish willfulness, it is not required to 
show that the defendant knew that his act was in violation of the law since the general rule says “ignorance 
of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution.’.” The Court also stated that, although 
some laws require knowledge that the conduct is in violation of the law, this rule does not apply to §32 of 
the SEA criminal conviction “for violation of rules and regulations implementing §10(b) necessarily involves 
fraudulent conduct and breaches of duty by the defendant. Such acts do not involve conduct that is often 
innocently undertaken.” Id.   Willfulness was defined by the Second Circuit to mean: “in this context ‘[] a 
realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act under the securities laws.’. and that such 
an act ‘involved a significant risk of effecting the violation that occurred.’.” U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d. at 
447. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 159; see LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:13. (Professor 
Donald C. Langevoort states that: “in a case based on the misappropriation theory, for example, it would be 
enough that the defendant was aware that what he was doing was prohibited by (or contrary to the interests 
of) his employer. Given the emphasis in Chiarella and Dirks on the intent to benefit and breach of fiduciary 
duty elements for establishing a violation in the first place, nearly all violations of the abstain or disclose rule 
should provide a basis for criminal prosecution under this approach.”) Id. See also supra note 1025 and 
accompanying text.  
1147 Id.  
1148 Newman, 773 F.3d at 447. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 615.  
1149 Wang & Steinberg, at 159. See supra notes 1025-26 and accompanying text. 
1150 Obus, 693 F.3d. 276, 286 (2nd Cir. 2012). (The Second Circuit stated that: “we have held that scienter 
‘may be established through a showing of reckless disregard for the truth, that is, conduct which is highly 
unreasonable and which represents an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,’.”) Id. Citing 
SEC. v. McNulty, 137 F.3d. at 741. See id.  
1151 U.S. v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 159 (2nd Cir. 2013). (The Second Circuit asserted that: “[i]t is sufficient 
if the government proves that the defendant [ ] purchased or sold securities while knowingly in possession of 
the material nonpublic information,’”) Id. Citing Teicher, 987 F.2d. at 119; Obus, 693 F.3d. at 286; See 
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 164. See supra notes 1072-76 and accompanying text. However, 
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To suffice the element of scienter for the insider tipper, the insider must intentionally and 
deliberately, or recklessly in civil proceeding, tip another person material non-public 
information in a breach of the insider’s duty of trust and confidence for personal benefit.1152 
The tipper must have knowledge that the tip would be used for securities trading.1153 The 
tippee’s scienter is established by showing that the tippee has knowledge that the insider 
has tipped information that is material and non-public disclosed in a breach of the tipper’s 
duty of trust and confidence for personal benefit, and he/she still uses this information to 
trade or tip others for personal benefit.1154  
                                               
some courts require not only that the defendant trades knowing that he/she has material non-public 
information, but also must use the information. This means that the knowledge of material non-public 
information is the cause of the trade. For more information see supra notes 1029-59 and accompanying text. 
Although the SEC denied that the Rule 10b5-1awarness standard was a modification of the element of 
scienter, many scholars have suggested otherwise. See supra note 1072-76 and accompanying text.  
1152 Obus, 693 F.3d. at 286. (The Second Circuit stated that: “the tipper must tip deliberately or recklessly, 
not through negligence. Second, the tipper must know that the information that is the subject of the tip is non-
public and is material for securities trading purposes or act with reckless disregard of the nature of the 
information. Third, the tipper must know (or be reckless in not knowing) that to disseminate the information 
would violate a fiduciary duty.” Id. The Second Circuit stated that “there is a valid defense to scienter if the 
tipper can show that he believed in good faith that the information disclosed to the tippee would not be used 
for trading purposes.” Id. at 287. The Second Circuit also found that there is no bright line between a negligent 
tip and reckless tip. However, it stated that it does not required that a tipper needs to know for certain that 
the tippee would trade. Conscious avoidance and willful blindness can be sufficient to establish tipper 
scienter.”) Id. See Salman v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (U.S. 2016). WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 
167; Strader, supra note 1022, at 1465-72. See also supra notes 774-826 and accompanying text.  
1153 Salman v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. at 427. (The government asserted that “in order to establish a defendant’s 
criminal liability as a tippee, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tipper expected that the 
information being disclosed would be used in securities trading. Id. The Supreme Court also found that: “by 
disclosing confidential information as a gift to his brother with the expectation that he would trade on it, 
Maher breached his duty of trust and confidence to Citigroup and its clients.”) Id. see supra note 756-58 and 
accompanying text.  
1154 United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2nd Cir. 2014). (“In sum, we hold that to sustain an insider 
trading conviction against a tippee, the Government must prove each of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: that (1) the corporate insider was entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the corporate insider 
breached his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confidential information to a tippee (b) in exchange for a 
personal benefit; (3) the tippee knew of the tipper’s breach, that is, he knew the information was confidential 
and divulged for personal benefit; and (4) the tippee still used that information to trade in a security or tip 
another individual for personal benefit.”) Obus, 693 F.3d. at 289. (The second Circuit stated that “To 
summarize our discussion of tipping liability, we hold that tipper liability requires that (1) the tipper had a 
duty to keep material non-public information confidential; (2) the tipper breached that duty by intentionally 
or recklessly relaying the information to a tippee who could use the information in connection with securities 
trading; and (3) the tipper received a personal benefit from the tip. Tippee liability requires that (1) the tipper 
breached a duty by tipping confidential information; (2) the tippee knew or had reason to know that the tippee 
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In regard to the element of liability under Rule 14e-3, the elements are as follows: 
(1) when any person has taken a substantial step to commence or has commenced a tender 
offer; (2) another person purchases, sells, or causes the purchase or sale of any security of 
the issuer (the target of the tender offer) in possession of material non-public information 
related to such tender offer; (3) with scienter.1155 The other person knows or has reason to 
know such information is non-public, and has been acquired directly or indirectly from the 
offering person, from the issuer, or anyone acting on behalf of the offeror or the issuer.1156 
The SEC does not require that the trader knows that the information is material or related 
to a tender offer as to be distinguished from other types of corporate acquisitions or the 
trade is in breach of fiduciary duty.1157 However, in criminal proceedings, the Second 
Circuit, in U.S. v. Cassese,1158 affirmed the District Court’s decision that to prove the 
willfulness standard in criminal prosecutions under Rule 14e-3, the government must prove 
that the defendant knew that the material non-public information related to, or most likely 
related to, a tender offer.1159 In addition, the elements of improper tipping of material non-
public information related to a tender offer are as follows: (1) after any person has taken a 
substantial step to commence or has commenced a tender offer; (2) the offeror or the target 
                                               
improperly obtained the information (i.e., that the information was obtained through the tipper’s breach); and 
(3) the tippee, while in knowing possession of the material non-public information, used the information by 
trading or by tipping for his own benefit.”) Id. Salman v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. at 427. (The Supreme Court referred 
to the Government statement that “in order to establish a defendant’s criminal liability as a tippee, it must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the tipper expected that the information being disclosed would be used 
in securities trading…The Government also notes that, to establish a defendant’s criminal liability as a tippee, 
it must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper breached a duty—in other words, that the tippee knew that 
the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that the tipper expected trading to ensue.”) Id. 
see supra notes 817-26 and accompanying text.  
1155 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 6 (Sept. 4, 1980).  
1156 Id; See JACOBS, supra note 860, at §5:40; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §7:9.  
1157 See United States v Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2nd Cir. 1991). See supra note 652 and accompanying 
text.  
1158 428 F.3d.92, 97 (2nd Cir. 2005).   
1159 Id. See. See supra notes 1096-109 and accompanying text.  
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company or anyone acting on their behalf tips material nonpublic information related to a 
tender offer; (3) to any other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably 
foreseeable that such communication is likely that such a person will trade; and (4) with 
scienter.1160 Here there is no requirement of a breach of fiduciary duty or gaining personal 
benefit from the improper disclosure.1161 The tippee only needs to know that the 
information was disclosed by an insider either directly or indirectly and the information is 
non-public.1162 However, in criminal prosecutions, the tippee must know that the purchase 
or sale is related to a tender offer and it is material non-public information.1163  
Evidence in Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Proceedings   
 
The question of whether presented evidence in illegal corporate insider trading 
proceedings is enough or sufficient to prove a conclusion of liability is one of the most 
difficult questions that courts have to face.1164 This is because the evidence must 
demonstrate that the insider has traded while subjectively being aware of material non-
public information, or the evidence must show that the insider intentionally has tipped an 
outsider such information for personal benefit. In addition, the evidence must prove the 
other elements of the prohibited conduct.1165 However, due to the complexity and 
unmitigated trading volume of securities transactions in impersonal markets along with 
abundant modern online social apps and blogs, it has become more difficult to detect and 
investigate illegal corporate insider trading activities especially when suspected traders 
                                               
1160 Rule 14e-3(d)(1), 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(d)(1). See JACOBS, supra note 860, at §5:40; Hazen, supra note 
7, at §12:168. See supra note 437-46 and accompanying text. 
1161 Id.  
1162 SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 6239, Tender Offers, at 6 (Sept. 4, 1980); Id.  
1163 HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:168.  
1164 NAGY ET AL, supra note 84, at 548.  
1165 Id; Langevoort, supra note 597, at 5. 
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allege that the trade was based on an innocent bases, such as rumors or speculative 
news.1166  Courts have stated that the SEC, in civil proceedings, and the DOJ, in criminal 
proceedings, need to prove the elements of prohibited conduct of illegal corporate insider 
trading prohibited conduct using direct or circumstantial evidence.1167 Courts have allowed 
the use of circumstantial evidence because they have recognized that direct evidence is not 
usually available due to the secrecy of trading on inside information and the difficulty of 
finding “a smoking gun” that directly proves the commitment of an illegal trade.1168 
However, courts require that represented evidence must corroborate the alleged facts and 
demonstrate the elements of the illegal conduct and it shall not be based on conjecture and 
speculation.1169 It is noteworthy that the standard of proof in criminal proceeding is that 
                                               
1166 See The Future of White Collar Enforcement: A prosecutor’s View Prepared Remarks of U.S. Attorney 
Preet Harara New York City Bar Association, The United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New 
York, (Oct 20, 2010) available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/speech/future-white-collar-
enforcement-prosecutor-s-view-prepared-remarks-us-attorney.   
1167 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sabrdaran, 252 F.Supp. 3d 866, 878 (N.D. Cal. 2017). (The 
District Court of Northern District of California rejected the defendants’ argument that no direct evidence 
proved sharing of a tip, stating that: “direct evidence is not necessary. ‘Direct evidence of insider trading is, 
indeed, rare; and the SEC is entitled to prove its case through circumstantial evidence.’ But it ‘may not base 
insider trading actions on strained inferences and speculation.’ In meeting its burden, the SEC must identify 
the facts’.” Id. SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004). (The Eleventh Circuit, in civil 
proceeding, stated that: “The SEC must prove violations of § 10(b) and § 14(e), and their supplementary 
Rules, by a preponderance of the evidence, and may use direct or circumstantial evidence to do so. 
‘Circumstantial evidence has no less weight than direct evidence as long as it reasonably establishes that fact 
rather than anything else.’.”) Id. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 451 (2nd Cir. 2014). (The Second 
Circuit, in criminal proceeding stated that to conclude judgment of conviction, “no distinction between direct 
and circumstantial evidence. The Government is entitled to prove its case solely through circumstantial 
evidence, provided, of course, that the Government still demonstrates each element of the charged offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt… However, if the evidence ‘is nonexistent or so meager,’ such that it ‘gives equal 
or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury 
must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt,’.” Id. Citing Cassese, 428 F.3d at 99.  
1168 Nagy et al, supra note 84, at 548; Id. Circumstantial evidence means: “Evidence based on inference and 
not on personal knowledge or observation.” It is defined also as “all evidence that is not given by eyewitness 
testimony.” Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Direct evidence is defined as “evidence that 
is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or 
presumption.” Id.  
1169 S.E.C. v. Evans, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 4 (D. Or. 2006). (The Distract Court of District of Oregon 
stated that: “the SEC may not base insider trading actions on strained inferences and speculations.”) Id. See 
supra note 1154. See also LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13.   
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the DOJ must prove the elements of the illegal corporate insider trading liability beyond a 
reasonable doubt either through the use of direct or circumstantial evidence.1170 The 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is if the presented evidence “gives equal or nearly 
equal circumstantial support to a theory of innocence as a theory of guilt, that evidence 
necessarily fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”1171 However, in civil 
proceedings, the accepted standard of proof is the preponderance of evidence.1172 The 
preponderance of evidence standard means that “the greater weight of the evidence…that 
has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight, though not sufficient to free 
the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial 
mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”1173  
Illegal corporate insider trading activities are detected by the SEC’s Enforcement 
Division, which is also responsible for investigating and seeking civil proceedings against 
violators using several sources.1174 These sources include referrals from self-regulatory 
organizations, such as the Financial Industrial Regulatory Authority (FINRA).1175 
                                               
1170 Newman, 773 F.3d. at 451. 
1171 Newman, at 455. See SIMON M. LORNE AND JOY MARLENE BRYAN, 11 ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS, 
§1:29.40, Westlaw (database updated by November 2018). The standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” “is 
the standard used by a jury to determine whether a criminal defendant is guilty.  In deciding whether guilt 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must begin with the presumption that the defendant is 
innocent.” Reasonable Doubt, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
1172 Evans, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, at 4. (The District Court of District of Oregon stated that: “The 
standard of proof in a civil case is preponderance of the evidence, and this standard applies even where the 
SEC bases its case on circumstantial evidence.”) Id. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d, at 1298. (The Eleventh Circuit 
stated that: “The SEC must prove violations of § 10(b) and § 14(e), and their supplementary Rules, by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”) Id. See Hervé Gouraige, Do Federal Courts Have Constitutional Authority 
to Adjudicate Criminal Insider-Trading Cases? 69 Rutgers U.L. Rev. 47, 83 Nt. 159 (2016). 
1173 Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). (“This is the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the 
jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge 
may be.”) Id.  
1174 See Chair Mary Jo White, Remarks at the Securities Enforcement Forum, (Oct 9, 2013) [White], available 
at: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100913mjw; How Investigations Work, supra note 1125; Andrew 
Van Osselaer, Insider Trading Enforcement & Link Prediction, Texas Law Review, Vol. 96:399,400,02 
(2017).   
1175 Id.  
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Resources also include whistleblowers, investors’ complaints, and media reports.1176 In 
addition to these traditional sources of detection, the Enforcement Division detects illegal 
corporate insider trading transactions through an in-house-developed market analysis 
system,1177 called the Advanced Bluesheet Analysis Program (ABAP).1178 The ABAP has 
helped the Enforcement Division not only detect suspicious trading activities before major 
events, but also detect other correlated trades, revealing the relationship between multiple 
traders that may not be noticed.1179 After detecting a potential violation of the illegal insider 
prohibition, the Enforcement Division goes on to build more facts about the case through 
an informal investigation by interviewing voluntary witnesses and reviewing brokerage 
records and trading data.1180 The Enforcement Division may decide to proceed to a formal 
investigation after getting a formal order from the SEC, where the Division has the power 
to subpoena witnesses and require the production of records and other necessary orders to 
investigate the violation.1181 While doing the investigation, the Enforcement Division 
focuses on finding facts that are related to proving the elements of illegal corporate insider 
trading liability.1182 This includes possession of material non-public information at the time 
of the trade, and finding scienter.1183 Sometimes, the Enforcement Division may also seek 
                                               
1176 Id. 
1177 See Osselaer, at 406. 
1178 White, supra note 1174.  
1179 Id; Osselaer, at 406.  
1180 Id; Nagy et al, supra note 84, at 548.  
1181 §21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u. See White, supra note 1174; Osselaer, supra note 747, at 402-03; Enforcement 
Manual, supra note 1126, at §2.3.  
1182 Osselaer, supra note 1174, at 403; Hilton Foster, Insider Trading Investigation, Securities and exchange 
Commission, 4, available at: https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_enforce/foster.pdf.  
1183 Id.  
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to obtain a court order to use wiretapping especially when there is no apparent connection 
between the trader and an insider.1184  
Proving that the insider has acted with scienter is a fact-specific issue and there is 
no general rule that determines the amount or nature of evidence to show when an insider 
has been subjectively aware of possessing material non-public information when he/she 
traded a security,1185 or that the tipper has tipped or transferred material non-public 
information, and the tippee was in possession of such information.1186 That said, in a civil 
proceeding, courts require that scienter is established by direct or circumstantial evidence 
in which the fact-finder can extract from such evidence a permissible inference of finding 
knowledge or being reckless in not knowing,1187 or in a criminal proceeding, to infer willful 
                                               
1184 Nagy et al, supra note 84, at 548; Osselaer, supra note 1174, at 405.  
1185 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 188; DANIEL J. 
FETTERMAN AND MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING CORPORATION AND INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT 
INVESTIGATIONS, §14:15, Westlaw (database updated up to Dec. 2017). 
1186 Id.  
1187See SEC v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. Cir. 2004). (The SEC brought a civil action against Scoot 
Ginsburg, who was chairman and CEO of Evergreen Media Corporation, for violating §10(b) and Rules 10b-
5 and 14e-3. Id. at 1296. “The case was tried to a jury which found that Ginsburg had violated the insider 
trading provisions.” Id.  However, the district court granted Ginsburg’s renewed motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and vacated the judgment against him, because it concluded that the evidence was insufficient 
to permit a reasonable jury to find that he had tipped his brother and father through phone calls about inside 
information who then traded after receiving the phone calls. Id. The SEC appealed. Id. The Eleventh Circuit 
found that: “people generally buy when they believe the price of a stock is going up and sell when they 
believe it is going down (either absolutely or relative to the expected performance of other stock). The 
factfinder in an insider trading case need only infer the most likely source of that belief. The temporal 
proximity of a phone conversation between the trader and one with insider knowledge provides a reasonable 
basis for inferring that the basis of the trader’s belief was the inside information. The larger and more 
profitable the trades, and the closer in time the trader’s exposure to the insider, the stronger the inference that 
the trader was acting on the basis of inside information.” Id. at 1299. Ginsburg tried to rebut it by 
demonstrating evidence that the conversations were frequent and the trades by his brother and father were 
not exceptional along with the “longer spans of time between the conversations and trades.”  In addition, 
Ginsburg also showed some public information about the companies in an attempt to show that that the 
motive was not because of receiving confidential information. Id. at 1301. However, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that: “The district court commented that ‘it is plausible that the investments ... were driven not by 
tips but rather by public knowledge.’ It is also plausible that they were driven by insider information. And it 
was up to the jury to choose between those competing plausible theories of fact.” Id. “The SEC did not have 
the burden of putting in evidence that compelled the inference Ginsburg conveyed nonpublic information to 
Mark. All it was required was put in evidence that reasonably permitted that inference. It did that. The 
call/trade pattern occurrences coupled with the jury’s right to disbelieve the innocent explanations of the calls 
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intent without a reasonable doubt.1188 For example, circumstantial evidence may include 
facts of suspicious trades in volume and time, attempts to hide the trades from being 
noticed, such as the use of multilabel brokers or portfolio accounts, the timing of a trade 
that follows personal meetings, or a telephone conversation with someone who knows 
material non-public information.1189  Professor Donald C. Langevoort observed that: 
“many courts have wisely taken the position that the timing of the trade (e.g., shortly after 
a telephone conversation with someone who clearly knew the information and had some 
                                               
and trades are enough to support the verdict.” Id. See CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO INSIDER TRADING 
& REPORTING, § 4:9 Westlaw (2018 ed.).  
1188 See U.S. v. Cassese, 428 F.3d. 92 (2nd Cir. 2005). (The Second Circuit examined the issue of whether all 
of the evidence together was sufficient to support a jury’s finding that Cassese willfully violated the Securities 
laws. Cassese, on behalf of Computer Horizon, entered merger negotiations with another company, 
Compuware. Id. at 95. The deal did not happen. Id. The CEO of Compuware informed Cassese that 
Compuware would not be doing a deal with Computer Horizon but might be interested in the future. He also 
told him that his company was going to announce a deal with Data Processing Resources Corporation 
(DPRC), but he did not reveal any details about the terms or structure of the deal. Cassese bought shares on 
DPRC through two brokerages, and later sold it for profit. Id. at 96. After being found guilty by the jury of 
violating Rule 14e-3, Cassese moved for a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 97. He argued that the government 
failed to prove that he knew the transaction was a tender offer, and that the government’s evidence of criminal 
intent was circumstantial and consistent with his announcement. Id.  In a renowned motion, the district court 
concluded that “in criminal persecutions under Section 14(e) and Rule 14e-3… [T]he Government, to prove 
willfulness, must prove that the defendant believed that the material non-public information he traded upon 
related, or most likely related to, a tender offer.” Id. On appeal by the government, the government argued 
that “it was not required to prove that Cassese believed that he was relating violating a particular law, nor 
that he was violating a rule that government trading related specifically to a tender offer.” Id. at 98. The 
government stated that “all was needed was prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cassese realized that he 
was committing a wrongful act. The Government contends that the evidence showed that Cassese believed 
it was unlawful to trade securities based upon insider information when he purchased DPRC shares, and that 
this realization was enough to establish a willful violation of Rule 14e–3 even if he was not aware that the 
trades violated a rule regulating trading in connection with tender offers.” Id.  However, the Second Circuit 
concluded that “even under the Government’s relaxed theory of criminal liability…[I]t did not adduce enough 
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cassese believed that he was acting unlawfully.” Then, the 
Second Circuit stated that: “Since few events in the life of an individual assume the importance of a criminal 
conviction, we take the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ requirement with utmost seriousness. Here, we find that 
the Government’s evidence failed to reach that threshold. As discussed above, viewed singly, each of the 
areas of proof by the Government was characterized by modest evidentiary showings, equivocal or attenuated 
evidence of guilt or a combination of the three. More importantly, when the evidence is viewed in its totality, 
the evidence of willfulness is insufficient to dispel reasonable doubt on the part of a reasonable fact finder. 
Viewed in the most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence, at best, gives “equal or nearly equal 
circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence,” and thus “a reasonable jury must 
necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 103. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 620 Nt. 30.  
1189 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 188. (The authors reviewed several circumstantial pieces of 
evidence that have been used to show scienter by courts.) See also CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO INSIDER 
TRADING & REPORTING, supra note 1187.  
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reason to pass it on) suffices to create an inference of insider trading, but only if such a 
trade was inconsistent with the defendant's prior pattern of trading activity.”1190 
Civil Penalties and Criminal Sanctions against Illegal Corporate Insider Trading 
Wrongdoers 
 
There are multiple civil penalties and criminal sections that can be imposed upon 
illegal corporate insider trading violators. This section focuses on potential civil and 
criminal penalties that are directly relevant to illegal corporate insider trading violations. 
These possible penalties are discussed below.  
SEC’s Administrative and Civil Enforcement 
 
The SEC has various options to seek enforcement against charged persons for illegal 
corporate insider trading activities. These options can be divided into two parts based on 
the forum that the SEC may choose to enforce the prohibition of illegal corporate insider 
trading. In general, the SEC can seek civil penalties, injections, and equitable relief 
including disgorgement, a bar from the industry, or cease and desist orders.1191  
a. Administrative Enforcement   
The SEC can bring an administrative cease and desist order against any person for 
violating federal laws including illegal corporate insider trading. A cease and desist order 
is an “order prohibiting a person from continuing a particular course of conduct.”1192 
Section 21C of the SEA states that if the SEC “finds, after notice and opportunity for 
hearing, that any person is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of 
                                               
1190 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §3:13.   
1191 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 639; RALPH GERSTIEN, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF 
INSIDER TRADING CASES BROUGH BY GOVERNMENT—CRIMINAL AND CIVIL, 166 American Jurisprudence Proof 
of Facts 3d 1, §13, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018); Liza Casabona, Editor, 1030 Litigating with the 
SEC: Choice of Forum, 2005 WL  4919004 (Westlaw); LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:17. 
1192 Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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this title…the Commission may enter an order requiring such person…to cease and desist 
from committing or cause such violation and any future violation of the same 
provision.”1193  By bringing a cease and desist order, the SEC can prohibit any person from 
serving as an officer or director of an issuer if it is determined that the person has acted in 
violation of Section 10(b) or rules thereunder and if “the conduct of that person 
demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer.”1194 In addition, 
the SEC can impose civil money penalties against illegal corporate insider trading 
wrongdoers.1195 In a cease and desist proceeding, Section 21B (c) of the SEA allows the 
SEC to impose civil money penalties against any person that “is violating or has violated 
any provision…Or was a cause of the violation.”1196 These civil penalties are divided into 
three tiers with a maximum civil money penalty of $100, 000 for a natural person and 
$500,000 for entities other than a natural person.1197  
b. Civil Enforcement  
The SEC has other options to seek before federal courts beyond pursing 
administrative proceedings. For example, the SEC can request that a federal court issue a 
restraining order or a freeze request, which is not available in the SEC’s administrative 
proceedings.1198 In addition, the SEC can seek civil money penalties against illegal 
corporate insider trading violators and controlling persons, temporary restraining orders, 
                                               
1193 §21C (a). 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-3. For more discussion about this provision, see JACOBS, supra note 93, at 
§12:132.  
1194 §21C (f). 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-3. 
1195 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:17; Casabona, supra note 1191. 
1196 §21B (a)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-2.  
1197 Id. §21B (b). See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 1122, at 8; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:17; 
JACOBS, supra note 93, at §12:133.  
1198 See Casabona, supra note 1191; Choi & Pritchard, supra note 1122, at 9; Katherine H. Brown, SEC 
Civil Remedies for Insider Trading Actions under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Rule 10b-5, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 679 (1988).  
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and injunctive and ancillary relief including disgorgement and barring them from the 
industry. Section 21(d) of the SEA empowers the SEC when “any person is engaged or is 
about to engage in acts or practice constituting a violation” to seek to prevent such action 
in the proper federal court and “upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary 
injunction or restarting.”1199 The SEC can also obtain a temporary restraining order and/or 
freeze assets by showing evidence inferring that the potential defendant has traded on 
inside information.1200 When the SEC seeks permanent injunctive relief, it can also request 
other equitable remedies.1201 It may also seek disgorgement of ill-gotten profit made or loss 
avoided.1202 In addition, the SEC can ask the court to prohibit any person who violates the 
                                               
1199 §21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u. Injunction means: “A court order commanding or preventing an action.” 
Injunction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
1200 Id. See GERSTIEN, supra note 1191, at §17. A temporary restraining order is also termed “Preliminary 
injunction” which means: “A temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent an irreparable 
injury from occurring before the court has chance to decide the case. Injunction, Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014). 
1201 See §21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u.  Equitable remedy is: “a nonmonetary one such as an injunction or 
specific performance, obtained when available legal remedies, monetary damages, cannot adequately redress 
the injury.” Remedy, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
1202 §21(d)(5). Although there is no an express statutory provision that empowers the SEC to seek 
disgorgement, §21(d)(5) of the SEA implicitly endorsed the SEC to request disgorgement. §21(d)(5) states 
that: “In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any provision of the 
securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be 
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.” Id. Courts have recognized that the SEC has the right 
to seek disgorgement as a part of an equitable remedy. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 13008 (2nd Cir. 1971).  “The SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in order 
to effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty assessment.” 
Id. S.E.C. v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200-01 (2nd Cir.1984) (The Second Circuit asserted that "given the federal 
courts' broad equitable powers, such noninjunctive relief may take a variety of forms. Disgorgement of 
illegally obtained profits is by no means a new addition to this catalogue of permissible equitable remedies. 
Indeed, in Texas Gulf Sulphur, supra, this court affirmed a district court order requiring individual defendants 
to pay over the profits realized from trading on insider information.”) Id. In general, disgorgement means: 
“the act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) on demand or by legal compulsion.” 
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). “Disgorgement is a type of restitutionary remedy that seeks to 
deprive the defendant of any monetary gains obtained through trading on nonpublic material information.” 
Brown, supra note 724, at 1198. The measure of disgorgement applied by courts is “Disgorgement needs 
only be a reasonable approximation of profit causally connected to the violation.” SEC v. First City Financial 
Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215,1230 (1989). This measure was adopted by the Distract Court of the District of 
Columbia. For more discussion about disgorgement, see LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:11; WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 652; JACOBS, supra note 93, at §20:109.  
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illegal corporate insider trading prohibition under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to serve as 
an officer or director of an issuer “if the person’s conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve 
as an officer or director of any such issuer.”1203 
The most important remedy that the SEC may seek to enforce illegal corporate 
insider trading prohibition is a civil money penalty. Section 21A of the SEA empowers the 
SEC to seek civil money penalty before a Federal court against any person who appears to 
violate the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading by “purchasing or selling a 
security…[W]hile in possession of material, nonpublic information…or…[B]y 
communicating such information.”1204 The SEC can seek a civil money penalty up to three 
times the profit gained or loss avoided.1205 In addition, the SEC may request a civil 
monetary penalty upon controlling persons who control the violator of illegal corporate 
insider trading prohibition, which must not exceed the greater of $1,000,000 or three times 
the amount of the profit gained, or loss avoided as a result of the illegal trade. However, if 
the violation was in the form of communication material non-public information, the 
controlling person may only be liable to pay the profit gained or loss avoided if the 
controlling person directed the violator to communicate such information.1206  The terms 
“profit gained” and “loss avoided” are defined by the statute as “the difference between the 
                                               
1203 §21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u. 
1204 §21A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1.  
1205 Id, See GERSTIEN, supra note 1191, §20; Casabona, supra note 1191, at 1033; JACOBS, supra note 93, at 
§20:171; WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 664; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:2. 
1206 However, §21A(b) provides a limitation for a controlling person liability, in which the controlling person 
may be subject to pay such penalty unless it is established that “(A) such a controlling person knew or 
recklessly disregarded the fact that such controlled person was likely to engage in the act or acts constituting 
the violation and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such act or acts before they occurred; or (B) such 
controlling person knowingly or reckless failed to establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or procedure 
required under Section 15(f) of this title or section 204A of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and such 
failure substantially contributed to or permitted the occurrence of the act or acts constituting the violation.” 
Id. (b). See JACOBS, supra note 93, at §20:171.   
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purchase or sale price of the security and the value of that security as measured by the 
trading price of the security a reasonable period after public dissemination of the nonpublic 
information.”1207  
Criminal Enforcement 
 
The most severe punishment that may be imposed upon illegal corporate insider 
trading wrongdoers who willfully trade on or tip material non-public information is 
penalties that follow a conviction in criminal enforcement action taken by the DOJ. 
According to Section 32(a) of the SEA, “any person who willfully violates any provision 
of the SEA…shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both, except that when such person is a person other than a natural 
person, a fine not exceeding $25,000,000 may be imposed.”1208 In addition to facing 
imprisonment and a fine, courts may also impose criminal forfeiture of illegal profits 
gained because of the violation.1209   
Private Cause of Action for Contemporaneous Traders 
 
Prior to enacting the ITSFEA of 1988, the courts have had conflicting opinions of 
whether private investors can sue and seek damages under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
                                               
1207 §21A(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 670. (The authors find that 
the statute refers to a measure of the civil penalty that courts may impose “the facts and circumstances,” 
However, it “provides no guidance as to which facts and circumstances should be considered. A number of 
courts have applied a three-factor analysis focusing on (1) the egregiousness of the violation; (2) whether the 
violation was an isolated; and (3) the degree of scienter involved.”  Id. See also JACOBS, supra note 93, at 
§20:171; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:2.  
1208 §32(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff. For more discussion about the definition of willfulness, see supra note 1146. 
In corporate insider trading criminal cases, the judicial sentence is subject to the advisory United States 
Sentencing Guideline Manual. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 2018, Ch. 1 Pt. 1, 
available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf. Illegal 
corporate insider trading is addressed in the Guidelines at §2B1.4. The base level of an illegal insider trading 
offense is eight. To this base level is added several levels matching the gain resulting from the offense. Both 
prison terms and fines are based on the resulting figure. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 631.  
1209 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §8:13.  
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against violators of corporate insider trading law.1210 In particular, they disagreed about the 
finding of a causal connection between the illegal corporate insider trading violations and 
the loss claimed by such investors during trading at the time of the violations.1211 In 1988, 
Congress enacted Section 5, which became Section 20A of the SEA, an express private 
cause of action for contemporaneous traders to seek damages against illegal corporate 
insider trading violators and controlling persons when the violation has co-occurred. This 
section states that:  
Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder 
by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material, nonpublic information 
shall be liable in an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to any person who, 
contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of such 
violation, has purchased (where such violation is based on a sale of securities) or sold 
(where such violation is based on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.1212 
                                               
1210 For more discussion about the judicial debate of whether private investors have a stand to seek damages 
against insiders for trading on inside information, see Peter J. Henning, Between Chiarella and Congress: A 
Guide to the Private Cause of Action for Insider Trading under the Federal Securities Laws, 39 U. Kan. L. 
Rev. 1 (1990); HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:169; LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §9:1; WANG & 
STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 508.  
1211 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228(2nd Cir. 1974).  (The Second 
Circuit provided justification to allow private investors to seek damages against illegal insider trading 
violators. It found that, “If underwriter of debenture offering did divulge material inside information 
concerning corporation's earnings to certain of its customers and if customers sold stock of corporation on 
national securities exchange without disclosing the information, underwriter and customers could be held 
liable in private action for damages to buyers who, during period in question, purchased stock of the 
corporation in the open market without knowledge of the material inside information.” Id. West Headnotes 
7. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19(6th Cir. 1976). (The Sixth Circuit stated that: “Investors must 
be prepared to accept the risk of trading in an open market without complete or always accurate information. 
Defendants’ trading did not alter plaintiffs’ expectations when they sold their stock, and in no way influenced 
plaintiffs’ trading decision. We hold, therefore, the defendants’ act of trading with third persons was not 
causally connected with any claimed loss by plaintiffs who traded on the impersonal market and who were 
otherwise unaffected by the wrongful acts of the insider.”) Id. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 
(1983): (In the wake of Chairella, the Second Circuit rejected to grant a private cause of action and stated 
that “while we agree that the general purpose of the securities laws is to protect investors, the creation of a 
new species of ‘fraud’ under section 10(b) would ‘depart radically from the established doctrine that duty 
arises from a specific relationship between two parties ... and should not be undertaken absent some explicit 
evidence of congressional intent.”) Id.  
1212 §20A(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1. This section also, under subsection (3), states that controlling persons may 
be liable under the same standard of liability provided under Section 20(a) of the SEA. §20(a) of the SEA 
states “Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this title 
or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent 
as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable…unless the controlling 
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation 
or cause of action.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t. §20A(c) provides private cause of action against tippers, which states 
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Section 20A (a) limits the cause of action to contemporaneous traders of the same 
class of security who are on the opposite side of the transaction in question.1213 However, 
it does not define “contemporaneous traders” and left this issue to be developed by 
courts.1214 When a court grants a judgment in favor of contemporaneous traders, they are 
entailed to receive compensation for damages that must not exceed the profit gained or loss 
avoided by the violator and shall be offset by any disgorgement paid by the violator.1215   
Statutes of Limitation  
 
The SEC civil enforcement to impose civil penalties upon illegal corporate insider 
trading violators is limited to up to five years after the date of the purchase or sale on the 
basis of inside information.1216 However, the SEC civil action for injunctive relief under 
Section 21(d)(1) of the SEA has no statute of limitation.1217 For criminal enforcement 
brought under Article 32(a) of the SEA, the statute of limitation is six years from the time 
                                               
that: “Any person who violates any provision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder by 
communicating material, nonpublic information shall be jointly and severally liable under subsection (a) 
with, and to the same extent as, any person or persons liable under subsection (a) to whom the communication 
was directed.” Id. 
1213 See Henning, supra note 1210, at 32.  
1214 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §9:3. (Professor Donald Langevoort has observed that, to date, “the 
courts have not given concrete meaning to the term either. One tendency has been to construe 
contemporaneousness narrowly, with suggestions that standing might well be limited to those who can 
show—for widely traded securities, at least—that they traded within a day or so of the insider. Indeed, many 
courts now insist on same day trading.”) Id. WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 521. (The authors 
reviewed the judicial development of the definition of “contemporaneous traders,” and concluded that the 
class of contemporaneous traders opens when the insider trades. However, the time of the class of 
contemporaneous ends is not agreed by courts. Many courts have endorsed that same-day trading is 
contemporaneous.) Id.   
1215 §20A(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1. “The total amount of damages imposed under subsection (a) shall not 
exceed the profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction or transactions that are the subject of the 
violation….The total amount of damages imposed against any person under subsection (a) shall be 
diminished by the amounts, if any, that such person may be required to disgorge, pursuant to a court order 
obtained at the instance of the Commission, in a proceeding brought under section 21(d) of this title relating 
to the same transaction or transactions…” Id. See  
1216 SEA, §21A(d)(5), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-1. (“No action may be brought under this section more than 5 years 
after the date of the purchase or sale.”) Id.  
1217 See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 5, at 649.  
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of perpetrating the crime.1218 In addition, a private cause of action ends after the elapse of 
five years from “the date of the last transaction that is the subject of the violation.”1219 
Summary 
 
Part 4 discusses governmental enforcement of the prohibition of illegal corporate 
insider trading and potential civil and criminal liability that may ensue from a violation of 
the prohibition. This part reveals that there are two general elements of an illegal corporate 
insider trading violation including the prohibited conduct which is the purchase or sale of 
a security on the basis of material non-public information in a breach of fiduciary-like duty 
of trust and confidence, and the state of mind of the violator which must constitute of 
intentional and deliberate intent to violate the prohibition in criminal proceedings or at least 
constitute a reckless standard in civil proceedings. This part reveals that the standard of 
proof in civil lawsuits is more flexible and lower than the standard in criminal proceedings, 
which means that facing civil liability is more likely than criminal liability.  
This part also indicates that the major sanctions and penalties are civil monetary 
penalties up to three times the amount of ill-gotten gain or the loss avoided in civil 
proceedings and fines up to 5 million dollars for natural persons and imprisonment of no 
more than 20 years in criminal prosecution.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1218 18 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for a securities fraud offense, 
unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within 6 years after the commission of 
the offense.”) Id. at (b). 
1219 §20A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t-1. 
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Part 5. Summary of Chapter 2  
 
The objective of Chapter 2 is to determine the U.S. corporate insider trading 
regulations by answering three general questions: (1) What differentiates corporate insiders 
from other market participants that prompts securities laws to regulate their securities 
trading activities? (2) When can corporate insiders legally trade in accordance with federal 
securities laws? and (3) When are they prohibited from trading?  
This chapter reveals that corporate insiders are subject to a fiduciary duty under 
corporate state law, which makes them vulnerable to liability whenever they misuse 
confidential information for their personal advantage. This includes trading in the 
corporation’s stock on the basis of material non-public information. Corporate insiders 
including directors, officers, and large shareholders, are a special group among the main 
players in securities markets that Congress has sought to regulate within the SEA. The 
basis of the justification has been that to maintain investors’ confidence in securities 
markets, corporate insiders, as fiduciaries who are entrusted to manage and control public 
corporations, shall not be permitted to misappropriate confidential information for their 
personal benefit.1220 Corporate insiders are regulated under Section 16 of the SEA where 
they are subject to public disclosure requirements about their securities ownership and 
trading transactions, and prevented from making short-swing profit that results from 
speculative trading transactions within a six-month period. They are also prohibited from 
making short-sale transactions.1221 
Although Section 16 of the SEA seeks to prevent insiders from misusing their trust 
position by abusing confidential information for trading purposes, it does not generally 
                                               
1220 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.  
1221 See supra note 259-62 and accompanying text. 
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prohibit corporate insiders from trading on material non-public information in their 
corporations’ security. However, the prohibition of trading on material non-public 
information was first imposed and developed by the SEC, and then by federal courts. This 
prohibition has developed to cover a broader scope of persons and goes beyond corporate 
insiders and others who have a fiduciary-like relationship with the corporation or its 
shareholders. It includes any person who trades on material non-public information in 
breach of his/her direct or derivative fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence either owed 
to the other party in transaction or to the source of the information.1222 
While the boundaries of legal and illegal corporate insider trading are not 
completely clear,1223 one could deduce that corporate insiders can legally trade in two 
situations: (1) the trade is based on a personal assessment and sophisticated evaluation at a 
time when the insider is not aware of material non-public information; and (2) when the 
trading transaction is made pursuant to a written trading plan even if the insider is aware 
of material non-public information at the time of the execution of the trade given that the 
trading transaction is executed in good faith. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1222 Although this is the dominate determination in U.S. law, few cases and new trends make it unlawful to 
trade on inside information wrongfully obtained through deception disregarding of the existence of a breach 
of fiduciary duty. See supra notes 660, 683 and accompanying text. 
1223 See HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:160. 
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Chapter 3. Saudi Arabian Corporate Insider Trading 
Regulations 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 describes the Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations by 
dividing the chapter into five parts. The first part determines the legal status of companies’ 
insiders in Saudi Arabia and provides a general understanding of insiders’ duty. The second 
part goes to examines the regulations governing legal corporate insider trading. The third 
part intensively examines the regulations governing illegal corporate insider trading. The 
fourth part discusses governmental enforcement of the prohibition of illegal corporate 
insider trading, and the last part provides a summary of this chapter.  
Part 1.  Legal Status of Corporate Insiders 
 
Introduction 
 
Directors of JSCs listed in the Exchange possess the default statutory power and 
authority to manage and control the JSC’s business and property. According to the CL of 
2015, a JSC “shall be managed by a board of directors whose number…is not less than 3 
and not more than 11.”1224  Article (75) of this law also states that “the board of directors 
shall have full powers to manage the company in a manner that serves its purposes, except 
for powers entrusted to the general assembly…”1225 The CL of 2015 gives the board of 
directors the power to control the internal as well external business realm of a JSC.1226 For 
instance, the board of directors holds the power to determine the goals and objectives of 
the company, to monitor the business operations, and to assess the achievements of the 
                                               
1224 CL of 2015, supra note 179, art. 68(1).  
1225 Id. art. 75.  
1226 Id.  
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determined objectives.1227 In addition, it has the authority to represent the company in front 
of third parties.1228 It has the right “to enter into loan agreement” and to “relieve the 
company’s debtors from liability.”1229  
Due to these vast default powers in the hands of JSC directors, potential abuse of 
power and deviation from the goals and interests of the JSC is a reasonable concern for 
public investors.1230 Therefore, the question is whether JSC directors and managers owe 
any legal duty that can restrain them from abuse of their power including misusing 
confidential information for trading purposes. As discussed later in this chapter, Saudi 
securities regulators have imposed restrictions and legal obligations upon JSC directors, 
senior executives, and to some extent substantial shareholders related to their securities 
ownership and trading activities.1231 However, this part attempts to answer this question 
from a conceptual and theoretical perspective of why JSC insiders in Saudi Arabia are a 
unique class of traders.1232  
This part discusses the Saudi Arabian legal perspective of directors’ and managers’ 
legal status. It starts with a discussion of the legal status of JSC directors and executives in 
accordance with Islamic law. Next, it examines the related articles under CL of 2015 and 
CGR, and then assesses insiders’ status. 
 
                                               
1227 Id. art, 75. See also Khalid Al-Habshan, The Current Rights of Minority Shareholders in Saudi Arabia, 
International Law Research; Vol. 6, No. 1, 195 (2017), available at: https://bit.ly/2DZigVC; Mohamed 
Soliman, Ownership Structure, Board Composition, and Dividend Policies Evidence from Saudi Arabia, 4 
(2013), available at: https://bit.ly/2MTfBzr.  
1228 Id.  
1229 Id.   
1230 See Al-Jaber, supra note 179, at 286. 
1231 See discussion infra Part 2 of this Chapter. PP. 225.  
1232 Id. See also Mahayni, supra note 160, at 147. 
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Do Corporate Insiders Have a Special Status?  
 
Some commentators have argued that the concept of fiduciary duty is not addressed 
by the CL of 2015 or CGR since neither set of laws contains articles expressly addressing 
the concepts of “fiduciary duty” or “the principal-agent relationship.”1233 They have 
suggested that this approach follows the most contemporary companies laws in the Middle 
East, where directors’ and managers’ fiduciary duty is a “nascent legal concept.”1234 That 
said, some commentators have observed that the notion of regulating corporate governance 
including insiders’ fiduciary duty by statutory articles is a fairly new concept for Saudi 
Arabian regulatory institutions and for directors and investors.1235 In fact, the regularization 
of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is still in the process and review stage. In 2017, 
the CMA introduced the CGR based on the new Saudi CL of 2015, which includes Articles 
governing self-dealing and company opportunities. These articles were amended on April 
17, 2018.1236 Thus, they argue that the regulations related to corporate governance 
including the fiduciary duty of JSC insiders are still novel. In addition, companies have 
                                               
1233 See Al-Habshan, at supra note 1227, at 196. 
1234See Berg, Alexander S.; Di Benedetta, Pasquale, the World Bank, Report on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSC), Cooperate Governance Country Assessment-Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 31 (2009), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/838731468106752813/Kingdom-of-Saudi-Arabia-
Report-on-the-Observance-of-Standards-and-Codes-ROSC-corporate-governance-country-
assessment; Al-Habshan, supra note 1227, at 196 citing Lu’ayy Al-Rimawi, Emerging markets of the 
Middle East: A critique of selected issues in Arab securities regulation, Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 7(2), 160 (1999); MESHAL FARAJ, TOWARD NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS IN THE 
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA: LESSONS FROM DELAWARE, 53 (2014).  
1235 Ayman Mohamed Zerban ed al, Corporate Governance of Directors Responsibility in Appointing Senior 
Mangers: A Case in Saudi Arabia, International Journal of business and Management; Vol. 13, No.1, at 186 
(2018).  
1236 Um Al-Qura (the Official Gazette), Royal Decree No. 79 (dated 25/7/1439H corresponding to 4/11/2018), 
visited on Aug 22, 2018 (April 17, 2018) available at uqn.gov.sa. The CGR also was amended in March 28, 
2018 and some of the amendments went into effect on January 1, 2019. See The Capital Market Authority, 
The Capital Market Authority Approves the Amendments of the Corporate Governance Regulations, (2018), 
https://cma.org.sa/en/MediaCenter/PR/Pages/CGRAmendments.aspx.  
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little experience and awareness of the concept of fiduciary position in JSCs, and the 
application of the law is still being determined.1237 
However, Saudi Arabia’s approach of not specifically codifying the concepts of 
fiduciary duty and the principal-agent relationship does not mean that these concepts are 
novel or unknown to Saudi Arabian law and to judges. Islamic law, which is the “ultimate 
source of reference” in Saudi Arabia, 1238 contains legal rules, as is illustrated below, that 
govern the JSC’s insiders’ fiduciary position and the liability of their breach of duty. Thus, 
in the absence of regulatory articles, judges are directed to step in and fill the legal gaps 
based on legal rules of Islamic law.1239 Furthermore, by promulgating the CGR that governs 
the corporate governance of listed JSCs, the CMA has expressly stated under several 
articles that JSC directors are subject to legal duties that require them to comply with the 
principles of loyalty, honesty, and care.  
Corporate Insiders Legal Status under Islamic Law 
 
Overview 
 
The idea of creating a company as an artificial entity that has a separate legal status 
from its shareholders was an unknown concept in classical Islamic jurisprudence.1240 
Historically, classical Islamic jurists recognized several forms of capital contractual 
                                               
1237 See Zerban et al, supra note 1235.  
1238 Basic Law of Governance, supra note 160, art. 7 (This Article states that “Government in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the book of god and the Sunnah of the prophet (PBUH), which are 
the ultimate source of reference for this Law and other laws of the state.”) Id.  
1239 See id. art. 48. (Article 48 states that “the courts shall apply rules of Islamic Shari’ah in cases that are 
brought before them, according to the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna, and according to laws which are decreed 
by the ruler in agreement with the Holy Qur’an and the Sunna.”) Id. FARAJ, supra note 1234, 45 (2014); See 
Al-Jaber, supra note 179, at 7. 
1240 MUHAMMAD UMER CHAPARA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM, THE ISLAMIC FOUNDATION, 254 
(1985); Abdul-Aziz Khayyat, al-shirkat fi al- shari’a al-Islamiyyah wa all-Qanun al-Wad’I [The Companies 
in Islamic Shari’a and Statuary Laws], 213 (4th ed. 1994). (Ar).  
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partnerships “sharikat al-amwal”;1241 however, these forms did not maintain separate legal 
entity status from the partners.1242 When the JSC form was brought to Islamic countries by 
statutory legislation, Islamic jurists sought to examine the characteristics of this company 
according to Islamic law.1243 Islamic jurists approved the JSC form based on qiyas 
(analogy) to already established contractual partnerships of sharikat al-enan (limited 
partnership) and sharikat al-mudaraba (silent partnership).1244 They also ratified this form 
based on the general legal maxim of ibaha, which assumes admissibility and validity of 
new contracts or transactions by default, unless there is a specific text in shari’a that 
precisely states otherwise.1245 They determined that recognition of the JSC form is 
supported by the source of al-maslahah al-mursalah (public interest) where the allocation 
                                               
1241 The classical forms of sharikat al-amwal (capital contractual partnerships) in Islamic law are two forms 
of partnerships. (1) Sharikat al-mufawadah (unlimited partnership): This partnership requires full equality of 
the partners in terms of the contributed capital, the right to control, and the profit and liability. WAHBAH AL-
ZUHAYLI, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, 453 (2001); MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, 
ISLAMIC FINANCE LAW, ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE, 117 (2006); (2) sharikat al-inan (limited partnership): 
“A partnership between two or more parties whereby each partner contributes a specific amount of money in 
a manner that gives each one a right to deal in the assets of the partnership, on condition that the profit is 
distributed according to the partnership agreement and the losses are borne in accordance with the 
contribution of each partner to the capital.” Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions [AAOIFI], Shari’ah Standards, Manama, 327 (2015), http://aaoifi.com/shariaa-
standards/?lang=en;  EL-GAMAL, at 117. In addition to these forms of partnerships, Islamic jurists recognized 
a special form of partnership which involves a contribution of capital by one partner and labor by another, 
termed sharikat al-mudaraba (silent partnership) “An agreement between two or more persons whereby one 
or more of them provide finance [sahib al-mal], while the others provide entrepreneurship and management 
[mudarab] to carry on any business venture whether trade, industry or service, with the objective of earning 
profits. The profit is shared by them in an agreed proportion. The loss is borne only by the financiers [silent 
partners] in proportion to their share in total capital.” CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 261.  The sahib ul-mal 
(financier or silent partner) is a silent partner, which means that he/she has a claim on the profits without any 
say in the management of the firm.” Habib Ahmed, Islamic Law, Investors’ Rights and Corporate Finance, 
12 J. Corp. L. Stud. 367, 381 (2012); EL-GAMAL, at 120; AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 485.  
1242 See Gohar Bilal, Business organizations under Islamic Law A brief Overview, Center for Middle Eastern 
Studies, Harvard University, 83, 86 (1999), https://bit.ly/2F0oiV1.  
1243 Ahmed, supra note 1241, at 385; AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 526.  
1244 See supra note 1241; CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 255; Ahmad N. Azrae et al, Separate Legal Entity 
Under Syariah Law and Its Application on Islamic Banking In Malaysia: A note, International Journal of 
Banking and Finance: Vol. 6: Iss. 2, article 8, 7 (2009). See supra note 1241.  
1245Ahmed, supra note 1241, at 386; Muhammad Al-Uthaymin, Al-Sharh Al-Mumti’ Ala Zad Al-Mustaqni’, 
[Islamic Jurisprudence Book] 9/400 (2008). 
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of capital and labor into large business organizations that have separate legal entities from 
its members is an economic need for modren societies.1246 Some Islamic jurists have 
concluded that classical Islamic jurisprudence’s recognition of specific forms of 
partnerships was not inclusive, but new emerged forms of partnerships or companies can 
be recognized on the basis of the default rule of the assumption of admissibility, not the 
prohibition, regarding commercial status and transactions.1247  
Although classical Islamic jurisprudence did not recognize the notion of a separate 
legal entity in capital contractual partnerships, this concept is not foreign to Islamic law. 
Islamic law applies the concept of giving legal status to a non-human entity in other legal 
relationships such as a waqf (trusts).1248 When a waqf is established, the property of the 
waqf is recognized by Islamic law as a separate legal entity.1249 Moreover, classical Islamic 
jurists have recognized the concept of the separation of control and ownership in sharikat 
al-mudaraba, which is one of the major characteristics of JSCs.1250 Islamic jurists stated 
                                               
1246 CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 255.   
1247 AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 525; Al-Uthaymin, supra note 1245, at 9/400; Khayyat, supra note 
1240, at 1/219. 
1248 See Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 1/217; Azae et al, supra note 32, at 146. A waqf is “a legal and religious 
institution wherein a person dedicate some of his properties for a religious or a charitable purpose.” Mufti 
Muhammad Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, 154 (1998). In a waqf, Islamic jurists have realized 
that the ownership of the asset of the waqf is not included in the ownership of the beneficiaries or the trustee. 
Therefore, Islamic law permits the trustee to borrow and lease the property of a waqf and conduct other 
transactions for the benefit of the waqf. The trustee, however, is not personally liable for the debt of the waqf 
and is not personally subject of lawsuits for acts he conducts while acting as a trustee. See Id.  
1249 See id.   
1250 Islamic jurists stated that the sahib al-mal (silent partner) has no right of control in sharikat al- mudaraba, 
whereas the mudarab (entrepreneur) has the exclusive right to control and manage the business of sharikat 
al-mudaraba. Al-Mawsueat Al-Faqh’iat Al-Kuwaitia [Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence], Kuwait-
Ministry of Awqaf & Islamic Affairs, 38/50 (1st ed. 1998); Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 286.  Moreover, 
Islamic jurists stated that in regard to sharikat al-inan (limited partnership), the partners can agree that one 
partner who contributes to the capital retains an exclusive right to control the business of sharikat al-inan 
and the others only contribute capital with no right to manage the business. AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, 
at 452; EL-GAMAL, at supra note 1241, at 118; AAOIFI, supra note 1241, at 330. Therefore, the managing 
partner in sharikat al-inan also holds the position of mudarab (entrepreneur). Al-Uthaymin, supra note 1245, 
at 9/403; CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 255; AAOIFI, id.  
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that the contract of shirkat al-modarabah (silent partnership) underlies the separation of 
the right of control from the right of ownership. Whereas the sahib al-mal (silent partner) 
owns the property of the silent partnership, and the modarab (entrepreneur or manager 
partner) owns the right to control and use the property for the benefit of the silent 
partnership.1251 
Corporate Insiders Owe a Fiduciary Duty and Act Based on Agency Authorization  
 
Islamic jurists treat the JSC form as a combination of sharikat al-Inan (limited 
partnership)1252 and al-modaraba (silent partnership)1253 but with some recognition of the 
differences between the statutory JSC form addressed in regulations and the Islamic 
jurisprudential partnership forms.1254 They also treat the legal status of directors as 
modarabain (manager partners) in Sharikat al Modaraba, and senior executives as private 
employees and agents.1255  
Islamic jurists define the legal status of those who manage the partnership or 
company according to two main concepts: agency and trust or fiduciary.1256  Islamic jurists 
                                               
1251 Id; Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, at 38/65.  
1252 sharikat al-inan (Capital limited partnership) can be defined as “a partnership between two or more 
parties whereby each partner contributes a specific amount of money in a manner that gives each one a right 
to deal in the assets of the partnership, on condition that the profit is distributed according to the partnership 
agreement and the losses are borne in accordance with the contribution of each partner to the capital.” 
AAOIFI, supra note 1241, at 327; EL-GAMAL, at supra note 1241, at 118.  
1253 sharikat al-mudaraba (silent partnership) is a special form of partnership that involves contribution of 
capital by one partner and labor by another. “An agreement between two or more persons whereby one or 
more of them provide finance [sahib al-mal], while the others provide entrepreneurship and management 
[mudarab] to carry on any business venture whether trade, industry or service, with the objective of earning 
profits. The profit is shared by them in an agreed proportion. The loss is borne only by the financiers [silent 
partners] in proportion to their share in total capital.”  CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 261. The sahib ul-mal 
(financier or silent partner) has a claim on the profits without any say in the management of the firm. Ahmed, 
supra note 1241, at 381; EL-GAMAL, at supra note 1241, at 120; AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 485.  
1254 CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 255; AAOIFI, supra note 1241, at 359; Al-ZUHAYLI, at 529. 
1255 AL-ZUHAYLI, at 529; Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 1/249. For convenience, the term JSCs’ directors and 
managers is used instead of using the classical terms. 
1256 AAOIFI, supra note 1241, at 355. 
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have concluded that these concepts of agency authority and fiduciary possession also apply 
to modern partnerships and companies including JSCs. Islamic jurists have ruled that JSC 
directors and managers are acting in agency power and are treated as fiduciaries in regard 
to their possession of the company’s capital and assets.1257  
a. Agency Authorization 
Islamic law has ruled that the contract of the capital partnership (sharikat al-inan) 
underlies wakalah (agency authorization).1258 Each partner acts on behalf of himself, in 
regard to his own part of the partnership’s capital and assets, and as an agent for the other 
partners.1259 If one partner has an exclusive right to manage the partnership, that partner 
will have agency authorization on behalf of all partners as the same as the modarab 
(manager partner) in sharikat al-modaraba.1260 Therefore, the agency authorization is the 
base that justifies the directors and managers’ right to act and manage JSC forms1261  
b. Duty of Trust or Fiduciary (al-amana) 
In addition to the agency authorization to act and manage, Islamic jurists have ruled 
that the legal status of directors regarding the control and possession of the capital and 
assets of the JSC is al-amana (trust or fiduciary) and a director is called al-ameen (trustee 
or fiduciary).1262  
                                               
1257 CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 255; AAOIFI, supra note 1241, at 359; AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 
529.  
1258 AL-ZUHAYLI, at 457. Wakalah means: “A contract, which gives the power to a person to nominate another 
person to act on his behalf as long as he is alive based on the agreed terms and conditions.” Islamic Capital 
Market Fact Finding Report, Report of the Islamic Capital Market Task Force of the International 
Organization of Securities Commission, at annex 2, 5. (2004), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD170.pdf. 
1259 AL-ZUHAYLI, at 467; Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, at 26/43 (1st ed. 1992). 
1260 See also note 36. 
1261 AAOIFI, supra note 1241, at 355.  
1262 AL-ZUHAYLI, at 474; CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 255.  
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Islamic law imposes the legal status of a fiduciary or trustee in connection with 
several contractual and non-contractual relationships, such as a waqf, wakalah, 
partnership, and wilayat (guardianship).1263 Al-ameen (trustee or fiduciary) can be defined 
as any person who is in possession of another’s property based on the authorization from 
its owner or by law.1264 For instance, a guardian of an orphan is a ameen because he/she is 
authorized by law to take possession of the orphan’s property. Al-mutawalli (the trustee) 
of a waqf is a ameen because of the possession of the property of a waqf by authorization 
of the al-waqif (the settlor). An agent is a ameen because he/she is in possession of the 
property of the principal by authorization.1265 Therefore, a director is also a ameen because 
he/she is in possession of the JSC’s property by authorization from the shareholders.1266 A 
private employee has the same legal fiduciary status because his/her possession of the 
property of the employer is by the employer’s authorization.1267  
The general rule in Islamic law is that directors, as agents, are entrusted with 
managing the business operations of the company and using its resources and properties 
for the benefit of the company within the scope of its business and in accordance with the 
powers under which they are authorized to act.1268 Therefore, in the event of loss or damage 
to the company, the basic rule is that there is no liability upon directors because of that loss 
or damage without showing taqsir (negligence) or ta’addi (transgression) acts.1269 Since 
                                               
1263 Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, at 6/236 (2nd ed. 1986).   
1264 Al-Uthaymin, supra note 1245, at 9/390. 
1265 Id. See also, Walid Hegazy, Islamic Liability (Daman) as Practiced by Islamic Financial Institutions, 25 
Wis. Int’l L.J. 797, 98 (2008). 
1266 AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 474.  
1267 Id, at 421.  
1268 Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 1/269; AL-ZUHAYLI, at 501.  
1269 Id; Al-Uthaymin, supra note 1245, at 9/392; Zainudin Jaffar, The concept and Application of Daman In 
Islamic Commercial Law, The University of Edinburgh, 141 (1994), 
https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/17552.  
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they are the fiduciary, they are believed based on their personal denial of committing a 
transgression or negligence related to the loss or damage.1270 However, if the evidence 
demonstrates that their claim or presentation is untrue, they would lose credibility and may 
be held liable.1271  
 According to Islamic law, negligence means inaction or refraining from acting 
where there is a duty to act. Transgression means any act performed in violation of a duty 
not to act.1272 Islamic jurists have stated that the standard of what is negligence and 
transgression is determined based on the conditions laid out in the contract of the company 
or by custom.1273 For example, if directors engage in a transaction that is beyond their 
general authority, that is a transgression act; therefore, they would bear the risk of their 
actions and may be held liable. If they were lazy in managing the business operations of 
the company in accordance with customary business practices, they may be deemed 
negligent and be subject to liability in the event of loss.1274  
Fiduciary Principles of Corporate Insiders 
 
Islamic jurists state that directors of JSCs are under a duty to act and “exercise 
maximum possible care and skill in the discharge of their responsibility in the same way 
as a mudarib is expected to do in his capacity as a trustee.”1275  In addition, they must 
manage the business of the company in a manner that is in the best interest of the 
                                               
1270 Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250 (1st ed. 1992), at 26/58; AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 
1241, at 516.  
1271 Id; Al-Uthaymin, supra note 1245, at 9/392.  
1272Ibn Qudamah Al-Maqdisi, Al-Mughni [Islamic Jurisprudence Book] (Ar), 7/162 (3rd ed. 1997); 
Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, 13/151 (2nd 1988). 
1273 Al-Uthaymin, supra note 1245, at 9/391; Dubayan Muhammad Al-Dubayan, Al-Mu’amalat Al-Maliah 
Asalah Wa Muaessara [Financial Transactions-Classic and Contemporary] 14/165 (2000) (Ar). 
1274 See, AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 504.  
1275 CHAPARA, supra note 1240, at 255. See Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 1/280.  
 
 241 
 
company.1276 They must also refrain from committing any kind of deceptive or unethical 
acts that involve favoritism, or any other unlawful acts that may harm the company or 
violate the law.1277 
 Islamic jurists have linked most of the acting powers of directors and derivatively 
managers to the business’ customary practices or the custom of merchants.1278 
Consequently, Islamic jurists have developed four objective categories governing the 
principal-agent relationship.1279 The first category includes acts that directors can perform 
without the need for consent, which include all acts needed to pursue the purpose of the 
business, such as the purchase or sale of goods; hire employees; and perform other actions 
that would result in benefiting the company pursuant to its purpose.1280 The second 
objective category includes acts that only can be performed by general authorization. This 
general authorization gives directors the right to undertake all the acts that are normally 
known to be under the business’ customarily practices benefitting the company, such as 
forming another company or entering into investment transactions.1281  
The third category covers acts that directors cannot conduct without specific 
consent, even though general authority was given.1282 These acts include all conduct that 
involves favoritism and conflict of interest, such as self-dealing. Otherwise, directors 
would be subject to liability in front of the company and the shareholders.1283 This category 
                                               
1276 AAOIFI, supra note 1241, at 355.  
1277 Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 1/278.  
1278 Khayyat, at 1/248; AL-ZUHAYLI, at 507. 
1279 See AL-ZUHAYLI, id; Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, at 38/55. 
1280 Id; Al-Dubayan, supra note 1273, at 477.  
1281 AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 507-8; Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, at 
38/61; Al-Dubayan, supra note 1273, at 483.  
1282 Id.  
1283 Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 1/270. See Al-Uthaymin, supra note 1245, at 9/423. 
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also includes acts that are not normally within the business’ customarily practice or regular 
management.1284 In addition, it includes any action that would result in financial harm or 
transactions that exceed the available capital of the company.1285 The fourth category 
includes acts that directors cannot engage in including acts that are in violation of the law, 
such as purchasing unlawful goods, even though they are given specific consent to do 
so.1286    
The foregoing objective categories show that Islamic law has treated the fiduciary 
principles of JSC directors under two general considerations: The directors’ need for 
independence in managing and controlling the business and property of the company, and 
the notion that the relationship between directors and shareholders is based on trust. 
Therefore, directors are not allowed to go beyond what they are entrusted to do which is 
managing the company and pursuing its purpose. Directors are not allowed to breach this 
trust, and they must obtain consent for acts that exceed their basic agency authorization.  
Regulatory Articles Addressing Corporate Insiders’ Fiduciary Principles  
 
Although the CL of 2015 does not state specifically that directors are subject to a 
fiduciary duty, the fiduciary duty principles are expressly addressed by the CGR. Article 
(29) of the CGR states that “each member of the Board shall comply with the principles of 
truthfulness, honesty, loyalty, and care of the interests of the company and its 
                                               
1284 Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, at 38/58; AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 507-
8.  
1285 AL-ZUHAYLI, supra note 1241, at 508; Jurisprudence Encyclopedia, supra note 5, Dar Al- Safwa, at 
38/61; Al-Dubayan, supra note 1273, at 463.  
1286 Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, supra note 1250, at 38/62. Khayyat, supra note 1240, at 1/265. 
See Jaffar, supra note 1269, 142.  
 
 243 
 
shareholders.”1287 In addition, the CL of 2015 and CGR have addressed detailed articles 
regarding specific duties of directors that relate to directors’ fiduciary or trustee position.  
The imposition of these duties is consistent with the concept of directors’ fiduciary 
position and agency capacity under Islamic law,1288 as is true for most jurisdictions 
worldwide.1289 However, the CL of 2015 fails to expressly impose the same duties upon 
managers and other employees of JSCs. According to legal commentators, the legal status 
of managers is their agency acting on behalf of the board of directors. This means that the 
board of directors has the default right to manage the company and the senior executives 
are merely acting as agents under the board’s direction and supervision.1290 In addition, the 
CL of 2015 and CGR do not impose the same duties of directors on substantial 
shareholders.1291 However, the CGR partially fills this gap.   
The CL of 2015 governs the directors’ duty of loyalty by addressing specific duties 
that are characterized as recurring situations involving the duty of loyalty.1292 The CL of 
2015 imposes a duty to refrain from self-dealing, not to compete with the company’s 
business opportunity, and a duty to disclose any conflict of interest involving self-
dealing1293 or the company’s opportunity.1294 It also imposes a duty of maintaining 
confidentiality.1295   
                                               
1287 CGR, supra note 159, art. 29.  
1288  FARAJ, supra note 1234, at 40. 
1289 See Al-Habshan, at supra note 1227, at 196; Abdullah AlKahtani, The Influence of Corporate Governance 
on Protecting Minority Shareholders’ rights in the Saudi Stock Market: A Comparative Study, 196 (2015),  
https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/3c09765d0428e922951f48b4521647698a00353a1
f74da4d16f7c28c46f4459d/2267612/Alkahtani_Abdullah_thesis.pdf.   
1290 Al-Jaber, at supra note 179, at 328.  
1291FARAJ, supra note 1234, at 76. For more discussion about the protection of minority shareholders in Saudi 
Arabia, see AlKahtani, supra note 1289, at 90.  
1292 See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law, §4.1., 141(1986).  
1293  CL of 2015, supra note 179, art. 71; CGR, art. 30(14).  
1294  CL, art. 72; CGR, supra note 159, art. 30(15).  
1295  CL, art. 74, CGR, supra note 159, art. 30(16).   
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The CGR contains provisions addressing the duty of loyalty imposed upon directors 
in paragraph (2) of Article (29) where it states that “loyalty…is achieved when the Board 
member avoids transactions that may entail conflicts of interest and ensure fairness of 
dealing, in compliance with the provisions relating to conflict of interest in these 
Regulations.”1296 In addition, Chapter 6 of the CGR contains seven provisions governing 
conflict of interest. 
The CGR fills the gap left in the CL of 2015 in that it specifically addresses the 
managers and employees’ duty of loyalty, where they are required to refrain from activities 
that involve conflict of interest and self-dealing.  Article (43) of the CGR requires the board 
of directors to initiate and apply a written policy “to deal with actual and potential conflict 
of interest situations which may affect the performance of Board members, the Executive 
Management or any other employees of the Company when dealing with the Company or 
other Stakeholders.”1297 This provision indicates that the policy must include clear 
procedures for disclosing conflicts of interest prior to commencing such activities. When 
the company has a transaction or enters into a contract with a “related party,” the company 
must publicly disclose “without any delay of that contract or transaction if it equals to or 
exceeds 1% of the Company’s total revenues.”1298   
Besides the requirement of disclosure involving conflict of interest, the CMA, 
through its power to regulate the capital market, imposes a duty to disclose information 
regarding ownership of securities and trading activities of directors, senior executives, and 
substantial shareholders. Article (90) of the CGR requires disclosure of information about 
                                               
1296 CGR, supra note 159, art. 29(2).  
1297 Id. art. 43.  
1298 Id.  
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the ownership of directors, managers, and substantial shareholders in the company and any 
change in their interest during the fiscal year.1299 The duty of disclosure regarding holding 
securities and trading activities of insiders is discussed in detail in the next part. 
Summary 
 
This part endeavors to answer the question of the legal status of corporate insiders 
in Saudi Arabia and why they are subject to restricted rules and regulations regarding their 
securities ownership and trading activities. This part reveals that the nature of the legal 
status of directors and managers is based on two principles: agency authorization, and 
trustee or fiduciary possession. This result is derived from Islamic law as the resort for 
judges when the statute is silent about the issue. Directors and managers are also subject to 
restricted duties and several obligations to refrain from abusing their power for their 
personal advantage. Abuse of powers includes self-dealing and corporate opportunity, or 
to wrongfully disclose confidential information to others without a legitimate business 
purpose.  
Although the concepts of the principal-agent relationship and the fiduciary 
principles are recognized by classical Islamic jurisprudence and applied within the CL of 
2015 and CGR, the notion of fiduciary obligations and self-restraint and accountability is 
relatively new to listed companies because of the novelty of governing the subject of 
corporate governance by regulations that involve governmental enforcement. The 
                                               
1299 Article 90 of the CGR requires the Board to “the Board’s operations during the last fiscal year and all 
factors that affect the company’s business. The report shall include, according to this Article, several 
mandatory information related to the Board members and description of their duties and responsibilities. The 
report must also include a discerption of any interest in a class of voting shares held by major shareholders, 
and “any interest, contractual securities or rights issue of the Board members, Senior Executive and their 
relatives on shares or debt instrument of the company or its affiliates, and any change on these interest or 
rights during the last fiscal year.” Id. Article 45(b)(2) of the LR of 2017 has Similar provision of Article 90 
of the CGR. Supra note 159.  
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determination of the legal status of corporate insiders as being subject to fiduciary 
principles helps to understand why corporate insiders are regulated by securities laws. In 
particular, it explains why corporate insiders are subject to public disclosure requirements 
and are criminally prohibited from trading on inside information or disclosing it to others 
to trade. The regulations of Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading are discussed below.    
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Part 2. Regulations Governing Legal Corporate Insiders’ Trading 
  
 Introduction  
 
Companies’ insiders are in a sensitive position within the company because they 
either have managing control or control stock in the company and often have both powers. 
Therefore, insiders are subject to restricted legal trading regulations where their special 
position grants them access to sensitive price information about the company and its 
business operations. Thus, they are considered as a special class of traders.1300 The CML 
and its implementing regulations state that companies’ insiders have a duty to publicly 
disclose their trading activities and securities ownership.  
This part identifies the duty to disclose insiders’ trade transactions and securities 
ownership in Saudi Arabia. It starts with an examination of the ownership structure in the 
Saudi stock market, and then analyzes of the concept of disclosure of insiders’ trades. This 
part then examines and assesses the related regulatory provisions of trading disclosure and 
the lock-up periods imposed upon directors and senior executives.  
 
 
Ownership Structure of the Saudi Stock Market   
 
Listed companies’ insiders have restricted trading regulations because of their 
sensitive position inside the company; however, insiders are legally allowed to trade on 
their company’s stock, except when specifically prohibited.1301 In Saudi Arabia, 
                                               
1300 See Cohen et al, supra note 294, 1009; Khalid Saad Al-habshan, Issues Involving Corporate 
Transparency in the Saudi Capital Market, Public Administration Research; Vol. 6, No. 2, 32 (2017), 
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/par.v6n2p21; Abdulrahman Y. Baamir, Issues of Transparency and 
Disclosure in the Saudi Stock Market, 22 Arab L.Q., 72 (2008).  
1301 Baamir, at 74.  
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companies’ insiders have business control and direct or indirect stock control over a large 
number of listed companies on the capital market. The available data on the Saudi capital 
market show that the ownership of listed companies is highly concentrated, and the 
companies are controlled by a small number of investors. In most instances, listed 
companies are either government-owned or family-owned.1302  
The Saudi Arabian government owns 37.14 percent of the total market value of 
stocks in the Saudi stock market, which equals S.R.615 billion ($164 billion).1303 This 
percentage of ownership makes the Saudi Arabian government the largest investor in the 
Saudi capital market.1304 In fact, the Saudi government owns 45 percent of the total capital 
of the 20 largest listed companies in the Saudi stock market in the banking, petrochemical, 
telecommunication, and electricity sectors.1305 The Saudi government owns their 
shareholdings through three public agencies: (1) the Public Investment Fund; (2) the 
General Organization for Social Insurance; and (3) the Public Pension Agency. The Public 
Investment Fund is the largest investor in the Saudi stock market. They own substantial 
shareholdings in more than 20 listed companies ranging from 5.4 percent to 70 percent of 
the total outstanding shares of these companies with a total market value of $131.6 
                                               
1302 AlKahtani, supra note 1289, at 177.  
1303 Ikrami Abdullah, Airtifae Malakiat Al-Hukuma Al-Saudia fi Al-Ashum Al-Mahaliya e’la 37.1 % [Saudi 
Government’s Shares in Domestic Equity Rises to %37.1], Aleqtisadiah Newspaper, (Oct 16th, 2017) (Ar). 
http://www.aleqt.com/2017/10/15/article_1267351.html.  
1304 The Saudi Government owns most of the stocks through three agencies (1) The Public Investment Fund; 
(2) The Public Pension Fund; (3) the General Organization for Social Insurance. In addition, the Saudi 
Government owns shares directly in The Saudi Electricity Company worth $28.8 billion. See Forbes Middle 
East, The Top 25 Investors in TADAWUL, Forbs [Forbs Middle East] (August 2017), 
https://www.forbesmiddleeast.com/en/list/top-25-investors-tadawul-stock-exchange/.     
1305 Fadal Al-Buainain, 20 sharikat tamtalik Al-Hukuma 45 % min rasmaliha murashahat lel' khaskhasah  
[20 Companies Candidate for Privatization That The Saudi Government Owns 45% of their Capital,] Okaz 
Newspaper, (April 20, 2014),  
https://www.okaz.com.sa/article/917274.  
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billion.1306 The General Organization for Social Insurance is the second largest investor in 
the market with substantial shareholdings in 30 listed companies ranging from 5.7 percent 
to 35.12 percent with a total market value of $28.8 billion. The Public Pension Agency is 
the third largest investor in the market, as a substantial shareholder in 19 listed companies 
ranging from 5.27 percent to 23.79 percent of the total outstanding shares with a total 
investment worth $12.8 billion.1307 In addition to large shareholding ownership in the Saudi 
stock market, the shares held by the Saudi government are not available for trading in the 
general market but they are held for long-term investment return purposes.1308 In particular, 
the Saudi government has stock control over large companies, such as the Saudi 
Telecommunication Company (STC),1309 and the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
(SABIC).1310 These non-floated shares held by the Saudi government eliminate the 
possibility of rotation of control. Therefore, the Saudi government retains the right to elect 
a great number of board of directors members represented in many companies listed in the 
stock market.1311  
                                               
1306 Kam yablugh Al-ayed alsanawi le Sinduq Al-Aistithmarat Alama min Al-sharikat Al-Saudia Al-Mudraja 
fi Al-Swuq Al-Saudi? [Exclusive from Argaam Newspaper, How Much is the Return of the Public Investment 
Fund from the Listed Companies, (Nov 17, 2016), 
https://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/454988; Abdullah, supra note 1303; Forbes Middle East, 
supra note 1304. The investment value of the Public Investment Fund increased from $121.1 billion to $131.6 
after the Saudi government transferred its equity ownership in the Saudi Electricity Company to the Public 
Investment Fund on September 17, 2017. See id; Al-Saudia lil kahraba'" Tu'lin an Tasjil Al'Ashum Al-
Mamlukat lil Hukumat fi ras mal alsharikat fi muhafazat sunduq Al-Aistithmarat Alama [Saudi Electricity 
Company Announces the Registration of Government-Owned Shares in the Company’s Capital in the Public 
Investment Fund Portfolio], Argaam Newspaper, (Sep 17, 2017),  
https://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/505109.  
1307 Forbes Middle East, supra note 1304. 
1308 FARAJ, supra note 1234, at 75.  
1309 The Saudi government owns 83.77 % of STC total outstanding shares. The Public Investment Fund owns 
70 % of the STC, the General Organization for Social Insurance owns 7 %, and the Public Pension Agency 
owns 6.77% of STC. These data are derived from the official website of the Saudi stock market 
[www.Tadawul.com.sa/].  
1310 The Saudi government owns 75.7% of SABIC. The Public Investment Fund owns 70%, and the General 
Organization for Social Insurance owns 5.7% of SABIC. See id. 
1311 FARAJ, supra note 1234, at 75.  
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In addition to the Saudi government as the largest investor in the Saudi stock 
market, a few families and individual investors also hold large equity ownership and 
exercise control over many other listed companies.1312 This demonstrates that the notion of 
concentrated control in the hands of a few shareholders is the dominate practice for many 
listed companies in the Saudi stock market.1313 Alqhatani reported that 20 percent of the 
total outstanding shares of more than 22 listed companies in the Saudi stock market are 
owned by a single family or by only a few shareholders.1314 In addition, the market data of 
substantial shareholders in Saudi listed companies show that 81 individuals out of 282 
substantial shareholders1315 own shares worth S.R. 151.15 billion ($40.3 billion) and 
comprise 7 percent of the market value of the total listed shares in the Saudi stock 
market.1316 However, only 22 substantial shareholders own shares worth S.R.1 billion 
($375 million) or more.  Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Al Saud is the largest investor after the 
Saudi government with investments worth $9.6 billion. Prince Sultan bin Mohammed bin 
Saud Al Kabeer is next with investments of approximately $4.4 billion. The other 20 
investors own investments ranging from approximately $1 billion to $306 million1317  
The available market data show that one-third of the listed companies have at least 
two directors from the same family.1318 In addition, according to a media report, three 
families have 41 percent of the membership on boards of directors of 68 listed companies. 
                                               
1312 AlKahtani, supra note 1289, at 179.  
1313 Id, at 181.  
1314 Id, at 179.  
1315 The 281 substantial shareholders other than individual investors include local and international 
governmental and private funds and organizations. See Abdullah, supra note 1303.  
1316 Talal Al Sayah, 151 Milyaraan He'sas Kibar Al-Mulak Al'Afrad fi Al'Ashum Al-saudi [151 billion portion 
equity of the biggest shareholders, Aleqtisadiah Newspaper, (May 25, 2015), 
http://www.aleqt.com/2015/05/25/article_960109.html.  
1317 Forbes Middle East, supra note 1304.  
1318 AlKahtani, supra note 1289, at 179. 
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Members from the Al-Saud, Al-Issa, and Al-Rajhi families have been named 89 times on 
the boards of directors of listed companies. Members from the Al-Saud family tops the list 
with 34 memberships, members from the Al-Rajhi family have 28 memberships, and 
members from the Al-Issa family have 27 memberships on boards of directors of listed 
companies. For instance, the members from the Al-Rajhi family own and control Al-Rajhi 
Bank and Al-Rajhi Insurance. In addition, some members of the Al-Rajhi family including 
their cousins have substantial shareholding ownership and control over Albilad Bank, 
Najran Cement, Arabian Cement, Saudi Cement, Yanbu Cement, NADEC, Tabuk 
Agriculture, and Tabuk Advanced Companies.1319   
To reduce concerns about a negative effect because of the large ownership and 
control held by companies’ insiders, and to provide necessary protection concerning 
investor confidence in the Saudi capital market, the CML and its implementing regulations 
have adopted a public disclosure policy as an overarching principle governing insider 
trades and securities ownership in the Saudi stock market.1320 In addition to requiring 
disclosure, the CMA imposes trade restrictions “lock-up periods” on directors and senior 
executives of listed companies preceding the public announcements of the quarterly and 
annual financial results of listed companies.1321 The following section discusses the 
concept of public disclosure and the regularity provisions governing the public disclosure 
of insider trades and block-out periods imposed on directors and senior executives.    
Concept of Public Disclosure of Insider Trades 
 
                                               
1319 Maaal.com, bial'Asma'.. 3 ayilat Tastahwidh alaa 41% min majalis 'edarat Al-sharikat Al-musahama [3 
families hold 41% of the boards of directors of joint stock companies], (Mar 18, 2015), 
http://www.maaal.com/archives/55910.  
1320 Beach, supra note 153, at 338. 
1321 See Al-habshan, supra note 1300, at 32; Baamir, supra note 1300, at 74. 
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Public disclosure of insider trades is regulated to accomplish two goals, in general.   
The first goal is to use the public discourse system as a tool to deter trading violations based 
on inside information that is available to insiders but is not yet available to the public.1322 
When insiders are required to disclose their trading transactions, the likelihood that insiders 
will be noticed and punished for trading on inside information increases. Therefore, 
insiders are more likely to refrain from trading on inside information that they have access 
to because of their position inside the company.1323 As a result, the disclosure requirement 
gives the CMA a useful tool to investigate insider trades to deter insiders from abusive 
trading.1324 
The second goal of the imposition of trading disclosure is to provide the public with 
up-to-date and reliable trading information as part of an efficient stock market.1325  The 
disclosure of insider trades to the public helps investors make informed investment 
decisions in two ways. First, it draws their attention to the possibility that such trading was 
based on inside information, which may imply that the market price of the related security 
is inaccurate.1326 In addition, since insider trades could be motivated by reasons other than 
inside information, such as liquidity or diversification,1327 public disclosure gives investors 
valuable information about the prospect of the company.1328 Investors, in turn, use the 
disclosed trading information to adjust their bidding to related securities that they believe 
reflect the newly disclosed information.1329  
                                               
1322 COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 944; Fried, supra note 285, at 810.  
1323 Fried, id.   
1324 Beach, supra note 153, at 338. 
1325 Id, at 338-340. 
1326 Fried, at 810.  
1327 Cohen et al, at supra note 294, at 1010.   
1328 COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 944.  
1329 Fried, at 810. 
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Public disclosure of an increase or decrease in substantial shareholders’ ownership 
helps shareholders protect their interest in the company by making necessary decisions to 
deal with the new development. An increase or decrease in the equity ownership of 
substantial shareholders may also lead to a change in the direction of the company and its 
business management and operation.1330 For example, a new substantial shareholder may 
seek changes or amendments to the company’s articles of association or to the board of 
directors. Such a potential change in equity ownership justifies the need for public 
disclosure about any changes in equity ownership regarding substantial shareholders.1331  
 Public Disclosure of Corporate Insider’s Securities Ownership and Trading 
Transactions 
 
The CML does not expressly require insiders of listed companies to disclose their 
ownership or trading activity. In general, Chapter 7 of the CML requires listed companies 
to periodically disclose information or to promptly disclose material developments.1332 
Listed companies are required to disclose certain information when they conduct an initial 
public offering,1333 and they are required to continue to disclose financial and managerial 
information in the secondary market.1334 The continuous disclosure system has two 
mandatory disclosure regimens. According to Article (45) of the CML, listed companies 
are mandated to disclose certain information in quarterly and annual reports including their 
financial condition and updates on financial and managerial developments.1335 Article (45) 
requires listed companies to disclose in their annual reports “information regarding 
                                               
1330 Baamir, supra note 1300, at 71. 
1331 Id.  
1332 CML, supra note 152, art. 45, and 46.  
1333 Id. arts. 40, and 42.  
1334 See Beach, supra note 153, at 338; Gouda, supra note 161, at 124-26.  
1335 CML, supra note 152, art. 45.  
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members of its board of directors, executive officers, senior staff and substantial investors 
or shareholders as required under the rule of the Authority.”1336 Listed companies are also 
required to promptly disclose any new material development.1337 Chapter 7 of the CML, 
however, was written in generalities and the content of these reports are only partly stated. 
This implies that the legislature intentionally left gaps in Chapter 7 by following the goals 
of applying the general policy of the CML: professionalism and administrative 
independence.1338  
The CML has granted the CMA vast rulemaking power to regulate and rule the 
public disclosure system whether by adding or reducing the content of such disclosure or 
having authority to develop the forms of disclosure.1339 Article (45) of the CML clearly 
states this rule by requiring listed companies to disclose in addition to their financial status, 
“any other information as required by the rules of the Authority.”1340 It also requires listed 
companies to disclose in their annual reports “any…information as may be required by the 
rule of the Authority as it deems necessary to assist investors and their advisers in making 
a decision to invest in the issuer’s Securities.”1341 The disclosure rulemaking authority of 
the CMA is also emphasized by Article 46 which authorizes the CMA to request the issuer 
“to provide any information or data pertaining to such party and the issuing party shall 
provide the same within the period of time specified in the request.”1342 The CML also has 
granted the Saudi Stock Exchange, represented by its board of directors, the authority to 
                                               
1336 Id. art. 45(b)(2).  
1337 Id. art. 46. See Beach, supra note 153, at 338; Gouda, supra note 161, at 154. 
1338 Beach, supra note 153, at 339.  
1339 Id.  
1340 CML, supra note 152, art 45(a)(4).  
1341 Id. art. 45(b)(4). 
1342 CML, supra note 152, art. 46(b).  
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propose regulations and rules related to the operation of the Exchange.1343 The authority 
power granted to the board of directors includes the power to issue regulations imposing 
“immediate and timely publication of information regarding transactions executed in 
Securities traded on the Exchange” and requiring “issuers of Securitas, shareholders and 
members to disclose such information to the Exchange as the Exchange deems 
necessary.”1344 These proposed regulations and rules must be approved by the board of the 
CMA before becoming effective.1345  
In 2004, the CMA used its rulemaking authority by issuing the Listing Rules of 
2004 (LR of 2004), which contained rules governing the listing of securities and the 
disclosure system.1346  Article 45 of the LR of 2004  regulated the disclosure of insider 
trades.1347 It required substantial shareholders, directors and senior executives to disclose 
their securities ownership in the issuer once they occupied such capacities, and when there 
was a significant change in their ownership percentage.1348 Directors, senior executives, 
and substantial shareholders were also required to disclose to the CMA and the issuer any 
change in their previously disclosed ownership objective.  However, LR of 2004 is no 
longer an effective law and Article 45 is no longer applied.  
On December 31, 2017, the CMA board issued a resolution enacting a new 
regulation called the Rules of Offering Securities and Continuing Obligations 
                                               
1343 Id. art. 23(a).  
1344 Id. art. 23(a)(3).   
1345 Id. art. 23(b).  
1346 The Listing Rules [LR of 2004], Board of the Capital Market Authority’s resolution No. 3-11-2004, dated 
20/8/1425H (corresponding to April 10th, 2004), amended by to the Resolution No. 1-64-2016, dated 
19/8/1437H (Corresponding to May 26th, 2016), art. 45.   
1347 Id.  
1348 Id. art. 45(a)(3)(4).  
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(ROSCO).1349 The CMA also approved the Listing Rules (LR of 2017) that had been issued 
by the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).1350 According to CMA’s announcement, the 
ROSCO replaced the Offer of Securities Regulations of 2004 and the LR of 2004.1351 The 
enacted regulations became effective on April 1, 2018.1352 Article (68) of the ROSCO titled 
“Restriction on Dealings,” and Article (33) of the LR of 2017 are the articles containing 
disclosure requirements on insider trades. However, Article (68) of the ROSCO solely 
requires disclosure from substantial shareholders. In addition, Article (90) of the CGR 
requires the board of director of a listed company to disclose, in the annual report, the name 
of the directors, senior executives and substantial shareholder’s ownership and interest in 
securities of the listed company.  Article (69) of the ROSCO imposes lock-up periods upon 
directors and senior executives during the periods preceding or following the 
announcement of quarter and annual reports. These articles are discussed below.  
Substantial Shareholders’ Regulatory Disclosure Requirement  
 
Article (68) of the ROSCO and Article (33) of the LR of 2017 governs the 
disclosure of substantial shareholders. According to Article (68) of the ROSCO, substantial 
shareholders must disclose once they become a substantial shareholder and must 
subsequently disclose to the Exchange any change from their initial disclosure.1353 
Paragraph (a) of Article (68) obliges persons who own or is interested in 5 percent or more 
                                               
1349 ROSCO, supra note 157.  
1350 LR of 2017, supra note 158. 
1351 Capital Market Authority, CMA Board Issues its Resolution Approving the Rules of Offering Securities 
and Continuing Obligations and Approving Listing Rules, (Dec 31, 2017), available at 
https://cma.org.sa/en/Market/NEWS/Pages/CMA_N_2345.aspx.  
1352 Id.  (CMA indicates that “the Rules of Offering Securities and Continuing Obligations aims to regulate 
the offering of securities in Saudi Arabia. It includes the conditions of the offer of securities, identifies the 
requirements of listing and offering, and the conditions and requirements of capital changes. In addition to 
regulating the continuing obligations on issuers whom their securities are listed…”) id.  
1353 ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 68  
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of any class of voting shares or convertible debt instruments of an issuer deemed 
“substantial shareholders.”1354 Substantial shareholders are also required to disclose a list 
of persons who have interest in the shares or convertible debt instrument owned or 
controlled by the substantial shareholders.1355  A person is considered to have interest in 
shares or convertible debt instruments of an issuer when such securities are owned or 
controlled by: “1) a relative of that person; 2) a company controlled by that person; or 3) 
any other person with that person has agreed to act in concert to acquire an interest in or 
exercise voting rights in the shares or in the convertible debt instruments of the issuer.”1356 
Substantial shareholders are required to disclose three types of information in their initial 
disclosure: (1) the names of all persons who own or have the right to dispose the related 
securities; (2) detailed information about the ownership process; and (3) detailed 
information about loans or any other financial support received from any other person.1357 
In addition to imposing a duty to disclose to the CMA when they become owners 
of 5 percent or more, substantial shareholders must update their initial disclosure to the 
Exchange.1358 Substantial shareholders are required to disclose any change to the list of the 
persons that was previously disclosed to the CMA.1359 This duty to update is triggered 
when a new person is added to the list or a person who was previously included in the list 
is excluded.1360 Article 33 of the LR of 2017 requires substantial shareholders to disclose 
                                               
1354 Id. art. 68(a).  
1355 Id. art. 68(b).  
1356 Id. art. 68(c) 
1357 Id. art.68(d).  
1358 Id. art. 68 (b).  
1359 Id.  
1360 Id.  
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their holding or interest securities to the Exchange for public disclosure through special 
electronic filing.1361  
Directors’ and Senior Officers’ Regulatory Disclosure Requirement   
 
In the wake of enacting of ROSCO, directors and senior executives are no longer 
required to disclose their securities ownership and trading activities to the CMA.1362 
However, the Exchange is required to disclose directors and certain executives’ securities 
ownership to the public. In April 2016, the CMA issued a decision requesting that the Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul) shall disclose the ownership percentage for the board members, 
the chief executive officers (CEO) (or the top executive at the company), and the chief 
financial officer (CFO) of listed companies, in addition to the substantial shareholders of 
an issuer.1363 The listed companies are now required to electronically file the ownership 
                                               
1361 LR of 2017, supra note 158, art. 33(a) (This Article states that a “person required to notify its holding or 
interest in listed securities to the Exchange under the applicable Implementing Regulations, must make such 
notification to the Exchange through the designated electronic system or any other means determined by the 
Exchange.”) Id.  
1362 For a question on whether there are any legal provisions within the CMA’s implementing regulations, 
the student was given the following email response: “After repealing the Listing Rules of 2004 governing the 
disclosure of directors and senior officers trading activities, the Capital Market Authority states that the Rules 
on the Offering of Securities and Continuing Obligations effective since April 1, 2018, has replaced the 
Listing Rules of 2004. The Article 68 of the Rules of Offering and Continuing Obligations now only 
addresses the dealings of substantial shareholders and does not impose any duty to disclose upon directors or 
senior officers in relation to their own securities.” (See email from the Capital Market Authority, CMA info, 
to student, Sep 10, 2018, 2:57 AM, on file with the student). The same question was emailed to Tadawul. 
The Tadawul referred to part 9 of the Corporate Governance Regulations of 2017: Disclosure and 
Transparency, Article 92: Disclosure by the Board. (See email from the Saudi Stock Exchange “Tadawul,” 
Customer Service to the student, Sep 8, 2018, 8:34 PM, on file with the student). Article 92 of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations of 2017 requires that the board must regulate the disclosures of the directors and 
executive management. The Board shall 1) maintain “a register for the disclosure of the Board members and 
the Executive Management and updating it regularly based on disclosures required as per the Companies law, 
the Capital Market Law and their implementing regulations; and 2) mak[e] [] such register available for 
review by the Company’s shareholders free of charge.” However, Tadawul’s answer does not answer the 
student’s question and makes the subject of directors and senior executive trading disclosure more confusing 
because Article 92 bases the disclosure on what is required by the Companies Law, the Capital Market Law 
and their implementing regulations.” The question was which legal provisions govern the disclosure of 
directors’ and senior executives’ trades. Therefore, Article 92 does not contain the answer. 
1363 The Saudi Stock Exchange [Tadawul] Announces the Implementation of CMA Resolution Pertaining to 
Investor’s Ownership Disclosure Mechanism, Tadawul’s Website, (April 11, 2016) available at: 
https://bit.ly/2O61cj6. 
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percentage of the related persons on Tadawul’s website.1364 In addition, Article (33) of the 
LR of 2017 requires the same disclosure obligation. It states that “the Exchange shall, on a 
daily basis, publish an updated list which includes the direct ownership of directors, the 
CFO, and the CEO (or the highest executive position) in the issuer’s listed shares.”1365 
The available data show that listed companies are responsible for disclosing the 
ownership percentage of directors and senior executives to Tadawul through electronic 
filing. A caveat on Tadawul’s website under each published list of directors’ securities 
ownership states that:  
The listed company (Publisher) shall be responsible for the accuracy of the 
published information pertaining to the ownership of the Board of Directors, Chief 
Executive Officer or highest executive position, and the Chief Financial Officer. 
The listed company shall also be responsible for updating this information thereof. 
Therefore, the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) shall not be liable for the 
information contained therein, nor for any consequences that may result from the 
said information.”1366 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time to Disclose the Ownership of Listed Companies’ Insiders  
 
Article (68) of the ROSCO states that when a person has ownership or interest in 5 
percent or more of any class of voting shares or convertible debt instruments of an issuer, 
the person must notify the CMA by the end of the third day following the execution of the 
transaction or the occurrence of the event that results in such ownership or interest.1367 
                                               
1364 Id.  
1365 LR of 2017, supra note 158, art. 33(e).  
1366 See Tadawul’s website, available at https://bit.ly/2D0lTMu.  
1367 ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 68 (a).  
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Since substantial shareholders are also required to disclose the list of persons that have an 
interest in the shares or convertible debt that substantial shareholders own or control, 
substantial shareholders are required to disclose by the end of the third day following any 
event that results in the inclusion or exclusion of a person on that list.1368 Article (33) of 
the LR of 2017 requires the disclosure or the notification of ownership or change of an 
ownership, which is to be submitted to the Exchange, no later than three days following 
the event that triggers the duty to disclose.1369 Article (33) also requires the Exchange to 
publish on a daily basis an updated list of direct ownership of directors, and the CEO and 
the CFO in the issuer’s listed shares.1370 
Based on Article (68) of the ROSCO and Article (33) of the LR of 2017, it can be 
said that substantial shareholders, directors, and senior executives are given a flexible 
timeframe to disclose their identity and ownership percentage. Instead of disclosing by the 
end of the same trading day based on Article (45) of the repealed LR of 2004, insiders 
legally have three trading days to report their identity and securities holdings. These new 
regulatory articles grant investors more flexibility to invest with anonymity for three 
trading days. Some commentators have argued that requiring disclosure from owners of 
5% or more of an issuer’s securities is a disadvantage that comes at the expense of getting 
more liquidity into the market.1371 Large investors typically want to invest without public 
knowledge about their investments, particularly their partners or creditors.1372 However, 
when the disclosure paradigm was evaluated by the CMA by the end of 2017, the CMA 
                                               
1368 Id. art. 68 (b).  
1369 LR of 2017, supra note 158, art. 33 (b).  
1370 Id. art. 33 (f).  
1371 Mahayni, supra note 160, at 155.  
1372 Id.  
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maybe found that the previous requirement of disclosure had put unwarranted restrictions 
on corporate insiders and discouraged investors from bringing more capital and liquidity 
to the Saudi capital market.1373 However, instead of increasing the security ownership 
percentage that would trigger disclosure, the CMA simply delayed the disclosure time from 
the same day to three days.1374 The most likely reason for this delay of disclosure can be 
imputed to the new trade settlement cycle system that was applied in 2017. TADAWUL 
implemented the T+2 settlement cycle instead of T+0, in which the ownership transfer date 
is two days after the transaction day.1375  Therefore, Article (68) of the ROSCO took into 
consideration that the time of settlement or transfer of ownership is three days from the 
date of the transaction. Therefore, it grants a three-day period for disclosure after 
transferring ownership.  
Despite the goal of enhancing the financial sector by increasing liquidity or 
accommodating the new settlement cycle system, the change from a one-day period to a 
three-day period for insiders’ disclosure may unwittingly help large shareholders make 
more profits by trading based on inside information or even without inside information but 
by taking advantage of late disclosure obligation.1376 Therefore, public investors may 
characterize the late trading disclosure as a sign of a low efficient market imputed to the 
Saudi stock market because up-to-date trading information is one of the bases of efficient 
markets. When companies’ insiders have three days instead of one day to trade without 
                                               
1373 Id. (Mahayni argues that 5% shareholding is insufficient to control the company or affect the trading 
value of the related shares. The author suggested that socio-economists should help CMA by calibrating the 
threshold that would attract investment by larger and small investors.) Id.  
1374 See ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 68; LR of 2017, supra note 158, art. 33(b).  
1375 See Sophie Baker, Saudi Stock Exchange to Shift to T+2 trading settlement Cycle, Pension& Investment, 
(March 24, 2017), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170324/ONLINE/170329911/saudi-stock-exchange-
to-shift-to-t2-trading-settlement-cycle.  
1376 See Fried, at supra note 285, at 810.  
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disclosure, they will gain more profits without being disturbed by price adjustmenta that 
public investors may make.1377 Some commentators have suggested that public disclosure 
shall be taken before even the time of the trade, in which securities professionals, 
broker/dealers, and public investors may have sufficient time to respond by adjusting their 
biddings to reflect the potential insider trading before it is commenced.1378 This pre-trading 
disclosure requirement would help to reduce the profits that insiders may generate from 
trading on inside information and discourage them from doing so.1379 In addition, it may 
help level the playing field between public investors and insiders where the public would 
know in advance that an insider is going to trade, and therefore, they could trade or refrain 
from trading based on informed investment decisions.1380 However, delaying the disclosure 
time to a three-day period does not serve the policy of reducing the incentive of trading on 
inside information by corporate insiders.  
 
The Board of Director’s Annual Report on the Securities Ownership of Insiders and 
Changes in Ownership during the Fiscal Year 
 
Article (90) of the CGR requires the board of directors of a listed company to 
disclose any information related to the board’s operations in the previous fiscal year 
including all factors that affect the company’s business.1381 According to this Article, the 
report must include several types of information related to the directors and senior 
                                               
1377 See Fried, id.  
1378 COX ET AL, supra note 7, at 944; Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading 
Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S.  Cal. L. Rev. 303 (1998).  
1379 Fried, Id. (Professor Jesse M. Fried has suggested that the best effective-cost plan to reduce profits gained 
from trading on inside information by corporate insiders is to require them to disclose in pre-trading bases, 
which would substantially reduce corporate insider trading profits as a group.) Id. at 306.   
1380 Id. at 313.  
1381 CGR, supra note 159, art. 90.   
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executives and a description of their duties and responsibilities. The report must include 
the “names, qualification, and experience of the board members and executives 
management,”1382 as well as a description of the “composition and classification” of the 
directors, as follows: “Executive directors, Non-Executive Director, or Independent 
Director.”1383 The report must also include a description of any interest in a class of voting 
shares held by substantial shareholders1384and “any interest, contractual securities or rights 
issue of the Board members, Senior Executive and their relatives on shares or debt 
instrument of the company or its affiliates, and any change on these interest or rights during 
the last fiscal year.”1385 
The CGR places great emphasis on the disclosure of the remuneration of the 
directors and senior executives. Pursuant to Article (93) of the CGR, the board must 
disclose the policy and the mechanism that determine the remunerations of the board of 
directors and senior executives1386 in its annual report under Article (90) of the CGR.1387 It 
also requires the board to completely disclose, without any omission or misleading 
information, the remuneration granted to the directors and senior executives directly or 
indirectly.1388  The report must reveal the nature of the remuneration, whether it was in the 
form of cash or not. If the remunerations were in the form of shares of the company, the 
report must also disclose the value of the shares in accordance with the market value of the 
                                               
1382 Id, art. 90(2).  
1383 Id, art. 90(4).  
1384 Id, art. 90(25).  
1385 Id, art. 90(26).  
1386 Id, art. 93(a)(1).  
1387 Id, art. 93(a)(8).  
1388 Id, art. 93(a)(2).  
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shares on the due date.1389 The board of directors is required to publicly disclose its annual 
report within three months from the end of the fiscal year.1390 
Trading Restrictions on Directors and Senior Executives 
 
Article (69) of the ROSCO imposes trading restrictions “lock-up periods” on 
directors and senior executives. According to this article, “the directors, senior executives 
or audit committee members of the issuer and any of their associates” are prohibited from 
trading in any securities of the issuer (1) during the 15 calendar days preceding the end of 
the financial quarter and until the date of the announcement of the reviewed interim 
financial statements of the issuer;1391 and (2) during the 30 days preceding the end of the 
financial year and until the date of the disclosure of the audited annual financial statements 
of the issuer.1392 Article (69) of the ROSCO provides an exception from the prohibition of 
trading during the lock-up periods. Directors, senior executives, and audit committee 
members of the issuer are allowed to trade during lock-up periods for “exercising the 
subscription’s right in rights issues1393 and the sale of such rights.”1394 
Article (34) of the LR of 2017 requires issuers to “provide the Exchange with the 
details of its directors, audit committee members, senior executives, and any of their 
associates in accordance with the form prescribed by the Exchange. The Exchange will 
                                               
1389 Id.  
1390 ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 65.  
1391 Id. art. 69(a)(1).  
1392 Id. art. 69(a)(2).  
1393 The CMA defines rights as “an offer of additional shares to exciting shareholders which enables those 
shareholders to subscribe in proportion to their existing holdings.” Capital Market Authority, Glossary of 
Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital market Authority [Glossary of Defined 
Terms], Issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority, Resolution No. 4-11-2004, dated 20/8/1425H 
corresponding to Oct 4, 2004, and amended by resolution No. 1-7-2018, dated 1/5/1439H corresponding to 
Jan 18, 2018, https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/CMA_Glossary_en.pdf. 
1394 ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 69(b).  
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oversee their adherence to the lock-up periods imposed by the Rules on the Offer of 
Securities and Continuing Obligations.”1395 In addition, Article 33 of the Listing Rules 
states that the Exchange should publicly disclose the ownership percentage of persons 
subject to the lock-up periods.1396 
It is worth noting that associates and related persons to the directors, senior 
executives, and committee members are also subject to the same ban from trading during 
the lock-up periods.1397 The CMA defines a person who is related to directors and senior 
officers as (1) immediate family members, husband/wife and minor children; and (2) a 
company that a director or senior executive or any member of their immediate families 
have direct or indirect controlling interest in that company, which enables them to “vote or 
control the votes of 30 in percent of the voting rights in the general assembly…[or] appoint 
or dismiss directors having the majority of the voting rights in the board meetings...”1398  
Trading during Lock-Up Periods is Circumstantial Evidence of Trading based on 
Inside Information 
 
The underlying theory of the regulatory imposition of lock-up periods on trading 
by directors and officers on their company’s stock can be based on the notion that they are 
more likely to be knowledgeable of or have access to inside information while preparing 
financial reports and before releasing them to the public.1399 Article 45(c) of the CML 
considers the financial content and the management forecast of the quarterly and annual 
                                               
1395 LR of 2017, supra note 158, art. 34(c).  
1396 Id, art. 33(f).  
1397 Id. art. 34(c); ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 69.  
1398 Glossary of Defined Terms, supra note 1393.  
1399 Ari B. Lanin & Daniela L. Stolman, Securities Enforcement-Building a Better Insider Trading 
Compliance Program, Aspen Publisher, Vol 25, No. 3, 6 (2011), https://bit.ly/2QtDpeB.  
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reports to be confidential information.1400 Therefore, before disclosing such information to 
the CMA, it is prohibited to disclose the information to any other persons “not bound by a 
confidentiality obligation and an obligation to protect such information.”1401 This 
prohibition of disclosing financial information before revealing it publicly along with the 
prohibition of trading before the disclosure clearly indicates that the goal is to prevent 
trading based on inside information and to assure investors that the market is safe.1402   
Although trading during these lock-up periods is not by itself considered illegal 
corporate insider trading,1403 the trading time is circumstantial evidence which may indicate 
that the trading is based on inside information. In 2010, the ACRSD ratified the CRSD’s 
decision to convict a director of a company for trading on inside information related to the 
fourth quarter report of the company and during a lock-up period.1404 The Appeal 
Committee stated that a director’s trading during the lock-up period “indicates that the 
[director] was aware of the fact that he possesses [] inside information and was willing to 
use this information” to avoid market risks. Therefore, the requisite state of mind can be 
demonstrated by the fact that the director traded during a lock-up period.1405  
Summary  
 
This part explains the regulations pertaining to corporate insider trading in terms of 
the requirement of public disclosure and the imposition of lock-up periods preceding the 
                                               
1400 CML, supra note 152, art. 45(c).  
1401 Id.  
1402 See Beach, supra note 153, at 341.  
1403 Paragraph (d) of Article 34 of the Listing Rules of 2017 states that: “The Exchange shall, when it becomes 
aware that any person mentioned in paragraph (c) of this Article is not in compliance with the lock-up periods 
imposed by the Rules on the offer of Securities and Continuing Obligations, notify the Authority of the 
suspected breach in order for the Authority to take the appropriate steps.” LR of 2017, supra note 158, id.  
1404 The Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes ( hereinafter ACRSD), Decision No.229/ 
L.S/ 2010 of 1431 H, season of 15/6/1431H (corresponding to May 29, 2010), P.5, available at:  
http://www.crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/229-31E.pdf. 
1405 Id. 
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public disclosure of the issuer’s financial periodical results. This part shows that the scope 
of corporate insiders who are subject to the disclosure requirement includes directors, 
senior executives, and substantial shareholders who own 5 percent or more of the equity 
security of the issuer. These insiders are required to publicly disclose their securities 
ownership and trading transactions by the end of the third day following the transaction. 
Corporate insiders and senior executives are also prohibited from trading during lock-up 
periods—15 days before the end of the financial quarter until the announcement—and 30 
days before the end of the fiscal year until the announcement of financial result.   
The definition of insiders under the Saudi Arabian regulations includes persons who 
possess actual control or voting control over equity security. Therefore, shares that are 
owned by family members or controlled companies are attributed to these insiders whether 
by the requirement of public disclosure upon substantial shareholders, or the prohibition 
from trading during lock-up periods by directors and senior executives. This part shows 
the importance of public disclosure and transparency that the CMA has sought to apply in 
the Saudi stock market. However, delaying the time of disclosure from a one-day period to 
a three-day period was not the right approach to take to accomplish the goal of public 
disclosure.  
After a discussion about the regulatory restrictions upon corporate insiders, the next 
part discusses the prohibition imposed upon corporate insiders from trading on inside 
information that is unknown to the public.  
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Part 3. Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Regulations 
 
Overview 
 
While insiders are legally permitted to trade in their companies’ stock, the CML 
imposed a permanent ban on trading after insiders obtain inside information that has not 
yet been disclosed to the general public.1406 The ban of illegal corporate insider trading in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a statutory prohibition included in Chapter 8 of the CML 
in addition to another provision related to the prohibition of manipulative activities to 
protect public investors from unfair and abusive market activities.1407 Article (50) of the 
CML, which prohibits illegal corporate insider trading, was drafted in consideration of 
recent international legal developments regarding the regulations of illegal corporate 
insider trading.1408 Article (50) reads as follows: 
(a) Any person who obtains, through family, business or contractual relationship, inside 
information (hereinafter an “insider”) is prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in 
the Security related to such information, or to disclose such information to another person 
with the expectation that such person will trade in such Security. 
Insider information means information obtained by the insider and which is not available 
to the general public, has not been disclosed, and such information is of the type that a 
normal person would realize that in view of the nature and content of this information, its 
release and availability would have a material effect on the price or value of a Security 
related to such information, and the insider knows that such information is not generally 
available and that, if it were available, it would have a material effect on the price or value 
of such Security. 
(b) No person may purchase or sell a Security based on information obtained from an 
insider while knowing that such person, by disclosing such insider information related to 
the Security, has violated paragraph (a) of this article. 
(c) The Authority has the power to establish the rules for specifying and defining the terms 
provided for under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article, and such acts or practices which 
the Authority deems appropriate to exempt them from their application, as may be required 
for the safety of the market and the protection of investors.1409  
 
                                               
1406 CML, supra note 152, art. 50. 
1407 See Saad Ali Aljloud, The Law of Market Manipulation in Saudi Arabia, 31 (2016), 
https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/14644/4/FulltextThesis.pdf%20.  
1408 See Beach, supra note 153; Gouda, supra note 161, at 156. 
1409 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a), (b), and (c).  
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Article (50) of the CML includes six rules. First, it determines that the prohibited 
conduct includes trading after obtaining inside information or disclosing the information 
to another with the expectation that the other person will trade on such information. 
Second, it defines who is an insider to include not only traditional companies’ insiders but 
also any person who obtains the information through a family, business or contractual 
relationship. Third, it defines the term “inside information” to mean information that has 
not been publicly disclosed or otherwise made available in which the information, if it were 
made public, would have a material impact on the price or value of the related security. It 
also requires that the insider must have knowledge about the nature of the information and 
its materiality. Fourth, it prohibits outsiders from trading based on inside information 
obtained from insiders if they have knowledge that the disclosure was in violation of the 
insider’s duty under Article (50) not to disclose inside information to another with the 
expectation that the other person will trade on such information. Sixth, Article (50) states 
that it gives the CMA the rulemaking authority to specify and define the terms provided 
and to exempt some practices from the coverage of the article as the CMA believes 
necessary for the safety of the market and the protection of investors.1410 
In November 2004, the CMA used its rulemaking authority under Article (50)(c) to 
more specifically define the rules and terms stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 
(50).1411 The CMA issued three articles under the Market Conduct Regulations of 2004 
(MCR),1412 which were designed to fulfill three purposes. Article (4) of the MCR defines 
when an insider is deemed to have traded in the related security and what a security 
                                               
1410 See Id; Beach, supra note 153, at 344. 
1411 MCR, supra note 156, arts. 4, 5, and 6.  
1412 Id. 
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involves. It also defines who is an insider and the meaning of inside information. Article 
(5) of the MCR concerns the prohibition of the disclosure of inside information to outsiders 
and what is deemed unlawful disclosure. Article (6) of the MCR provides a general 
prohibition from engaging in insider trading against insiders and outsiders. 
This part seeks to examine the regulations of illegal corporate insider trading in 
Saudi Arabia by discussing two main questions: Who is subject to the prohibition of illegal 
corporate insider trading as either an insider or outsider? and What does inside information 
mean? This part starts with a discussion of the development of illegal corporate insider 
trading regulations in Saudi Arabia. It then goes on to determine the Saudi Arabian theory 
of prohibiting illegal corporate insider trading. Next, this part defines who is subject to the 
prohibition of trading after obtaining inside information. In particular, it examines the 
statutory definition of the term “inside information” and what an insider must know while 
trading on such information to render the trading illegal.  
 
 
 
 
Development of the Regulations of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading 
 
a. Before Enacting the Capital Market Law 
The first Saudi Arabian attempt to statutorily address the prohibition of trading on 
inside information by company insiders was in 1997.1413 Between 1984 (when the first 
                                               
1413 Awwad Saleh Awwad, legal Regulation of the Saudi Stock Market Evaluation and Prospects for Reforms, 
University of Warwick institutional repository, 275 (2000), https://core.ac.uk/display/1383620/tab/similar-
list.  
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official stock market was established) and 1997,1414 trading on inside information by 
company insiders in the stock market was not directly statutorily prohibited and insiders 
were not statutorily prohibited to trade on inside information even if the trading was a 
breach of their fiduciary/trustee position.1415 The Saudi Arabian Companies Law of 1965 
(CL)1416 attempted to partially prevent insiders from exploiting inside information.1417 
Article (72) of the CL stated that: “Members of the Board of Directors should not disclose 
to the stockholders or to third parties outside the meeting of the General Assembly any 
confidential information they obtain because of their performance of the management of 
the company. Otherwise, they are deemed liable and subject to removal and liability for 
damages.”1418 However, prohibiting insiders from illegitimately disclosing inside 
information but not prohibiting them from trading on such information by themselves was 
an adequate sign that the prohibition fell short of addressing the issue of illegal corporate 
                                               
1414 The regulatory oversight and control of the Saudi Arabian stock market before establishing the Capital 
Market Authority in 2003 was distributed between multiple regulatory bodies. The primary market and some 
matters related to the secondary market were enforced and supervised by the Ministry of Commerce by 
applying the Companies Law of 1965. See infra note 1421. The secondary market was regulated and 
governed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA). In addition, stock market oversight was by the 
Ministerial Committee, which was the highest regulatory power in the capital market. It was mostly 
concerned about assessing the performance of the Ministry of Commerce and SAMA in regulating the stock 
market and joint stock companies listing their shares in the exchange. See Awwad, supra note 1413, at 275, 
41; Beach, supra note 153, at 314; Abdulaziz Al-Dakhil, Suq Al-Asehum Al-Soudi Quraa Tarikhia Wa 
Istishraf Lilmustaqbal [The Saudi Stock Market Histroical Reading and Outlook for the Future], 115,  (2010) 
(Ar). 
1415 See Awwad, supra note 1413, at 41.  
1416 The Saudi Companies Law [CL of 1965], Royal Decree No. (M/6), Dated 22/3/1385H (corresponding to 
July 22, 1965), available at: 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=373&VersionID=48. Saudi Arabian 
joint stock companies were regulated by the Saudi Arabian Companies Law of 1965 including the rules 
concerning securities initial public offerings and a few rules governing the secondary market. Moreover, the 
secondary market was governed by the ministerial committee, which was established by the Royal Decree 
No. (1230/8) dated 11/07/1403H (corresponding to April 24, 1983.) The supervision of the share trading and 
the exchange was under the authority of the Department of the Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA).  See 
Awwad, supra note 1413, at 41; Beach, supra note 153, at 314.  
1417 See Al-Ghamdi, supra note 180, at 308.  
1418 CL of 1965, supra note 1416, art. 72. 
 
 272 
 
insider trading.1419 Commentators have noted that during the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Saudi Arabian government was not concerned about combating abusive market conduct 
including illegal corporate insider trading where the market was thin and was traded by 
only a few investors.1420 A Saudi Arabian governmental official in the mid-1990s asserted 
that: “The policy of the government, at the establishment of the Saudi market, was rather 
to encourage as much trading as possible and only later to introduce, step-by-step, more 
rules to the market.”1421  In the mid-1990s, the Saudi Arabian government attempted to 
develop the stock market by improving the regulations and the operations of the market.1422 
Among other regulatory improvements, the Ministerial Committee, which was the highest 
regularity power over the Saudi Arabian stock market, issued the Disclosure Rules of 
1997.1423  
Enacting the Disclosure Rules was an important step toward the development of 
regulating the illegal corporate insider trading ban. The rules required companies to make 
full disclosure of material developments, and contained provisions for prohibiting 
manipulation and trading on inside information.1424 Dr. Awwad Saleh Awwad indicated 
that prior to the enactment of the Disclosure Rules of 1997, the Saudi Arabian stock market 
lacked clear and robust disclosure rules, which allowed companies and large investors to 
spread untrue statements and mislead investors about the true condition of listed companies 
and their financial earnings. Enacting the Disclosure Rules represented a coordinated effort 
                                               
1419 See Awwad, at 275 Nt. 123.  
1420 Awwad, at 275; Mahayni, supra note 160, at 50.  
1421 Id. (Citing an interview with Mr. Mansoor Al-Mayman, Deputy Minister of Finance and National 
Economy, member of the Supervisory Committee, Riyadh, Nov 21, 1997.) 
1422 See Awwad, supra note 1413, at 275; Mahayni, supra note 160, at 52.  
1423 Awwad, at 410. Citing Ministerial Committee Disclosure Rules, Minster of Commerce Circular 
Reference Number 2222/221/9/3340 Date 8/11/1417. 
1424 Awwad, at 410.  
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to gain investors’ confidence through the application of widely accepted disclosure 
regulations and to meet public demands for a strong disclosure regime that would ensure 
that public investors were given timely and accurate information.1425 With regard to 
prohibiting illegal corporate insider trading, Article (4) of the Disclosure Rules described 
a general prohibition of trading on inside information. Article (4) reads: “Any person 
should not deal on inside information, information which is not published and freely 
available to the public, whether this information is received either indirectly or 
directly.”1426 
However, the Disclosure Rules of 1997 was criticized as it overly imposed technical 
and restrictive requirements along with broad prohibitions in the absence of an enforcement 
agency committed to applying and enforcing such regulations by supervising public 
disclosure and combating securities fraud and illegal corporate insider trading.1427 In 
addition, the Disclosure Rules expressly lacked associated criminal sanctions or even civil 
liabilities.1428 Article (4) was also criticized for its generality and the lack of clarity of its 
language.1429 Dr. Awwad noted that as of 2000, no enforcement actions had been taken 
                                               
1425 Awwad, at 95.  
1426 Disclosure Rules of 1997, supra note 1423, art. 4.  
1427 See Awwad, supra note 1413, at 254. See Mahayni, supra note 160, at 51; Beach, supra note 153, at 317. 
(Joseph W. Beach contends that the previous regulations governing the Saudi Arabian stock market were 
enforced arbitrarily. He argues that “[T]he shifting sands of Saudi day-to-day governance did not provide an 
idea foundation for a stable capital market.” Id. at 318.  
1428 Article (5) of the Disclosure Rules stated that: “The creation of an unfair market and/or persons acting 
on inside information, information which is not freely available to the public, is prohibited. Any violation 
will be punishable according to the regulation within the Kingdom.” Awwad, supra note 1413, at 412. See, 
id. 253. 
1429 Mahayni, supra note 160, at 52; Awwad, at 334. (Dr. Awwad noted that Article 4 failed to define who is 
an insider, and thus ignored the distinction between companies’ insiders and outsiders and the potential 
liability that could be imposed on them taking into consideration the degree of culpability and the knowledge 
about the wrongful conduct. Id. at 287 Dr. Awwad suggested that this would reduce the ability to enforce the 
Article. Id. at 334. In addition, Dr. Awwad criticized the broad definition of inside information in Article (4). 
It failed to distinguish between material publicly released information that would have an effect on the lack 
of related security and information. Id. at 279.  
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against insiders for trading on inside information, although a few warnings had been issued 
to some insiders for such illegal practices.1430  
b. After Enacting the Capital Market Law  
The turning point for the ban on illegal corporate insider trading occurred in 2003 
when the ban was introduced under Article (50) of the CML.1431 The CML imposes 
criminal punishment including a prison term of up to 5 years, and severe civil penalties for 
illegal corporate insider trading violations.1432 Since the previous prohibition of illegal 
corporate insider trading under the Disclosure Rules of 1997 was criticized for the absence 
of one independent agency responsible for enforcing the prohibition, the CML established 
the CMA with administrative autonomy and large rulemaking powers along with the 
authority to implement and enforce the CML including charging illegal corporate insider 
trading wrongdoers.1433 
Since the first years of its establishment, the CMA has considered combating illegal 
corporate insider trading as a priority to protect investors from unfair practices and ensure 
the equality of dissemination of information among market participants.1434 The CMA has 
robustly pursued illegal corporate insider trading violations through multiple means 
including adopting rigorous regulations to govern illegal corporate insider trading, seeking 
judicial enforcement of the prohibition,  and raising the public awareness about the 
prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading and its negative impacts.  
                                               
1430 Awwad, at 303. 
1431 CML, supra note 152, art. 50. 
1432 See Id. arts 57(c), and 59.  
1433 See Awwad, supra note 1413, at 336; Al-Dakhil, supra note 1414, at 279; Beach, supra note 153, at 311. 
1434 The Capital Market Authority, Annual Report 2007, 16, 
https://cma.org.sa/en/Market/Reports/Documents/cma_2007_report.pdf.  
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In November 2004, the CMA promulgated the Market Conduct Regulations 
(MCR), which is mostly concerned about prohibiting manipulation, illegal corporate 
insider trading, and misstatements and misrepresentation.1435 Under this regulation, the 
CMA used its rulemaking authority and promulgated three articles to provide greater 
certainty and clarity for the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading laid out under 
Article (50) of the CML. In addition to issuing regulations, in 2007, the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul), which is responsible for executing the trading of securities, issued a 
new electronic trading system that has allowed the CMA to monitor the trading transactions 
and detect any unusual trading practices including illegal corporate insider trading 
activities.1436 In 2007, the CMA began to announce a number of cases filed against illegal 
corporate insider trading wrongdoers.1437 CMA’s statistics revealed that from 2007 to 2017, 
97 illegal corporate insider trading cases were issued by the CMA Board, CRSD, and 
ACRSD.1438 In total, 81 cases (over 75 percent of the all the cases) were issued during the 
last three years.1439  
The CMA has also been vigorous in enforcing the prohibition and charging 
violators of corporate insider trading. On August 17, 2009, the CMA announced the first 
illegal corporate insider trading case where a company’s insider was sentenced to prison 
                                               
1435 See MCR, supra note 156, arts. 1 to 10. See Aljloud, supra note 1407, at 180.  
1436 See The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Annual Statistical Report (2007) available at 
https://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/wcm/connect/6f5e1ab1-d31d-42a3-8bdf-
abab761fb61e/Annual_Report_2007_English.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=R
OOTWORKSPACE-6f5e1ab1-d31d-42a3-8bdf-abab761fb61e-lHLGRHE;Annual Report 2007, supra note 
1434, at 8; Andrew Englan & Abeer Allam, First Insider Trader Is Jailed in Saudi, Financial Times (Aug 
18, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/02905c38-8c17-11de-b14f-00144feabdc0; MOHAMED A. RAMADY, 
THE SAUDI ARABIAN ECONOMY: POLICIES, ACHIEVEMENTS, AND CHALLENGES, 153 (2nd ed. 2010).  
1437 See Annual Report 2007, supra note 1434, at 70-71.  
1438 See Capital Market Authority, Annual Report 2017, 236-37, 
https://cma.org.sa/en/Market/Reports/Documents/cma_2017_report.pdf.  
1439 Id.  
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by the CRSD.1440 The CMA announced that the Committee found the Chairman of Bishah 
Company guilty of committing illegal corporate insider trading while he was serving as the 
chairmen of the company in violation of Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (6)(a) of 
the Market Conduct Regulation.1441 The Committee sentenced the accused insider to a 
three-month prison sentence, imposed a monetary fine of SR100,000 ($26,666), banned 
him from trading shares in the market for five years, and obliged him to disgorge SR52,690 
($14,056) representing the realized gain he had made from his illegal corporate insider 
trading transactions.1442   
Recently, the CMA also announced the decision of the ACRSD against the former 
chairman of the second largest telecommunication operator company in the Kingdom, 
Etihad Etisalat (Mobily), his trading relative, and two other violators for trading and tipping 
inside information.1443 On November 3, 2014, an investigation initiated by the CMA found 
that the company was misleading its shareholders about its real financial condition in 2013 
and 2014 when it suffered a loss of more than $300 million.1444 The investigation 
uncovered illegal corporate insider trading transactions committed by the former chairman 
                                               
1440 The Capital Market Authority, Announcement by the Capital Market Authority Regarding the Issuance 
of a Final Adjudication by the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes to Convict a violator of 
the Capital Market Law and its Implementing Regulations, (August 18, 2009), 
https://cma.org.sa/Market/NEWS/Pages/CMA_N528.aspx. 
1441 Id. 
1442 Id.  
1443 The Capital Market Authority, An Announcement form the Capital Market Authority, Regarding the 
Decisions Issued By the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disclosures Convicting Violators 
of the Capital Market Law and its Implementing Regulations [Mobily’s Decision], (Feb 26, 2018), 
https://cma.org.sa/en/Market/NEWS/Pages/CMA_N_2367.aspx.  
1444 See Shujae Al-Buqami, Al-Qawayam Al-Malia li sharikat Mobily Al-Saudia Tuzhar 'arbaha.. wa tadhad 
Shayieat Al-khsayr [The Financial Statements of Mobily Company Show Profits and Refute Rumors 
“Losses,”] Asharq Al-Awsat, last visited on Dec 11, 2018, (Nov 4, 2014), https://bit.ly/2QRGFnm; 
Telecommunications Services, Reuters, Saudi Market regulator says suspects insider trading in Mobily 
shares, last visited on Dec 11, 2018 (March 2, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/mobily-stocks-
regulator-idUSL5N0W421320150302. 
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of the board of directors, and his trading relative when they sold a high portion of their 
stockholdings in Mobily.1445 A media report revealed that on February 26, 2015, the 
chairman of Mobily reduced his stockholdings in the company, that he owned directly and 
indirectly through his private investment firm, to 5.3 million shares compared to 14.8 
million shares at the end of 2013.1446 The ACRSD convicted the former chairman for 
tipping and the relative for trading on the inside information received from the former 
chairman regarding the stock of Mobily in violation of  Article (50) of the CML and Article 
(5) and (6) of the MCR of 2004. They imposed a fine of SR100,000 ($26,666) on each 
violator and prohibited them from working in listed companies for three years. The 
ACRSD also obliged the former chairman business investment company to pay 
SR280,948,800 ($74,919,680) to CMA’s account for the avoided losses on the investment 
portfolio. The third and fourth violators were found guilty of committing trading on the 
investment portfolio of the third violator, imposing a fine of SR200,000 ($53,333) on the 
third violator, and obliging him to disgorge SR30,493,325.75 ($8,131,553.5) to CMA’s 
account for the avoided losses. The fourth violator was fined SR100,000 ($26,666) and 
prohibited along with the third violator from working in listed companies for three 
years.1447 
                                               
1445 The Capital Market Authority, CMA Announcement in Regard to the Assignment of a Specialized Team 
to Review Etihad Etisalat Co. (mobily)’s Finciial Statements, Conduct Site Visits, Obtain Documents and 
Hear Concerned Parties’ Statement, (Feb 26, 2015), 
https://cma.org.sa/en/Market/NEWS/Pages/CMA_N_1676.aspx; The Capital Market Authority, CMA 
Announces the Referral of a Suspicion of Violations of Article (50) of the Capital Market Law and Article 
(5) and (6) of the Market Conduct Regulations to the Bureau of Investigation and Public Prosecution, (May 
13, 2015),  https://cma.org.sa/en/Market/NEWS/Pages/CMA_N_1782.aspx.  
1446 Abdulaziz Al-Soghier Yatkharaj Bi’akthar Min 9 Malayin Sahm Fi Sharikat “Mobily” Khilal Eam 2014 
[The Chairman of Mobily, sold more than 9 million shares of Mobily in 2014, Argaam News, (Feb 26, 2015), 
http://gulf.argaam.com/article/articledetail/488834.  
1447 Mobily’s Decision, supra note 1443.  
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In addition to the enforcement of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading 
by seeking the imposition of sanctions and penalties, the CMA has also worked on 
increasing public awareness about the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading.1448 
For this purpose, the CMA issued prospectuses describing examples of when illegal 
corporate insider trading occurs and why it is prohibited.1449 For example, one brochure 
illustrated the occurrence of illegal corporate insider trading and the purpose of the 
prohibition by giving an example of a director or an employee of a listed company who 
discovered that the company would make above-expected profits. Then the insider 
purchased more shares of the company before the disclosure of the earnings of the 
increased profits, or disclosed the information to another person that could misuse the 
information for trading purposes.1450 The CMA commented that this conduct does not 
contribute to the fairness of the market because the insider is taking advantage of 
information that is not available to general public investors.1451   
 
 
Theory Underlying the Prohibition of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading  
 
                                               
1448 See Saudi CMA Warns: Insider Trading Is a criminal Offense, Arab News (Nov 22, 2015), 
http://www.arabnews.com/economy/news/839471.  
1449 See the Capital Market Authority, CMA Supports Companies and Market Participants to Prevent Insider 
Trading Crime (April 9, 2016), 
https://cma.org.sa/en/MediaCenter/PR/Pages/insider_trading.aspx; Hayyat Alsuq Tuhadir: Altadawul 
Bina’an Ala Maelumat Dakhilia Mahdur Wa Tuad “Jarima Jenayiya,”[The Capital Market Authority Warns: 
Trading on Insider Information is Prohibited and It Is a “Criminal Offense”] Mubashir News, (Nov 22, 2015), 
https://bit.ly/2rzpokt.  
1450 The Capital Market Authority, Insider Trading Handbook, 3, available at, 
 https://cma.org.sa/en/Awareness/Publications/booklets/English.pdf.  
1451 Id.  
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The general rationale underlying the prohibition of trading on inside information, 
in Saudi Arabia is that inside information must not be exploited for trading purposes until 
the information becomes available to all public investors.1452 The justification is that 
trading on inside information is unfair, it harms the safety of the market and public 
investors’ confidence, and contradicts the policy of transparency and equal access to 
information.1453 Thus, anyone who obtains inside information must refrain from trading or 
disclosing the information to another until the information becomes public knowledge.1454  
The explanation for the unfairness of trading on inside information is that an insider 
would trade on inside information that other investors would and could not know about.1455 
The ACRSD and CMA view this informational asymmetry of trading on inside information 
as generating unjust profits that harm the integrity and safety of the stock market. The 
ACRSD has often asserted that the purpose of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider 
trading is to protect investors and establish justice and equality in access to information.1456 
The CMA also has announced that trading on inside information is against the principle of 
justice to have equal access to information, so the CML has imposed and protected 
investors by prohibiting trading on inside information under Article (50).1457 
                                               
1452 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H,  season of 13/2/1437H (Corresponding to Nov 25, 
2015), P. 15, http://crsd.org.sa/Ar/Appeals/-973 اﻷول/ 20 اﻷول/اﻟﻤﻠﻒ% 20 اﻟﺠﺰء% 20%201437%20 ﻋﺎم% 20 ﻗﺮارات%
37.pdf. See also Beach, supra note 153, at 344; Gouda, supra note 161, at 154.  
1453 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, season of 17/2/1437 (corresponding to Nov 29, 2015), 
P. 17, available at: 
http://www.crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/974-37E.pdf.  
1454 Fahad M. Al-Nufi, Al-Himaya Al-Jinayiya Li-Asuk Al-malia Al-Sauodi [The Criminal Protection for the 
Saudi Capital Market], 150, (2006), https://bit.ly/2rzpokt.  
1455 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, P.17-18; Awwad, supra note 1413, at 336.  
1456 ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, Season of 28/6/1430 (corresponding to June 21, 2009), 
P. 22,  
http://crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/147-30E.pdf.  
1457 ACRSD, Decision No.146/ ل.س / 2009 of 1430H, season of 27/6/1430 (corresponding to June 20, 2009), 
P.14, http://www.crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/146-30E.pdf. 
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Trading on inside information contradicts CML’s policy of requiring continuous 
disclosure to ensure that material events and developments are disclosed as soon as they 
are discovered.1458 The CML requires issuers to not disclose inside information to other 
persons without confidentiality obligations, and to maintain adequate procedures to prevent 
any undesirable leaks before disclosing the information in accordance with the law and 
through recognized channels.1459 Misusing inside information by secretly trading on that 
information is a complete contradiction to the policy of transparency in securities 
transactions and equal access to information.1460 Moreover, one of the main functions that 
CML requires the CMA to pursue is to protect investors from unfair practices that involve 
fraud, manipulation, and cheating,1461 including illegal corporate insider trading.1462 The 
CML treats the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading and the prohibition of 
manipulative practices under Chapter Eight of the law.1463 The CML also provides severe 
imprisonment terms up to five years for both violations.1464 This implies that the CML 
considers trading on inside information as harmful to the investor’s confidence as 
manipulation. Therefore, the measures taken to deter such behaviors are the same. 
                                               
1458 CML, supra note 152, art. 46(a). (This Article requires an issuer to disclose to the CMA once such issuer 
becomes “aware of any material developments which may affect the prices of the Securities issued by such 
party. If such party has a Security traded on the Exchange, the Exchange must be informed of such 
developments in writing.” Id.  
1459 See CML, supra note 152, art. (45)(c). (This Article considers information related to the annual and 
quarterly reports of the issuer related to the (1) balance sheet; (2) the profit and loss account; (3) the cash 
flow statement; and (4) “an evaluation of the issuing company management of current and future 
developments and any future possibilities that may have significant effect on the business results or financial 
position of the company” as confidential information before this information is disclosed to the CMA. It 
requires the issuer to prevent any “disclosing of such information to parties not bound by a confidentiality 
obligation and obligation to protect such information.” 
1460 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, P. 6.  
1461 See CML, supra note 152, art. (5)(a)(4). See also Beach, supra note 153, at 325.  
1462 See Annual Report 2007, supra note 1434, at 16. (The CMA added illegal insider trading when 
enumerated the functions of CMA as spelled out under the CML.) Id.  
1463 CML, art. 49. See Aljloud, supra note 1407.  
1464 See CML, supra note 152, art. 57(c).  
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In addition, illegal corporate insider trading is principally prohibited for the purpose 
of preventing traditional insiders, such as directors and managers, from pursing self-interest 
and being selfish by trading on inside information or disclosing it selectively to their family 
members or business partners while the public is unfairly unaware of such information. In 
2015. The CMA stated this justification:  
Trading based on inside information has direct negative effect on the Capital Market as 
well as investors therein. The efficiency of the performance of capital markets is associated 
with the confidence of investors. Such confidence has many bases, the first of which is 
guaranteeing that all investors would obtain all available information in an equal manner. 
They must be also provided with security and protection against illegal exploitation of 
inside information, which is not available to the public and only available to insiders by 
the virtue of their occupations and professions or disclosing such information to close 
persons or relatives. In order to level the playing field between investors in relation to the 
obtainment of information and prevent any person/s from utilizing inside information, 
legislations set texts criminalizing the illegal usage of inside information whether by 
insiders themselves or through others. This also aims to deter violators, achieve the security 
and integrity of free trading in the Exchange and to protect investors from prejudicing to 
equity between them.1465 
 
On the basis of equal access to information, the prohibition range of trading on 
inside information is broad under the CML and its Implementing Regulations to include 
all possible scenarios when inside information could be exploited. The status of “an 
insider” has been broadened to include not only traditional company insiders, although 
inside information is more vulnerable to misuse by them, but also includes any persons 
who obtain inside information based on employment, contractual, or familial 
relationships.1466 Thus, the prohibition of trading on inside information covers trading by 
outsiders who obtain inside information from insiders or from a chain of persons 
                                               
1465 ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 17.  
1466 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
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transferring inside information.1467 The issue of who is subject to the prohibition of illegal 
corporate insider trading is discussed below.  
Who is Subject to the Prohibition of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading?  
 
Since the concept of the prohibition of trading on inside information is to protect 
the equal flow of information to the public domain, the CML and MCR have determined 
who is prohibited from misusing inside information for trading purposes, in both general 
and broad terms, to prevent all possible persons who have obtained inside information from 
trading on such information.1468 However, the CML and MCR divide persons subject to 
the prohibition of trading on inside information into two categories. The first category 
includes those whom the regulations consider to be “insiders” presuming that they are 
aware of or have access to inside information, whether directly or indirectly. The other 
category includes all other persons (outsiders) who are not included in the first group.  
Article (50)(a) of the CML defines an insider: “Any person who obtains, through 
family, business or contractual relationship, inside information (hereinafter an 
‘insider.’)”1469 The term insider has also been defined in more detail by the CMA under 
Article (4)(b) of the MCR, which reads as follows:  
(b) For greater certainty, insider means any of the following:1) A director, a senior 
executive or an employee of the issuer of a security related to inside information; 2) A 
person who obtains inside information through a family relationship, including from any 
person related to the person who obtains the information; 3) A person who obtains inside 
information through a business relationship, including obtaining the information: • From 
the issuer of a security related to inside information; • From any person who has a business 
relationship with the person who obtains the information; or • From any person who is a 
business associate of the person who obtains the information; 4) A person who obtains 
inside information through a contractual relationship, including obtaining the information: 
• From the issuer of a security related to inside information; or •From any person who has 
a contractual relationship with the person who obtains the information.1470 
                                               
1467 Id, art. 50(b).  
1468 Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 158.  
1469 Id.  
1470 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(b).  
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The definition of an insider under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article 4(b) of 
the MCR indicates that insiders exclusively are either company insiders including directors 
and managers, or outsiders who legally receive inside information directly or indirectly 
from the issuer because of family, business, or contractual relationships.1471 The concept 
that correlates these types of persons as insiders is that the regulations do not consider their 
obtaining of inside information unlawful because their access to such information is for 
legitimate business purposes or any other purposes that are not related to the subject of the 
prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading. The goal, however, is to prevent the misuse 
of inside information for trading purposes. In addition, for the goal of protecting investors 
from such misuse of inside information, the regulations consider these persons to be under 
a duty to keep and maintain the confidentiality of the information. The regulations 
predicate that those persons have knowledge of inside information; thus, they have an 
insider status and are bound to a duty to maintain confidentiality of the information until 
such information becomes known to the public.1472 
 It is worth mentioning that the statutory definition of an insider does not require 
that such covered persons owe the issuer or the shareholders a fiduciary/trustee duty while 
obtaining inside information.1473 This means that a violation of the prohibition of trading 
or disclosing inside information for trading motivations is not solely contingent on a breach 
                                               
1471 See Gouda, supra note 161, at 154.  
1472 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 14. 
1473 See Gouda, supra note 161, at 155. 
 
 284 
 
of such duty although a breach can simultaneously occur with the perpetration of this 
violation.1474 
Article 50(b) of the CML and Article 6(b) of the MCR prohibit outsiders from 
trading on inside information where Article 50(b) states that: “(b) No person may purchase 
or sell a Security based on information obtained from an insider while knowing that such 
person, by disclosing such insider information related to the Security, has violated 
paragraph (a) of this Article.”1475 In addition, Article 6(b) of the MCR reads: “A person 
who is not insider is prohibited from engaging in insider trading if he obtains the inside 
information from another person and he knows or should have known, that the information 
is inside information.”1476 
The regulations prohibit outsiders from trading on inside information obtained from 
insiders while knowing that such disclosure is in violation of Article (50)(a) of the CML 
                                               
1474 Finding a simultaneous breach of fiduciary/trustee duty and illegal insider trading is obvious in the 
scenario of disclosure of inside information by a company’s director to an outsider. When a company’s 
director obtains inside information because of his/her privy position inside the company, and then disclosing 
such information to facilitate another person’s trades, he/she commits illegal corporate insider trading and 
also a breach of his/her trustee/fiduciary duty owed to the company and shareholders not to misuse the 
property (information) of the company for self-interest and not to unfairly favor him/herself over the interest 
of the company and its shareholders. For more discussion about the breach of fiduciary duty by traditional 
company insiders, see Part 1 of Chapter 3: The Legal Status of Corporate Insiders. Some commentators have 
argued that since Article (50)(a) does not require an insider to be a fiduciary, the term “an insider” is not 
limited to persons obtaining inside information through family, business, or contractual relationships, but 
goes beyond that to include everyone in possession of inside information. See Gouda, supra note 161, at 155. 
This suggestion is based on the reading of the phrase “any person” at the opening of the definition of “an 
insider.” Id.  However, many commentators correctly conclude that the definition of “an insider” under 
Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (4)(b) of the MCR is an express inclusive definition of “an insider.” 
See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 158; Mazhar Farghaly, Jari’yim Al-Tadawul Bina’an Alaa Maloumat 
Dakhilia [The Offences of Trading Based on Inside Information], 21, (April 2014) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the student).  Although the definition starts with a broad word “any person,” it limits the scope 
of the term by using the word “because of” or “through family, business or contractual relationship.” In 
addition, Article (4)(b) states in plain words that “for greater certainty, insider means any of the following…” 
which means clearly that any person that is not one of the enumerated persons is not “an insider” even though 
it is possible that such person becomes in possession of inside information. 
1475 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(b). See Gouda, supra note 161, at 155; Beach, supra note 153, at 344.  
1476 MCR, supra note 156, art. 6(b).  
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and Article (5)(a) and (b) of the MCR.1477 The disclosure is in violation of paragraph (a) of 
this article, and occurs when the disclosure by the insider has not been made for legitimate 
purposes, but the insider discloses the inside information while he/she knows or has reason 
to know that the recipient of the information will trade on such information. Article 6(b) 
of the MCR also covers outsiders who obtain inside information although indirectly from 
an insider, if they know or should have known that the inside information is nonpublic, and 
it is material.   
Who has Insider Status?  
 
The determination of an insider under Article 50(a) of the CML and Article 4(b) of 
the MCR contains one of the requisites or elements that must be found to hold someone 
liable as an insider for trading on inside information that is unknown to the public. This 
element is called the “assumed element” upon which a defendant of illegal corporate 
insider trading shall have a special position or status of an insider, and thus be deemed 
liable where the other elements of the violation suffice. Thus, insiders can be divided into 
two groups: primary and secondary insiders.  
Primary Insiders  
 
With respect to misusing inside information for trading purposes, the main target 
group of the regulations is those who control and manage the issuer or represent the issuer 
in front of third parties.1478 This includes all traditional companies’ insiders, directors, 
senior executives, and other employees of the issuer, no matter what their position title is, 
                                               
1477 Id. art 5(a) and (b).  
1478 See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 158; Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 21; Jamal Al-Othman, Al'iifsah wa 
Ashafafia fi Al-Maloumat Almutailiqa bi Al-Arwaq Al-Malia Al-Mutadawala fi Al-Bursa [The Disclosure 
and Transparency of Information Relating to Securities Traded on the Exchange], 350 (2010). (Ar.) 
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who are regularly privy to inside information.1479 These insiders are the only expressly 
enumerated persons based on their positions under the definition of “an insider” in Article 
(4)(b) of the MCR. This implies that these insiders are the main target of the prohibition of 
trading on inside information and, in most instances, if others trade on inside information, 
these insiders would be the source of the information.1480 It is notable that Article (4)(b) 
does not expressly name substantial shareholders as one of the issuer’s insiders. However, 
many commentators suggest that substantial shareholders are included in this group of 
primary insiders.1481  
The fulfillment of the presumed element of illegal corporate insider trading liability 
with respect to primary insiders is based on the notion that primary insiders, by virtue of 
their special positions inside the company, are always informed about the company’s 
affairs and any new developments during the course of the business operation.1482 The 
CMA has considered this presumed element as irrefutable because primary insiders’ access 
to inside information by virtue of their privy positions prevents them from alleging that 
their trading in the issuer’s stock preceding the announcement of material information 
occurred while they had no access to such information.1483 
 In a case before the ACRSD,1484 the CMA asserted that Article (50)(a) necessitates 
a presumed element to impute liability for illegal corporate insider trading for those who 
                                               
1479 See Id.  
1480 Awwad, supra note 1413, at 285. 
1481 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 24. See also Id.  
1482 Ahed Al-Saeed, Dealing with Confidential Information of Public Share Holding Companies –
Comparative Study, 285, (2012), https://meu.edu.jo/libraryTheses/58b2b6b5c5bbf_1.pdf. (Ar.). 
1483 See ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, P. 12.  
1484 Id. (The facts of the case involve a company’s director who traded in the shares of his company based on 
inside information indicating that the board of directors will discuss the possibility of transferring its affiliate 
companies to be one public joint stock company or merging these affiliate companies to its company and the 
likelihood of the capital increase accordingly. The insider traded, as an agent, through an investment account 
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occupy a special legal status of an insider. It is always presumed that their trades are based 
on inside information obtained because of their inside position at the time of the trade in 
question where other elements of the offense suffice.1485 In this case, the CMA stated that 
the defendant held the position of Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of the company 
when he purchased the company’s stock. Therefore, the presumed element was definitely 
proven that he had access to inside information.1486 In addition, the ACRSD explained that 
the presumed element under Article (50)(a) requires the presence of two elements: (1) the 
defendant is “an insider” who obtains inside information because of his/her position; and 
(2) the inside information in question satisfies the legal requirements in which the 
information is unknown to the public, and its availability to the public would substantiality 
impact the price of the related security. The ACRSD concluded that the presumed element 
was satisfied for the defendant since the defendant was Vice Chairman of the Board of 
Directors. The obtained information was that the defendant along with other directors 
requested a feasibility study about converting a number of affiliates, in which the company 
had invested in, into a public joint stock company or integrate them with their company 
and thus increase the company’s capital.1487 The ACRSD found that the presumed element 
under Article (50)(a) sufficed because the defendant was an insider and the request to 
conduct the study was inside information.1488  
 
                                               
of his six family members during the period that directly preceded the company’s board of directors meeting 
to decide to launch the study and before the announcement about its decision to conduct a study on the 
feasibility of converting a number of its affiliates to be joined in one public joint stock company or merging 
them to the parent company in which it would lead to a capital increase of the company, accordingly.) Id. 
P.1.  
1485 Id. P. 12.  
1486 Id.  
1487 Id. P. 20.  
1488 Id.  
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 Secondary Insiders  
 
Secondary insiders include all other enumerated persons who are deemed to have 
the legal status of an insider under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article 4(b) of the MCR. 
These individuals include those who legally obtain inside information either directly from 
the issuer and persons acting on its behalf, or indirectly from others who originally obtain 
the inside information from the issuer or one of its insiders.1489 These persons are 
enumerated in inclusive terms as any person who obtains inside information through a 
family, business, or contractual relationship.1490 This group includes private contractors 
who have a temporary business relationship with the issuer that gives them access to inside 
information for business purposes, such as private lawyers, external auditors, and financial 
advisors.1491 Secondary insiders also include low-level employees of the issuer who do not 
have regular access to inside information.1492 In addition, family members of primary 
insiders or other insiders are also considered secondary insiders who are subject to the 
prohibition of trading on inside information obtained from a family source.   
Article (4)(b) describes when such company outsiders are legally deemed to occupy 
the status of an insider: A person is deemed “an insider” if such person obtains inside 
information through:  
(1) A direct business relationship with the issuer of the related security, or 
indirectly through a business relationship with another person, or from a 
business associate of the person who obtains the information;  
                                               
1489 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 24; Ahmad Baz Metwally, Al'ikhlail al-Juzyie bi Al-Iltizaim bi Al-
Shafafia wa al-Ifsah aun Al-Maloumat fi Bursa Al-Arwaq Al-Malia- Al-Tayamul Al-Dakhiliyah [The Partial 
Breach of Duty of Disclosure and Transparency of Information on the Stock Exchange- Insider Dealing], 28 
(2012). (Ar.). 
1490 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
1491 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 25; Metwally, supra note 1489, at 28.  
1492 Id.  
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(2)  A direct contractual relationship with the issuer of the related security, or 
indirectly obtained the information from any person who has a contractual 
relationship with the person who obtains the information; and 
(3) A family relationship, including any person related to the person who obtains 
the information (who is deemed to occupy the legal status of an insider).1493  
Article (4)(b) indicates that persons have insider status if they legally obtain inside 
information because of a direct business or contractual relationship with the issuer or one 
of the primary insiders, or indirectly from a source with whom he/she has a business or 
contractual relationship. It also includes any person who obtains inside information through 
a family relationship with one of the primary insiders or other secondary insiders. This 
means that the prohibition of trading on inside information covers first-level persons 
informed about inside information as well as other persons who obtain the information 
through a chain of persons who are privy to inside information.1494 Although the definition 
of an insider under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (4)(b) of the MCR is a broad 
definition, some commentators argue that this legal definition does not include all possible 
persons that may obtain inside information.1495 For example, a person could obtain inside 
information through a friendship relationship. However, the definition focuses on specific 
relationships from which inside information is most likely to be obtained either from the 
                                               
1493 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(b).  
1494 Gouda, supra note 161, at 156. 
1495 Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 158.  
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issuer or indirectly from sources that have legally obtained the inside information through 
a business or contractual relationship.1496  
The CMA believes that all secondary insiders are always presumed to have access 
to inside information if other elements of the violation suffice. Therefore, the assumed 
element required pursuant to Article (50)(a) of the CML is satisfied.1497 However, some 
commentators correctly suggested that the assumed element does not suffice regarding 
secondary insiders in the absence of evidence showing that the inside information is related 
to the matter of their job duties or a responsibility they were contracted to perform.1498 For 
example, for a low-level employee who works in the accounting department of a listed 
company, it is reasonable to presume that he/she is informed about inside information 
related to confidential financial information of the listed company. However, for a low-
level employee who works as a receptionist at a listed company, the presumption that this 
employee is an insider is based on conjecture and should not suffice the assumed element 
unless there is additional evidence connecting the employee to the inside information.1499 
With regard to persons obtaining inside information through a family relationship, 
the CMA illustrates the justification of adopting the presumption that family members 
occupy the legal status of an insider by stating that:  
 The CMA regards the transfer of inside information between family members is presumed 
as circumstantial evidence where it is confirmed to be a fact when the information is used 
by such family members through trading in the security in question. This presumption of 
the transfer of inside information between family members has been adopted by many 
legislations, which tend to include spouses and relatives under the prohibition of illegal 
                                               
1496 See Gouda, supra note 161, at 155 Nt. 152. (The authors conclude that family, business, and contractual 
relationships “are meaningful in the Saudi community. In all likelihood, if insider trading were to take place, 
it would be through these relations.”) Id.  
1497 See ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, P. 12. 
1498 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 24; Metwally, supra note 1489, at 28. 
1499 This suggestion is derived from Professor Donald Langevoort’s analysis. See LANGEVOORT, supra 
note 6, at §3:13.  
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corporate insider trading as the same as original insiders. This inclusion is established 
because of two reasons: (1) the impossibility of proving that the disclosure to a spouse and 
relatives by the regular methods of evidence because of the close relationship between 
them; and (2) because of the nature of human selves, the disclosure of inside information 
can possibly occur intentionally or unintentionally between very close persons while 
mutual dialogues.1500 
 
Although CMA stresses that trading relatives are always presumed to be privy to 
inside information, in 2009, the ACRSD asserted that the family relationship connection 
does not by itself demonstrate that a defendant has obtained inside information unless this 
presumption is supported by other evidence.1501 This case involved an allegation that a 
chairman of a listed company (first defendant) and his brother (second defendant) 
purchased shares of the chairman’s company before the announcement of an acquisition 
deal.1502 The allegation regarding the satisfaction of the presumed element with respect to 
the second defendant was based on the fact that the chairman’s brother was a statutory 
insider who was presumed to have access to inside information obtained from his brother 
(the chairman). Therefore, the CMA presumed that since the information was available to 
the chairman of the company, the chairman disclosed the information to his brother.1503 To 
confirm this presumption, the CMA stated that the trading activities of the chairman’s 
brother on the related stock showed that he was trading on low volume in the past, but he 
suspiciously traded on a large volume in the period preceding the disclosure about the 
acquisition deal.1504  However, the attorney of the chairman’s brother successfully rebutted 
this presumption by producing other evidence, thus weakening the presumption of 
                                               
1500 ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 14.  
1501 ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, season of 30/6/1430 (corresponding to June 23, 2009), 
P. 22, http://crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/148-30E.pdf.  
1502 Id. P.1.  
1503 Id. P. 9.  
1504 Id. P. 10.  
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obtaining inside information.1505 Although the ACRSD convicted the chairman of trading 
on inside information before the public disclosure of the acquisition deal, it acquitted the 
chairman from illegal corporate insider trading liability of unlawful disclosure to his 
brother.1506 The ACRSD stated that it was not persuaded by the evidence produced by the 
CMA that the chairman’s brother traded on inside information received from his 
brother.1507 First, the ACRSD found that the family relationship between the defendants 
was not certain evidence to demonstrate the disclosure to the chairman’s brother unless it 
was supported by other evidence. Second, the suspicious large volume trading in the 
company’s stock preceding the disclosure of the acquisition deal was insufficient evidence 
to prove that the trading was based on inside information1508 since there were other 
reasonable justifications of such high trading volume, which weakened the presumption. 
They reasoned that rumors circulated on the internet about a rise in the company’s capital, 
which led to an increased market price of the company’s stock before the disclosure of the 
acquisition deal. In addition, the chairman’s brother was a frequent trader in the company’s 
stock.1509  
In another case issued in 2015, the ACRSD concluded that there was enough 
evidence to convict trading relatives for illegal corporate insider trading. The facts of this 
case involved an allegation against two listed company’s directors who were also brothers. 
Four of their family members traded on inside information related to a real estate sale of 
                                               
1505 Id. P. 6.  
1506 Id. P. 23.  
1507 Id. P. 22.  
1508 Id.  
1509 Id.  
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the company.1510 The allegation indicated that the trading relatives purchased a high 
number of shares during the period between the signing of the sale agreement and the 
public disclosure of the deal based on inside information obtained from the first defendant. 
After the sale was announced, the defendants sold all their shares in the company.1511 The 
ACRSD found that the presumption of the occurrence of the disclosure and the obtaining 
of inside information was sufficient to find liability of illegal disclosure and trading on 
inside information by the defendants.1512  They reasoned that the first defendant was a 
member of the executive committee of the company and was authorized to sign and 
conclude the sale deal. Thus, the inside information, which was the sale of the real estate, 
was definitely available to the first defendant.1513 Second, the Department of Surveillance 
and Analysis of CMA’s report showed that the trading relatives purchased a large number 
of shares of the listed company in question before the announcement of the sale 
confirmation.1514 In addition, the timing of their trading was suspicious because it occurred 
after receiving an offer that was described as a serious offer and after the consent of the 
other partner sharing ownership of the real estate with the company.1515 Third, the trading 
relatives provided contradictory justifications for their trading activities. Finally, there was 
no trading activity by the trading relatives during the previous six months before the public 
disclosure.1516  
                                               
1510 ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 1.  
1511 Id. P. 3.  
1512 Id. P. 20.  
1513 Id.  
1514 Id.  
1515 Id. P. 21.  
1516 Id. 
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In summary, it can be suggested that the presumption of trading on inside 
information obtained through family relationships can be rebutted by showing that there 
were other reasons for the trade, such as circulated rumors that caused the market price of 
the stock to rise, or the person has a history of trading in the stock in question.1517 However, 
the presumption can be confirmed in the absence of a justified explanation of the trade 
decision.1518 In particular, when a suspicious trade is conducted by one or more members 
of the same family, or the family member has no trading history in the previous six months 
of the public disclosure, the trading activity can be called into question.1519 
Liability of Outsiders Trading on Inside Information 
  
In addition to the prohibition of trading on inside information, the Saudi Arabian 
regulations prohibit insiders from disclosing inside information to others for the same 
reason that prohibits them from trading by themselves.1520 The regulations go further to 
prohibit recipient outsiders from trading on or communicating inside information either 
obtained directly from an insider or indirectly through a chain of recipients of such 
information.1521 This prohibition is imposed to close any legal loopholes by which inside 
information may be exploited for trading purposes and to ensure confidentiality of the 
information until it is disclosed to the general public.1522  
                                               
1517 ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501.  
1518 ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452.  
1519 It is important to mention that there is no specific definition of family members subject to the status of 
“an insider” under Article (50)(a) of the CML. Dr. Mazhar Farghaly suggests that the definition should be 
determined narrowly because the violation of trading on inside information is a criminal offense. He also 
suggests that the definition applied herein is the same as the definition of family members associated or 
related to directors and senior executives or substantial shareholders defined in the Glossary of Defined 
Terms issued by the CMA, which include only the “individual’s spouse or minor children.” Glossary of 
Defined Terms, supra note 1393. See Email from Dr. Mazhar Farghaly to the student (Jan 8, 2019, 1:14 PM) 
(on file with the student). 
1520 Metwally, supra note 1489, at 35; Al-Othman, supra note 1478, at 358.  
1521 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(b); MCR, supra note 156, art. 5(b), and (6)(b).  
1522 See Metwally, at 35.  
 295 
 
 
Prohibition of Disclosing Inside Information to Outsiders 
  
Article (50)(a) of the CML prohibits insiders from disclosing inside information “to 
another person with the expectation that such person will trade in such information.” In 
addition, Article (5)(a) of the MCR provides that: “An insider is prohibited from disclosing 
any inside information to any other person when he knows or should have known that it is 
possible that such other person may trade in the security related to the inside 
information.”1523 Article (5)(b) goes on to prohibit outsiders from disclosing inside 
information obtained from insiders. It states that: “A person who is not insider is prohibited 
from disclosing to any other person any inside information obtained from an insider, when 
he knows or should have known that it is possible that such other person to whom the 
disclosure has been made may trade in the security related to the inside information.”1524 
On the basis of these articles, the prohibition of disclosing inside information to 
outsiders does not require the fulfillment of the assumed element, which means that it is 
not necessary for the information to be disclosed by an insider.1525 The elements required 
to establish liability for disclosing inside information under Article (50)(a) of the CML and 
Article (5) of the MCR are as follows: (1) the information disclosed meets the legal 
attributes of inside information under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article 4 (c) of the 
MCR; and (2) the disclosure was committed with the expectation that such recipient will 
trade on the information received. Or, as Article (5) states, the disclosing person “knows 
or should have known that it is possible that such other person may trade in the security 
                                               
1523 MCR, supra note 156, art. 5(a).  
1524 Id. art. 5(b).  
1525 See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 178; Farghaly, supra note 1474, 42,45.  
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related to the inside information.”1526 Any disclosure that meets these two elements is 
prohibited and the person making such a disclosure is punished the same as if he/she had 
traded on inside information.1527 
The general understanding of this prohibition is that insiders who are privy to inside 
information and outsiders who obtain such information from insiders have a duty not to 
disclose inside information to outsiders until the information is disclosed to the general 
public.1528 Therefore, a violation of the prohibition from disclosing inside information 
articulated under these provisions does not apply when the disclosure was made for 
legitimate legal purposes such as passing inside information between directors of the board 
of the issuer or disclosing it to a private lawyer representing the issuer in a legal matter.1529 
The scope of this prohibition applies when the disclosure is made to outsiders for 
illegitimate purposes in which the insider violates his/her duty under Article (50)(a) of the 
CML and Article (5) of MCR .  
Does Disclosure have to be Related to Trading on Inside Information or is Mere 
Disclosure Prohibited Conduct? 
 
The CMA interprets that the prohibition from disclosure under Article (50)(a) of 
the CML and Article (5) of the MCR applies whenever the disclosure is made for non-
business purposes (i.e., the disclosure is made to a person not bound by a confidentiality 
obligation).1530 This disclosure contradicts the protection that the CML has provided to 
                                               
1526 MCR, supra note, 7, art. 5(a) and (b). See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 
1452, P. 20; ACRSD, Decision No.424/ L.S/ 2012 of 1433 H, season of 20/2/1433 (corresponding to Jan 14, 
2012), P. 2,  http://www.crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/424-33E.pdf.  
1527 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, 45. 
1528 See Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1425, P. 15; Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 41; 
Metwally, supra note 1489, at 35.  
1529 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 42.  
1530 See ACRSD, Decision No.424/ L.S/ 2012 of 1433 H, supra note 1526, P. 3; Farghaly, supra note 1474, 
at 42; Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 160.  
 
 297 
 
maintain confidentiality of the information before it flows to the general public to establish 
equal access to information.1531 Therefore, the CMA finds that the mere breach of a duty 
to maintain confidentiality of inside information results in liability under Article (50) of 
the CML or Article (5) of the MCR. In addition, it is notable that by promulgating Article 
(5) of the MCR, the CMA has softened the element of the requisite state of mind of the 
disclosing person or has objectively presumed that it is sufficed.1532  This presumption is 
in conflict with the plain language of Article (50)(a). It requires that for finding a violation 
of disclosing inside information by insiders, the disclosing insider must have actual 
knowledge or, at least, an expectation that the recipient of the inside information will trade 
on this information.1533  
The issue of insiders’ liability for unlawful disclosure was reviewed by the ACRSD, 
in 2012.1534 This case involved an appeal by the CMA against the CRSD’s decision that 
reversed the Board of the CMA’s decision to financially fine an executive insider for 
making a press statement containing inside information to a news organization. The Board 
of CMA fined the executive insider SR50,000 ($13,333) for violating Article (5)(a) of the 
MCR. The argument was that the insider made a press statement to Reuters before notifying 
the CMA about the insider’s company expectation of increasing the net profit for the first 
quarter of 2009 at least 200% over the previous quarter.1535 The executive insider filed a 
                                               
1531 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 15.  
1532 Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 182. 
1533 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a) (This Article states that: “Any person who obtains, through family, 
business or contractual relationship, inside information (hereinafter an “insider”) is prohibited… to disclose 
such information to another person with the expectation that such person will trade in such Security.”) Id.  
1534 ACRSD, Decision No.424/ L.S/ 2012 of 1433 H, supra note 1526.  
1535 Id. at P. 2.  
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grievance against the decision before the CRSD and it rendered a judgment in favor of the 
insider and canceled the CMA Board’s decision. Subsequently, the CMA appealed.1536  
The CMA claimed that it imposed a financial penalty against the insider because 
he had a privy position, he knew or should have known the nature of the confidentiality of 
the information and the legal means to disclose. The CMA argued that the decision was 
imposed because the goal was to protect and maintain confidentiality of inside information 
and thus, insiders were required to refrain from disclosing it to anyone not bound to keeping 
the information confidential.1537 The CMA claimed that the alleged violation committed 
by the insider satisfied the requisites and elements articulated under Article (5)(a) of the 
MCR, which included more details than Article (50)(a) of the CML.1538 The CMA 
explained the elements required by Article (5)(a) as follows: (a) the disclosing person is an 
insider; (b) the disclosed information meets the legal attribute of inside information; (c) 
when making the disclosure, the insider knows or should know the information is inside 
information; and (g) the disclosure is made to an outsider.1539 The CMA found that the 
executive was an insider, and the information disclosed was inside information that the 
insider knew or should have known was inside information, and the disclosure was made 
to an outsider. Therefore, “all the elements required by the provision of the article 
existed.”1540  
The ACRSD confirmed the CRSD’s decision that the act committed from the 
insider did not violate Article (50)(a) of the CML when he disclosed inside information to 
                                               
1536 Id.  
1537 Id.  
1538 Id.  
1539 Id.  
1540 Id.  
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a Reuters agent.1541 While recognizing that the Board of CMA’s decision was based on 
Article (5)(a) of the MCR, the CRSD read Article (50)(a) as it requires that an insider 
making the disclosure must have actual knowledge or an expectation that the person 
receiving inside information will trade based on this information.1542 Thus, it concluded 
that this element was absent in the case, and Article (5)(a) of the MCR, upon which CMA 
based its decision, did not apply to the act the insider committed.1543  
On the basis of this case, it can be noted that the CMA has intended to prohibit any 
breach of the duty of confidentiality by the issuer’s insider by making such conduct 
actionable under Article 5(a) of the CML. However, based on the CMA’s understanding, 
it can be argued that the language of Article (5) of the MCR prohibits conduct that is out 
of the scope of illegal corporate insider trading of which Article (50)(a) of the CML was 
designed to prohibit. The prohibition from disclosing inside information under Article 
50(a) of the CML was to prevent insiders from selectively disclosing inside information to 
investors and thus giving them an unfair informational advantage over the market because 
of their illegal access to inside information.1544 Therefore, Article (50)(a) triggered the 
prohibition from selectively disclosing inside information when there is an expectation that 
the recipient of the information will trade on that information. However, the CMA believes 
that the goal of Article (5) of the MCR is to maintain confidentiality of inside information 
                                               
1541 Id. at 4.  
1542 Id.  
1543 Id.  
1544 This notion has been used by the CMA in illegal insider trading proceedings to justify prohibiting insiders 
from selectively disclosing inside information to their relatives to trade. See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 
2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 17-18. (The CMA stated that legislators set texts criminalizing the illegal 
usage of inside information whether by insiders themselves or through others for the goal of achieving the 
safety and integrity of securities trading in the Exchange and to protect investors from depriving them the 
right to have equal access to information.) Id. at P.18.  
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disregarding whether the disclosing person is an insider or not and notwithstanding that the 
disclosing person would expect the recipient to trade, and whether or not the recipient 
actually misused the information.1545  As a result, it can be argued that Article (5) of the 
MCR goes too far beyond the purpose of prohibiting illegal corporate insider trading. 
Therefore, in this case, the CRSD and ACRSD correctly rejected this broad approach and 
restricted the prohibited conduct of disclosing inside information to acts involving actual 
knowledge or at least the existence of circumnutates that reasonably lead to an expectation 
that the recipient of the inside information will trade or disclose the information to trade 
on this information.1546 In fact, Article 50(b)’s prohibition of trading on inside information 
by outsiders supports this conclusion since it restricts liability to an outsider’s knowledge 
of inside information that the insider expected the outsider to trade on.1547 
Outsiders’ Prohibition from Trading on Obtained Inside Information  
 
Since the purpose of prohibiting illegal corporate insider trading is to prevent the 
exploitation of inside information to ensure that investors are trading on the same publicly 
available information, illegal corporate insider trading regulations prohibit outsiders who 
improperly obtain inside information from trading on such information or disclosing it to 
others for the same purpose. Article (50)(b) of the CML states that “no person may 
purchase or sell a security based on information obtained from an insider while knowing 
that such person, by disclosing such insider information related to the Security, has violated 
paragraph (a) of this Article.”1548 An insider violates paragraph (a) of Article (50) by 
disclosing inside information “to another person with the expectation that such person will 
                                               
1545 ACRSD, Decision No.424/ L.S/ 2012 of 1433 H, supra note 1526, P. 2. 
1546 Id. at 3.  
1547 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(b). 
1548 Id. 
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trade in such security.” In addition, Article (6)(b) of the MCR states that: “A person who 
is not insider is prohibited from engaging in insider trading if he obtains the inside 
information from another person and he knows or should have known, that the information 
is inside information.”1549  
 The elements required to find outsiders liable for trading on inside information are 
as follows: (1) An outsider trades on obtained inside information; and (2) such outsider has 
knowledge that the obtained information is inside information that he/she knows that he is 
in possession of and he/she deliberately intends to exploit the information before the public 
disclosure.1550 However, the element of requiring that an outsider must have knowledge 
that the obtained information is received directly or indirectly from an insider is unclear.  
Does an Outsider need to Know that the Inside Information was Obtained Directly 
or Indirectly from an Insider? 
 
The language of Article (50)(b) of the CML apparently requires that the recipient 
outsider must know that the insider (by disclosing inside information) has expected that 
the outsider will trade on the information.1551 Therefore, the apparent meaning of this 
language indicates that not every disclosure of inside information prohibits recipient 
outsiders from trading on such information. Outsiders are only prohibited from trading 
when they have positive knowledge that the disclosing person is an insider and the 
disclosure was with the expectation that the recipient will trade.1552 Some commentators 
have noticed that Article (50)(b) uses the gerundive “while knowing” which “means the 
                                               
1549 MCR, supra note 156, art 6(b).  
1550 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, P. 13.  
1551 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(b). (This Article states that: “No person may purchase or sell a security 
based on information obtained from an issuer while knowing that such person, by disclosing such insider 
information related to the security, has violated paragraph (a) of this Article.”) Id.  
1552 See Gouda, supra note 161, at 156.  
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seller/buyer of the security must have a positive knowledge that the information he is using 
is leaked by an insider.”1553 
However, the CMA has interpreted Article (50)(b) in a different direction by 
promulgating Article (6)(b) of the MCR.1554 This Article does not require that an outsider 
must receive inside information from an insider but generally states that the inside 
information is obtained from “another person.”1555 The CMA defines “another person” as 
“any natural or legal person recognized as such under the laws of the Kingdom.”1556 The 
CMA has asserted that the identity of the disclosing person is irrelevant to the elements of 
liability of outsiders trading on inside information.1557 The only fact that an outsider needs 
to know or should know is that the information obtained is inside information meeting the 
legal attributes stated under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (4)(c) of the MCR.1558 
Therefore, it can be said that the CMA provides a general prohibition of any attempts to 
exploit inside information through promulgating Article (6)(b), in which inside information 
must not be subject to trading activities by any person whether the information originated 
from an insider or not and whether or not the recipient outsider knows the information was 
leaked by an insider.1559 However, one commentator argued that the CMA, by 
promulgating Article (6)(b), has incorrectly presumed that the material element to prohibit 
outsiders from trading on inside information is the knowledge of the confidential nature of 
                                               
1553 Id.  
1554 MCR, supra note 156, art. 6(b).  
1555 Id. (This Article states that: “A person who is not insider is prohibited from engaging in insider trading 
if he obtains inside information from another person and he knows or should have known, that the information 
is inside information.”) Id.  
1556 Glossary of Defined Terms, supra note 1393.  
1557 ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 2009 ل.س/  of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 8.  
1558 Id; ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, P. 5.  
1559 Id.  
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the received information and not the source of the information as Article (50)(b) expressly 
states.1560 Thus, the commentator argued that the CMA has broadened the scope of an 
illegal corporate insider trading offense to include conduct that the legislators did not intend 
to prohibit under Article (50)(b).1561  
The ACRSD has reviewed this issue on two occasions. In 2009, the ACRSD 
expressly rejected the CMA’s argument and stated that Article 50(b) of CML stated clearly 
that a trading outsider must know that the information he/she possesses is obtained from 
an insider who violated Article 50(a) because of the disclosure.1562 However, in 2015, the 
ACRSD concluded that evidence of trading patterns at suspicious times preceding major 
public disclosure, and the defendant’s acknowledgment that he knew that the information 
he possessed was material and specific information, were enough evidence to find the 
defendant liable based on Article 6(b) of the MCR.1563  
In 2009, the ACRSD reviewed a case brought by the CMA alleging that two 
outsiders traded on inside information in violation of Article (50) of the CML and Articles 
(5)(b) and 6(b) of the MCR.1564 The facts of this case involved two defendants. On two 
separate occasions, the first defendant received inside information which he disclosed to 
his son-in-law (the second defendant) and they traded simultaneously on that 
information.1565 The main dispute between the defendants’ attorney and the CMA was a 
                                               
1560 Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 186.  
1561 Id.  
1562 ACRSD, Decision No.146/ ل.س / 2009, supra note 1457.  
1563 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453.  
1564 ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 2009 ل.س/  of 1430H, supra note 1457. 
1565 Id., The facts of this case are as follows: The first time, on October 29, 2004, the first defendant instructed 
his broker to purchase a large number of shares of a company because he was informed that the Board of 
Directors of this company issued a letter to the Minister of the Ministry of Commerce regarding an increase 
in the company’s capital. The first defendant told his broker that the increase in the company’s capital would 
be announced shortly—within two days—and they were just waiting for the ratification by the Minister. The 
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question of law: whether the CMA is required to prove that the source of the information 
was an insider in accordance with the definition of an insider under Article (50)(a) of the 
CML and Article 4(b) of the MCR.1566 The defendants’ attorney claimed that to hold his 
clients liable for trading on inside information, the CMA must identify the person who 
disclosed the inside information to know whether he/she was an insider or not.1567 If the 
source of the information was an outsider, then the elements of illegal corporate insider 
trading were not satisfied because the regulations require that the disclosure be made by an 
insider in violation of his/her duty under (50)(a).1568 However, the CMA rebutted the 
attorney’s argument by stating that the defendants’ attorney wrongfully alleged that the 
name or identity of the source of the information was necessary to find the defendants liable 
of violating Article 50 of the CML and Article (5)(b) and (6)(b) of the MCR.1569 The 
articles do not require, as an element of illegal corporate insider trading liability, that the 
source of the information is known. There are two elements of illegal corporate insider 
                                               
first defendant also was sure that the rise after the public disclosure would be around SR40 ($10.6) to SR50 
($13.3). At the same time, the first defendant’s son-in-law (second defendant) purchased a high number of 
the same company’s shares. The CMA alleged that the second defendant based his trading in this company 
on the information disclosed by the first defendant. The evidence provided by CMA was recordings of 
telephone conversations between the first defendant and his broker, and the acknowledgment by the first 
defendant that the telephone conversations belonged to him. In addition, the defendants gave contradictory 
statements, and there was no trading history in this company during the previous six months. The evidence 
also indicated that the second defendant’s purchase of shares coincided with the first defendant’s purchase 
and the close relationship between them. For the second trading time, the CMA alleged that the defendants 
traded on inside information on December 18, 2004. The first defendant obtained inside information from an 
insider, then disclosed the information to the second defendant who sold all their stocks in the company. 
Based on the telephone conversation recordings between the first defendant and his broker, the first defendant 
said that “people expected the board of *** Company to announce something. But when I enquired, the board 
told me that nothing will be announced, thus I told you to sell the shares.” The presented evidence was that 
the first defendant acknowledged that it was his voice on the recordings. On the same day, the second 
defendant sold all of his stocks in the company, in addition to the same evidence presented by the CMA 
regarding the first alleged violation. Id. at P. 1-4, 19.  
1566 Id. at P. 5.  
1567 Id.  
1568 Id. at P. 6.   
1569 Id. at P. 8.  
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trading liability required in the regulations: (1) trading by any person based on obtained 
inside information related to the traded security in question; and (2) with the requisite state 
of mind. In other words, a willful violation that is enough to establish liability and general 
criminal intent. This means that the violator knows that he has information that is inside 
information and he/she deliberately intended to exploit it by trading or attempting to 
trade.1570  
The ACRSD rejected the CMA’s argument and stated that Article (50)(b) expressly 
requires a special status of the source of information (i.e., an insider).1571 This requirement 
is emphasized by requiring that the outsider must be aware that by disclosing the inside 
information, the insider has violated Article (50)(a).1572 In regard to the first alleged 
violation, the ACRSD concluded that it could not infer from the available evidence that the 
first defendant received inside information from an insider. However, for the second 
alleged violation, the ACRSD found the defendants liable for trading on inside information 
because the source of the information proved to be an insider. In a recorded telephone 
conversation, the first defendant told his broker that he obtained the information from the 
board of directors of the company. The ACRSD asserted that all directors are insiders and 
there is no need to specifically know which one disclosed the information.1573 
In 2015, the ACRSD revisited this issue of whether it is required to prove that an 
outsider violated the regulations of illegal corporate insider trading by receiving 
information from an insider.1574 The facts of this case involved an allegation by the CMA 
                                               
1570 Id.  
1571 Id. at P. 23. 
1572 Id. at 23.  
1573 Id. at P. 21. 
1574 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453. 
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that an outsider traded on inside information in violation of Article (6)(b) of the MCR.1575 
The allegation stated that the defendant purchased a large number of shares of a listed 
company in 2010 before the announcement of paying dividends and sold all the purchased 
shares after the announcement. Again in 2011, the defendant purchased a large number of 
shares in the same company before the announcement of paying dividends. After the public 
disclosure, the defendant sold all his stocks in this company.1576 However, the CRSD 
acquitted the defendant from illegal corporate insider trading liability, and the CMA 
appealed against the decision.1577 The judgment rendered by the CRSD was based on the 
absence of evidence showing that the defendant was an insider or an outsider who received 
the information from an insider.1578 The CRSD rejected the CMA’s argument regarding the 
broad scope of Article (6)(b) of the MCR, and stated that Article (6)(b) must be read in 
connection with the other provisions, in particular, Article (50)(b) of the CML.1579 
The CMA claimed before the ACRSD that the CRSD’s decision was invalid 
because it erred in the interpretation of the regulations.1580 The CMA stated that under 
Article (50)(c), the CRSD ignored that the CMA has the authority to specify and identify 
the terms stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this article.1581 These paragraphs shows that 
the CMA has the right to issue executive regulations and rules that interpret and detail the 
forms and rules that apply to the prohibition under Article (50) of the CML. These forms 
and conduct include all possible scenarios when inside information may be exploited.1582 
                                               
1575 Id. at P. 1.  
1576 Id.  
1577 Id. at P. 4.  
1578 Id.  
1579 Id. at P. 5.  
1580 Id. at P. 4.  
1581 Id.  
1582 Id.  
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The CMA indicated that Article (6)(b) of the MCR aims to criminalize trading on inside 
information by outsiders when they receive inside information from another person not 
only from an insider as the CRSD’s decision implies.1583 The CMA stressed that the 
defendant admitted that he received information from some friend and did not remember 
his name but the information he obtained was specific.1584 He also admitted that he did not 
know that the information he received was inside information, and if he had known, he 
would not have traded on that information.1585 The defendant also offered to settle the case 
with the CMA.1586 Applying these facts to Article (6)(b), the CMA stated that Article 6(b) 
of the MCR has two parts: (1) it prohibits non-insiders from trading on inside information 
and the defendant was a non-insider who traded on inside information; and (2) the 
information was obtained from another person.1587 It was proven that he traded on inside 
information obtained from a friend. Therefore, there was no requirement that the person 
obtained the information from an insider.1588 The CMA interpreted the term “another 
person” as defined under the Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules 
of the Capital Market Authority.1589 A person means: “Any natural or legal person 
recognized as such under the laws of the Kingdom.”1590  
The ACRSD ruled that it is required in order to prove the violation of trading on 
inside information according to Article (50) of the CML and Article (6)(b) of the MCR to 
include the following elements: (1) trading by an insider or non-insider directly or 
                                               
1583 Id.  
1584 Id. at P. 6.  
1585 Id. at P. 7.  
1586 Id.  
1587 Id. at P. 5.  
1588 Id.  
1589 Glossary of Defined Terms, supra note 1393. 
1590 Id; ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 5.   
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indirectly on inside information; and (2) the person trading knows that the information is 
inside information which requires the satisfaction of the general criminal intent that he 
knows he is in possession of inside information and he desires to exploit such information 
before public disclosure.1591 Based on the presented evidence, the ACRSD concluded that 
the defendant had traded on inside information in violation of Article (50) of the CML and 
Article (6)(b) of the MCR.1592 The ACRSD based the conviction on the proof that the 
defendant acknowledged that he obtained inside information from some friend, and the 
information was specific and reliable. The defendant’s trading pattern was suspicious in 
that he only purchased shares two times in the same company’s stock and sold them after 
the public disclosure.1593 
The ACRSD, however, did not explain how an outsider is liable for trading on 
inside information received from an outsider. This decision apparently does not require 
that an outsider trading on inside information must receive the information from an insider. 
In this case, it can be argued that the ACRSD concluded from the evidence that the nature 
of the information and the trading pattern in addition to other presented evidence 
reasonably led to the conclusion that the information originated from an insider even 
though the insider was not named in the case. Had the information not been specific or the 
defendant had denied that he received the information from someone, it would have been 
difficult for the CMA to prove that the trading was based on inside information. 
Nevertheless, the ACRSD’s conclusion does not seem to be based on finding that the 
information originated from an insider.  
                                               
1591 Id. at P. 13.  
1592 Id.  
1593 Id. at P. 15-16. 
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Definition of Inside Information  
 
The core element of illegal corporate insider trading liability is that the trading is 
based on obtained inside information. Although companies’ insiders are presumed to 
always be aware of the internal affairs of the company they serve, they are only prohibited 
from exploiting certain information, for trading purposes, that meets the statutory 
requirements of inside information.1594 In addition, this prohibition is temporary until this 
defined inside information is released to the public. Therefore, the ACRSD has asserted 
that the protection of inside information starts from the time an insider obtains such 
information until it is disclosed publicly for the purpose of leveling the field between 
general investors and insiders regarding the investment decision-making.1595  
Article (50)(a) of the CML defines inside information as:  
information obtained by the insider and which is not available to the general public, has 
not been disclosed, and such information is of the type that a normal person would realize 
that in view of the nature and content of this information, its release and availability would 
have a material effect on the price or value of a Security related to such information.1596 
 
Article (4) (c) of the MCR also defines inside information by stating that:  
For greater certainty, inside information means information that fulfils the following: 1) 
Information that relates to a security; 2) That has not been disclosed to the general public, 
and that is not otherwise available to the general public; and 3) That a normal person would 
realise that, in view of the nature and content of the information, disclosing it or making it 
available to the public would have a material effect on the price or value of the security.1597 
These Articles define inside information by providing objective characteristics used 
to determine whether one piece of information is inside information, whether according to 
the law or based on the circumstances of the obtained information. In general, there are 
three characteristics of inside information, stated under these Articles, are three 
                                               
1594 See CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a); MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(c).  
1595 ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P. 22.  
1596 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
1597 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(c).  
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characteristics as follows: (1) the information is related to a security; (2) it has not been 
available to the general public; and (3) it is material.1598 These characteristics are discussed 
below.  
Related to a Security 
 
Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (4)(c) of the MCR require that the 
information protected from exploitation must be information related to a security.1599 
Article 4(a) of the MCR defines the meaning of this requirement of which the related 
security “must be a traded security…whose price or value would be materially affected if 
the information was disclosed or made available to the general public.”1600 The CMA also 
defines “traded security” as “a security traded in the exchange.”1601  
This characteristic concerns the object of which the information can be exploited 
under the scope of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading. Inside information is 
exploited by the purchase or sale of a certain traded security related to inside information, 
in which the disclosure of such information would materially impact the price of the 
security in question. 1602 Therefore, the exploitation of inside information that is related to 
an untraded security is excluded from the prohibition boundaries. In addition, information 
that the issuer is permitted to keep secret and is undisclosed to the public is considered to 
                                               
1598 See ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 2009 ل.س/  of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 9.  
1599 Article (2) of the CML states that the term “securities” must include: “(a) Convertible and tradable shares 
of companies; (b) Tradeable debt instruments issued by companies, the government, public institutions or 
public organizations; (c) Investment unites issued by investment funds; (d) Any instruments representing 
profit participation rights, any rights in the distribution of assets; or either or the foregoing; (e) Any other 
rights or instruments which the Board determines should be included to treated as securities if the Board 
believes that this would further the safety of the market or the protection of investors…” CML, supra note 
152, art. 2.  
1600 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(a)(2).  
1601 Glossary of Defined Terms, supra note 1393. 
1602 See Metwally, supra note 1489, at 21.  
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have no impact on the related traded security even though it is confidential. For example, 
it could include patents, trade secrets, and other confidential information that the issuer is 
legally permitted to keep secret and undisclosed.1603    
Article (4)(a)(5) of the MCR expressly states that illegal corporate insider trading 
occurs if the trading is “directly or indirectly effected in a security related to inside 
information.”1604 The same Article determines that the trading is considered to be direct in 
a security if the trader “execute[s] a trade in the security for any account in which he has 
an interest; or if [the trader] makes a bid or offer on the Exchange for the security.”1605 It 
defines the situations that constitute indirect trading in a security as follows: (1) if the trader 
“executes a trade as agent for another person;” (2) if the trader “arranges a trade to which 
a relative or person with whom he has a business or a contractual relationship is party; or 
(3) if the trader “arranges for his agent or any other person acting on his behalf or at his 
direction to trade in the relevant securities.”1606 
Non-Public Information  
 
Article (50)(a) of the CML determines that inside information “is not available to 
the general public, [and] has not been disclosed.”1607  Article (4) of the MCR also describes 
inside information as information that “has not been disclosed to the general public, and 
that is not otherwise available to the general public.”1608 This means that inside information 
is non-public if it is in the hands of people bound by the duty of confidentiality and not yet 
                                               
1603 Id.  
1604 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(a)(5).  
1605 Id. art. (4)(a)(3).  
1606 Id. art. 4(a)(4).  
1607 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
1608 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(c)(2).  
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released to the general public.1609 Therefore, if the information is only known by people 
entrusted to keep the information in confidence, the information is non-public no matter 
how many people know about the information.1610 The requirement that the information 
must be non-public information is imposed because the subject of illegal insider regulations 
is to prevent the exploitation of confidential information, in which it gives the trader an 
informational advantage to more accurately appraise the future value of the related 
security.1611 Non-public information can be defined as any information that is related to the 
issuer’s financial and managerial status or to the issuer’s security itself, and such 
information, which the issuer is required to disclose, has not yet been released to or known 
by the general public.1612 
The CML and CMA’s implementing regulations treat non-public information 
related to the issuer’s earning power and its business and managerial developments as 
confidential information prohibited from being disclosed to outsiders not bound by a duty 
of confidentiality until such information is disclosed through the regulatory means.1613 The 
CMA has also asserted that the duty to disclose non-public information and to maintain the 
                                               
1609 See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 150; Al-Othman, supra note 1478, at 340.  
1610 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 12.  
1611 ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 10. (The CMA asserted that the 
knowledge of inside information gives the insider “an advantage over others that would enable him to 
approach the proper evaluation of share’s market value expected in the near future.”) Id.  
1612 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 11-12. See also ROSCO, supra note 157, arts. 62, and 63.  
1613 Article (45)(c) of the CML considers information and data related to the annual and quarterly reports of 
the issuer that relates to (1) the balance sheet; (2) the profit and loss account; (3) the cash flow statement; and 
(4) “an evaluation of the issuing company management of current and future developments and any future 
possibilities that may have significant effect on the business results or financial position of the company” as 
confidential information before this information is disclosed to the CMA. CML, supra note 152, art. 45(c). 
This Article also requires the issuer to prevent any “disclosing of such information to parties not bound by a 
confidentiality obligation and obligation to protect such information.” Id. In addition, Article (46)(a) of the 
CML requires issuers to disclose to the CMA once such issuer becomes “aware of any material developments 
which may affect the prices of the Securities issued by such party. If such party has a Security traded on the 
Exchange, the Exchange must be informed of such developments in writing.” Id. art. 46(a). See also the 
ROSCO, Id. arts. 61, 62, 63, and 64.  
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confidentiality of such information before public disclosure and illegal corporate insider 
trading liability is connected and indistinguishable.1614 This connection comes from the 
notion that illegal corporate insider trading regulations aim to prohibit the misuse and 
exploitation of inside information for trading purposes before the information becomes 
public through regulatory methods of disclosure. Therefore, “the misuse of information 
not-disclosed by statutory means makes such information inside and confidential.”1615  
Rumors and Unspecific Information v. Non-public Information  
 
Another question that can be raised under the definition of non-public information 
is whether non-public information must also be specific and not based on rumors and 
unverified news to constitute non-public information that is subject to exploitation. Many 
commentators suggest that the content of the information that is related to the traded 
security of the issuer must lead to a realization of the occurrence of a specific event either 
at the current time or in the future.1616 General or speculative information that is not 
supported by facts, such as the company is experiencing its greatest prosperity, is not 
considered non-public information because it lacks the necessary specificity and because 
the person obtaining such information would still undertake substantial economic risk if 
he/she decided to trade based on this information.1617 Therefore, the unfair informational 
advantage is absent. This suggestion also applies to rumors and circulating news, in which 
a person who hears rumors or unverified news is not prohibited from trading on such 
                                               
1614 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 5.  
1615Id.  
1616 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 12.; Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 157; Al-Othman, supra note 1478, at 
340; Metwally, supra note 1489, at 21. 
1617 Id. 
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information since it is not protected under illegal corporate insider trading regulations.1618 
One commentator suggested that this analysis can be inferred from the requirement under 
Article (50)(a) of the CML that non-public “information is of the type that a normal person 
would realize that in view of the nature and content of this information...”1619 This phrase 
implies that the content and nature of the information must be specific and have a 
determinative value of whether it is non-public information; thus, it is protected under 
Article (50) of the CML.1620 
Trading outsiders who deny obtaining inside information from an insider typically 
cite the availability of rumors and speculative news as a defense in illegal corporate insider 
trading cases. In 2009, the ACRSD accepted an outsider defendant’s allegation that his 
trading was based on rumors and speculative news that flourished within the investment 
community and he did not obtain non-public information from his brother, who was the 
chairman of the issuer of the security related to the information in question.1621 The 
ACRSD acknowledged that rumors were spreading on the Internet about an increase in the 
company’s capital which led to an increase in the market price of the company’s stock.1622 
The ACRSD concluded that the increase of the market price of the stock was because of 
the rumors and the circulated news attracted investors to trade.1623 Therefore, under such 
circumstances, the presumption of obtaining inside information is weakened.1624  
                                               
1618 Id.  
1619 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
1620 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 13.  
1621 See ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501. (The information was about an 
imminent conclusion of an acquisition transaction of another company.) Id. at P. 6.  
1622 Id. at P. 21.  
1623 Id.  
1624 Id. at P. 22. 
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In another case in 2015, however, the ACRSD found an outsider liable for trading 
on inside information related to the announcements of paying dividends even though the 
defendant denied receiving the information from an insider but claimed he overheard it 
while at a gathering of friends.1625 The ACRSD concluded that the conviction of the 
defendant under Article (6)(b) of the MCR was based on the reoccurring trading patterns 
of the defendant in the same company’s stock before the two announcements of paying 
dividends in 2010 and 2011, and he did not trade in this stock between these periods. In 
addition, the defendant admitted that he received specific information two different times 
from persons who did not remember sitting with a group of friends.1626  
Article (6)(b) of the MCR does not Require Non-public Information to be Obtained 
from an Insider 
 
As discussed above, Article (6)(b) of the MCR does not require that an outsider has 
some knowledge that the non-public information is obtained from an insider or originated 
from an insider.1627 As a result, the CMA decided that Article (6)(b) of the MCR makes it 
unlawful for any person to trade on inside information obtained from any other persons 
(insiders or outsiders, and known or unknown) if the person receiving the information 
knows or should know that the information is inside information.1628 This interpretation by 
the CMA can mean that investors who obtain information by any means, including social 
media apps, are required to investigate whether the obtained information is non-public and 
prohibited to be used under Article (50)(a) of the CML or not. Therefore, it can be argued 
                                               
1625 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 17.  
1626 Id. at P. 16.  
1627 See supra notes 143-185 and accompanying text.   
1628 See ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 3; ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 
ل.س/ 2009  of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 13. 
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that this prohibition is broad and makes illegal corporate insider trading regulations 
uncertain. In particular, it can include legal trading within the realm of illegal corporate 
insider trading prohibition.1629 This uncertainty can be illustrated as follows:  
1- Article (6)(b) of the MCR does not take into consideration that when 
information including non-public information is transferred between many 
people, there is a high likelihood that the information obtained by the trading 
outsider would lose specificity and even accuracy.1630 Therefore, it is 
impractical to require a trading outsider to inquire about the specificity and 
accuracy of the information, or examine whether the information is non-public 
or not as described under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (4)(c) of the 
MCR.  
2- When a trading outsider decides to trade based on rumors or unverified news 
circulating on the Internet, he/she would take a considerable risk that the 
information may turn out to be untrue. Thus, such a trading outsider would not 
have the unfair informational advantage that illegal corporate insider trading is 
prohibited. Even if the content of the rumor reflects true non-public 
information, it is not likely to be considered non-public at this stage.1631   
3- This Article does not distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors in terms of the ability to distinguish between non-public information 
and mere speculative news. Sophisticated investors are more capable of 
realizing that the information obtained is non-public information based on their 
                                               
1629 See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 186.  
1630 See Coles, supre note 822, at 215. 
1631 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §5:6.  
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knowledge and experience. However, unsophisticated investors are more likely 
to fail to distinguish between speculative news received from friends and non-
public information that is protected from exploitation under Article (50) of the 
CML.1632  
Non-public Information Becomes Public  
 
The prohibition of trading on inside information ends when the information 
becomes public. Thus, the determination of whether or not the information is non-public 
has a determinative outcome in illegal corporate insider trading liability.1633 Article (50) of 
the CML and Article (4) provide two possible ways in which information becomes public: 
(1) when the information is disclosed through regulatory methods of disclosure; or (2) the 
information is available to the general public through any other method of disclosure.1634 
One commentator described this regulatory approach as a mix between a restricted 
approach that only recognizes information as public when the information is disclosed 
through recognized means, and a flexible approach that focuses on the availability of the 
information to the public disregarding the method of disclosure.1635  
Public release of the information by recognized methods undisputedly converts the 
information from non-public to public information so it can legally be used for trading 
purposes. In a case before the ACRSD, the CMA asserted that the purpose of Article (50) 
of the CML is to protect inside information from any misuse or exploitation at the time that 
such information has not been disclosed to the public or made available to the public 
                                               
1632 See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 186. 
1633 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 12.  
1634 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a); MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(c)(2). 
1635Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 154. 
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through the regulatory methods set by the CMA and Exchange.1636 The CMA states that 
the regulatory methods of disclosure are two exclusive methods: (1) disclosing the 
information in a continuous manner according to the continuous disclosure rules; or (2) 
disclosing the information in the periodic financial statements as well as the annual board 
reports.1637 According to the CMA’s implementing regulations and the Exchange’s rules, 
any public disclosure by an issuer must be filed through the electronic system designated 
by the Exchange.1638   
On many occasions, the ACRSD has asserted that the protection of inside 
information in terms of time starts once a person obtains the information until the time of 
public disclosure.1639 However, it remains unclear whether non-public information can 
                                               
1636 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 5.  
1637 Id. See CML, supra note 152, arts. 45(c), and 46(a). (Article (45) of the CML obliges listed companies 
to disclose quarterly and annual reports. Information regarding the financial condition of the issuer, its 
directors and management, and management forecast is protected under paragraph (c) of this Article as is 
deemed confidential, and the issuer is prohibited from disclosing the information to other parties not bound 
by the confidentiality obligation before disclosing the information to the CMA. Article (46)(a) of the CML 
imposes upon issuers a duty to continuously update the CMA in writing once the issuer becomes “aware of 
any material developments which may affect the prices of the securities issued by such party. If such party 
has a Security traded on the Exchange, the Exchange must be informed of such development in writing.”) 
See ROSCO, supra note 157, art. 62. (Article 62 of ROSCO states that: “An issuer must disclose to the 
Authority and the public without delay any material development in its sphere of activity which are not public 
knowledge, and which may affect the assets and liabilities or financial position or the general course of 
business of the issuer or its subsidiaries and which may reasonably lead to movements in the price of the 
issuer’s listed securities or significantly affect an issuer’s ability to meet its commitments in respect of list 
debt instruments.”) See LR of 2017, supra note 158, art. 30.  (Article (30) of the Listing Rules states that “an 
issuer is required to make a disclosure to the public as soon as possible following the occurrence of an event 
that is required to be disclosed pursuant to any applicable continuing obligation set out in the Implementing 
Regulations and the Exchange Rules. In all cases, the disclosure has to be made before the start of the trading 
period that follows the occurrence of the relevant event.”) id.  
1638 ROSCO, supra note 157, arts. 61(a), and (64)(b). (Article (61)(a) of the ROSCO states that: “All 
disclosures made by an issuer must be complete, clear, and accurate and not misleading and shall comply 
with the means of disclosure specified by the Exchange in the Listing Rules.” In addition, Article (64) of the 
ROSCO states that: “The issuer shall disclose its interim and annual financial statement through the electronic 
system specifically designated for such purpose by the Exchange.”) Article (29)(a) of the Exchange’s Listing 
Rules states that: “All notifications to the Exchange and Disclosures to the public by an issuer must be in 
Arabic, the issuer may translate them to English, and must be made through the system specifically 
designated by the Exchange for such purpose.” LR of 2017, Id. art. 29(a).   
1639 ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P. 22.  
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become public for the purpose of illegal corporate insider trading regulations if the 
information has been revealed to the public through non-regulatory designated means. For 
instance, it is unclear whether a press statement by the issuer through a national newspaper 
is adequate to consider the information available to the public. It is certain, however, that 
disclosing inside information before filing the information with the CMA is a violation of 
Article (45)(c) of the CML.1640 The CMA has actively enforced this prohibition against 
even press statements or interviews made by listed company officials where a new 
development has been disclosed before notifying the CMA.1641  In one case, the CMA 
asserted that disclosing non-public information to a news reporter was in violation of the 
prohibition of disclosing inside information under Article (5)(a) of the MCR. However, the 
ACRSD reversed the decision of CMA and asserted that disclosing non-public information 
through a media press is not actionable under illegal corporate insider trading 
regulations.1642  
According to the available data of illegal corporate insider trading cases, there has 
been no case where a defendant has alleged the availability of information to the public 
through nontraditional public disclosure, such as a press statement. However, it can be 
inferred from the definition of inside information under Article (4)(c)(2) of the MCR that 
non-public information can become public if it is disclosed through nationwide news media 
                                               
1640 See supra note 229.  
1641 See ACRSD, Decision No. 417/L.S/2011 of 1433 H. season of 2/2/1433H (corresponding to Dec 27, 
2011), http://www.crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/417-33E.pdf. (The case 
involved a grievance claim by a listed company against the CMA Board’s decision imposing a fine on the 
company of an amount equal to SR. 200,000 ($53.333) for a press statement made by the company’s 
chairman to a national newspaper before disclosing this information to the CMA. The disclosed information 
was that the board of directors decided to pay interim dividends to the shareholders. The ACRSD rejected 
the company’s claim and endorsed the CMA Board’s decision.) Id. at 2.  
1642 ACRSD, Decision No.424/ L.S/ 2012 of 1433 H, supra note 1526, at P. 4.  
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in which the availability of the information to the general public is accomplished even 
though the disclosure is in violation of other provisions of the CML since the goal of equal 
access to information is fulfilled.1643  
Material Information 
 
The Saudi Arabian regulators have realized that not all non-public information 
related to a traded security must be subject to the prohibition of trading on inside 
information.1644 Therefore, Article (50) of the CML states that inside information must be 
material, which means the information “is of the type that a normal person would realize 
that in view of the nature and content of this information, its release and availability would 
have a material effect on the price or value of a Security related to such information.”1645 
Article (4) of the MCR also requires that inside information must be information “that a 
normal person would realise that, in view of the nature and content of the information, 
disclosing it or making available to the public would have a material effect on the price or 
value of the security.”1646  
The adopted materiality standard is that non-public information is material if it 
would objectively and significantly impact the price or value of the related security because 
of the public disclosure of such information.1647 This is what Article (4)(a)(2) of the MCR 
indicates by defining a security related to inside information. This Article states that: “A 
security related to inside information shall mean any security whose price or value would 
                                               
1643 Article (4)(c)(2) of the MCR defines non-public information as information “has not been disclosed to 
the general public, and that is not otherwise available to the general public.” MCR, supra note 156, art. 
4(c)(2). See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 153. See also Metwally, supra note 1489, at 14.  
1644 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 15.  
1645 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
1646 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(c)(3).  
1647 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 15. 
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be materially affected if the information was disclosed or made available to the general 
public.”1648  
To determine whether the information is material because of its disclosure would 
have a material effect on the related price or value of a security, Article (50)(a) of the CML 
and Article (4)(c)(3) of the MCR provides an objective test based on a normal person’s 
perspective of whether the information is material or not.1649 A reasonable person’s 
standard determines whether the information is material or immaterial based on the content 
and nature of the information itself regardless of whether the person receiving the 
information treats it as such if, as a matter of law or under the circumstances, it is material 
information.1650  
CMA’s Determination of Material Information  
 
In addition to the requirement of making periodic reports and to accomplish CML’s 
goal of full disclosure, the CMA imposed two duties of continuous disclosure upon issuers. 
First, under Article 62 of the ROSCO, the CMA requires issuers to publicly disclose 
material developments, under the assessment of the issuer, at the time they are discovered 
and without delay.1651 Furthermore, Article (63) of the ROSCO necessitates prompt 
disclosure of specific developments and events notwithstanding the issuer’s assessment 
                                               
1648 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(a)(2). 
1649 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 16; Metwally, supra note 1489, at 19; Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 
155.  
1650 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 17.  
1651 ROSCO, supra note 204, art. 62(a) (Under this article, material developments that must be disclosed are 
any new event that is not already known by the general public, and may affect the assets and liabilities or 
financial position of the issuer that may reasonably lead to a change in the price of the related security or 
would significantly affect the issuer’s ability to fulfill its commitment related to listed debt instruments. For 
the purpose of determining whether the information is material, issuers are required to “assess whether a 
prudent investor would be likely to consider information about the development in making his investment 
decision.”) Id.  
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about the materiality of such events.1652 This Article enumerates 27 specific events that 
cover most of the issuer’s business operations and management developments in addition 
to matters affecting the life-cycle of the issuing company.1653   
                                               
1652 ROSCO, supra note 204, art. 63.  
1653 These 27 specific events are as follows: “1) any transaction to purchase, sell, lease or mortgage an asset 
at a price equal to or greater than 10% of the net assets of the issuer according to the latest reviewed interim 
financial statements or audited annual financial statements, whichever is later; 2) any debt outside the issuer’s 
ordinary course of business, of a value equal to or greater than 10% of the issuer’s net assets; according to 
the latest reviewed interim financial statements or audited annual financial statements, whichever is later; 3) 
any losses equal to or greater than 10% of the issuer’s net assets; according to the latest reviewed interim 
financial statements or audited annual financial statements, whichever is later; (4) any significant change in 
the issuer’s production environment or activity including (but not limited to) the availability of resources and 
the possibility of obtaining them; 5) any changes in the composition of the directors, the audit committee or 
to CEO’s position of the issuer, and in case the issuer is a special purposes entity, any changes in the 
composition of the directors, the audit committee or to CEO’s position of the sponsor and the special purposes 
entity; 6) any dispute including any litigation, arbitration, or mediation where the value involved is equal to 
or greater than 5% of the net assets of the issuer according to the latest reviewed interim financial statements 
or audited annual financial statements, whichever is later; 7) any judicial decision issued against the board or 
any of the directors where the subject of the decision involved relates to the business of the board or any of 
the directors in the issuer; 8) the increase or decrease in the net assets of the issuer equal to or greater than 
10% according to the latest reviewed interim financial statements or audited annual financial statements, 
whichever is later; the increase or decrease in the gross profit of the issuer equal to or greater than 10% 
according to the latest audited financial statements; 10) the entering into, or the unexpected termination of, 
any contract with revenues equal to or greater than 5% of the gross revenues of the issuer according to the 
latest audited annual financial statements;  11) any transaction between the issuer and a related party or any 
arrangement through which the issuer and a related party invest in any project or asset or provide financing 
therefore if this transaction or arrangement is equal to or greater than 1% of the gross revenues of the issuer 
according to the latest audited annual financial statements; 12) any interruption in the principal activities of 
the issuer or its subsidiaries equal to or greater than 5% of the gross revenues according to the latest audited 
annual financial statements;  13) any changes in the issuer’s articles of association or the location of the 
issuer’s principal office;  14) any change in its external auditors;  15) the presentation of any winding-up 
petition, the making of any winding-up order or the appointment of a liquidator in respect of the issuer or its 
affiliates under the Companies Law, or the commencement of any proceedings under the Bankruptcy 
Regulations; 16) the passing of a resolution by the issuer or its affiliates that it be dissolved or liquidated, or 
the occurrence of an event or termination of a period of time which would require the issuer to be put into 
liquidation or dissolution;  17) the making of any judgement, decision, order or declaration by a court or 
judicial body, whether at first instance or on appeal, which may adversely affect the issuer’s utilisation of 
any portion of its assets which in aggregate value represents a value in excess of 5% or more of the net assets 
of the issuer according to the latest reviewed interim financial statements or audited annual financial 
statements, whichever is later;  18) the call for convening a general or special assembly and its agenda;  19) 
the outcome of the general or special assembly;  20) any proposed change in the capital of the issuer; 21) any 
decision to declare, recommend to declare or pay dividends or to make any other distributions to the holders 
of its listed securities;  22) any decision or a recommendation not to pay dividends which would otherwise 
have been expected to have been paid; 23) any decision to call, repurchase, draw, redeem or propose to buy 
any of its securities and the total amount and value thereof; 24) any decision not to make payment in respect 
of debt instruments or convertible debt instruments; or 25) any change in the rights attaching to any class of 
listed shares or to the debt instruments convertible to such shares. 26) If the issuer is a special purposes entity, 
any court proceedings taken or threatened against the special purposes entity, any criminal or disciplinary 
procedures or sanctions to be inflicted on or likely to be inflicted on the special purposes entity. 27) If the 
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The CMA believes that the issuers’ duty to disclose relevant information imposed 
under the CML and its implementing regulations is to fulfill the policy of full disclosure to 
give public investors adequate information to make their investment decisions in view of 
equal access to sensitive price information related to traded securities.1654 The idea is that 
any misuse of inside information before public disclosure is in violation of the essence of 
the CML and its implementing regulations.1655 Therefore, the CMA has considered that 
any information an issuer is required to disclose is either related to periodic reports or to 
continuous disclosure. Thus, a twofold paradigm is material regarding illegal corporate 
insider trading liability.1656 
In illegal corporate insider trading cases, the issue of materiality of non-public 
information has been presumed to suffice with little discussion. The CMA and ACRSD 
approved the satisfaction of the materiality element of inside information by the issuing 
company disclosing the information  to the public and presuming the information disclosed 
meets the materiality requirement laid out under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article 
(4)(c) of the MCR.1657 When the element of materiality was discussed, it was enough for 
the ACRSD to indicate how the public disclosure of such information would affect the 
issuer’s financial condition or its business growth and the subsequent result on the value 
                                               
issuer is a special purposes entity, any court proceedings taken or threatened against members of the board 
of directors of a special purposes entity, any criminal or disciplinary proceedings or sanctions to be inflicted 
on or likely to be inflicted on members of the board of directors of the special purpose entity, If the subject 
matter of the procedure or sanction relates to the work of the Board of Directors or one of its members in the 
Special Purpose Entity.” Id.  
1654 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, at P.15; ACRSD, Decision 
No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 5-6. 
1655 Id.  
1656 Id.  
1657 For example, see Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 49, at P. 4-5, 15-16; ACRSD, 
Decision No.424/ L.S/ 2012 of 1433 H, supra note 1526, at P. 2; ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 
1430 H, supra note 1456, at P.13, 19-20.  
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of the issuer’s security. In one case, the materiality element of disclosed information was 
approved by referring to the issuer’s statement about the effect of such information.1658 In 
this case, the announcement about a real estate sale included the following statement: “the 
company would achieve…a gain of (SR77.500,00). Such gain would positively affect the 
results of the fourth quarter of the year 2010, increase the rights of shareholders and provide 
the liquidity that would contribute to implementing company’s future investments and 
projects.”1659 
Market Reaction after Public Disclosure 
 
Although the focus in illegal corporate insider trading cases before the ACRSD is 
on the fundamental effect of the issuer’s disclosure on the value of the traded security, the 
reaction of the market price is a statutory measure to determine the materiality of 
information. Article (50)(a) plainly states that the materiality standard is determined by 
inquiring whether a reasonable person would view the disclosure of the information to the 
public as having “a material effect on the price or value of a Security related to such 
information.”1660 Thus, a reflection in the market price because of the information disclosed 
is an important aspect to determine the materiality of the information.1661 The CMA has 
used the market price reaction after the disclosure to calculate the profits gained or loss 
avoided by the defendant from trading on inside information.1662 In one case, the ACRSD 
analyzed the materiality of information in question based on the market price reflection 
                                               
1658 ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, at P. 20.  
1659 Id.  
1660 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a). 
1661 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 15. 
1662 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P.1.  
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after the public disclosure.1663 In this case, the defendant’s attorney unsuccessfully tried to 
undermine the materiality of the information in question.1664 The attorney stated that the 
disclosed information about the board of directors’ decision to raise the workforce 
development program expenses allocated to the fourth quarter of 2004 from SR37.5 million 
($19.6 million) to SR467.5 million ($124.666 million) was immaterial since the 2004 
profits at the announcement of financial results were higher than the profits of 2003.1665 In 
addition, the attorney argued that it was uncertain whether or not the decrease of the stock 
price after the public disclosure was due to the information in question.1666 However, the 
ACRSD rejected the defendant’s attorney’s argument and asserted that the Article (50)(a) 
test of materiality was linked to a prudent person’s realization of the information’s 
significant impact on the price or value of a security.1667 The ACRSD found that since the 
stock market price decreased by 6.8 percent compared to the closing price of the previous 
day before the public disclosure, it was enough to prove materiality where no other factors 
were proved to contribute to the adverse impact of the stock price after the public 
announcement of the financial results.1668  
Must Material Information be Certain? 
 
The statutory definition of inside information, under Article (50)(a) of the CML, 
apparently does not require that for the information to be material it must be certain that it 
will occur.1669 In fact, the statutory definition hinges on finding materiality on a significant 
                                               
1663 ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 1431 H, supra note 1404. 
1664 Id. at P. 4.  
1665  Id.  
1666 Id.  
1667 Id. at P. 6.  
1668 Id. at 6. 
1669 See CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
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effect of the information after public disclosure on the price or value of the related 
security.1670 This means that based on an objective assessment of its disclosure or 
availability to the general public, information is material inside information if the 
information is related to a security and its public disclosure would significantly affect the 
price or value of the related security, even if a price change is uncertain to occur.1671 
However, part of the objective assessment of the materiality of information in question is 
based on whether it is more likely than not that the information will occur. When the 
information is more unlikely to occur, it is not required to be publicly disclosed since an 
effect on the price or value of the related security is unlikely. However, there is no clear 
legal standard to determine when a future event will probably occur.  
Illegal insider trading cases tried before the ACRSD show that the probability of 
the occurrence of an event is most likely to be an issue related to mergers and acquisitions. 
In one case, the ACRSD concluded that information was material if it involved the 
knowledge of the defendant (the vice president of the company) about a management 
memorandum that would be presented to the board of directors. The memorandum would 
request a feasibility study and recommend financial advisors to conduct the study on 
converting some affiliated companies to a joint stock company or merging them into the 
parent company, and to determine the capital increase accordingly and recommend hiring 
financial advisors to conduct the study.1672 The defendant’s attorney argued that the 
decision to conduct the study issued by the board of directors was immaterial because it 
                                               
1670 Id.  
1671 See ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 2009 ل.س/  of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 9.  
1672 ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P. 21. 
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was just a mandate to conduct a study not an approval of the conversion or the merger.1673 
The ACRSD rejected the attorney’s argument and concluded that the request to conduct 
the study met the requirement of inside information.1674 The ACRSD noted that the 
management memorandum was preceded by inviting financial advisors including their 
names in the minutes of the board. Thus, the information was not hidden from the defendant 
(as the vice president), so he was aware that he was in possession of inside information 
from the time he had knowledge of the request until the disclosure to the public.1675  
Another case related to trading on inside information involving an acquisition 
transaction. The ACRSD concluded that the knowledge or expectation of an imminent 
approval of an acquisition deal by the board of directors of a listed company and the 
subsequent public disclosure was material inside information.1676 The defendant’s attorney 
unsuccessfully alleged that the acquisition negotiation, which his client (the chairman of 
the acquiring company) was authorized to conclude, was not material because it was mere 
negotiation and was uncertain to occur since it was conditioned on the approval of the 
board of directors.1677 The attorney argued that the memorandum contained a term that 
allowed revocation or cancelation of the deal at any time. Therefore, the attorney claimed 
that his client’s trading before the approval of the acquisition deal by the board of directors 
did not constitute illegal corporate insider trading because the information was 
immaterial.1678 The ACRSD concluded that the deal of acquiring all proprietary rights of 
                                               
1673 Id. at P. 5.  
1674 Id. at P. 20. 
1675 Id.  
1676ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 19. 
1677 Id. at 6. 
1678 Id. (The facts of this case involved the following events: First, at the beginning of 2006, the negotiation 
started between the chairman’s company to acquire all proprietary rights of another company. A 
memorandum of understanding was signed to authenticate the willingness of the two companies and their 
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another company is inside information meets all the requirements stated in Article (50)(a) 
of the CML and Article (4)(c) of the MCR.1679 The ACRSD asserted that the inside 
information regarding this case constituted inside information from the time the defendant 
was authorized to complete the negotiation with the other company until the time of the 
public disclosure about the conclusion of the transaction.1680  
The ACRSD, however, did not offer an express standard that would objectively 
determine when an expectation of the conclusion of merger and acquisition deals 
constitutes knowledge of inside information. What can be inferred from the ACRSD’s 
decision is that an expectation of the occurrence of an acquisition or merger (which 
constitutes inside information) may be presumed to take place at any time—between the 
knowledge of one or more serious steps to prepare for a merger or an acquisition until any 
public disclosure of related information. These serious steps taken to prepare for a merger 
could include (1) knowledge about an imminent decision by the board of directors to 
                                               
consent to enter into negotiations about the acquisition of all proprietary rights of the other company and 
concluding the deal when there was consensus of all the terms of the deal. The signature of the memorandum 
of understanding was disclosed to the public. The board of directors of the acquiring company authorized the 
defendant (the chairman) to represent the company in the negotiation and to conclude the acquisition deal. 
The defendant purchased shares of his company. Next, the board of directors issued a decision to continue 
concluding the deal based on the offer presented by the other company and authorized the defendant to sign 
the memorandum of agreement. Later, the company disclosed to the public that the board of directors 
approved the acquisition of the entire proprietary rights of another company for an amount equal to SR273 
million ($72,800 million).) Id. at P. 19. 
1679 Id. at P. 19.  
1680 Id. (In this case, the CMA asserted that the negotiation between the companies about the acquisition was 
emphasized by signing the memorandum of understanding. Thus, it met the requirements of inside 
information because the company publicly disclosed the negotiation and the signed memorandum of 
understanding. As the CMA stated, if the negotiation was immaterial, the company would not have had to 
disclose it to the public. Id. at P. 14. However, because the defendant’s trading occurred after the disclosure 
of the acquisition negotiations, the inside information that was found to be misused was the expectation of 
imminent approval of the deal followed by public disclosure.) Id. at P. 19. 
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conduct a feasibility study,1681 or (2) knowledge of a serious merger negotiation involving 
the signing of a memorandum of understanding.1682  
Requisite State of Mind: The Possession vs. Actual Use of Inside Information  
 
To avoid punishing innocent acts, the regulations consider illegal corporate insider 
trading as intentional criminal conduct. In fact, the requirement that the conduct of illegal 
corporate insider trading must be intentional is considered the legal element that restricts 
the range of liability of illegal corporate insider trading.1683 The requisite state of mind 
required under the regulation of illegal corporate insider trading is the insider’s knowledge 
that the information obtained is non-public and material.1684 To establish illegal corporate 
insider trading liability, Article (50)(a) expressly requires that the insider “knows that such 
information is not generally available and that, if it were available, it would have a material 
effect on the price or value of such security.”1685  
The requisite culpable state of mind, termed “the moral element,” is established 
based on the availability of the general criminal intent.1686 This general criminal intent 
means that the insider must be aware that he/she is in possession of inside information that 
satisfies all of the legal characteristics required under Article (50)(a), and he/she willfully 
desires to exploit the information by trading in the related security while the obtained 
information is still unknown to the public.1687  
                                               
1681 See ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P. 20.  
1682 See ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 19. 
1683 Beach, supra note 153, at 344. 
1684 See Id.   
1685 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a). 
1686 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 39; Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 186.  
1687 See Id; Nabeel Yousef Al-Samhan, Insider’s Penal Responsibility for the Inside information in Stock 
Exchange -A Comparative Study-, 73 (2013-2014), https://meu.edu.jo/libraryTheses/587ddb4f44993_1.pdf. 
(Ar) 
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This standard of awareness and desire to exploit has been established to fulfill the 
moral element by the ACRSD and the CMA in illegal corporate insider trading cases. The 
CMA has asserted that illegal corporate insider trading is a willful and intentional violation 
that requires general criminal intent. In particular, the defendant is aware of possessing 
inside information that has not been disclosed to the public, and he/she deliberately exploits 
the information by trading or disclosing the information to others while the information is 
non-public.1688 Similarly, the ACRSD has stated that, pursuant to Article (50)(a) of the 
CML and Article (6) of the CML, the required element is that the insider or outsider knows 
that the information he/she is trading on is based on inside information. Thus, this element 
is determined by the availability of the general criminal intent which includes both 
knowledge and desire. This requires that the person knowingly possesses inside 
information and knowingly exploits or uses this information before it becomes public 
knowledge.1689  
Article (50)(a), however, does not expressly require actual knowledge of inside 
information. This allows the court to presume knowledge based on the availability of 
circumstances surrounding the trade in question.1690 The ACRSD and CMA have applied 
a presumption of the fulfillment of this element when the conduct of trading on a security 
related to inside information occurs before the information is disclosed to the public, and 
where circumstantial evidence supports an inference of awareness and exploitation.1691 In 
one case against a chairman of a listed company who purchased the company’s stock before 
                                               
1688 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P.5; ACRSD, Decision No.974/ 
L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 2.  
1689 ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 21.  
1690 Beach, supra note 153, at 344 Nt. 187. 
1691 See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 182.  
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the disclosure of an acquisition deal, the ACRSD found that the moral element of illegal 
corporate insider trading was satisfied based on the following reasons: (1) the defendant 
was authorized by the board of directors to negotiate and close the acquisition deal; (2) the 
defendant failed to provide a reasonable explanation of his trading act that justified the 
purchase of his company’s stock before the board of director’s meeting and the public 
disclosure; and (3) the absence of any purchase trading by the defendant during the six 
months prior to the purchase.1692 Therefore, the ACRSD concluded that the evidence 
revealed “the awareness of the defendant that he possessed inside information that had not 
been disclosed to the public, and his intent to utilize the information by the purchase of the 
company’s stock during the period preceding the announcement to the public.”1693 
Another case involved an allegation against two directors of a listed company, who 
were also brothers, and four of their family members for trading on inside information and 
disclosure of the information related to a real estate sale of the company.1694 The ACRSD 
determined fulfillment of the moral element based on the following presented evidence by 
the CMA: (1) the first defendant was a member of the executive committee in the listed 
company and was authorized to negotiate and sign the sale deal which informed him about 
concluding the deal per law; (2) the family relationship connected the defendants and the 
defendants’ trading in a short period before the public disclosure; (3) most of the 
defendants purchased the company’s stock after the company received a serious offer to 
purchase the company’s real estate  and before the public disclosure, and sold their entire 
holdings after the disclosure; (4) there were contradictory reasons and statements to the 
                                               
1692 ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 19. 
1693 Id.  
1694ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 20. 
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CRSD by the trading relatives regarding their trading at the time of the investigation; and 
(5) the defendants did not make any trading transactions on the stock in question for at least 
six months prior to their trading in question..1695 
The meaning of stating that the moral element is satisfied by the availability of 
general criminal intent is that the motivation or the goal of trading or disclosing inside 
information is irrelevant to find an insider liable.1696 It is irrelevant whether the insider 
intended to personally gain illegal profit from the trade or whether the insider intended to 
donate the profit to charity.1697 An insider would be held liable for disclosing inside 
information when he/she is aware that he/she is disclosing inside information to another 
while the information is non-public.1698 Thus, it is irrelevant whether the disclosing insider 
would personally benefit from the disclosure or not.1699  
The CMA, however, has realized that a general standard of awareness could 
unwittingly hinder financial institutions and other authorized persons’ job of conducting 
their securities business.1700 Therefore, the CMA’s Authorized Persons Regulations of 
2005 (APR), Article (30)(c) has provided an affirmative defense from illegal corporate 
insider trading liability under Articles (5) and (6) of the MCR. This defense applies to 
authorized persons or their employees acting on their behalf if they deal in or advise on a 
                                               
1695 Id. P. 20. 
1696 ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 1431 H, supra note 1404, at P. 5. See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, 
at 182. 
1697 See Al-Samhan, supra note 1687, at 74. 
1698 ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 20; Al-Samhan, supra note 1687, 
at 74. 
1699 See Id. 
1700 For more information about the regulations regarding authorized persons, please see Authorized Persons 
Regulations, Board of the Capital Market Authority’s Resolution No. 1-83-2005, Dated 21/05/1426H 
(corresponding to June 28, 2005), Amended by Resolution No. 3-85-2017, Dated 27/12/1438H 
(corresponding to Sep 18, 2017),  
https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/AUTHORISED%20PERSON.pdf. See also 
Mahayni, supra note 160, at 176. 
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security related to inside information “while another department of the authorised person 
is in possession of inside information.”1701  To claim the availability of this defense, 
authorized persons must meet the following conditions: (1) the authorized person has 
established “Chinese wall” arrangements1702 and effectively applied and maintained these 
arrangements in proportion to the nature and size of the authorized person’s securities 
business; and (2) the individual making the deal or advising the activity neither has 
knowledge of inside information nor has obtained “advice on the dealing or advising 
activity from an individual who has knowledge of the inside information.” 1703 
Is It an Admissible Defense to Claim Non-use of Inside Information after Admitting 
Awareness? 
 
The defense of non-use of obtained inside information can arise after it is proven 
that the defendant was aware of inside information and presumed that the trading or 
disclosure was for exploitation of such information. In this scenario, the defendant may 
argue that he/she was going to trade anyway and obtaining inside information was not the 
motivation of his/her trading activity, but he/she had other legal reasons to trade (e.g., a 
previous plan to pay for a financial obligation or liquidation and reinvestment, or based on 
a noticeable increase of stock market prices in general). This issue has been discussed by 
the ACRSD and CMA. However, the motivation is excluded from the assessment of the 
satisfaction of the moral element, which only requires general criminal intent toward the 
                                               
1701 Authorized Persons Regulations, supra note 1700, art. 30(c). 
1702 Article (30)(a) of the Authorised Persons Regulations defines “Chinese Wall Arrangements” as “written 
policies and procedures established by an authorised person to secure confidential or inside information 
obtained by authorised person in the course of carrying on securities business that are designed to ensure that 
the information is known only to employees of the authroised person who are authrorised to receive it, and 
to ensure that the information is not disclosed to any other persons.” Id. 
1703 Authorised Persons Regulations, supra note 1700, art. 30(c) (1), (2), and (3). 
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elements of the prohibited conduct. Thus, this defense has been rejected by the ACRSD 
and CMA.1704 At the same, they did not close the door for a  future argument that could be 
more persuasive regarding the legitimacy of the reason to trade as a legal defense. 
One case involved an allegation against a company director who traded while he 
was aware of inside information regarding a potential decision by the board of director to 
conduct a feasibility study of a merger.1705 The defendant’s attorney unsuccessfully argued 
that the prohibited trading conduct under Article (50)(a) was the trades based on inside 
information for the purpose of protecting trading activities made in good faith and was not 
based on inside information.1706 The attorney argued that his client’s purchase of the 
company’s stock was not based on inside information but was based on his analysis of the 
stock price movement and the noticeable increase of the market price of the stock.1707 The 
attorney claimed that his client had long been aware of the request to convert the affiliated 
companies into one joint stock company or merge them into the parent company. However, 
his trading pattern for the sale of his ownership resulted in the sale of 2 million shares, 
which proved that his client did not make his purchase of 249,803 shares before the 
announcement based on this inside information.1708 
The CMA rejected the attorney’s argument and asserted that while the defendant 
was aware of inside information, the defendant’s trading was, by itself and without more, 
a violation of Article (50)(a) of the CML. This Article prohibits a person obtaining inside 
information from trading directly or indirectly on the security related to the information.1709 
                                               
1704 See ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 1431 H, supra note 1404, at P. 5. 
1705ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P. 1. 
1706 Id. at P. 5.  
1707 Id.  
1708 Id. at P. 6.  
1709 Id. at P. 7.  
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The CMA rebutted the attorney’s claim of non-use of inside information by referring to the 
elements required to find an insider liable under Article (50)(a). The CMA emphasized that 
someone who trades while he is aware of inside information obtained because of his/her 
special position satisfies all the elements required under Article (50)(a).1710 This is because 
“the knowledge of inside information provide the one who possesses it a greater advantage 
that would enable him to be close to an accurate assessment of the market value of the 
stock.”1711 However, while rejecting that the motivation of trade is relevant to satisfy the 
moral element, the CMA stated that: “If we found during the investigations that the motive 
of the purchase of company’s shares was not based on the inside information, this 
accusation would have been set aside. On the contrary, the investigations revealed that the 
inside information was the motive of the purchase of the shares.”1712 
The ACRSD rejected the defendant’s defense that the obtained inside information 
was not the motive of the trade but the increase of the market price of the stock. The 
ACRSD stated that the market price of the stock was higher in previous periods, but the 
defendant did not purchase the stock in these periods.1713 In addition, the ACRSD asserted 
that this defense should be ignored because of the inability of the defendant to reasonably 
justify his purchase of the stock in question.1714  
In another case, a company’s insider sold a large number of his stock holdings 
before the announcement of crediting unexpected expenses to the fourth quarter financial 
                                               
1710 Id. 
1711 Id. 
1712 Id. 
1713 Id. at 21. 
1714 Id.  
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results.1715 The defendant’s attorney alleged that the motivation of the trading activity was 
to have liquidity to pay off debt.1716 However, the ACRSD rejected this argument and 
stated that this defense was not an acceptable reason or a legal justification for trading 
during a lock-up period. The validity and integrity of the motive to trade did not negate the 
offense as long as the moral element of the offense was satisfied. In addition. the ACRSD 
noted that the reason was not justified since the value of the shares sold exceeded the 
amount of the alleged debt, which demonstrated that the motive was not to pay the debt.1717  
Summary 
 
This part describes the regulations related to illegal corporate insider trading in 
Saudi Arabia by answering three questions: (1) Who is subject to the prohibition? (2) What 
does inside information mean? and (3) What is the requisite state of minds to find liability?  
This part shows that the theory that the Saudi Arabian regulators used to regulate 
the subject of trading on inside information is equal access to information. That said, the 
prohibition reach goes beyond traditional corporate insiders to include persons having the 
status of insiders if they obtain inside information through a family, business, and 
contractual relationship. The prohibition also includes corporate outsiders who trade on 
inside information when they have knowledge that the information is inside information. 
In addition to prohibiting trading on inside information, Saudi regulations prohibit insiders 
from disclosing inside information to outsiders before public disclosure. They also prohibit 
outsiders from disclosing inside information obtained from insiders to others. Inside 
information is information that which is not public, related to a traded security, and its 
                                               
1715ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 1431H, supra note 1404, at P.1 
1716 Id. at 3.  
1717 Id. at 5. 
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disclosure or availability to the public would significantly affect the price or value of the 
related security.   
This part reveals some uncertainty regarding the application of the regulations on 
certain aspects where the distinction between legal and illegal trading becomes difficult to 
ascertain. In particular, there is no clear answer about whether insiders’ unlawful disclosure 
of inside information requires positive knowledge that the disclosure will result in helping 
another person’s trade on such information. It is also uncertain whether legitimate reasons 
for trade would foreclose corporate insiders from liability if they traded at a time they were 
aware of inside information. In addition, this part reveals that there is a contradiction in 
liability standards regarding outsiders’ trading on inside information between the statute 
and CMA’s regulations. CMA’s regulation does not require that that the outsider must 
know that the inside information was received from an insider. In contrast, the statute does 
require this element.  
Once a person violates the prohibition of trading on inside information, he/she is 
subject to various sanctions and penalties. The next part discusses governmental 
enforcement of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading.     
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Part 4. Governmental Enforcement of the Illegal Corporate Insider Trading 
Prohibition  
 
Overview 
 
The Saudi Arabian regulators have viewed the act of illegal corporate insider 
trading by statutory insiders and others as a serious threat to the safety and honesty of the 
capital market of Saudi Arabia. The CML and its implementing regulations have been 
designed to address such abusive market conduct by providing general prohibition of 
trading on inside information upon statutory insiders and others obtaining such information 
improperly. As a result, illegal corporate insider trading has been deterred and discouraged 
by categorizing it as criminal conduct punishable by the highest severe sanctions that the 
CML applies for securities violations. The regulators also have taken into consideration the 
difficulty of proving illegal corporate insider trading violations and the nature of how these 
violations occur. Thus, the CML has allowed the prosecution to prove the perpetration of 
illegal corporate insider trading using all types of evidence, whether it is direct or 
circumstantial.   
This part discusses the elements of illegal corporate insider trading liability and the 
evidence needed to prove the satisfaction of these elements. This part also examines the 
sanctions that may be applied and imposed against illegal corporate insider trading 
wrongdoers.   
Elements of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Liability  
 
To prove that a person, who is subject to the prohibition scope of illegal corporate 
insider trading, is liable for violating Article (50) of the CML and Articles (4), (5), or (6) 
of the MCR, there must be a satisfaction of elements required under these articles. Article 
(50)(a) of the CML states that an insider is prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in 
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a security related to inside information when the insider knows that such information is not 
generally available and, if it were available, it would have a material effect on the price or 
value of such security.1718 It also prohibits an insider from disclosing such information to 
another person with the expectation that such person will trade in the related 
security.1719Article (6)(a) and (5)(a) of the MCR provide the same prohibition. Article 
(6)(a) states that: “an insider is prohibited from engaging in insider trading.”1720Article 
(5)(a) prohibits insiders “from disclosing any inside information to any other person.”1721  
In addition to prohibiting insiders from engaging in illegal corporate insider trading 
and improper disclosure conduct, Article (50)(b) imposes prohibition upon outsiders as 
follows: “No person may purchase or sell a security based on information obtained from 
an insider while knowing that such person, by disclosing such insider information related 
to the security,” and if so, they have violated their duty not to disclose under Article 
(50)(a).1722 The prohibition is defined under Article (6)(b) and (5)(b) of the MCR. Article 
(6)(b) provides that an outsider is prohibited from engaging in illegal corporate insider 
trading if he/she obtains inside information from another person and knows or should know 
that the information is inside information.1723 Article (5)(b) of the MCR states that an 
outsider is prohibited from disclosing inside information he/she has obtained from an 
insider.1724     
                                               
1718 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
1719 Id. 
1720 MCR, supra note 156, art. 6(a). 
1721 Id. art. 5(a).  
1722 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(b).  
1723 MCR, supra note 156, art. 6(b).  
1724 Id. art. 5(b).  
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On the basis of this preview of these articles, the elements of liability for illegal 
corporate insider trading can be divided into two types depending on the determination of 
whether the accused person is a statutory insider or an outsider. 
Statutory Insiders’ Elements of Liability  
 
If the accused person is a statutory insider, three elements are required to find the 
insider liable for violating Article (50)(a) of the CML and Articles (6)(a) and (5)(a) of the 
MCR. The first element, the “assumed element,” requires determining that the accused 
insider has special status. The second element, the “material element,” covers the actus 
reus of the prohibited illegal corporate insider trading conduct. The third element, the 
“moral element,” relates to the mens rea of the accused person while committing the 
prohibited conduct. These elements are discussed below.  
Assumed Element  
 
The assumed element is a condition in Article (50)(a) of the CML requiring the 
availability of specific types of relationships from which inside information is obtained. 
Article (50)(a) states that: “Any person who obtains, through family, business or 
contractual relationship, inside information.”1725 As Article (4)(b) of the MCR illustrates, 
this includes traditional insiders, such as directors and senior executives, as well as others 
who obtain inside information in confidence because of family, business, or contractual 
relationships.1726 The notion of the assumed element is that it is always presumed that these 
statutory insiders are privy to inside information. Therefore, their trading is presumed to 
be based on inside information without the need to demonstrate access to such 
                                               
1725 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(a).  
1726 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(b).  
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information.1727 As a result, when the defendant has a statutory insider position, this 
element is satisfied.1728  
Material Element  
 
The material element means the performance of physical acts of the prohibited 
conduct subject to illegal corporate insider trading liability.1729 The prohibited conduct of 
illegal corporate insider trading involves trading in a security related to the inside 
information either directly or indirectly or the disclosure of inside information to outsiders 
to trade.1730    
a. Direct or Indirect Trade of a Security Related to Inside Information 
The main prohibited conduct under illegal corporate insider trading liability is the 
exploitation of inside information obtained by an insider because of his/her position inside 
the company. The performance of physical conduct is represented in the purchase or sale 
of the security related to inside information while the information has not been publicly 
disclosed.1731  To satisfy the material element, three factors must be present: (1) physical 
conduct by either entering into a purchase or sale of a security related to inside information 
or disclosing such information; (2) the information has not yet been released to the public; 
and (3) it meets the statutory requirements of inside information.1732 However, it is 
irrelevant whether or not the trader has experienced the result from the purchase or sale 
and regardless of whether the purchase or sale has been made directly or indirectly.1733  
                                               
1727 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 14.   
1728See ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P.12.  
1729 Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 181. 
1730 CML, supra note 50(a).  
1731 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 28. 
1732 See ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P.13; 20; ACRSD, Decision 
No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 9, 20.  
1733 Id.  
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Article (4)(a) of the MCR defines when trading of a security is made directly or 
indirectly as follows: (1) the purchase or sale is direct if the insider “executes a trade in the 
security for any account in which he has an interest;1734 or (2) if he makes a bid or offer on 
the Exchange for the security.”1735 The purchase or sale is made indirectly when: (1) the 
insider “executes a trade as an agent for another person; (2) if he arranges a trade to which 
a relative or person with whom he has a business or a contractual relationship is a party; 
(3) if he arranges for his agent or any other person acting on his behalf or at his direction 
to trade in the relative securities.”1736 The meaning of indirect trading on inside information 
is that the insider is not the one making the trade, but rather another person has been used 
as a tool to cover the real identity of the trader (i.e., the insider).1737  
b. Disclosure of Inside Information to Another Person to Trade Directly or 
Indirectly 
The disclosure of inside information to another person for trading purposes is 
prohibited under Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (5)(a) of the MCR. This 
prohibition constitutes an insider performing a specific action of disclosure or transfer of 
inside information to another person, and the recipient’s exploitation of the information by 
trading in the security related to this information either directly or indirectly.1738 However, 
it is important to mention that even if the recipient of the information did not trade directly 
                                               
1734 See ROSCO, supra note 204, art. 68(c): (A person is deemed to have an interest in shares or convertible 
debt instruments of an issuer when such securities are owned or controlled by: “1) a relative of that person; 
2) a company controlled by that person; or 3) any other person with that person has agreed to act in concert 
to acquire an interest in or exercise voting rights in the shares or in the convertible debt instruments of the 
issuer.”) Id.  
1735 MCR, supra note 156, art. 4(a)(3). 
1736 Id. art. 4(a)(4).  
1737 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 28. 
1738 See ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 20.  
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or indirectly in the related security, the disclosing insider may still be liable under Article 
(5)(a) of the MCR.1739   
Moral Element  
 
The moral element is about the mens rea or the requisite culpable state of mind of 
the defendant at the time of the prohibited conduct. To satisfy this element, it requires that 
the insider had general criminal intent at the time of the trade. The insider must know that 
he/she is in possession of inside information and he/she intends to take advantage of 
possessing the information before it becomes public, by trading directly or indirectly in the 
security related to the inside information or disclosing it to another to trade.1740 The 
motivation of the trade is irrelevant to prove the moral element. Even if the information is 
not the motive of the trade, such trade is in violation of the regulations of illegal corporate 
insider trading.1741 To satisfy the moral element for the disclosure of inside information, 
the disclosing insider must disclose the inside information to another person while he 
knows that he has inside information that has not been announced to the public.1742  
Outsider’s Elements of Liability 
 
There are two elements of liability for outsiders’ violations of illegal corporate 
insider trading regulations: the material element and the moral element.1743 The material 
element of outsiders’ liability resembles the same prohibited conduct as insiders. They are 
prohibited from either trading in the security related to obtained inside information or 
                                               
1739 See supra notes 1530-47 and accompanying text. See also Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 31; Al-Nufi, 
supra note 1454, at 181. 
1740 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 38; Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 186; ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 
2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, at P. 19-20. See Supra notes 1683-99 and accompanying text. 
1741 See Supra notes 1704-17 and accompanying text. See also ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 
H, supra note 1456, P. 7. 
1742 See ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, P. 20.  
1743 ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 2009 ل.س/  of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 8.  
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disclosing the information to others.1744 However, since outsiders are not presumed by law 
to be privy to inside information, their liability is based on trading on obtained inside 
information from others who are privy to inside information.1745 Although Article (50)(b) 
clearly states that “no person may purchase or sell a Security based on information obtained 
form an insider,”1746 The CMA interpreted this rule in Article (6)(b) of the MCR as “A 
person who is not insider is prohibited from engaging in insider trading if he obtains the 
inside information from another person…”1747 Therefore, the CMA reads Article (50)(b) 
as not requiring that an outsider must obtain the information from an insider or even know 
the identity of the disclosing person. 1748 
The moral element of outsiders’ liability is established based on the same requisite 
state of mind that is required for insiders’ liability. The outsider must be aware that the 
obtained information is inside information based on the statutory requirements and he/she 
intends to use the information through the purchase or sale of a security related to the inside 
information or the disclosure to others to trade while the information is non-public.1749   
Evidence in Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Proceedings   
 
                                               
1744 Id.  
1745 Id.   
1746 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(b).  
1747 MCR, supra note 156, art. 6(b).  
1748 See ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 2009 ل.س/  of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 8. However, some 
commentators have argued that Article (6)(b) goes beyond what Article (50)(b) expressly states that the 
outsider must obtain the inside information form an insider. See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 186. This 
understanding was adopted by the ACRSD in one published case. See ACRSD, Decision No.146/ ل.س/ 2009  
of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 19. However, in another published case, the ACRSD reviewed this issue 
but did not provide an express statement of whether the source of the information must be an insider or not. 
That said, it can be inferred that the ACRSD has adopted the CMA’s position that the source of information 
is irrelevant to the elements of liability for outsiders’ violations. See ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 
of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 13.  
1749 See ACRSD, Decision No.146/ 2009 ل.س/  of 1430H, supra note 1457, at P. 8, 19; ACRSD, Decision 
No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 2, 13. See also Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 51; Al-
Nufi, supra note 1454, at 186.  
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Article (25)(i) of the CML has clearly established a broad rule evidentiary standard 
stating that: “Evidence in Securities cases shall be admissible in all forms including 
electronic or computer data, telephone recordings, facsimile messages and electronic 
mail.”1750 As a result, the Saudi Arabian regulators have adopted the standard of a “free 
proving method” in illegal corporate insider trading proceedings and other securities cases 
where liability can be demonstrated by unmitigated evidence. There is no differentiation 
between the civil and criminal evidentiary standard and both proceedings can be proved by 
direct or circumstantial evidence.1751 One of the reasons behind adopting this broad 
evidentiary standard is that the regulators took into consideration the special nature of 
illegal corporate insider trading offense and securities violations where, in most instances, 
direct evidence is unavailable.1752  
The ACRSD and CMA have asserted that the principle of flexible standard or proof 
is a well-established principle in Saudi Arabian criminal law, and it is more important in 
the area of securities violations.1753 This is because securities crimes are easily committed 
and do not leave any significant material evidence that may point to the violator or the 
circumstances of the perpetration of the crime. In addition, the negative effect of such 
crimes on the safety and honesty of the capital market and investors’ confidence in the 
integrity of securities transactions necessitates the expansion of acceptable evidence to 
prove securities crimes and violations.1754  
                                               
1750 CML, supra note 152, art. (25)(i).  
1751 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 53; Tariq Afifi Sadiq, Al-Himaya Al-Qanunia Li’amaliat Altadawul 
Fi’aswaq Almal Wifqun Li’nidhaam Al-Sauodi [Legal Protection for Trading Transactions in the Capital 
Markets According to the Saudi Law], 288, (2015). (Ar). 
1752 See Id. 
1753 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 18.  
1754 Id. See also ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 14. 
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Article (25) (i) of the CML has applied the flexible standard of proof on both civil 
and criminal lability and has expressly ascertained the validity of electronic and non-
traditional evidence.  On the basis of this Article, illegal corporate insider trading liability 
can be proven by direct evidence including a legal confession by the defendant, witness 
testimony, and documentary evidence, which directly demonstrate the commission of 
illegal corporate insider trading.1755 However, the express validity or authentication of 
electronic and non-traditional evidence, under Article (25)(i) of the CML, highlights the 
importance of this type of evidence in securities cases since securities violations are usually 
proven through such evidence.1756 The essential evidence in illegal corporate insider 
trading cases is the electronic report prepared by the CMA’s Department of Surveillance 
and Analysis. The CMA has used an electronic surveillance system to monitor the daily 
securities transactions.1757 If an illegal trading transaction is suspected, a surveillance 
inquiry is released. The department then studies and analyzes the data of the trade in 
question, and if it reveals that the transaction may be in violation of the law, the case is 
transferred with a report to the Enforcement Department for appropriate action.1758 In 
addition to surveillance reports, recorded telephone conversations have been useful 
evidence to demonstrate the illegal corporate insider trading claim. The CMA’s Authorised 
Persons Regulations, Article (51), requires authorized persons, including brokers and 
dealers, to record telephone communication made with their clients.1759 Moreover, this 
                                               
1755 See Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 53; Sadiq, supra note 1751, at 288. 
1756 Id.  
1757 See Annual Report 2017, supra note 1438, at 151.  
1758 Id. See also Capital Market Authority, Organizational Structure, 
https://cma.org.sa/en/AboutCMA/CMA_Department/Pages/default.aspx.  
1759 Authorised Persons Regulations, supra note 1700, art. 51(a). See Sadiq, supra note 1751, at 288. 
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article requires authorized persons to disclose to their clients that the telephone 
conversations will be recorded.1760  These telephone recordings have been used by CMA 
to review the conversations of potential accused persons and their brokers/dealers to 
determine whether the recordings involved any mention of the nature and source of 
information obtained and the trading motivation.1761  
Illegal corporate insider trading liability can also be proven by circumstantial 
evidence that does not directly prove the event in question, but indirectly show other events 
that could reasonably infer the occurrence of the prohibited conduct.1762 Circumstantial 
evidence used in illegal corporate insider trading proceedings includes statutory 
circumstantial evidence, such as the law presumes the knowledge of the law.1763 In addition 
to statutory circumstantial evidence, there is judicial circumstantial evidence where the 
judges analyze the facts of the case and the surrounding circumstances. They then derive 
the circumstantial evidence from the facts presented and use it to prove or disapprove the 
culpable event.1764 The most common types of circumstantial evidence used by the ACRSD 
and CMA to prove the liability of trading on inside information are as follows: (1) whether 
there is a relationship that may connect the defendant to an insider; (2) suspicious trading 
timing with high volume and number of shares preceding an issuer’s public disclosure; (3) 
                                               
1760 Id. art. 51(b).  
1761 See Id. art. 51(c); Sadiq, supra note 1751, at 295. In one case, the ACRSD found two defendants liable 
for trading on inside information where the evidence presented inferred that the first defendant obtained 
inside information from an insider. ACRSD, Decision No.146/ ل.س/ 2009  of 1430H, supra note 1457. At P. 
21. The ACRSD relied on convicting the two defendants on a recorded telephone conversation between the 
first defendant and his broker. The first defendant told the broker that he received inside information from 
the board of director that they would not announce that the company was raising capital; therefore, he asked 
the broker to sell his stock holdings in this company. Id.   
1762 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 61. See Amir Ali Al-Qaradaghi,  Masayil Fiqhia Muasira [Contemporary 
Jurisprudential Issues] 36, (2011), http://irep.iium.edu.my/5693/1/ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ_ﻓﻘﮭﯿﺔ_ﻣﻌﺎﺻﺮة .pdf. (Ar). 
1763 See ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 1431H, supra note 1404, at P. 5. 
1764 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 61; Al-Qaradaghi, supra note 1762, at 38.  
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the defendant’s trading history of the stock during the previous six months;  and (4) whether 
the defendant could reasonably justify his/her trading during the suspicious time.1765  
The direct or circumstantial evidence presented must persuade the magistrates of 
two aspects. The first aspect is that the evidence presented must show that the trading event 
occurred and violated the law. The second aspect must demonstrate the attribution of the 
perpetration of the violation to the defendant in question and that he/she was subject to 
punishment.1766 Therefore, the judges must make their conclusion based on the presented 
evidence and whether or not it was enough to find the defendant liable for committing an 
illegal corporate insider trading violation.1767 The ACRSD stated that it is not required to 
base its judgment on evidence that positively proves all parts of the alleged facts.1768 It is 
sufficient that all pieces of presented evidence, as a group, constitute the Committee’s 
satisfaction of its conclusion of the case.1769 The ACRSD also emphasized that it is fully 
empowered to comprehend the facts and to assess the presented evidence and to conclude 
what it deems appropriate to be applied based on the alleged facts.1770 The ACRSD asserted 
that while the committee exercises its assessment, it has full discretionary power to uphold 
what it deems to be persuading evidence and to ignore other evidence, even if it is probable 
in the case.1771 
Sanctions and Penalties of Illegal Corporate Insider Trading Violations  
 
                                               
1765 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 20; ACRSD, Decision No.974/ 
L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 16.  
1766 Farghaly, supra note 1474, at 54; Al-Qaradaghi, supra note 1762, at 49.  
1767 See ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, P.20. 
1768 See ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 17; ACRSD, Decision 
No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P.  27.  
1769 Id.  
1770 ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P.21; ACRSD, Decision No.148/ 
L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, P. 21.  
1771 Id.  
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Illegal corporate insider trading violations are treated as criminal acts by the CML. 
The law has imposed several severe sanctions and penalties against violators, including 
imprisonment up to five years. By adopting a full disclosure policy, the imposition of such 
severe sanctions and penalties reveals the seriousness of the violations and shows how the 
CML intends to apply tough deterrence measures for a breach of insiders’ duty of trust and 
confidence. When they misuse non-public information, they disrupt the available public 
information and damage investors’ confidence by trading or disclosing inside information 
to others to trade.1772  
The imposition of sanctions and liability is the last step of an illegal corporate 
insider trading proceeding after a series of procedures and steps. It starts with the suspicion 
of an illegal corporate insider trading violation, an investigation and collection of evidence, 
filing a case before the CRSD, a trial hearing and presenting arguments, and then ends with 
a judgment by the CRSD that may include sanctions and penalties if convicted.  
Investigation Power and Public Prosecution  
 
The CML has empowered the Board of CMA, under Article (5)(c), to conduct the 
necessary investigations to enforce the CML and its implementing regulations.1773 The 
CMA has the right to undertake appropriate investigative procedures regarding any 
potential violations of the law including the right to subpoena witnesses, collect evidence, 
                                               
1772 See ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 1431H, supra note 1404, at P. 3.  
1773 CML, supra note 152, art. 5(c). (This Paragraph states that: “For the purpose of conducting all 
investigations which, in the opinion of the Board, are necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this 
Law and other regulations and rules issued pursuant to this Law, the members of the Authority and its 
employees designated by the Board are empowered to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the 
production of any books, papers, or other documents which the Authority deems relevant or material to its 
investigation. The Authority shall have the power to carry out inspections of the records or any other 
materials, whoever the holder may be, to determine whether the person concerned has violated, or is about 
to violate any provision of this Law, the Implementing Regulations or the rules issued by the Authority.”) Id.  
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and require the production of any documents related to the investigation.1774 In addition, 
the CMA was authorized to conduct any public action against the accused persons before 
the CRSD.1775 However, on December 31, 2014 and pursuant to the High Order of the 
Prime Minister of the Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia,1776 the CMA transferred the 
authority of investigation and public prosecution of violations to the Public Prosecution 
under Articles (31), (49) and (50) of the CML.1777 Transferring investigation and 
prosecution powers to the Public Prosecution has resulted in decreased authority for the 
CMA so they now only have the right to refer any suspected violations to the Public 
Prosecution under Article (50) of the CML.1778   
If the investigation results in a decision to charge the accused person, public action 
is taken by the Public Prosecution by filing a public lawsuit before the CRSD in accordance 
with the Resolution of Securities Disputes Proceedings Regulations of 2011.1779 
Jurisdiction of the CRSD over Securities Disputes and Imposition of Sanctions 
 
                                               
1774 Id. See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 420; Beach, supra note 153, at 325, 50.  
1775 CML, supra note 152, art. 59(a). See Id.  
1776 High Order No. (4690), Dated 6/2/1435 (corresponding to Dec 10, 2013), see Capital Market Authority, 
CMA Announces the Start of the Referral of Criminal Offences to the Bureau of Investigation and Public 
Prosecution (Dec 31, 2014), available at: https://www.cma.org.sa/en/market/news/pages/cma_n_1589.aspx.  
1777 Id.  
1778 The CMA has indicated that since the High Order date, it has referred to the Public Prosecution 88 cases 
related to violations of Article (31), (49) and (50) of the CML by the end of 2017.  Annual Report 2017, 
supra note 1438, at 162. See also Capital Market Authority, Conclusion of Joint Workshop Between CMA 
& the Branch of the Bureau of Investigation & Public Prosecution in Riyadh, (April 1, 2017), available at 
https://cma.org.sa/en/MediaCenter/PR/Pages/BBIPPWorskshop.aspx.  
1779 The regulations of criminal and civil proceedings before the CRSD and ACRSD are promulgated by the 
Board of CMA, pursuant to Article (25)(d) of the CML, under the Resolution of Securities Disputes 
Proceedings Regulations (RSDPR), Resolution No. 1-4-2011, Dated 19/2/1432H (corresponding to Jan 23, 
2011), Amended by Resolution No. 1-104-2017, Dated 2/3/1439H (corresponding to Nov 20, 2017), 
available at: https://cma.org.sa/en/RulesRegulations/Regulations/Documents/RSDPR_en.pdf.  
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One of the features of the CML is that it has created special judicial bodies, the 
CRSD and ACRSD, which are empowered to exclusively adjudicate securities cases.1780 
In addition, the CML only allows filing lawsuits in designated judicial committees against 
investors or related securities regulatory bodies in Saudi Arabia.1781  
The CML has given the CRSD and ACRSD the necessary powers to exercise their 
judicial jurisdiction on securities disputes.1782 These judicial powers include the issuance 
of subpoenas, orders to produce evidence, and to settle disputes and impose sanctions.1783  
In illegal corporate insider trading and other criminal cases, this judicial power is triggered 
after the CMA or Public Prosecution seeks such imposition of sanctions and penalties.1784 
The ACRSD has asserted that the imposition of appropriate sanctions and penalties upon 
violators is part of exercising its jurisdiction over settling securities disputes.1785 The 
ACRSD has stated that the imposition of appropriate sanctions and penalties is under the 
discretion of the committee. These sanctions and penalties are applied based on serving 
and achieving the goals of the law, which include the policy of full disclosure and 
transparency in the capital market and to ensure the protection of investors from unfair and 
                                               
1780 See CML, supra note 152, art. 25(a). (This Article reads: “The Authority shall establish a committee 
known as the ‘Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes’ which shall have jurisdiction over the 
disputes falling under the provisions of this Law, its Implementing Regulations, and the regulations, rules 
and instructions issued by the Authority and the Exchange, with respect to the public and private actions.”) 
Id.  See also art. 25 (g). ( This Article states that “An Appeal Panel is to be formed by a Council of Ministers’ 
decision…The Appeal Panel shall have the discretion to refuse to review the decisions of the Committee for 
the Resolution of Securities Disputes, to affirm such decisions, to undertake a de novo review of the complaint 
or suit based on the record developed at the hearing before the Committee and to issue such decision as it 
deems appropriate in relation to the complaint or the suit. The decisions of the Appeal Panel shall be final.”) 
Id. 
1781 See Beach, supra note 153, at 347, 52; Gouda, supra note 161, at 119.  
1782 See CML, supra note 152, art. 25(a) to (i). See Sadiq, supra note 1751, at 270  
1783 See CML, supra note 152, art. 25(a). See the Resolution of Securities Disputes Proceedings Regulations, 
supra note 371.  
1784 See CML, Art. (59)(a). See also Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 420; Beach, supra note 153, at 350. 
1785 ACRSD, Decision No.148/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1501, P. 22. 
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improper conduct. Thus, the Committee has the power to consider the mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances of sanctions when contemplating the facts and surrounding 
circumstances.1786  
Available Sanctions and Penalties against Illegal Insider Trading Wrongdoers 
 
The available sanctions and penalties against violators of illegal corporate insider 
trading prohibition include administrative actions, civil liability, and criminal sanctions.  
Administrative Actions 
 
The CML has given the CMA vast power to tackle illegal corporate insider trading 
violations and to enforce the CML sanctions and penalties. They are designed to ensure 
that wrongdoers are punished for gaining unjustified free-risk profits or avoiding losses by 
trading on inside information that must not be used until it reaches the public domain. The 
CMA has three main powers that can be invoked against illegal corporate insider trading 
violations: to trigger an illegal corporate insider trading case, to financially punish 
wrongdoers without the need to file a case with the CRSD, or to settle with the accused 
person.  
a. Triggering Illegal Insider Trading Violation Cases 
Since the CMA is responsible for monitoring the securities trading activities, 
suspicious trading transactions involving illegal corporate insider trading are discovered 
first by the CMA’s department of surveillance and analysis through the use of an electronic 
surveillance system.1787 Therefore, a report that the Department of Surveillance and 
Snalysis issues triggers an illegal corporate insider trading case. Based on this report, the 
                                               
1786Id.   
1787 See CML, supra note 152, art. 5; Annual Report 2007, supra note 1434, at 57; Annual Report 2017, supra 
note 1438, at 162. 
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Board of the CMA decides whether to transfer the suspected violation to the Public 
Prosecution or save the case.1788 As a result, the first administrative action that the CMA 
has is the right to trigger an investigation of a potential illegal corporate insider trading 
violation. Then it can refer the violation to the Public Prosecution to start an official 
investigation, which may lead to filing a public action case with the CRSD to seek judicial 
sanctions and penalties pursuant to Articles (57)(c) and (59)(a) of the CML.1789  
 
 
b. Imposition of Financial Penalties on Illegal Insider Trading Wrongdoers 
Without Filing a Case with the CRSD 
Article (59)(b) of the CML grants the Board of the CMA the right to impose a fine 
against any violators of the CML and its implementing regulations.1790 Imposition of this 
violation must not be granted until the investigation is closed and results in finding that the 
conduct of the accused person is in violation of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider 
trading.1791 The Board of CMA has the right to impose a fine not less than SR10,000 
($2,666) and not more than SR100,000 ($26,666) for each violation attributed to the 
                                               
1788 The CMA indicated that from the date of the High Order that decided to transfer the investigation and 
prosecution power to the Public Prosecution, it has referred 88 cases to the Public Prosecution related to 
violations of Article (31), (49) and (50) of the CML by the end of 2017.  Annual Report 2017, supra note 
1438, at 162.  
1789 See CML, supra note 152, art. 59(a).  
1790 CML, supra note, 2, art. 59(b). (This article reads: “The Authority may, in addition to taking the actions 
provided for under paragraph (a) of this Article, request the Committee to impose a financial fine upon the 
persons responsible for an intentional violation of the provisions of this Law, its Implementing Regulations, 
the rules of the Authority and the regulations of the Exchange. As an alternative to the foregoing, the Board 
may impose a financial fine upon any person responsible for the violation of this Law, its Implementing 
Regulations, the rules of the Authority and the regulations of the Exchange. The fine that the Committee or 
the Board can impose shall not be less than SR 10,000 and shall not exceed SR 100,000 for each violation 
committed by the defendant.”) Id.  
1791 Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 443; Beach, supra note 153, at 350-51.  
 
 354 
 
accused person.1792 It is important to mention that Article (59)(b) clearly states that the fine 
is imposed for each violation individually as it constitutes a separate violation by itself.1793 
Therefore, violations are not correlated even though there is only one criminal result. For 
example, when an insider trades several times on the same inside information, the fine may 
be imposed for each trading time.1794 
 
 
 
c. Authority to Settle with the Accused Person before Filing a Case before the 
CRSD 
Article (64) of the CML provides that it is admissible for the CMA and an accused 
person to reach a settlement to avoid proceedings before the CRSD.1795 This article grants 
the CMA the right to settle after an investigation results in accusing the person,1796 but the 
offer to settle cannot be rendered until there is an actual indictment against such a 
person.1797 The authority to settle with the accused person for violating the law is a unique 
authority given to the CMA when it discerns that the suitable and appropriate way to punish 
the accused person is to make him/her pay triple the profits or losses avoided from 
                                               
1792 CML, supra note 152, art. 50(b).  
1793 Id. see Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 444.  
1794 See ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 1431H, supra note 1404, at P. 3.  
1795 CML, supra note 152, art. 64. (This Article reads: “A person charged with violation of Article 50 of this 
Law may avoid proceedings before the Committee by reaching an agreement with the Authority pursuant to 
which he agrees to pay the Authority a sum not exceeding three times the profit he has realized, or three times 
the losses he has averted by committing the violation. Such arrangement shall be without prejudice to any 
compensation awardable as a result of the violation.”) Id.  
1796 See Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 447; Beach, supra note 153, at 349; Gouda, supra note 161, at 157.  
1797 Id.  
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committing illegal corporate insider trading.1798 The option of settlement to avoid criminal 
proceedings is not a right of the accused person but an exclusive right of the CMA to choose 
instead of criminal prosecution.1799 In some instances, however, when an accused person 
tries to request a settlement during the investigation to avoid judicial proceedings, it can be 
used by the prosecution as circumstantial evidence against the accused person. In a case 
before the ACRSD, during the interrogation, the accused person requested a settlement 
with the CMA,1800 but then the CMA used the accused person’s settlement request as 
circumstantial evidence of self-admission of committing illegal corporate insider 
trading.1801  
Judicial Civil Liabilities and Criminal Sanctions  
 
The CML has allowed the prosecution to seek and impose broad and varied civil 
and criminal actions against illegal corporate insider trading wrongdoers.1802 Such actions 
may be taken at an early stage, even before the trial commences. Other civil actions are 
also available to the CRSD and ACRSD to impose on the accused person after conviction. 
Article (59)(a) of the CML states that “if it appears to the Authority that any person has 
engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in acts…constituting violation..., the Authority 
shall have the right to bring a legal action before the Committee to seek an order for the 
appropriate action…”1803  This article contains several civil orders and penalties that the 
CRSD may decide to apply whether in the pre-trial period and as precaution measures or 
                                               
1798 Id.  
1799 Al-Nufi, supra note 1454, at 451.  
1800 ACRSD, Decision No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 3.  
1801 Id.  
1802 See Gouda, supra note 161, at 162; Beach, supra note 153, at 350.  
1803 CML, supra note 152, art. 59(a). The power to seek an order for the appropriate action against illegal 
insider trading wrongdoers was transferred to the Public Prosecution on Dec 31, 2014. See supra notes 368 
and accompanying text. 
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to impose as civil penalties after a conviction. Article (57)(c) gives the prosecution the right 
to seek prison terms against the accused person.1804 
a. Preliminary and Precaution Civil Actions  
The prosecution can request that the CRSD issue a temporary order against an 
accused person including seizing and executing property, a travel ban, and a ban from 
trading.1805 These temporary decisions can be requested even before the issuance of an 
indictment against the accused person when the prosecution deems it necessary to prevent 
the accused person from actions that may hinder the illegal corporate insider trading case. 
The Resolution of Securities Disputes Proceeding Regulations, Article (37), determines the 
procedures that must be taken by the prosecution to request a temporary order.1806 This 
article allows the CRSD to issue a temporary decision against the accused person after a 
request by the prosecution. It expressly states three available temporary decisions: a travel 
ban, placing a protective attachment on the accused person’s properties including bank and 
investment accounts, or a trading ban from any purchase in the Exchange.1807 However, 
this article provides that the prosecution must justify its request of issuing a temporary 
order against an accused person, including legal documents and supporting proof.1808 This 
article also allows the CRSD to issue a temporary order after a request from the prosecution 
for 30 days in the event that there were no official charges issued by the prosecution.1809 
Moreover, an accused person who is subject to a temporary order may challenge the 
                                               
1804 Id. at art. 57(c).  
1805 Id. at art. 59(a)(2), (7) and (8).  
1806 RSPDR, supra note 371, art. 37.  
1807 Id.  
1808 Id. at art. 37(1).  
1809 Id. at art. 37(2).  
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decision by filing a memorandum with the committee requesting a cancelation of the 
order.1810 
b. Civil Penalties and Criminal Sanctions  
Articles (57)(c) and (59)(a) contain several available civil penalties and criminal 
sanctions that the prosecution can seek to impose before the CRSD. The CRSD has the 
discretion to impose such a sanction or reject it even if there was a conviction. 
 Civil penalties that can be imposed upon illegal corporate insider trading 
wrongdoers include the imposition of disgorgement of all gains realized or losses avoided 
from illegal corporate insider trading transactions.1811 Article (59)(a)(4) provides two 
options for payment of penalties. It provides that the disgorgement can be paid as 
indemnification to persons who have suffered damages because of the violation. It also 
offers the option to deposit the amount of the illegal gains in CMA’s account.1812  In 
addition to disgorgement and restitution, the CRSD may ban the person from working for 
listed companies1813 or working as a broker, portfolio manager, or investment advisor for 
a period determined at the discretion of the CRSD.1814 Another civil penalty is a ban from 
trading (or purchasing) securities for a period determined by the CRSD.1815  
                                               
1810 Id. at art. 37(3).  
1811 CML, supra note 152, art. 59(a)(4). 
1812 Id. However, it can be noted that all available illegal insider trading cases show that the disgorgement is 
payed to the CMA’s account.  
1813 Id. art 59(a)(9).  
1814 Id. art. 59(a)(6).  
1815 Id. art. 59(a)(2). It is important to mention that the CRSD has the authority to determine the specific 
amount of disgorgement and the duration of a ban from trading, working for a listed company or as a broker, 
portfolio manager or investment advisor, or other demanded penalties or sanctions. See ACRSD, Decision 
No.974/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1453, at P. 18. (on the basis of the published cases, the usual period 
applied is three years for all of these penalties.) See Id.  
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Two criminal sanctions are available to be imposed upon illegal corporate insider 
trading wrongdoers. The most important sanction is imprisonment terms of up to five years 
as provided by Article (57)(c) of the CML.1816 The other available criminal sanction is the 
imposition of a financial fine against the violator, pursuant to Article (59)(b) of the CML. 
The fine must not be less than SR10,000 ($2,666) and not exceed SR100,000 ($26,666).1817  
Statute of Limitations 
 
Although the CML provides statutes of limitation under Article (58)1818 for claims 
brought under Articles (55), (56) and (57),1819 illegal corporate insider trading violations 
                                               
1816 CML, supra note 152, art. 57(c). (This article states that: “In addition to the penalties and financial 
compensation provided for under this law, the Committee may, based on a claim filed by the Authority, 
punish the persons who violate Article 49 and 50 with imprisonment term not exceeding five years.”). 
(However, there is no clear standard of when the prosecution can seek imprisonment terms against the 
accused person. On one published case, the CMA did not request the imposition of imprisonment term against 
the accused person. See ACRSD, Decision No.147/ L.S/ 2009 of 1430 H, supra note 1456, at P. 22.  In 
contrast, all the other published cases, it is noted that the CMA sought imprisonment terms against the 
accused person. In one case, the CMA appealed against CRSD’s decision which included the rejection of 
imposition of imprisonment sentence against the accused person. ACRSD, Decision No.229/ L.S/ 2010 of 
1431H, supra note 1404, at P. 3. In this case, the CMA reasoned its rejection to the CRSD’s decision that the 
legislators have sought to protect the market from the pervasive of crimes and to achieve the principles of 
equal access to information among investors. For enforcing this goal, the Saudi legislators have imposed 
imprisonment terms against illegal insider trading wrongdoers to punish them for their unlawful act and to 
deter the reoccurrence of this crime in the market. Id. However, the ACRSD asserted that the imposition of 
imprisonment terms is subject to the discretion of the CRSD “which is empowered to determine the 
appropriate sanctions considering the conditions and the circumstances of each offense in accordance with 
the authority that is delegated to CRSD under Article (25/a) of the Law.” Therefore, the ACRSD concluded 
that it was unnecessary to overturn the CRSD’s decision. Id. at P. 6.  
1817 CML, art. 59(b). See supra notes 1793-94 and accompanying text.  
1818 CML. art. 58. (This Article states that: “A suit under Articles 55, 56 and 57 of this Law shall not be heard 
if the complaint is filed with the Authority after the elapse of one year from the date when the claimant should 
reasonably have been aware of facts causing him to believe he had been the victim of a violation, and in no 
case may such complaint be heard by the Committee after five years from the occurrence of the violation 
subject of the claim.”) Id.  
1819 CML, supra note 152, arts. 55, 56 and 57. (Article (55) grants a private cause of action for investors to 
sue for compensation incurred because of a misleading prospectus. Article (56) provides a private right of 
action for investors to claim compensation for damages against any person who has made a misrepresentation 
that misleads another in relation to the sale or the purchase of a security. Article (57)(a) grants a private right 
of action to claim damage against any person who has committed intentional manipulation on a security price 
activity in violation of Article (49) of the CML.) See Gouda, supra note 161, at 120, 162.  
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are not subject to the statute of limitations stated under Article (58) of the CML. Therefore, 
the defense of a statute of limitations is not a valid action.1820  
No Private Cause of Action Available Against Illegal Insider Trading Violators  
 
The CML does not contain an article providing any private cause of action for 
investors against illegal corporate insider trading violators. In addition, the private right of 
action has been rejected by the ACRSD.1821 In an illegal corporate insider trading case 
brought by a private investor, the ACRSD asserted that the prohibition of illegal corporate 
insider trading under Article (50) of the CML is a penal violation and the general rules state 
that criminal sanctions and penalties must be limited to criminal offenses.1822 However, the 
ACRSD stated that an injured investor because of an illegal corporate insider trading act is 
entitled to sue for damages when he/she can prove the suffering of damages and can link 
the suffered damages to the violation of the defendant.1823 The ACRSD stated that illegal 
corporate insider trading violators will not be held liable to compensate investors for 
damages unless three elements exist: a fault committed by the defendant, suffering of 
damages by the plaintiff, and a causal relation between the fault committed and the 
damages suffered.1824    
                                               
1820 See Gouda, supra note 161, at 157.  
1821 ACRSD, Decision No.415/ L.S/ 2011 of 1433, season of 1/2/1433H (corresponding to Dec 26, 2011), 
P.2, available at: http://crsd.org.sa/en/AppealsCommittee/Decisions/Documents/415-33E.pdf. (The 
plaintiff’s suit was based on an allegation that the defendant traded based on inside information and was 
charged by the Committee for Illegal Insider Trading. Id. at 1. The plaintiff claimed that he purchased shares 
in the same company during the same time the illegal insider trading violation took place, and because of the 
insider selling activity on the stock, the stock price rapidly plunged in value which caused the plaintiff to 
suffer loss in an amount equal to SR1,522,000 million ($405,866.667 thousand). Id. In 2011, the Committee 
dismissed the case, and the plaintiff appealed.) Id. at 1. 
1822 Id. at P. 2.  
1823 Id.  
1824 Id. (In this case, the ACRSD stated that the plaintiff purchased the shares during the time the violation 
was committed, then sold them several months after the violation. Thus, the claimant “was not able to prove 
before the Appeal Committee the relation linking the damages he alleged and the violation of the respondent.” 
As a result, this lack of demonstrating the casual relation is sufficient to show that the violation of the 
respondent did not cause the damages alleged by the plaintiff. Thus, no compensation should be award.) Id. 
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In general, the private cause of action is unavailable for investors who claim injury 
because of illegal corporate insider trading activity since there is no express article within 
the CML that grants the right to sue. In addition, proof of a causal connection between the 
damages suffered by investors trading at the time of illegal corporate insider trading in the 
Exchange is very difficult or almost impossible to prove since there is no inducement by 
the illegal corporate insider trading violator, and the lack of reliance by investors.   
Summary  
 
Part 4 discusses the government’s enforcement of the prohibition of illegal 
corporate insider trading in Saudi Arabia. It describes the elements of liability, the 
acceptable standard of proof, and the potential sanctions and penalties for violations of the 
prohibition. It reveals that liability upon corporate insiders includes three elements: (1) the 
occupation of an insider’s status gives access to inside information, (2) a direct or indirect 
trade of a security related to inside information that meets the statutory attributes of inside 
information, or (3) the disclosure of such information to an outsider, while the insider 
knows that he/she is in possession of inside information that has not been disclosed to the 
public.  Outsiders’ liability is the same as insiders except that outsiders do not need to have 
an insider status that gives legal access to inside information.  
One important aspect of this part is that the violation of the prohibition is treated as 
a criminal violation. The standard of proof is flexible in illegal corporate insider trading 
cases where the prosecution can prove the perpetration of the violation by direct or 
circumstantial evidence. This part shows that after a conviction in illegal corporate insider 
trading proceedings, wrongdoers are subject to several sanctions and penalties. The major 
sanctions are being banned from working as a director or officer in listed companies, 
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disgorgement of ill-gotten gains or losses avoided, fines up to $26,666, and imprisonment 
not exceeding five years.  
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Part 5. Summary of Chapter 3 
 
Chapter 3 describes Saudi Arabian regulations of corporate insider trading. The 
examination of the regulations focuses on answering three questions: (1) Why are corporate 
insiders’ trades and securities ownership regulated by securities regulations? (2) What 
differentiates them from other investors? and (3) When can insiders can trade legally and 
when are they prohibited from trading? 
This chapter reveals that corporate insiders are subject to a fiduciary or trustee duty 
to pursue the interests of the company and must refrain from acts that involve conflict of 
interest or misuse of confidential information unless specific consent is given. By enacting 
the CML, Saudi Arabian regulators recognized the need to place more restrictions upon 
corporate insiders whether to prevent them from misusing the inside information available 
to them because of their privy position or to foster the transparency and disclosure policy 
of the CML. Corporate insiders are required to publicly disclose their securities ownership 
of their corporation equity security and their trading transactions that result in a change of 
such ownership. However, a three-day period to disclose after the execution of the 
transaction gives the public late market information that is not valuable unless it were 
disclosed before or within the same day of trading. This chapter also shows that corporate 
directors and senior executives are subject to lock-up periods that require them to abstain 
from trading in their companies’ securities 15 days before financial quarters and until 
public disclosure and 30 days before the end of the issuer’s fiscal year until the 
announcement of the annual report.  
Although Saudi Arabian regulators have recognized the need to regulate corporate 
insiders due to their strategic positions as inside issuers, they approached the misuse of 
 363 
 
inside information for trading purposes in a broad prohibition reach based on the parity of 
access to information theory. The prohibition includes traditional insiders and others who 
obtain inside information through a special relationship (family, business, or contractual 
relationship). The reach of the prohibition is also broader covering corporate outsiders who 
trade on inside information when they know that the information is inside information.  
While the distinction between legal and illegal corporate insider trading can be a 
difficult task for corporate insiders, they are legally allowed to trade after taking 
precautions if they are not aware of or in possession of inside information and the trade is 
outside the lock-up periods. Such precautions may include asking the management if they 
are allowed to trade. Measures can also include refraining from trading anytime an insider 
is uncertain about whether he is in possession of inside information or not.  
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Chapter 4. Comparative Analysis between U.S. and Saudi 
Arabian Corporate Insider Trading Regulations 
 
Introduction 
 
After examining the regulations of corporate insider trading in the United States 
and Saudi Arabia, this chapter compares the two countries’ regulations. Although the 
countries’ regulations and treatment of corporate insider trading are not the same, they 
share considerable similarities on the legality question about insider trades and the rules 
governing their trades and securities ownership. Both countries have treated corporate 
insiders as a special class of traders and have subjected them to restrictions and rules due 
to the special position they hold as inside issuers of securities. Both countries’ regulations 
prohibit corporate insiders from misusing inside information by either trading on or tipping 
others to trade before public disclosure of inside information. They also require insiders to 
publicly disclose their ownership of securities and trading activities in a timely manner. In 
this sense, corporate insider trading regulations in the United States and Saudi Arabia are 
mostly similar. However, the two countries have different approaches to how insiders’ 
trades are regulated, and the sophistication of how the rules are applied.  They also have 
different limitations and reach of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading. To 
better state the similarities and differences between the two countries’ corporate insider 
trading regulations, this chapter offers a hypothetical case to illustrate how the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabian regulations would be applied. This chapter then provides a discussion of the 
resulting comparison.  
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Hypothetical Case 
 
Assume that there is a medium-size public corporation whose stock is registered 
and traded in the national exchange. The name of the company is Palms Coffee, a Palms 
State public corporation, which is a retail company selling roasted specialty coffee. It has 
more than 1,000 stores in Palms state. Its stock is quoted at $28 per stock, and it is a very 
successful company. The company is often covered by the national news media and press 
reports and the stock is followed by professional securities and large financial institutions. 
The company files all required mandatory reports with the national regulatory agency 
responsible for supervising and enforcing the securities laws of the national exchange.  
These reports include annual and quarterly reports that give detailed information about the 
financial position of the company and its prospective growth as assessed by the company’s 
management staff.  In addition, the company is required to disclose specific material 
information as soon as the company’s management discovers or creates the information. 
Facts 
 
In January 2016, S.J., the CEO of the company presented a new business expansion 
plan to the Board of Directors in which the corporation would acquire a company that made 
special coffee makers. The purpose of the project was to establish a second business line 
besides selling coffee and pastries at their 1,000 coffee stores. The projection was that this 
project would increase the corporation’s estimated revenue for the next three years by 15%. 
By majority vote, the board of directors decided to adopt this plan and to authorize the 
CEO of the company to start acquisition negotiations with the target company. This 
decision was disclosed to the public through regulatory means. By November 2016, the 
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corporation announced its acquisition of the coffee maker products. After the public 
disclosure, the price of the stock went up by 10% to $30.8 in two trading days. 
 One of the directors (director A.B., a large shareholder of Palms Coffee) had 
disagreed with the decision to adopt this project at the board meeting because he believed 
that it would not be profitable based on his long experience in the coffee industry. After 
the meeting, he wrote a trading plan to sell most of his stockholdings in the corporation, 
which would be executed over a 1-year period. However, Director A.B. instructed his 
broker not to sell any stock until two days after the corporation’s public disclosure about 
their expansion plan. The Palm’s CEO also purchased 1000 common stocks of Palms. In 
early 2017, the company experienced slow sales growth of the coffee makers products and 
the company publicly disclosed this slow growth within its first quarter earnings report. 
However, other low sales revenues started to emerge for other business lines, but the 
management decided that it was not material to inform the board or to disclose this 
information to the public. Between April and August of 2017, the CEO of the company, 
S.J., sold almost half of his stockholdings in the corporation. The sales of stocks by the 
CEO started after a brief meeting with the CFO of the corporation in April 2017.  
In November and December of 2017, the corporation experienced unexpected and 
significantly low sales of all its business lines including its coffee maker products.  By the 
end of the 2017 fiscal year, the corporation recorded a loss of 10% of its total assets. The 
CEO and CFO sent an email marked urgent and confidential to the board of directors to 
inform the directors about the new development of incurring the unexpected and significant 
losses. On December 19, 2017, Director B.A. was on the phone with his wife when he 
received an email from Palm’s management. He told his wife about the financial problem 
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but told her not to tell anyone about this information because it was confidential. Later, 
B.A.’s wife, C.A., told her father, A.D., that Palms Coffee had terrible news regarding their 
earnings for that year. She also told her father not to tell anyone else about this information 
because her husband told her that this information was confidential. However, A.D. 
immediately called his broker to sell his 2000 shares in Palms Coffee.  
On the same day, Director B.A. had a gathering with his friends. While he was with 
his friends, B.B., the best friend of Director B.A. asked the director about the Palms Coffee 
business. Director B.A. told B.B. that the corporation was facing a lower earnings revenue 
from what had been publicly expected including obstacles regarding the coffee maker 
products. However, B.A. cautioned his friend not to disclose this information to anyone 
because of the confidential nature of the information.  While the director was talking to his 
best friend, someone sitting in an adjacent table overheard the conversation. This person, 
A.W., was an investor in Palm’s stock and knew Director B.A. A.W., immediately called 
his broker and instructed her to purchase put options and sell his stake in the corporation. 
A.W. also told his friend, H.R. about Palm Coffee’s situation but did not tell him that the 
information came from the director. H.R., an investment manager at a large financial 
institution. H.R. passed this information to E.G., a security analyst specializing in the 
coffee industry, who disclosed the information to his manager, S.A.  He said there were 
strong rumors that Palm Coffee Corporation’s earnings for 2017 may be lower than 
expected because of slow sales growth including the coffee maker products. The manager 
then decided to sell one-third of the institution’s holdings in the corporation. On December 
22, 2017, the market stock price of the corporation sharply decreased to $24.8 per share. 
This dramatic decrease of the stock price alerted the Capital Market Authority to 
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investigate whether some news had not been disclosed to the public.  The Authority sent 
an inquiry to the corporation asking if there was any material information that had not been 
disclosed to the public. The corporation replied by making a public disclosure stating that 
the corporation’s earnings had significantly decreased in November and December of 
2017, which had affected the corporation’s 2017 earnings by a decrease equal to 10% of 
the net assets of the corporation.  After this public disclosure, the market stock price 
decreased by 4% from its price before the disclosure to $23.80 per share.  
Persons Vulnerable to Face Potential Corporate Insider Trading Liability based on 
the Facts 
 
From the facts of this hypothetical case, there are five situations where people may 
be vulnerable to penalties and sanctions under the coverage of corporate insider trading 
regulations.  
1. A.B., the director of Palms Coffee Corporation who made a written trading 
plan, in November 2016, to sell his stockholdings in the corporation after the 
Board decided to expand the business by acquiring the coffee makers 
company. A.B. decided to sell his stockholdings based on his personal 
assessment that the acquisition of the coffee maker products would be 
unprofitable. He knew that the information related to acquiring the coffee 
maker company was inside information. Thus, he decided to create a written 
trading plan and instructed his broker to execute this plan after this inside 
information became public. A.B. specified the plan including the price, 
amounts, and dates of the trade so it would be executed over a one-year 
period. 
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2. S.J., the CEO of the corporation who traded on two separate occasions. He 
traded the first time when he purchased stock in November 2016, and the 
second time when he started to sell a substantial amount of his stock between 
April and August of 2017 after the corporation disclosed the slow sale growth 
of the coffee maker products publicly and following a meeting with the CFO. 
3. A.D. who sold his entire stockholdings on December 19, 2017, after indirectly 
receiving confidential information from a director of Palms Coffee, B.A., 
through his wife, C.A., the daughter of A.D.  
4. A.W., a shareholder of Palms Coffee, who sold his stock of the corporation 
and purchased put options on December 19, 2017, betting that the 
corporation’s stock would decrease in value. A.W. received the information 
inadvertently when he overheard Palms’ director, B.A.’s conversation with 
his best friend. 
5. S.A., investment manager at a large investment institution, who sold a large 
amount of stock of the corporation based on information received form her 
employee, E.G., a security analyst who told the manager that information 
reflected rumors in the investment community. E.G. received the information 
from H.R. who obtained the information from A.W. 
Content of Inside information in the Hypothetical Case 
 
The inside information in this case was that Palms’ Coffee Corporation had 
significantly lower earnings from what was already expected and publicly known in 2017 
which recording a loss equal to 10 percent of the net assets of the corporation.  
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Application of U.S. Regulations 
 
First Case: A.B. is a Section 16 insider since he is a director of Palms Coffee 
Corporation with registered stock in the national exchange. Therefore, A.B. is subject to 
reporting requirements and has an obligation to refrain from gaining short-swing profits. 
In addition, A.B. is a Rule 10b-5 corporate insider under the classical theory of illegal 
corporate insider trading subject to the prohibition from trading on the basis of material 
non-public information. Applying the U.S. regulations, A.B. must have publicly disclosed 
his trading by the end of the second business day following the execution of the transaction 
that resulted in a change of securities ownership.  Assuming that the first sale transaction 
occurred on November 20, 2016, the public disclosure through filing Form 4 with the SEC 
was due by the end of the business day of November 22.1825  A.B.’s trading was legal 
corporate insider trading where he did not misuse any inside information. His trades started 
after a reasonable waiting period after public disclosure—two-day. A.B. used a written 
trading plan that complied with the requirements set out in the SEC’s Rule 10b5-1(c).1826 
Rule 10b5-1(c) granted corporate insiders an affirmative defense for trading transactions 
that occur while they are aware of inside information if the trading transaction is made 
pursuant to a trading written plan.1827 As a result, A.B. most likely is not liable for trading 
on inside information because his initial trading was based on a personal assessment of the 
corporation’s stock, which is completely legal. A.B.’s sale trading transactions during the 
time that he may have become aware of the experience of unexpected low sales were 
shielded from liability based on the written trading plan described in Rule 10b5-1(c). This 
                                               
1825 See supra note 357 and accompanying text. 
1826 See supra notes 1077-91 and accompanying text.  
1827 Id. 
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is because A.B. did not use this inside information even though he was in possession of it 
at the time of the trade.  
Second Case: S.J, the CEO of Palms Coffee, is a section 16 corporate insider and 
subject to the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading under Rule 10b-5 based on the 
classical theory since he is a senior officer serving in the highest officer position in the 
corporation. S.J.’s first purchase of the shares in November 2016 must have been publicly 
reported to the SEC using Form 4 in accordance with Section 16(a) of the SEA as well as 
his later sale transactions. The purchase transaction was completely legal because it was 
made after the corporation publicly disclosed the acquisition of the coffee maker company; 
therefore, there was no misuse of inside information. However, the sale transactions that 
S.J. made from April to August of 2017 could be the basis of civil and criminal liability. 
First, the sale transactions in April can be matched with the purchase transaction made in 
November. Thus, the sale transaction would be matched against the purchase transaction 
to constitute a violation of Section 16(b)—short-swing profit. It can be assumed that the 
purchase transaction was made on November 10, 2016, and the sale transactions were made 
from April. 1-10, 2017 which resulted in making a profit. The corporation, or its 
shareholders in a derivative suit, have the right to seek a private civil lawsuit against S.J. 
to pay back the short-swing profit made from the purchase that was made in November 
2016 and sales that were made in April. 2017. However, profits made from the sale 
transactions that exceeded the six-month period would not be subject to Section 16(b) of 
the SEA.1828  
                                               
1828 For more discussion about the matching the purchases and sales under Section 16(b), see supra notes 
374-93 and accompanying text. 
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Another potential liability that S.J, could face is the sale transactions that he made 
from April to August 2017 after the corporation publicly disclosed the slow sales growth 
of the coffee maker products and following a brief meeting with the CFO of the 
corporation. The CEO is presumed to be aware of the business operation of the corporation 
and its developments. S.J.’s sale transactions were suspicious in timing, amounts, and 
circumstances. It was after public disclosure of the slow sales growth of the coffee maker 
products. However, the public did not know about the significantly slow sales of other 
business lines. The sale of half of his stockholding in the corporation after a brief meeting 
with the CFO of the corporation indicates that inside information was conveyed.  
Third Case. A.D. is a corporate outsider and is not a Section 16 corporate insider. 
He has no special relationship with the corporation or its shareholders. Therefore, A.D. is 
not subject to the rule of the classical theory of illegal corporate insider trading. However, 
when A.D. received confidential information from his daughter, C.A., director B.A.’s wife, 
A.D. owed a duty of trust or confidence under the misappropriation theory not to misuse 
the confidential information for trading purposes.1829 In accordance to Rule 10b5-2, 
director B.A.’s disclosure to his wife was not illegal because the disclosure was with the 
expectation of maintaining confidentiality either based on the marital relationship itself or 
based on the history, pattern, or practice between them to expect that she would maintain 
confidentiality or based on the express acceptance by C.A. to maintain the information in 
confidence.1830 The same rule applies to C.A.’s disclosure to her father, A.D. As a result, 
A.D. would be likely to be found liable for selling his stockholdings in the corporation on 
the basis of material non-public information received in confidence from his daughter. The 
                                               
1829 See supra notes 629-45 and accompanying text. 
1830 Id.  
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sale trading transactions occurred a short time after the phone call between the director and 
his wife and at the same time, the director received the email from the corporate 
management showing that inside information most likely was conveyed. To hold B.A. 
liable for tipping inside information, there must be additional evidence showing that 
improper disclosure was made because Rule 10b5-2 presumes that disclosure between 
family members is made lawfully with the expectation of maintaining the confidentiality 
of inside information.  
Fourth Case. A.W., who was a shareholder of Palms Coffee, was not a Section 16 
corporate insider nor did he have a fiduciary-like relationship with the corporation or its 
other shareholders. Therefore, he is not subject to Section 16 of the SEA and is not covered 
by the classical theory of corporate illegal corporate insider trading.1831 He is a corporate 
outsider. A.W. received the information from B.A., a director of Palms Coffee. 
Determining whether A.W. is liable or not for trading on inside information hinges on 
finding out whether the disclosure or the tip by B.A. was improper. First, A.W. received 
an inadvertent tip by B.A. who disclosed the information to his friend, B.B. with a clear 
expectation and agreement of maintaining the confidentiality of the information. Therefore, 
B.A.’s disclosure to his friend was not improper in accordance with Rule 10b5-2. However, 
B.A.’s disclosure was careless since it allowed others, who he did not know, to acquire 
confidential information. Nevertheless, applying Dirks’ standard, the tip of B.A. to A.W. 
was inadvertent and unintentional. Thus, the disclosure was without breach of fiduciary 
duty because it was not for personal benefit since the tipping for personal benefit requires 
the tip to be intentional or at least reckless. As a result, A.W.’s sale transaction of his 
                                               
1831 For a discussion about whether shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to one another, see supra note 249-50 
and accompanying text. 
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stockholdings in the corporation was a lawful sale because the confidential information 
was inadvertently received and thus, A.W. did not owe a derivative fiduciary duty to the 
corporation or its shareholders.1832  
Fifth Case. S.A. is not a Section 16 corporate insider nor a classical insider under 
the classical theory of illegal corporate insider trading. As an investment manager, she sold 
a substantial amount of stock in the corporation on December 19, 2017, based on 
information received from her employee E.G. that there was a strong rumor within the 
investment community that Palms’ earnings for 2017 may be lower than expected because 
of slow sales growth. In addition to not being a classical insider, S.A., was not entrusted 
with the information nor did she receive the information as a fiduciary. Therefore, she did 
not owe an original fiduciary-like duty of trust or confidence. To be held liable for the sale 
transactions based on inside information, she must meet Dirks’s standard, as a remote 
tippee.1833 First, S.A. received the information from a chain of tippees where she was three 
levels removed from the original inside tipper, director B.A. Although E.G. told S.A. that 
the information originated from rumors, the content and specificity of the information 
should have raised a red flag for S.A. since she was a sophisticated investor and could 
distinguish rumors from inside information. However, to hold S.A. liable, she must have 
                                               
1832 A similar outcome to this scenario was decided in SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
(Barry Switzer overheard a conversation between an insider and his wife concerning a possible liquidation 
or sale of a public oil company. Switzer knew the insider. The insider testified that he did not know that 
Switzer was listening to the conversation. Switzer and several of his friends bought shares in the corporation.  
The court found that the insider did not breach his fiduciary duty to stockholders of the corporation under 
Rule 10b-5 when he disclosed the information to his wife because the information was given only to inform 
her of his up-coming business schedule that arrangements so child care could be made. The Court also 
concluded that the information was inadvertently overheard by Switzer, and “Rule 10b-5 does not bar trading 
on the basis of information inadvertently revealed by an insider.” Id. at 764-67. See LANGEVOORT, supra 
note 6, at §4:7. However, A.W. would likely be liable if the tip by director B.A. was made recklessly that he 
knew A.W. was listening and was a shareholder of the corporation. For a discussion about this issue, see John 
C. Jr. Coffee, Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and 
Strategies, 2013 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 281, 291 (2013). 
1833 See supra notes 817-26 and accompanying text.  
 375 
 
known other facts in addition to the nature of the information. She must have known that 
the information was disclosed from an insider in a breach of his/her fiduciary duty for 
personal benefit. From the facts presented, the only information that S.A. knew was that 
the source of the information was E.G. who informed her that the information was 
circulating in the investment community. As a result, this scenario is tricky and the 
likelihood of facing illegal corporate insider trading liability may be based on alleging that, 
as a sophisticated investor, she knew or was reckless in not knowing that the information 
was inside information improperly disclosed from an insider. In addition, S.A.’s sale of a 
substantial number of shares at a suspicious time preceding the public disclosure of this 
information supports such an allegation.1834  However, it is more likely that she would not 
be at least criminally liable because she did not have affirmative knowledge that the 
original inside tipper tipped the information for personal benefit and there were no 
circumstances known by S.A. that pointed in that direction.1835 Supposing that E.G. told 
                                               
1834 This potential allegation that arose under this case is similar to the allegation in Newman. In Newman, 
“the Government charged that Newman and Chiasson were criminally liable for insider trading because, as 
sophisticated traders, they must have known that information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a 
fiduciary duty, and not for any legitimate corporate purpose.” United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 
(2nd Cir. 2014). However, the Second Circuit rejected this allegation by concluding that: “a tippee’s 
knowledge of the insider’s breach necessarily requires knowledge that the insider disclosed confidential 
information in exchange for personal benefit.” Id. at 449.  
1835 Id. at 450. The Second Circuit stated that: “Here both Chiasson and Newman contested their knowledge 
of any benefit received by the tippers and, in fact, elicited evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding. 
Moreover, we conclude that the Government’s evidence of any personal benefit received by the insiders was 
insufficient to establish tipper liability from which Chiasson and Newman’s purported tippee liability would 
derive.” The Second Circuit also found that: “Even assuming that the scant evidence described above was 
sufficient to permit the inference of a personal benefit, which we conclude it was not, the Government 
presented absolutely no testimony or any other evidence that Newman and Chiasson knew that they were 
trading on information obtained from insiders, or that those insiders received any benefit in exchange for 
such disclosures, or even that Newman and Chiasson consciously avoided learning of these facts. As 
discussed above, the Government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Newman and Chiasson 
knew that the insiders received a personal benefit in exchange for disclosing confidential information.” Id. at 
453. For more discussion of possible difference between civil and criminal lability for remote tippees, see 
supra note 820.  
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S.A. that the original inside tipper was B.A. who disclosed this information inadvertently 
to A.W., it is most likely that S.A. would not be liable like A.W.’s trade.1836 
Question of Material Non-public Information  
 
In this hypothetical case, the inside information is the significant loss of earnings 
for the 2017 fiscal year, which was unknown to the public. This information is related to 
the earnings power of the corporation, which is the most likely information to be considered 
material information. The disclosure of the information would be reasonably viewed by a 
reasonable investor that it has significantly altered the total mix of information made 
available. Therefore, it is unlikely that anyone would question whether the earnings 
information is material or not.  However, the materiality question can be argued in this 
hypothetical situation concerning S.J., the CEO, by assuming that he received information 
regarding the earnings power of the corporation from the CFO in April 2017. The 
information at that time was contingent and speculative. He may argue that the significant 
loss occurred in November and December four to five months after his last trade. Therefore, 
the information was not a true fact but rather probable. Thus, it was not inside information. 
However, based on multiple judicial tests (i.e., the test of probability and magnitude, the 
test of the importance attached to the information, and the test of the reaction of the market 
after disclosure), it is most likely that this argument would fail. First, to consider 
information to be material, it does not need to be certain.1837 Second, the importance S.J. 
attached to the information when he sold half of his stockholdings in the company after a 
brief meeting with the CFO and while the public was not aware of probable significant 
                                               
1836 See supra note 1832.  
1837 See supra notes 907-43 and accompanying text. 
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decrease of the company’s earnings, shows that S.J. treated the information as material 
since it would alter the total mix of information publicly available.1838 Third, the reaction 
of the market after public disclosure strongly indicates that the information was material 
information.1839 This inside information became public knowledge after the disclosure 
made by the company in response to the national capital market authority which was filed 
with the authority and disseminated through national news. Assuming that the public 
disclosure was made only through a press statement in a national news agency, it would 
still be considered that the public disclosure transferred the information from being non-
public to public.1840  
Application of Saudi Arabian Regulations 
 
First Case. A.B., a director of the company, is subject to Article (33)(e) of the 
Listing Rules, which requires public disclosure of initial ownership and changes of 
ownership of securities held in the company.1841 He is also a statutory insider, expressly 
named by his position under Article (4)(b) of the MCR, making him subject to the 
prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading.1842 A.B.’s trading transactions were 
required to be publicly disclosed by the corporation to the Exchange by the end of the third 
business day following the execution of each transaction. If the sale transaction occurred 
on November 20, 2016, the public disclosure would be due on November 23. Next, A.B.’s 
sale trading transactions were made based on a written trading plan that he instructed his 
broker to execute after two business days following the public disclosure. This is a 
                                               
1838 See supra notes 958-65 and accompanying text. 
1839 See supra notes 944-57 and accompanying text. 
1840 See supra notes 970-1020 and accompanying text. 
1841 See supra notes 1362-66 and accompanying text. 
1842 See supra notes 1469-83 and accompanying text. 
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completely legal trade because the trade was based on A.B.’s personal assessment not on 
inside information and the time of the trade was made after public disclosure.1843 Therefore, 
public investors would have been able to trade based on equal access to information with 
the director.  However, it is possible that A.B.’s sale trading transactions from November 
to December of 2017, when A.B.’s was aware of the inside information in question, be led 
to an allegation of violating the illegal corporate insider trading prohibition even though 
non-use of the information can be shown.1844 
Second Case. S.J. is the CEO of the company and thus is subject to the public 
disclosure rules under Article (33) of the Listing Rules. He is one of the primary insiders 
named by their positions under Article (4)(b) of the MCR, making him subject to the 
prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading. S.J.’s trading must have been publicly 
disclosed by the corporation to the Exchange. S.J.’s purchase transaction in November 
2016 was completely legal since it was not made on inside information and the time of the 
trade was executed after public disclosure. However, S.J.’s sale transactions from April to 
August 2017 can be under the scrutiny of CMA and may become subject to liability for 
trading on inside information under Article (50)(a) of the CML because of the suspicious 
nature of the trade and surrounding circumstances. As a CEO, S.J. is presumed by law to 
be aware of the day-to-day business operations and developments including confidential 
information regarding the corporation.1845 During the time of the sale transactions, the 
public only knew about the slow sale growth of the coffee makers but was not aware of 
any other probable decrease in earnings for other business lines of the company. It is likely 
                                               
1843 See supra notes 1594-95 and accompanying text. 
1844 Id.  
1845 See supra notes 1478-83 and accompanying text. 
 379 
 
that S.J. was trading on inside information given S.J.’s sale of half of his stockholdings in 
the corporation in a short period of time and after a brief meeting with the CFO of the 
company and while the public was not aware of the material confidential information 
regarding the earnings power of the company. Therefore, liability is expected to ensue.   
Third Case. A.D. is not a director, senior executive, or substantial shareholder of 
the corporation. However, he has a family relationship with B.A., a director of Palms 
Corporation. Therefore, he is a statutory insider under Article (50)(a) of the CML and 
Article (4)(b) of the MCR.1846 A.D. is not required to publicly disclose the sale transactions 
of his stockholdings in Palms. The sale transactions were made before public disclosure of 
bad news regarding the corporation’s earnings. As a result, A.D. would likely face liability 
for trading on inside information in violation of Article (50)(a) of the CML. A.D. is 
presumed by law to have the status of an insider.1847 The access to inside information is 
assumed to have occurred through his daughter, C.A. As a result, A.D. may be found liable 
for trading on inside information before public disclosure. The timing of the trade plays a 
significant role in arriving at this probable conclusion since the trade was made shortly 
after the end of the phone call between B.A. and his wife, C.A. It could be proven that 
inside information was obtained by B.A while he was talking to his wife. In addition, the 
selling the entire stockholdings reveals that the decision to sell was prompt and suspicious 
preceding public disclosure. It is unclear whether B.A. and C.A. would be held liable for 
improper disclosure because of A.D.’s trade.  
                                               
1846 See supra notes 1489-1500 and accompanying text. 
1847 Id.  
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Fourth Case. A.W. is not subject to securities ownership disclosure since he is not 
a substantial shareholder, director, or senior executive. A.W. also is not a statutory insider 
specified in Article (50)(a) of the CML and Article (4)(b) of the MCR. He is an outsider.1848 
To find A.W. liable, his conduct must be in violation of Article (50)(b) of the CML and 
Article (6)(b) of the MCR.1849 A.W. sold his stockholdings and purchased put options in 
the company after obtaining inside information from B.A., a director, who revealed the 
information to his friend while A.W. was listening to the conversation. There are two 
possible allegations of violating the prohibition from illegal corporate insider trading 
against B.A. and A.W.  B.A. may face two allegations: improper disclosure to his friend 
B.B., and unlawful disclosure of inside information to A.W. for trading purposes. B.A. 
disclosed confidential information to his friend, B.B., So, this disclosure could be in 
violation of A.B.’s duty to maintain confidentiality of the information under Article 5(a) 
of the MCR. Thus, the disclosure can be considered improper. However, although it is 
possible to hold A.B. liable for unlawful disclosure of inside information, it is likely that 
he would not be liable because the disclosure was not made on the understanding that B.B. 
would trade on this information or that there was an expectation that a trade would follow 
as required in Article (50)(b). Regarding the second possible allegation against B.A., 
although the disclosure to B.B. may be viewed as improper, the disclosure to A.W. was 
made unintentionally and he would likely not be held liable since the liability for improper 
disclosure requires the disclosure to be intentional. On the other hand, A.W. received the 
information in an indirect way while he was listening to the conversation. A.W. knew that 
the information was inside information that was unknown to the public. It is likely that 
                                               
1848 See supra notes 1548-50 and accompanying text. 
1849 Id.  
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A.W.’s trade would be viewed as a violation of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider 
trading because the trade was in violation of investors’ expectation of equal access to 
information since the trade took place at a time the public was not aware of such 
information that was known to be important and confidential. A.W.’s trade would be 
alleged to be in violation of Article (6)(b) of the MCR which prohibits trading on obtained 
information from another person known to be inside information or he should have known. 
Fifth Case. S.A. is not a substantial shareholder, director, or a senior executive in 
Palms Coffee Corporation. She is also not a statutory insider under Article (50)(a) of the 
CML or Article (4)(b) of the MCR. She is an outsider. S.A. received the inside information 
in question from her employee, E.G., who received the information from H.R., who 
obtained the information from A.W., who originally overheard it from the director of 
Palms, B.A.  However, S.A. only knew that the information was received from A.W., who 
told her that it reflected rumors circulated in the investment community. S.A. would likely 
face liability even if she did not know that the information was transferred through a chain 
of persons and originated from an insider. This is because S.A. is a sophisticated investor 
who would be able to distinguish inside information from rumors. In addition, the 
information received was specific and before the end of the fiscal year. Therefore, S.A.’s 
sale transactions for a large number of shares was suspicious and suggested that she knew 
that she was trading based on inside information even though she did not know whether or 
not the information was originated from an insider or not. However, E.G. is unlikely to be 
liable for tipping inside information because Article (5)(b) of the MCR only prohibits 
outsiders from disclosing inside information obtained from an insider. Therefore, based on 
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the presented facts, E.G. was not aware that the information was obtained from an insider; 
thus, he would not be liable for disclosing the information. 
Question of Material Non-public Information 
 
The information in this hypothetical case is about the significant decrease in the 
company’s earnings for fiscal year of 2017. It can be said that this information is material 
information according to the law.1850 Specifically, earnings power is information that CML 
considers to be material and shall be protected from misuse until public disclosure in 
accordance with Article (45)(c) of the CML. This determination is based on the following 
reasoning: CML regards the public disclosure of earnings power if a reasonable person 
would consider that it could significantly affect the price or value of the related security. 
This effect could be proven to occur based on Palms’ announcement that the decrease in 
earnings was equal to 10 percent of the net assets of the company. The subsequent decrease 
in the price of the security after the announcement also implies the same conclusion. The 
information became public after the public disclosure made by Palms in response to the 
Capital Market Authority which was made through electronic filing with the Authority and 
the Exchange. Assuming that the disclosure was made only through a national news agency 
and then to the general public, it is unclear whether this method would be considered a 
recognizable method of dissemination by the CMA. However, it is suggested that the press 
release was enough to transfer the information to the public since it fulfilled the goal of 
equal access to information to the general public through the news media.  
 
                                               
1850 This information is related to one of the events that an issuer has a mandatory obligation to disclose as 
soon as it is discovered. See supra note 1653.  
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Comparative Results from Applying the U.S. and Saudi Arabian Regulations to the 
Hypothetical Case 
 
As for the application of U.S. and Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading 
regulations on the facts, this hypothetical case reveals important results that should shed 
light on the similarities and differences between the two countries’ regulations. Table 1 
shows the results of the hypothetical case under the two regulations:  
Table 1: Comparative Results  
Cases Probative Facts U.S. Regulations Saudi Arabian Regulations Result 
---- ------ S. 16 The Legal Status Result 
Public 
Disclosure 
Requirement 
(Art. 68 of the 
ROSCO & Art. 
33 of the Listing 
Rules 
The Legal Status Result Comparison 
A.B. 
1-Traded after 
public disclosure 
based on his 
personal 
assessment 
2- Traded on a 
written trading 
plan before 
becoming aware 
of material non-
public 
information. 
Yes 
Classical Insider 
(Chiarella & 
Rule 10b5-1) 
1-Must disclose 
the trade to the 
public by the 
end of the 
second business 
day of the 
transaction 
2-The trade was 
legal, and the 
written trading 
plan would 
shield him from 
liability even 
after being 
aware of inside 
information. 
Yes 
Primary Insider 
(Art. 50(a) of the 
CML &Art. 4(b) 
of the MCR) 
1-Must disclose 
the change of 
ownership to the 
public by the 
third day 
following the 
date of the 
transaction. 
2- The trade 
after public 
disclosure was 
completely legal 
3-It is possible 
to be held liable 
for trading on 
inside 
information 
while being 
aware of such 
information 
disregarding the 
fact that the 
trade was made 
pursuant to a 
written plan 
Both regulations 
have mostly 
similar results. 
The difference 
is: (1) the time 
of disclosure, 2 
v. 3 days; and 
(2) whether 
adopting a 
written trading 
plan would 
provide an 
affirmative 
defense against 
illegal corporate 
insider trading 
liability. In the 
United States, 
the answer is 
yes. In Saudi 
Arabia it is no. 
S.J. 
1-Pruchased 
shares after 
public disclosure 
in November 
2016 
2-Sale 
transactions 
between April to 
August 2017 
before public 
disclosure of bad 
news 
Yes Classical Insider (Chiarella) 
1-Must disclose 
to the public his 
trading 
transactions to 
the public. 
2-The purchase 
transactions 
were legal. 
3-Possible 
violation of S. 
16(b) (Purchase 
and sale within a 
six-month 
period). 
4-He is likely to 
face illegal 
corporate insider 
trading liability 
for April to 
August sale 
transactions. 
Yes 
Primary Insider 
(Art. 50(a) of the 
CML &Art. 4(b) 
of the MCR) 
1- Must disclose 
the change of 
ownership to the 
public by the 
third day 
following the 
date of the 
transaction. 
2-The purchase 
transactions 
were legal (no 
inside 
information 
misused). 
3- He is likely to 
face illegal 
corporate insider 
trading liability 
for April to 
August sale 
transactions. 
Both regulations 
provide similar 
outcomes. The 
differences are: 
(1) the time of 
disclosure, 2 v. 3 
days; and (2) In 
the United 
States, S.J. is 
likely to be held 
liable in the U.S. 
for violating 
S.16(b) by 
making a short-
swing profit. 
However, he is 
not liable in 
Saudi Arabia for 
the purchase and 
sale within a six-
month period.  
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A.D. 
Sold entire 
stockholdings in 
the corporation 
after receiving 
confidential 
information 
from his 
daughter, C.A. 
(director B.A.’s 
wife). 
No 
Family member 
covered under 
the 
misappropriation 
theory 
(O’Hagan & 
Rule 10b5-2). 
1-He is likely to 
face illegal 
corporate insider 
trading liability 
for 
misappropriating 
information 
received in 
confidence. 
2-The sources of 
the information 
are most likely 
not liable 
because the 
information was 
conveyed with 
the expectation 
of maintaining 
confidentiality. 
No 
Secondary 
Insider 
(Art. 50(a) of the 
CML &Art. 4(b) 
of the MCR) 
1- He is likely to 
face illegal 
corporate insider 
trading liability.  
2-It is not clear 
whether director 
B.A. and his 
wife, C.A. 
would be liable 
for improper 
disclosure.  
 
Both regulations 
provide similar 
outcomes. The 
only difference 
is that the source 
of the 
information is 
more likely to be 
held liable in 
Saudi Arabia 
than the U.S. 
A.W. 
Sold his 
stockholding on 
inside 
information 
received in an 
inadvertent way 
from director 
B.A. who 
disclosed the 
information to 
his friend, B.B. 
with the clear 
expectation and 
agreement of 
maintaining 
confidentiality 
of the 
information. 
No Tipper/Tppee (Dirks’ standard) 
He is likely to 
not be liable 
because the tip 
was not for 
personal benefit. 
It was an 
unintentional tip. 
Thus, A.W. did 
not owe a 
derivative 
fiduciary duty to 
the corporation 
or its 
shareholders. 
No 
Outsider (Art. 
50(b) of the 
CML & Art. 
6(b) of the 
MCR) 
1-It is likely that 
A.W. would be 
held liable for 
trading on 
information 
known to be 
confidential and 
material in 
violation of Art. 
6(b) of the 
MCR. 
2-It is likely that 
B.A. would not 
be held liable for 
the improper 
disclosure 
because it was 
made 
unintentionally. 
The regulations 
have different 
results. A.W. is 
more likely to be 
held liable in 
Saudi Arabia 
than the U.S. 
S.A. 
Sold a 
substantial 
amount of 
stockholdings in 
the corporation 
based on 
received 
information 
from her 
employee E.G., 
who stated that 
there was a 
strong rumor 
within the 
investment 
community that 
Palms’ earnings 
for 2017 may be 
lower than 
expected 
because of slow 
sales growth. 
No Tipper/Tipeee (Dirks’ standard) 
This case is a 
tricky case. She 
is likely to be 
liable because as 
a sophisticated 
investor she was 
reckless in 
trading on inside 
information. It is 
also likely that 
she would not be 
held liable 
because she did 
not know the 
inside tipper 
gained personal 
benefit from the 
disclosure. It is 
more likely that 
at least she 
would not be 
criminally liable.   
No 
Outsider (Art. 
50(b) of the 
CML & Art. 
6(b) of the 
MCR) 
S.A. is likely to 
face liability 
even if she did 
not know that 
the information 
was transferred 
through a chain 
of persons and 
originated from 
an insider. The 
information 
received was 
specific and 
preceding the 
end of the fiscal 
year. The trading 
pattern and 
timing suggest 
that S.A. knew 
that the 
information was 
inside 
information. 
This case is a 
tricky one in the 
U.S. and it is 
likely that civil 
liability may 
follow, but not 
criminal 
liability. 
However, in 
Saudi Arabia, it 
is likely that 
S.A. would be 
held liable. 
The Question of 
Material Non-
public 
Information  
The information 
related to the 
significant 
decrease in the 
company’s 
earnings for 
fiscal year 2017. 
 
-- 
There is a 
substantial 
likelihood that 
the disclosure of 
the omitted fact 
would have been 
viewed by a 
reasonable 
investor as 
having 
significantly 
altered the total 
mix of 
information 
made available 
to the public. 
(TSC Industries, 
Inc.) 
Under the test of 
probability and 
magnitude and 
the test of the 
importance 
attached to the 
information, this 
information is 
likely to be 
material 
-- 
Art. (50)(a) & 
Art. (4)(c) of the 
MCR 
(information is 
of the type that a 
normal person 
would realize 
that in view of 
the nature and 
content of this 
information, its 
release and 
availability 
would have a 
material effect 
on the price or 
value of a 
Security related 
to such 
information.) 
This information 
is material since 
it is related to 
the earnings 
power of the 
issuer. 
Both regulations 
have similar 
outcomes 
 
After applying the two countries’ regulations to the facts of this hypothetical case, 
the results reveal that both countries’ regulations agree that corporate insiders shall be 
subject to more restrictions and rules because they constitute a special class of traders.  
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A.B. and S.J. are treated as traditional corporate insiders under both regulations. 
They must have disclosed their trading activities to the public in a timely manner: two 
business days in the U.S. and three business days in Saudi Arabia. The two countries 
regulations agree that the trades by A.B. and S.J. after the public disclosure in November 
2016 were completely legal corporate insider trading. They also agree that S.J.’s sale 
transactions from April to August 2017 are likely to face illegal corporate insider trading 
liability.  However, the two regulations disagree in the other parts of A.B.’s and S.J.’s 
trades. A.B.’s sale transactions pursuant to a written trading plan would not shield him 
from liability in Saudi Arabia when the trades took place at a time that A.B. was likely to 
know about the significant decrease in the sales revenue of the company. In contrast, the 
written trading plan would shield A.B. from liability in the U.S.  S.J. can be civilly liable 
in the U.S. under Section 16(b) of the SEA to the corporation for the short swing profit 
made between the purchase transaction in November 2016 and the sale transactions in April 
2017 that occurred within a period of less than six months. However, S.J. would not be 
civilly liable in Saudi Arabia.  
Both regulations agree that A.D. is covered under the prohibition reach not as a 
tippee but as one who has an original duty as much as traditional insider to refrain from 
trading or tipping the information to others. A.D. is likely to be liable in both countries. 
Regarding A.W.’s case, the two regulations have different outcomes. In Saudi Arabia, he 
is likely to be liable for trading on inside information known to be obtained from an insider 
and yet unknown to the public. However, the disclosing insider, B.A., would not likely be 
subject to liability because his disclosure was unintentional. In contrast, it is less likely that 
the U.S. would hold A.W. liable because the disclosure was made inadvertently and, 
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therefore, unactionable under Rule 10b-5. In addition, B.A. would not be held liable for 
the same reason. However, S.A.’s case is the most difficult and tricky case under both 
regulations. On the one hand, civil liability may ensue from S.A.’s sale trading transaction 
but not incur criminal liability because S.A. did not know that the inside tipper disclosed 
the information for personal benefit. On the other hand, it is likely that S.A. would face 
criminal liability for her trades even though she did not know the information originated 
from an insider.  
Remarks on the Results of the Comparative Analysis between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabian Regulations  
 
Comparing the U.S. and Saudi Arabian regulations provides a good example of the 
pros and cons of having specific written provisions that govern corporate insider trading or 
leaving the case to develop by judges. Are there any genuine differences between adopting 
the framework of this law or the other? Although the two regulations seem different at face 
value, they are, in fact, mostly similar in application. Professor Franklin Gevurtz cited 
Bismakr’s comment to describe this issue, “[I]n both cases, public confidence might be 
better served if people saw only the end result rather than how the item was made.”1851 
a. Comparing the Substantive Law  
 
The comparison between the two countries’ regulations reveals that both 
regulations have similar outcomes in most scenarios even if the justifications to determine 
outcomes differ. The structure of the U.S. law is partially based on the statutory provisions 
of Section 16 of the SEA. However, Section 16 does not prohibit corporate insiders from 
trading on inside information that is available to them because of their privy position even 
                                               
1851 Gevurtz, supra note 36, at 70.  
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though Congress has been concerned about this issue. The law that prohibits corporate 
insiders from trading on inside information is a judge-made law based on the interpretation 
of the anti-fraud provision of Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-5. The current status 
of this judge-made law is a result of continuing developments and changes in the form and 
depth of the law over more than 55 years. In contrast, Saudi Arabian regulations of 
corporate insider trading are newly written regulatory laws. Both regulations recognize the 
importance of corporate insiders’ positions inside listed corporations which subjects them 
to restricted rules and treats them as a special class of traders. Both regulations require 
public disclosure from traditional corporate insiders, directors, senior officers and 
substantial shareholders because of their actual or constructive control over corporations. 
Because insiders have access to inside information which may give them an informational 
advantage over public investors, both regulations seek to prevent insiders from having an 
unjust advantage at the expense of public investors who have no means to attain the same 
advantage. United States federal securities laws have combated this unfair trading practice 
by prohibiting corporate insiders from making short-swing profits within a period less than 
six months under Section 16(b) of the SEA. The SEC and federal courts have created a 
prohibition from trading on the basis of inside information. Although the prohibition covers 
corporate insiders as well as outsiders, the prohibition of trading on material non-public 
information is restricted by requiring proof of a breach of fiduciary duty. Corporate insiders 
are liable for disclosing material non-public information when the disclosure is in breach 
of their fiduciary duty of loyalty when the disclosure is made for personal benefit. The 
prohibition from illegal corporate insider trading that extends to corporate outsiders can be 
based on a breach of the fiduciary-like relationship owed to the source of the information 
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or when the trade is made when the outsider knows that the information is directly or 
indirectly disclosed by an insider in breach of his/her fiduciary duty for personal benefit. 
This restriction of the reach of the prohibition is based on the Supreme Court’s recognition 
that there is no express provision in the SEA stating that all investors have a reasonable 
expectation of equal access to information. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has combated illegal 
corporate insider trading by providing a more general and broader prohibition than the 
United States. Saudi Arabian regulations contain a written statutory provision. Article (50) 
of the CML prohibits insiders from misusing inside information before public disclosure. 
The Saudi Arabian theory that underlies the broad prohibition is that investors shall have 
equal access to information. The policy of the CML is to require issuers to fully disclose 
material information as soon as it occurs. CMA interprets this duty by considering that any 
misuse of inside information before public disclosure shall be prevented.  
b. Comparing the Certainty and Predictability of the Two Regulations 
 
This comparison of the two regulations relates to whether the two regulations are 
clear and certain. The results show that having statutory written provisions provides more 
clarity to the law, but a broad prohibition would be the wrong choice because of the 
uncertainty that comes with broad language on prohibition in most scenarios.  
The Saudi Arabian regulations include a detailed description of the prohibited 
conduct of illegal corporate insider trading, the persons subject to the prohibition, the 
meaning of inside information, and the culpable state of mind. This specificity of the ruling 
on illegal corporate insider trading is one of the greatest advantages of having written 
regulations. It helps corporate insiders and others to predict with more accuracy what the 
law prohibits and how to avoid liability in advance. It also gives enforcement personnel 
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and judges adequate guidelines about the substance of the law and goals that it aims to 
achieve.  
The application of the two countries’ regulations reveals that both regulations of 
illegal corporate insider trading go beyond prohibiting traditional corporate insiders from 
misusing inside information in breach of their fiduciary duty to prohibit corporate outsiders 
from trading on the basis of an informational advantage before the public has the same 
information. However, the application of both regulations shows that they continue to 
suffer from uncertainty, either in the reach of the prohibition or the predictability of the 
law.  
The main notable aspect of the application of the Saudi Arabian regulations is that 
the regulations of illegal corporate insider trading, in particular, the CMA’s implementing 
regulations, have imposed a broad prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading that goes 
beyond corporate insiders and even people who have regular access to inside information. 
Although it can be agreed that the CMA has the rulemaking authority to interpret the 
statutory provision of Article (50) of the CML, the tendency of the CMA to create a broad 
approach has led to conflicting interpretations of Article (50) of the CML, which has made 
the law difficult to understand or predict.  
In contrast, the U.S. illegal corporate insider trading law lacks some written 
statutory provisions that determine the prohibited conduct with specificity including who 
is subject to the prohibition except for Rule 14e-3, which only governs trading on inside 
information related to a tender offer. This lack of statutory provisions has led to several 
discoveries of theories that differ from a legal basis and justifications, which causes the 
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law to be uncertain and confusing.1852 Professor Donald Langevoort commented on this 
issue by stating that the core motivation underlying the prohibition of illegal corporate 
insider trading in the United States (i.e., “fiduciary duty and fair play concepts,”) is the key 
to understanding the current status of the law. However, Professor Langevoort noted that:  
[T]he subjectivity of the law's motivation is also a source of confusion. Neither fair play 
nor fiduciary duty is a particularly well-defined concept; there is much room for 
disagreement over whether given trading instances contravene these standards. The desire 
to have an expansive and flexible reach to the prohibition in order to remedy all perceived 
wrongs, however, is inevitably in tension with another strong desire given prominence in 
recent securities law jurisprudence, the need for predictability and clarity in the law. Much 
                                               
1852 The timeline of the development of the illegal insider trading law shows that the prohibition started with 
a broad status-based that goes beyond traditional insiders to include persons who acquire inside information 
because of a special relationship (the SEC’s Cady, Roberts). Then it developed into a possessing-based law 
that prohibited anyone with possession of inside information from trading or tipping others (the Second 
Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur), SEC. & Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.,401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). However, 
although the SEC and the Second Circuit went back to restrict the law to be status-based to only cover persons 
with regular access to inside information (Second Circuit in Chairella), U.S. v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2nd 
Cir. 1978),  the Supreme Court restricted the reach of the prohibition to cover only traditional corporate 
insiders and others who owe fiduciary duty to the shareholder (the Supreme Court in Chairella), Chiarella 
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Then, the reach of the law became broader again to cover corporate 
outsiders who misappropriate inside information in breach of fiduciary duty owed to the source of the 
information (the Supreme Court in O’Hagan), U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). For a discussion of the 
timeline of the development of the law, see Langevoort, supra note 80. In subsequent years of O’Hagan, the 
fiduciary-like paradigm also diminished, as Professor Donna Nagy noted after examining the following lower 
courts’ opinions and the SEC administrative rules. For example, the SEC’s rule 10b5-2 made the law even 
broader by rephrasing the term “duty of trust and confidence” to be “duty of trust or confidence.” This 
rephrasing increased the limit of the misappropriation theory to include circumstances that did not constitute 
a breach of fiduciary duty. Nagy, supra note 417, at 1340. (Professor Donna Nagy asserted that: “To be sure, 
the terms "trust" and "confidence" are often used synonymously to describe reliance on the character or ability 
of someone to act in a right and proper way. However, as used in Rule 10b5-2, the term "confidence" may 
align more with an obligation of "confidentiality" than with obligations predicated on trust and loyalty.” 
Professor Nagy concludes that the expansion of the misappropriation theory to include persons who agree to 
maintain confidential information “simply dispenses” with the fiduciary principles.) Id. at 1360. See also 
Smith, supra note 207, at 1422. (Professor Gordon Smith suggested that: “This effort to override and expand 
on state fiduciary law suggests that the misappropriation theory is not about fiduciary relationships at all.”) 
Id. Many commentators have argued for enacting statutory provisions for the sake of clarity and certainty of 
the law especially with the concern that defendants are severally sanctioned for undefined crime. See for 
example, Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson Jr, Insider Trading Law Haven’t Kept Up with the Crooks, N.Y. 
Times, (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/opinion/sec-insider-trading-united-states.html; 
Nagy, supra note 423, at 1366; Painter et al., supra note 257, at 211; Karmel, supra note 426, at 766; Schipani 
& Seyhun, supra note 424, at 363.  
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of the complexity of the law of insider trading—something long recognized as a problem 
in this area —is a product of quixotic attempts by the courts to resolve this tension.1853 
 
In contrast to the U.S. restrictions, the CMA’s approach of broad prohibition upon 
anyone possessing inside information (the parity of information theory) is far broader than 
the current judge-made law of the United States or even the SEC’s rules. The U.S. 
regulations are a status-based prohibition that affect two groups of persons, at most: (1) 
persons who wrongfully use inside information for trading purposes in a breach of the 
fiduciary-like relationship and persons who receive this information to trade when the tip 
is made for personal benefit and the recipient knows that the tip is improper; and (2) persons 
who acquire inside information in a manner that is deceptive (e.g., computer hackers).1854 
That said, it the recent developments including the SEC’s rules, 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, and 
recent Supreme Court’s decision, in Salman, have brought more certainty to the U.S. 
regulations for corporate illegal corporate insider trading than to those in Saudi Arabia. 
This finding is illustrated below.  
From the facts of the hypothetical case presented in this chapter, in the U.S., 
director A.B. would be protected by Rule 10b5-1(c) using his written trading plan as an 
affirmative defense against allegations of trading on the basis of material non-public even 
after he was likely to be informed about such information. This rule protects corporate 
insiders from being liable for the mere fact of possessing inside information at the time of 
the trade which gives insiders more clarity and certainty about the legality of their trading 
activities. In contrast, Saudi Arabian regulations lack a compatible provision and it is 
uncertain that a written trading plan would be viewed as a justifiable reason to execute a 
                                               
1853 LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §1:6. 
1854 See supra notes 660-83 and accompanying text. 
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trade at a time when the corporate insider is aware of inside information before the 
disclosure to the public.  
Director B.A.’s disclosure to his wife, C.A, who, in turn, disclosed the information 
to her father, A.D., was presumed to be made with the expectation of maintaining 
confidentiality in accordance with Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) and (3). Therefore, the disclosure is 
presumed to not be improper and liability may not ensue regarding illegal corporate insider 
trading liability upon B.A. or C.A. In contrast, Saudi Arabian regulations and practice 
could cause confusion about whether disclosure to family members is illegal or not with 
respect to illegal corporate insider trading regulations. While Article (50)(a) of the CML 
considers family members as an insiders, implying that their access to inside information 
is recognizable and based on a duty to refrain from misusing such information for trading 
purposes, in practice, the CMA has provided mixed signals regarding this issue. In 
particular, corporate insiders can be held liable for unlawful disclosure when a family 
member trades on inside information.1855  
 Under the U.S. regulations, an inadvertent tip of inside information, as in the case 
of A.W, is less likely to result in liability for trading on such information since the 
disclosure was not improper and conducted with no intent to facilitate trading. This 
provides more clarity to corporate insiders who make a negligent disclosure that it would 
not result in illegal corporate insider trading liability. In contrast, in Saudi Arabia, it is 
likely that A.W. would be held liable for violating Article (50)(b) of the CML and Article 
(6)(b) of the MCR. However, it is uncertain whether director A.B.’s disclosure would be 
viewed as a violation by itself. Article (50)(a) restricts the liability for improper disclosure 
                                               
1855 See ACRSD, Decision No.973/ L.S/ 2015 of 1437 H, supra note 1452, P. 14. 
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to outsiders in situations that involve intentional disclosure in which the disclosing insider, 
at least subjectively, expects that the outsider recipient will trade. However, CMA’s Article 
5(a) of the MCR makes it unlawful to disclose even if the disclosing person does not expect 
that the outsider will trade but it is possible that he/she may trade. This negligent disclosure 
would be considered within the realm of criminal prohibition. Therefore, A.B.’s disclosure 
to his friend would create a considerable dilemma in determining the law in this scenario. 
One possibility is that the disclosure by itself was an illegal corporate insider trading 
violation and this view likely has valid grounds under Article (5)(a) of the MCR. Another 
possibility that the disclosure was not actionable under the prohibition of illegal corporate 
insider trading would be based on the language of Article (50)(a). However, the law is still 
far from being clear.  
The liability of remote tippees is another dimension that reveals the uncertainty of 
the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading. However, the recent judicial 
developments, particularly the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman, have brought greater 
certainty for the U.S. regulations. As for the case of S.A., it is less likely to, at least, be 
criminally liable in the United States because of her lack of knowledge that the information 
was disclosed by the inside tipper for personal benefit. However, in Saudi Arabia, it is more 
likely than not that they would hold S.A. liable for trading on information she likely knew 
was material and non-public even if she did not know the information was generated from 
an insider. This probable prediction of the law in this scenario is based on the language of 
CMA Article (6)(b) of the MCR which prohibits trading after possession of inside 
information from anyone. This scenario is also grounded on Article (50)(b) which prohibits 
outsiders from trading on inside information known to be disclosed by an insider in 
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violation of his duty not to disclose inside information to others with the expectation that 
they will trade. 
 S.A. is a sophisticated investor who would have been able to distinguish inside 
information from mere rumors. In fact, S.A.’s trading was intentional with conscious 
avoidance since she was aware that the information was specific and unknown to the 
public. However, if S.A. was not an investment manager but a small investor who did not 
have enough knowledge or experience in trading securities, would S.A. have known 
whether the information was inside information when the disclosing person was not an 
insider or related to an insider? As a result, the requirement in Article (50)(b) that the 
outsider must know that the inside information originated from an insider is a very 
important restriction to protect innocent traders. However, Article (6)(b) ignores this 
restriction and makes sophisticated and unsophisticated investors vulnerable to the same 
standard of criminal liability. 
Conclusion 
 
The comparison in this chapter revealed that Saudi Arabian corporate insider 
trading regulations agree with the U.S. in three main points. First, Saudi Arabian 
regulations require public disclosure of securities ownership from corporate insiders, 
directors, senior executives, and substantial shareholders. Second, Saudi Arabian 
regulations prohibit corporate insiders from trading on inside information that is available 
to them because of their fiduciary position. Third, Saudi Arabian regulations also prohibit 
corporate outsiders from trading on inside information.   
However, Saudi Arabian regulations differ from the U.S. on several issues. The 
regulations do not prohibit insiders from making short-swing profits. It prohibits directors 
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and senior executives from trading during certain lock-up periods. The regulations provide 
a broader reach for the prohibition of trading on inside information to combat any attempt 
to trade on inside information in which the trader, corporate insider or not, would possess 
unfair informational asymmetry: public investors would not be aware of the inside 
information. This broader prohibition can be described as a disadvantage of the Saudi 
regulations where broadness brings uncertainty. The Saudi Arabian regulations do not 
predicate the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading on construing trading on inside 
information as a fraud or deception but as a violation of the notion of fairness among 
investors in having equal access to information. The regulations do not require a breach of 
a fiduciary-like relationship to find liability. For tipper/tippee liability, Saudi Arabian 
regulations do not require that the tipper must disclose the information for personal benefit 
and the requirement of intentional disclosure under Article (50(b) of the CML is uncertain 
to protect from the prohibition of trading upon tippees. Tippees can be held liable without 
the need to know whether the source of the information was an insider or not. A negligent 
violation of the law can be the basis to justify criminal liability.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the current regulations of corporate 
insider trading in the United States and Saudi Arabia and to examine whether the two 
countries’ laws are doctrinally and practically similar or different. It also seeks to discover 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations by 
comparing the Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations with the U.S. 
regulations. Saudi officials can benefit from the well-established and sophisticated U.S. 
experience of regulating corporate insider trading dating back to the enactment of the SEA 
in 1934. This dissertation pursues these objectives by answering three general questions in 
both countries’ regulations: (1) Why are corporate insiders subject to rules and duties under 
securities laws in addition to their basic duties and obligations in corporate laws? (2) When 
are corporate insiders allowed to trade? and (3) When are they prohibited from trading? 
The analysis between U.S. and Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations reveals 
that both countries’ regulations share many similarities in the legality question of corporate 
insider trading and the application of the two sets of regulations. However, uncertainty and 
confusion are also found in the two countries’ regulations although the level of ambiguity 
is higher for the Saudi Arabian regulations than the U.S. regulations.  
Uncertainty in ascertaining the legal rules does not serve the goal of securities laws 
nor does it help people comply with the law. Corporate insiders play a significant role in 
fostering the growth and profitability of their corporations. Therefore, encouraging them 
to own more securities in their corporations is a useful mechanisms to motivate them to 
accomplish more economic success which, in the end, will benefit shareholders and public 
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investors.1856 In contrast, corporate insiders are entrusted with the property of their 
corporations and are given the default right to manage and control the business operation 
of their companies. Such large powers that come with an opportunity to abuse this right is 
a reasonable concern for public investors.1857 The confidence reposed on one of the main 
players in securities markets, corporate insider may collapse if corporate insiders use 
confidential information as if they own it and can do with it as they desire for their personal 
advantage, instead of sharing the information with those who entrusted them, the 
shareholders.1858 Consequently, confidence in the whole market may be damaged. 
However, it is unfair to apply confusing regulations upon the trading activities of corporate 
insiders. Some balance between the two concerns should be considered: prohibiting unfair 
informational advantage by corporate insiders and having bright-line rules that protect 
corporate insiders’ right to trade. Such a balance is more evident in the U.S. than Saudi 
Arabia.  
Notwithstanding the absence of written statutory provisions, the U.S. illegal 
corporate insider trading is defined by the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Since they have realized the need for some balance between the two concerns, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has applied two rules to accommodate the two concerns. The first rule 
is that the liability is not based on the possession of inside information but in a breach of a 
duty to disclose such information. The second rule is that not every act of selective 
disclosure to others ensues liability, but liability may be found when the disclosure is made 
for personal benefit.  
                                               
1856 See HAZEN, supra note 2, at §12:160. 
1857 See COLOMBO, supra note 11, at §1:1. 
1858 See LANGEVOORT, supra note 6, at §4:7. 
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In contrast to the U.S. regulations, Saudi Arabian regulations have applied the 
prohibition more broadly, making the differentiation between legal and illegal corporate 
insider trading difficult to ascertain. Saudi Arabian legislative experience in governing and 
regulating securities markets is relatively new, with the first unified securities market law 
in Saudi Arabia enacted in 2003. Therefore, this dissertation calls for regulators and judges 
to examine the problems that can result from overly general and broad provisions, as 
illustrated in this dissertation. This study highlights the need for equilibrium that guarantees 
investors’ confidence in the integrity of securities markets and the right to allow corporate 
insiders to trade without being vulnerable to uncertain liability. To highlight these issues, 
this chapter provides a summary of the findings and suggests recommendations for the 
Saudi Arabian corporate insider trading regulations.   
Summary  
 
This dissertation begins with an introduction chapter, Chapter 1, which provides 
introductory comments about the subject of the dissertation. It provides a definition for the 
term “corporate insider trading” and lays out the academic debate of whether corporate 
insider trading should be deregulated or regulated. Finally, this chapter provides an 
overview of the regulatory framework of U.S. and Saudi Arabian regulations related to 
securities laws and other sources of laws related to governing corporate insider trading. 
This chapter defines corporate insider trading as: “the purchase or sale of a stock of a listed 
corporation in a national exchange by one who has actual or constructive control of the 
corporation or who has legitimate access to inside information.”1859 It also defines the term 
inside information as “information that is not publicly known and is only available to 
                                               
1859 Chapter 1, What is Corporate Insider Trading? PP. 2.  
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corporate insiders and others who are bound by confidentiality duty where the disclosure 
of such information would have materially affected the market price of the traded 
stock.”1860 This chapter then discusses the legal and economic debate about whether 
corporate insider trading should be regulated. It concludes that a stronger reason to regulate 
corporate insider trading is the unfairness attached to allowing insiders to trade without any 
restrictions. Thus, corporate insiders should be deprived of the opportunity to personally 
benefit based on inside information when they are under a duty to share the profits from 
public disclosure of the information with the shareholders.1861   
The body of the dissertation has three chapters: Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Chapters 2 
and 3 are devoted to determining and assessing the regulations of corporate insider trading 
in the United and Saudi Arabia. Chapter 4 compares the U.S. and Saudi Arabian corporate 
insider trading regulations with more focus on the practicability of the two countries’ laws.  
The same basic questions are asked in Chapter 2 concerning U.S. regulations and 
Chapter 3 concerning Saudi Arabian regulations. The questions are (1) What it is the legal 
status of corporate insiders? (2) What are the rules and regulations that govern legal 
corporate insider trading? and (3) What are the regulations governing illegal corporate 
insider trading and when may corporate insiders be liable? 
The first parts of Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the question of the legal status of 
corporate insiders to clarify the importance of corporate insiders’ position and to justify the 
two countries’ securities regulations’ approach to regulate corporate insider trading. In 
particular, part one of Chapter 2 discusses the legal status of corporate insiders in the United 
States under corporate state law. It reveals that corporate directors, officers, and to some 
                                               
1860 Id.  
1861 See supra note 77-80 and accompanying text. 
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extent large shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the shareholders. 
While this part finds that there is no inclusive definition of when a fiduciary relationship is 
established, the analysis of this issue suggests that a fiduciary relationship is established 
when one person (fiduciary) is entrusted by another person (principal) and where the 
principal relies on the fiduciary to act in good faith and for the best interest of the principal 
and to refrain from conflict-of-interest conduct including misusing confidential 
information for personal benefit unless informed consent is given by the principal. Part 1 
of Chapter 3 discusses the same question for Saudi Arabian regulations and shows that 
corporate directors and officers are subject to a fiduciary duty. A fiduciary includes “any 
person who is in possession of another’s property based on the authorization from its owner 
or by law.”1862 Corporate directors and managers are under a duty to act within their agency 
authorization and refrain from acts involving favoritism unless specific consent is given.  
The analysis of the fiduciary principle in the two countries’ laws shows that this 
principle is well-established and developed in the United States whether through common 
law judges or by legal scholars. The concept has been developed even further at the federal 
level under the law of illegal corporate insider trading where the breach of a fiduciary that 
constitutes non-disclosure of material information in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security is recognized as a fraud actionable under federal securities laws. However, 
the analysis of the fiduciary concept in Saudi Arabia shows that even though Saudi Arabian 
law, particularly Islamic law, has recognized the fiduciary principle upon corporate insiders 
and other fiduciaries, the concept of fiduciary duty is still relatively new in terms of its use 
                                               
1862 See supra note 1264 and accompanying text. 
 401 
 
in regulations or governmental enforcement or even in terms of shareholders’ awareness 
about their right to hold directors accountable for their breach of fiduciary duty.  
The second parts of Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the regulations directly governing 
legal corporate insider trading. Part 2 of Chapter 2 discusses Section 16 of the SEA, which 
is considered the sole statutory provision within the U.S. securities laws that expressly 
governs corporate insider trading. In particular, this part analyzes the reporting 
requirements imposed upon corporate insiders, under Section 16(a), and the private civil 
liability on corporate insiders from gaining short-swing profits resulting from the purchase 
and sale or sale and purchase of the issuer equity security within a six-month period, under 
Section 16(b). This part also shows that corporate insiders under Section 16 are the 
directors, senior officers, and large shareholders who are the beneficial owners of more 
than 10 percent of the issuer’s equity security. Corporate insiders are required to disclose 
once they become subject to the rule of this section, and at the end of the second business 
day following the execution of a transaction that results in a change of beneficial 
ownership. By 45 days from the end of the issuer’s fiscal year, they are also required to 
disclose all trading transactions that were not disclosed or exempted from disclosure. 
Congress’ intent in issuing a private cause of action to the issuer to seek disgorgement of 
the ill-gotten gains of short-swing profits was to prevent corporate insiders from misusing 
their trust position by mishandling confidential information for trading on speculative 
transactions. However, Section 16 does not prohibit corporate insiders from trading on the 
basis of inside information. 
Part 2 of Chapter 3 examines the Saudi Arabian regulations that govern legal 
corporate insider trading. The analysis of this part reveals that Saudi Arabia requires public 
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disclosure of securities ownership and trading transactions of corporate insiders, under 
Articles (68) of the ROSCO and (33) of the LR of 2017. Corporate insiders who are subject 
to public disclosure are directors, senior executives, and substantial shareholders who own 
or have interest in five percent or more of the issuer’s equity security. Corporate insiders 
are required to disclose once they are in such a capacity, and by the end of the third business 
day following the date of the execution of a transaction that results in a change of ownership 
percentage. Within three months following the end of the fiscal year of the issuer, they are 
also required to disclose their securities ownership and trading transactions during the 
previous year in the board of director’s report. However, the Saudi regulations do not have 
a similar provision to Section 16(b) of the SEA. The Saudi Arabian regulations impose a 
different method to prevent corporate insiders from trading at a time they are more likely 
to be aware of inside information. The regulations impose lock-up periods that prohibit 
corporate insiders from trading on the issuer’s stock during the 15 days before the end of 
the financial quarter of the issuer until the announcement of the quarterly report and 30 
days preceding the end of the fiscal year of the issuer until the public disclosure of the 
annual report.  
The analysis of the public disclosure requirement imposed upon corporate insiders 
reveals that both regulations have focused in the definition of corporate insiders upon the 
ability to control the vote or the power to direct the vote of issuer’s stock and the stock that 
is owned indirectly by corporate insiders by having an interest in such stock. In addition, 
the analysis shows that although public disclosure of the trading transactions of corporate 
insiders serves as fair notice to the public that a corporate insider is trading and that it will 
help investors act based on such knowledge, this dissertation argues that the third-day 
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period available to corporate insiders to disclose may not serve the objective of requiring 
public disclosure. The insider still has three days to trade anonymously and gain profits 
that they may not have gained if they had disclosed before or simultaneously with their 
trading transactions. This delayed time of disclosure may add little benefit to public 
investors.1863  
The third parts of Chapters 2 and 3 examine the regulations of illegal corporate 
insider trading in the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Part 3 of Chapter 2 examines U.S. illegal 
corporate insider trading by answering three questions: (1) Who is subject to the 
prohibition? (2) What does material non-public information mean? and (3) What is the 
requisite state of mind? This part shows that the prohibition of trading on material non-
public information is not regulated by express statutory provisions. The law that prohibits 
this illegal trade is mostly a judge-made law based on the interpretation of the broad 
language of Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 10b-5 that prohibits the use of any deceptive 
or manipulative device in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.1864 This 
examination of the U.S. illegal corporate insider trading law reveals that the reach of the 
prohibition goes beyond Section 16 corporate insiders. However, the case-law and SEC 
rules have restricted the reach of the prohibition to persons bound by a fiduciary-like duty 
of trust and confidence either owed to the other party in a security transaction (classical 
theory) or to the source of the information (misappropriation theory). This includes 
                                               
1863 See supra notes 1376-86 and accompanying text.  
1864 The SEC has issued Rule 14e-3 promulgated under Section 14(e) of the SEA to regulate expressly the 
trading on material non-public information relating to a tender offer. This prohibition covers any person in 
possession of material nonpublic information acquired directly or indirectly from the offeror, the target 
company, or any person acting in behalf of the offeror or the target company. However, this rule is limited 
to information related a tender offer. For more discussion about this rule, see supra notes 646-59, 861-880, 
and 1092-1109 and accompanying text.  
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classical corporate insiders, family members, employees, and friends who are entrusted to 
keep material non-public information confidential.1865 This part also reveals that federal 
courts developed a special test for finding liability against tipping by insiders and trading 
by tippees who do not owe an original duty of trust and confidence. This test restricts the 
liability of tipping to situations involving disclosing material non-public information in a 
breach of corporate insiders’ fiduciary duty for personal benefit and the tippee knows or 
has reason to know that the disclosure of the insider was in a breach of his/her fiduciary-
like duty of trust and confidence for personal benefit. The recent development of 
tipper/tippee liability has focused on whether disclosure in the form of a gift to anyone 
would suffice for the personal benefit test. The analysis of this issue reveals that although 
the recent Supreme Court’s decision in Salman does not expressly comment on this 
argument, in 2017, the Second Circuit, in Martoma, found the logic of Salman holds: that 
the disclosure of material non-public information can be in the form of a gift to anyone 
and, therefore, suffices for the personal benefit test where it is not necessary that the parties 
share a personal relationship. The Second Circuit found that the disclosure can be made as 
a gift when the disclosure is made with the expectation that the tippee would trade. This 
part also shows that the definition of material non-public information was developed based 
on case-law to mean any information that has been disclosed or is known by the public 
where its disclosure would be considered by a reasonable investor to have significantly 
changed the total mix of publicly available information. This part also discusses the 
requisite state of mind for finding liability of illegal corporate insider trading. The analysis 
                                               
1865 See the discussion about the SEC’s Rule 10b5-2, supra notes 629-45 and accompanying text. See also a 
recent judicial development that attempted to find liability based on the deceptive acquisition of material 
non-public information, supra notes 660-83 and accompanying text.  
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of this element reveals that while the federal courts have provided inconsistent opinions, 
the SEC has issued Rule 10b5-1 to resolve this debate by triggering the liability based on 
whether or not the insider is aware of material non-public information when he/she 
conducts the trade. The analysis of this part shows that although the limit between legal 
and illegal corporate insider trading is still uncertain, the current law is far more certain 
than previously. This part discusses that a corporate insider trading can trade legally when: 
(1) the trade is based on public information and personal assessment or sophisticated 
knowledge of the insider when the insider is not aware of material non-public information; 
and (2) when the trade is made in accordance with a previously written trading plan even 
though the insider becomes aware of material non-public information at the time of the 
trade.   
Part 3 of Chapter 3 discusses Saudi Arabian illegal corporate insider trading 
regulations by answering the same questions discussed under the U.S. law. The analysis of 
the Saudi Arabian regulations shows that it regulates the prohibition under Article (50) of 
the CML which was defined by the CMA within the MCR. This part reveals that the theory 
of prohibiting corporate insider trading is broad and general and is based on the parity of 
equal access to information. The prohibition covers traditional corporate insiders and 
others who are considered under the insider status by obtaining inside information through 
a family, business, or contractual relationship. The prohibition also covers corporate 
outsiders who receive inside information and trade while knowing that the information is 
inside information. This part shows that inside information is defined by Article (50) of the 
CML. It covers information related to a traded security that has not been disclosed to the 
public or is not available otherwise, and its disclosure to the general public would 
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significantly affect the price or value of the related security.  This dissertation argues that 
the Saudi Arabian regulations suffer from uncertainty in several aspects, and the boundaries 
between legal and illegal trading can be difficult to define in some scenarios. First, it is 
uncertain that legitimate reasons to trade including trading pursuant to written trading plans 
can shield a corporate insider from liability when the trade is made when the insider could 
have been aware of inside information. Second, it is unclear and unsolved whether a 
corporate insider, to be held liable for disclosing inside information, must disclose the 
information to a corporate outsider with the expectation that the recipient will trade in the 
information. The third issue that the analysis reveals that is obscure is whether a corporate 
outsider is required to be held liable if the inside information is received directly or 
indirectly from an insider. This part concludes that although the distinction between legal 
and illegal corporate insider trading is not clarified, corporate insider trading is legal when 
the trade is made at a time the insider is not aware of inside information and not in a lock-
up period. The corporate insider should take some precautions to shield him/herself from 
liability, including reaching out to the management to ascertain whether he/she is allowed 
to trade. If there is uncertainty, the insider should refrain from trading.   
The fourth parts of Chapters 2 and 3 examine the governmental enforcement of 
illegal corporate insider trading prohibition. Part 4 of Chapter 2 discusses the U.S. 
governmental enforcement of the prohibition. The discussion reveals that the violation of 
the prohibition can result in criminal or civil liability or both. The violation must be 
intentional where negligent violations are not subject to the prohibition. This part shows 
that the probability of facing civil liability for violating the prohibition is much higher than 
criminal liability mainly because the standard of proof is lower in civil proceedings than in 
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criminal lawsuits.  This part also reveals that the elements of conduct of illegal corporate 
insider trading can be proven by circumstantial evidence. This part reports that the major 
civil penalty against violators of the prohibition is a civil monetary penalty of up to three 
times the amount of ill-gotten gain or loss avoided from the transaction. In addition, the 
major criminal sanctions include a fine not exceeding $ 5 million for natural persons and 
imprisonment of more than 20 years. The U.S. regulations also grant contemporaneous 
traders the right to seek damages against violators of the prohibition of trading on material 
non-public information.  
Part 4 of Chapter 3 discusses the Saudi Arabian governmental enforcement of the 
prohibition of illegal insider trading. This part reveals that the violation is considered a 
crime punishable by the highest sanctions available in the CML. This part shows that the 
standard of proof is flexible where the crime is proven through direct and circumstantial 
evidence. The major available sanctions against the violation of the prohibition are a ban 
from working as a director or officer for a listed company for a certain time, disgorgement 
of ill-gotten gains, a monetary fine not exceeding $26,666, and a prison term up to five 
years. The analysis of the government enforcement shows that the consequences of being 
caught for trading on inside information is more severe in the United States than in Saudi 
Arabia.  
Chapter 4 is a comparative analysis between the U.S. and Saudi Arabian corporate 
insider trading regulations. A hypothetical case involving several persons, insiders and 
outsiders, and various circumstances is the basis for a comparison of how each country 
would apply the regulations. The result of the comparison reveals that the Saudi Arabian 
regulations have the advantage in that Saudi Arabia has regulated corporate insider trading 
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through written provisions describing the prohibited conduct. However, the analysis also 
reveals that the Saudi Arabian regulations suffer from uncertainty and gaps. The analysis 
shows that the Saudi Arabian regulations contain a different standard of liability between 
Article (50) of the CML and the CMA’s articles in the MCR, which has made the law 
obscure. In contrast, although the U.S. prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading lacks 
a statutory provision, the certainty and the protection from unwarranted liability is far 
greater than Saudi Arabian regulations. In particular, the U.S. regulations grant corporate 
insiders an affirmative defense against liability when their trading is based on a written 
trading plan. The regulations do not cover negligent disclosure of inside information, and 
tippees liability hinges on whether the tippee knows or has reason to know that the 
information was disclosed directly or indirectly by an insider in breach of his/her fiduciary 
duty for personal benefit. The analysis shows that Saudi Arabian regulations do not have a 
parallel provision similar to the U.S. that grants an affirmative defense for insiders when 
they trade based on written trading plans made at a time when they are not aware of inside 
information. 
Recommendations 
 
Examining the U.S. and Saudi Arabian regulations and comparing the two 
countries’ regulations of corporate insider trading reveals important results that illustrate 
the need to reform Saudi Arabian regulations. This section proposes recommendations that 
aim to provide greater certainty in the Saudi Arabian regulations.  
a. Adding a New Article Similar to Rule 10b5-1(c) 
This dissertation recommends that the CMA adopt a new article that should be 
included in the MCR that contains parallel language to Rule 10b5-1(c) regarding written a 
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trading plan defense.1866 Corporate insiders are always presumed to be in possession of 
confidential information. However, premising illegal corporate insider trading liability on 
a possession standard imposes an unwarranted burden upon corporate insiders and it may 
discourage them from trading. The goal of the prohibition is not to discourage insiders from 
trading but to prevent them from trading based on inside information. Therefore, granting 
corporate insiders an affirmative defense when the trade is made pursuant to a written 
trading plan, contract, or instruction to sell or purchase the related security made before the 
insider becomes aware of inside information will encourage corporate insiders to trade in 
their companies’ stock without being vulnerable to the unwarranted risk of liability.1867   
b. Alternative Interpretation to the Liability of Disclosing Inside Information 
and Trading by Outsider Recipients.  
 
The second recommendation is that the CMA should adopt the apparent 
interpretation of Article (50)(a) regarding the prohibition of disclosing inside information 
where the unlawful disclosure is predicated on the knowledge or at least the expectation 
that the recipient will trade on the information.1868 The concern of the prohibition is that 
corporate insiders shall not selectively disclose inside information as it is their own 
property with the goal of facilitating others’ trades. Adopting this proposal would provide 
more certainty to the law in that it would only prohibits intentional acts aimed to disrupt 
equal access to information by giving unfair informational advantage to some outsiders 
                                               
1866 For more discussion about Rule 10b5-1(c), see supra notes 1077-91 and accompanying text. 
1867 See id.  
1868 See supra notes 1530-47 and accompanying text. 
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over public investors. However, negligent disclosure should not be a basis for criminal 
liability where the insider is acting with no culpable intent to violate the law.1869  
Regarding the liability of outsider recipients of inside information, this dissertation 
recommends that the CMA reinterpret the phrase “another person” under Article (6)(b) of 
the MCR.1870 The new interpretation of the phrase “another person” should mean an insider 
or another person who receives the information from an insider. Liability should arise when 
the outsider recipient obtains inside information directly from an insider or indirectly 
through other persons who originally obtained the information from an insider. In addition, 
the outsider recipient is aware that the information is disclosed improperly by the insider. 
This interpretation matches the apparent language of Article (50)(b) of the CML. This 
proposed interpretation would bring greater certainty to the prohibition so public investors 
would not be vulnerable to criminal liability when they trade on information thought to 
have originated from rumors or circulated news. In addition, the restriction of the broad 
language of Article (6)(b) of the MCR would ensure that only people who know that they 
are acting on improper and selected disclosure are punished. Investors acting on negligent 
or innocent intent shall be out of the scope of criminal liability.1871 
c. Requiring Corporate Insiders to Publicly Disclose their Trading Activities at 
the Same Time of their Trade.  
 
The final recommendation is that the CMA should amend its current regulation of 
the ROSCOS, Article (68), to require corporate insiders including directors and senior 
                                               
1869 This recommendation is derived from the U.S. recent development of tipper/tippee liability decided by 
the Second Circuit, in Martoma, and the comments of Professor Donald Langevoort. See supra notes 813-
16 and accompanying text. 
1870 MCR, supra note 156, art. 6(b). See supra note 1551-93 and accompanying text. 
1871 For more discussion, see supra notes 1627-32 and accompanying text. 
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executives, to file a report with the CMA or the Exchange disclosing their intent to trade 
in the company’s stock at the same time of their trades.1872 This proposal would help foster 
transparency and the application of the policy of public disclosure that the CML has sought 
to apply in the Saudi stock market. Public investors would be given the opportunity to 
respond to the insider’s trade in advance manner by reevaluating their decision of whether 
to buy or sell the company’s stock based on the already available public information and 
the new development regarding the insider’s report to trade. This proposal would also will 
reduce corporate insiders’ profits from trading on inside information since the public 
investors would be in a better position to react to the insider’s trade.1873 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The objectives of this dissertation are to answer three general questions: what are 
the regulations of corporate insider trading in the United States and Saudi Arabia? Are they 
similar or different? and How the Saudi Arabian regulations could benefit from the United 
States’ regulations? Since no previous study has systematically examined and compared 
these two countries’ regulations, this dissertation is an important contribution to the extant 
literature in three aspects. First, to the best of the student’s knowledge, this dissertation is 
the first dissertation to study the subject of corporate insider trading in Saudi Arabia. 
Second, this dissertation provides a considerable amount of data and discussions about the 
regulatory provisions, judicial analyses, and the CMA’s interpretations including practical 
issues that are addressed for the first time in a dissertation. While the dissertation describes 
the regulations of corporate insider trading in Saudi Arabia, the student has attempted to 
find answers for issues that emerged in the research as unclear or ambiguous in Saudi 
                                               
1872 See supra notes 1367-80 and accompanying text.  
1873 This recommendation is derived from Professor Jesse M. Fried. See Supra notes 1378-79.  
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Arabian regulations. For example, could corporate insiders could avoid be liable for trading 
while in possession of inside information when their trades were not motivated by the 
possession of such information? Could they be held liable for disclosing inside information 
even though their disclosure was not for the purpose of facilitating the recipient’s trades? 
Could corporate outsiders be held liable if they trade on inside information obtained from 
anyone including information obtained inadvertently from an insider?  
This dissertation also addresses the issue of public disclosure of corporate insiders’ 
securities ownership and trading transactions in light of the concern of trading on inside 
information by corporate insiders and how the three days wait after public disclosure policy 
may hinder to the effort of combating illegal corporate insider trading in Saudi Arabia. In 
addition to addressing the practical issues that were discussed for the first time, this 
dissertation offers a theoretical contribution to the literature by endeavoring to define the 
legal status of corporate insiders in Saudi Arabia and why they are regulated by securities 
regulations.  
Another significant contribution of this dissertation is in regard to the U.S. 
corporate insider trading regulations. While the U.S. illegal corporate insider trading law 
is still governed by case-law not by express statutory provisions, this dissertation provides 
an important contribution to the current body of the literature. It specifically describes the 
development of the law of illegal corporate insider trading in the United States before and 
after the enactment of the securities laws in the 1930s until the recent development of the 
law regarding the tipper/tippee liability, by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Salman. 
In addition, this dissertation not only determines the current status of the law but also 
attempts to explain the justification of the law. 
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The third and most significant contribution of this dissertation comes from the 
findings of the comparative analysis between the Saudi Arabian and U.S. corporate insider 
trading regulations. It is the first dissertation to compare between the two countries’ 
regulations and thus fills a significant gap in legal literature. The use of the hypothetical 
case to compare between Saudi Arabian and U.S. regulations shows the uniqueness of this 
dissertation. The use of a  hypothetical case has been employed to illustrate when corporate 
insiders can trade legally and when they are prohibited from trading under each country’s 
regulations and to highlight the similarities and differences between the two countries’ 
regulations. The dissertation uses the results of the comparative analysis to point out to the 
weaknesses and gaps found in the Saudi Arabian regulations and to make recommendations 
to reform the Saudi Arabian regulations. This dissertation hopes that the CMA and judges 
in Saudi Arabia can benefit from this comparative analysis and follow the 
recommendations to reform the current regulations so they are more certain and to avoid 
unwarranted conflicting interpretations. 
Acknowledgement of Limitations and the Need for Further 
Research  
 
Corporate insider trading is a broad subject. This dissertation has focused on 
describing and determining the two countries’ regulations of corporate insider trading by 
answering three specific questions: What is the legal status of corporate insiders and why 
are they regulated by securities regulations? and What are the regulations governing legal 
corporate insider trading? and What are the regulations governing illegal corporate insider 
trading? The lack of previous research that compares the Saudi Arabian regulations with 
the U.S. regulations necessitated the student to focus more on explaining the foundation 
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and the background of the two countries’ regulations of corporate insider trading which 
affects the dissertation’s length. The focus of the comparative analysis conducted on the 
two countries’ regulations was on the legal outcome from the application of each country’s 
regulations and how the uncertainty and contradictory interpretations founded in Saudi 
Arabia could be resolved by benefiting from the U.S. regulations. However, due to the 
restrictions of time and limited resources, the student did not address several issues that 
demand closer examination and further research. First, the dissertation is restricted to only 
address the Saudi Arabian and U.S. regulations. Therefore, the findings of this dissertation 
are solely focus on about the differences and similarities between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States. In addition, the recommendations proposed to reform the Saudi Arabian 
regulations are proposed based on this understanding. Further research may be conducted 
to compare the Saudi Arabian regulations with other countries’ regulations. 
The dissertation has not discussed the issue of the differences of the composition 
of the stock markets in Saudi Arabia and the United States and how these differences can 
impact the broadness or limitations of corporate insider trading regulations. Although the 
dissertation has described the ownership structure in the Saudi stock market, the 
dissertation has not discussed the ownership structure in the United States nor whom are 
targeted or are disadvantaged by the regulations whether in Saudi Arabia or the United 
States. For instance, this dissertation has not discussed the effect of allowing citizens of the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to trade on stocks listed in the Saudi stock 
market1874 or the impact of the recent opening of the Saudi stock sarket to foreign investors 
                                               
1874 See Capital Market Authority, Qarar Majilis Hayyat Al-Suwq Al-Malia Bishan Tatbiq Al-Musawat Al-
Attama Bayn Muatinia Dual Majils Altawawn fi Majal Tamlik Al-Ashum Wa Tadawuliha [The decision of 
the Board of the Capital Market Authority regarding the application of complete equality between the 
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to directly own and trade securities.1875 The issue herein is whether the CMA has taken the 
right direction by broadening the scope of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider 
trading because of the current stock market composition and the absence of judicial 
mechanisms that could fill the gap in the statutes. In particular, there is no stare decisis in 
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, further research can be conducted to investigate whether the 
composition of the Saudi stock market in comparison to the United States and the absence 
of judicial mechanisms to fill any legal gaps, such as making binding precedents as in the 
United States judicial system, could it suggest that the CMA is right by making the 
regulations too broad to avoid any legal gaps?  
Although the dissertation has partially covered the subject of the governmental 
enforcement of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading, it has not fully addressed 
the ability of the CMA, compared to the SEC, to enforce the law. The possibility of tracking 
down violations of illegal corporate insider trading and the foreseeability of charging 
violators in light of the limited enforcement personnel and limited resources for 
enforcement. Therefore, further research is needed to focus on studying the governmental 
enforcement of the prohibition of illegal corporate insider trading in Saudi Arabian with a 
comparative study with the United States.  
The subject of governmental enforcement of illegal corporate insider trading has 
another dimension that the dissertation has not addressed—the extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to enforce the regulations of illegal corporate insider trading. This issue is crucial to both 
                                               
citizens of the GCC countries in the field of securities ownership and trading activities], Sep 24, 2007. 
https://cma.org.sa/Market/NEWS/Pages/CMA_N343.aspx.  
1875 Ahmed Al Omran & Nikhil Lohade, Saudi Arabia to Open Stock Market to Foreign Investors on June 
15, The Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-to-open-stock-
market-to-foreign-investors-on-june-15-1429191506. Arab News, We Will Encourage more Foreign 
Investors this year, Says Saudi Capital Market Authority Head, Oct 2, 2017, 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/1170861/saudi-arabia.  
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countries. For example, is it possible to enfore local regulations of illegal corporate insider 
trading against investors who trade on inside information misappropriated outside the 
territory of the country? In addition, how could the public prosecution use a legal 
mechanism to indict and adjudicated foreign investors trading unlawfully based on inside 
information. This issue is a demanding issue for further research. In particular, after the 
CMA has allowed foreign investors to directly trade in listed companies’ stock in Saudi 
Arabia, possible illegal corporate insider trading can occur by obtaining inside information 
in the United States and trading in Saudi Arabia or the opposite. In addition, further 
research can address the possibility that the CMA and SEC can have a cooperation 
agreement to enforce their local laws against violators of the prohibition of illegal corporate 
insider trading. Therefore, the investigation and information could be shared between the 
two regulatory authorities regarding civil and criminal investigations and lawsuits.  
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